More Ships than Admirals? Thoughts on the cull to RN 2* Numbers

The First Sea Lord has confirmed that the Royal Navy will be reducing the number of Admirals it has in the Service, scrapping several 2* posts and seeing a drop to 1* roles instead. This is part of a wider reorganisation that will see more staff pulled away from NCHQ (fleet HQ) as the RN looks to reduce the number of Admirals it has.

The tired cliché of ‘more admirals than ships’ has been trotted out with tedious regularity for many years. There is no direct link between ship numbers and senior officers, and those who trot out this line forget that the RN has to fill a great many purple roles too, providing senior staff for other jobs.

On paper the RN usually has somewhere between 30-40 Admirals/Generals (of 2* rank and above). 

Of these, some 15 are usually in the direct line of Naval interest, filling roles that would usually form part of the Admiralty Board. So, in corporate terms, you’ve got a combination of senior heads who are responsible for HR, engineering, logistics, operations and procurement, as well as a few other specialists.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The reality is that since the end of the Cold War the RN has been pretty ruthless at trimming down senior numbers – in 1993 there were no less than four x 4* Admiral slots in the RN chain (1SL, 2SL, CINCNAVHOME and CINCFLEET). Today there is just one RN fixed 4* slot – namely the First Sea Lord post.

Other posts have been trimmed too – for example the move to reducing command structures under Levene saw the CINCFLEET role move from 4* to a 3* role, with the deputy 3* post downgraded too. This is mirrored elsewhere, as posts move around and get downgraded regularly.

While people like to look at the ships metric, this is arguably an unhelpful focus as the RN is about a lot more than just ships. When you add in the various other functions like airpower, the Royal Marines, shore establishments, NATO posts and the like, the RN is actually an incredible diverse organisation that has interests and responsibilities across a range of areas. That’s not to say ship numbers don’t matter, but that they are just part of what the modern Naval Service delivers – this is in addition to the many ‘purple’ jobs that need filling too across Defence.

With a force of some 30,000 regulars, plus RFA, Reservists and Civilians too on top of this, the RN has about 30-40 Admirals in total. This is, roughly 0.1% of its overall headcount. When you add in the roughly 80 Commodores (1*) and 220 Captains (OF5), you still realise that the five most senior ranks in the Royal Navy account for barely 1% of its overall headcount.

This is a pretty lean figure anyway, particularly compared to many other navies who seem fond of having large senior ranks in roles that often don’t need them. The RN is a really good example of a Navy that manages to stay pretty slim when it comes to rank structures.

It is to be utterly welcomed that the RN does not regard its senior structure as sacrosanct and is willing to review it and drive numbers down – no system should rest on its laurels. But, the move to downgrade some of these roles though is going to raise some interesting challenges.

From a practical perspective the real challenge will be one of driving the empowerment culture to ensure that the new 1* slots are seen as the point where the buck stops. There is perhaps a risk in the RN that in the desire to ‘get top cover’ issues get pushed up to the remaining 2* community members, potentially creating a bottleneck as too many decisions get sent for approval.

It is to be hoped that a truly empowered community emerges which can take decisions without constant upwards reference and which just gets on and does stuff. Creating a culture of ‘wanted to let you know what I’ve done’ not ‘I need to let you know so you can approve what I want to do’ is going to be essential here.

Coupled to this is the need to ensure that the OF5 and above community feel they can take risks and not see their careers end. While the adoption of the so-called ‘blood chit’ system which does not guarantee you a job beyond your current post helps prevent staleness in the senior ranks, it also does run the risk of creating a ‘risk averse’ culture. Would you be prepared to take a potentially difficult decision, mindful of the risk to your future career and the possibility of being out of a job, or is it easier to tow the party line and seek top cover?

There isn’t a right answer to this question, but it poses a wider question about how will the senior figures in the RN adopt a cultural change that permits an empowered risk taking culture where their people feel able to make difficult calls and not fear for their career prospects?

The possible risk of moving to the ‘blood chit’ system would be that in a way it disincentives promotion for merely average officers. While there will always be a 10% or so who excel in rank and merit promotion, and thrive on it,  there will be many more professionally competent individuals who are not going to set the world alight, but who are good at what they do.

If they feel that promotion is a risk too far, for example jumping from Commander to Captain suddenly puts their career at risk, then does this create paradoxically difficult behaviours as the middle tier reduce the scope of their ambition to avoid finding themselves out of a job in their mid 40s?

It will be interesting to see how people in secure well paying SO1 roles can be persuaded to step up and remain credible candidates for selection for promotion rather than reinforcing the desire to coast and avoid the eye of Sauron (sorry, the Appointer). The next few years will be critical as the current cadre of SO1s look to their career prospects and decide whether the risk/reward is too great, or if they prefer professional stability and a stable family life over the risk of being thrashed in a repeat succession of challenging OF5 roles with no certainty of a job every couple of years – the risk must be that those the RN wants to keep don’t want to stay.

The other wider challenge for the RN will be to demonstrate a clear pathway to a career that retains people. Downgrading a role doesn’t just impact the post itself, it also sees a score of posts below it reduced as you need to rerole the staff, and the jobs that people have to do to be professionally qualified to fill the 1 or 2* post.

For example, it may be the case that for a current 2* role, there are two x 1* and three OF5 posts that are linked to it that may now need to be downgraded or revaluated. The challenge is whether people are tempted to remain regardless of the rank, or if they feel that the reduced career prospects (and earning potential) particularly compared to their industry peers or tri-service colleagues makes it worth hanging around.

Talent retention with a reduced career opportunity is going to be particularly challenging for the middle bank of talent who do not enjoy the visibility and support of seniors, but who still have potential and want to promote, yet see their chances slipping away.

In practical terms though, this downgrade sends a very strong message to both the RN and the other Armed Services. It shows that the desire to change, to draw down ranks and really refocus how the RN does its core business is real, and that the RN is serious about changing itself.

It shows that the RN too is prepared to slay sacred cows (for instance scrapping the venerable post of FOST) in pursuit of doing things better. This could well be making things uncomfortable for other services used to larger rank structures and career opportunities – as if the RN can happily scrap posts ahead of a Defence Review, why can’t the other two Services? It will be interesting to see if others follow suit, or if the RN alone goes down this road of reducing its manpower pyramid.

As we look to entering 2020, it is clear that real structural change is being driven from the top of the RN. What matters now is seeing whether the Service embraces it or tries to see it off. But, when coupled with the raft of other changes going through, such as the Carrier entry to service, the arrival of the Carrier Strike Group concept and the move to forward basing, it is clear that much is likely to continue to change over the next 12 months, which will make the Royal Navy a markedly different organisation to what it is now.