Integrated Review 'call for evidence' - Is Trident To Be Scrapped?

The Cabinet Office has published a ‘call for evidence’ to support the Integrated Security Review. This is a chance for people to submit evidence to offer their views on some of the challenges facing UK national security priorities and try to help shape the focus of the review authors on what the future could hold.

The call for evidence is accompanied by a four page document setting out both the context that the review is operating in, and also some of the questions that need to be addressed. It is a fascinating read as an insight into the decision making process, and the likely direction of travel that will result.

For starters it is telling that the UK Government sees the future as being one of a global order where climate change, economic challenge and technological change drive much of the worlds problems. The document talks of the challenges around increased poverty, economic problems and how corporations will have GDP bigger than countries – making them highly credible actors.

 At the same time it recognises that the world is getting more complex, that the risk of state on state conflict is growing and that there is a pivot towards Asia as a dominant economic centre of attention. It notes that within the next few years 80% of the worlds poorest population are likely to live in fragile states.

This headmark vision is compelling in that it tells us that the likely future laydown and structure of UK national security will be built around trying to tackle very complex problems that will require the whole of government to respond.  In other words, while the armed forces will have a place in this response, so too will development, finance, economic trade and soft power and diplomacy – the future is not going to be one of the armed forces conducting national security in isolation.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

It is reassuring to see that the vision encompasses the UK as a predominantly global player, but it will be interesting to see how the vision of a world dominated by great power rivalry sits – will this be a review where the UK identifies that it has to choose sides, and what matters more – is it economic growth or hard military power?

In identifying that the future global balance of power is likely to lie in Asia, the Review offers the UK an intriguing option. For the first time since WW2 the balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic is arguably of less significance than the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region – but for the UK, active participation in military issues moves from all but mandatory forced interest to a far more discretionary one.

The UK enjoys military presence in Asia (albeit in a limited way), and continues to retain the reach to get there. But does this review herald a new look at whether the UK sees itself as a global military power able to influence, or will it instead call for investment in other areas instead as a way of securing influence and outcomes amenable to UK interests?

This is a fascinating policy decision to make because it fundamentally changes how the UK could look at its national security posture. If a decision is taken to engage in the Asia Pacific region in a way that leverages existing diplomatic, economic, aid and other assets, then this could beg the question ‘what does the UK need globally deployable armed forces for’?

As a non-resident power, other than the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and the Brunei garrison there is no real military commitment to the region. This gives planners the luxury of time to decide if they want to commit militarily to the region, or if in future the UK sees its interests as being best served in a non military way out there.

The paper makes several assumptions about what it wants the headline goals of UK policy to be:

● a more resilient UK: open from a position of strength;

● a secure, stable and prosperous Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood, which enables

our security and prosperity at home;

● a world order in which open societies and economies flourish;

● a more resilient world, well on the path to net zero by 2050;

● strong science, technology & data capabilities; and

● a reformed and refocused approach to defence underpinning all of the above

It is telling that all of these do not call for investment in any specific military capability, but seem to emphasise some trends though. It seems likely that resilience in the home base will be a key area of interest – for example what role could the armed forces play in future, based on COVID and other activities.

The call for secure stable Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood would seem to emphasise the importance of NATO at the heart of UK defence, although no suggestions are made about what role the UK will play in NATO and what form it may take.

The most telling line is that of ‘reformed and refocused approach to Defence’ – this single line is powerful. Reformed implies major change is coming, potentially to both structures and people, and also equipment. Refocused implies stepping away from some tasks to look at others instead.

It is likely then that whatever the final review settles on, the structure of the UK forces is likely to change significantly as a result of this review. The emphasis on the role of resilience, NATO security, science, climate change and so on does not instinctively suggest that we will see a military that looks like it does now.

Instead we are likely to see armed forces that will look very different in concept, and focused far more on issues that perhaps at the moment do not attract much interest or attention. What will be particularly interesting will be to see where ‘investment’ versus ‘disinvestment’ decisions are made, and what of the current force structures are seen as no longer offering the right outcome for Defence.

This is not the time to play Fantasy Fleets, but it is a time to look more widely at the direction the Government wants to move in and realise that the Armed Forces are likely to face very substantial changes soon.

The questions posed as a call for evidence also show an insight into where these priorities may lie –

What are the key opportunities, challenges, threats and vulnerabilities facing the UK now?

● What are the key global and domestic trends affecting UK international policy and national security out to 2030, and how should the government prioritise its efforts in response to these?

● What are the key steps the UK should take to maximise its resilience to natural hazards and malicious threats? How can we build a whole of society approach to tackle these challenges?

● What are the most effective ways for the UK to build alliances and soft power?

● What changes are needed to Defence so that it can underpin the UK’s security and respond to the challenges and opportunities we face? (Submissions focusing on the changing character of warfare, broader concepts of deterrence, technological advantage and the role of the Armed Forces in building national resilience are particularly welcome.)

● How should the UK change its governance of international policy and national security in order to seize future opportunities and meet future challenges?

● What lessons can we learn from the UK’s international delivery over the past 5 years? Which are the key successes we should look to develop and build on, and where could we learn from things that didn’t go well?

● How should UK systems and capabilities be reformed to improve the development and delivery of national strategy?

All of these questions focus on much deeper existential questions than ‘shall we have a deployable division’ or ‘should we put a 76mm gun on a Batch 2 River Class’. They really cut to the heart of what the UK government sees as its key security concerns – namely a rapidly changing world, a need to focus on governance, alliances, soft power and embracing new and emerging threats and what can all of government do to respond to them?

The likely outcome is a review which pushes a vision of national security that some may find uncomfortable. It will likely focus far less on force levels than it will on outputs, and focus as much on beefing up areas that work well – for example soft power and diplomacy as it does about reducing emphasis on other areas that seem harder to justify (all three services may be vulnerable in different ways).

The end result could have wide reaching ramifications and be felt for decades in the same way as the Sandys Review of 57 or the 68 Defence Review. Whether it ends up as a genuine policy shift or merely an effort to tighten budgets in the manner of the 81 review remain to be seen.

It could well be a concerning time for industry trying to work out what to make of this all – a review conducted at a time of unparalleled economic misery, which needs to cut spending, review commitments and make real changes to security is unlikely to be positive for all parts of the defence and security industry. Will we see a move to stepping away from the traditional support for some areas, versus a stepping up of support to others?

What is particularly notable is the lack of any mention of the nuclear deterrent or the concept of nuclear deterrence versus ‘wider deterrence’. Does this mean that deterrence is changing, and is the CASD vulnerable to no longer being relevant? Or is it merely the case that Trident is off the table and will not be covered by the scope of the review?

This is perhaps the biggest and most tantalising question that remains unanswered thus far – is the nuclear deterrent safe, or faced with the cost of renewing Trident,  is unilateral nuclear disarmament suddenly a genuine option in the review?

Will the new threats and challenges mean that cyber and broader deterrence is more important than nuclear deterrence – such a move would be bold, challenging and potentially unthinkable even a few months ago, but with COVID utterly changing the global order, suddenly everything seems to be on the table in a way never before thought possible. Who knows if Trident will survive?

While at the commencement of the Review it was hinted that both Trident and the wider commitment to GDP based expenditure and aid were 'off the table', that was many months ago and what feels like a lifetime before COVID.

While it isn't clear if the assumption that they are off the table has changed, it does feel somewhat disjointed to do a 'all areas' defence review and rule out wide chunks of it - for example the Trident commitment covers not only the submarines themselves, but then leads to a set of significant assumptions and force structure decisions to cover the Trident mission (for example strategic comms, ASW capabilities, MCMV capabilities and certain other niche assets). To keep them 'off the table' means that the balance of cuts will fall disproportionately on other areas instead.

Whether the review work has uncovered this and gently forced the issue back to the surface, or if it remains the case that 'Trident is not for cutting' is not entirely clear right now - particularly not on reading this document.

What is also left unsaid is that given the recent recession and fall in GDP, suddenly a commitment to 2% of GDP on defence looks a lot smaller than it did just a few months ago - is the new battle to be cuts to reach 2% or a rearguard to make it 3%? 

Whatever happens, we are in for an intriguing few months. If you have thoughts to offer on the review then the Cabinet Office wants to hear from you (although it recommends that you keep submissions to 500 words per question), and all replies can be requested via FOI. Please send any submissions to IRcallforevidence@cabinetoffice.gov.uk by 11 September.

In a year when everything seems to be changing, this review could be the one that has the biggest and most far reaching consequences for UK defence in decades. We are in for a fascinating time!