Persistence over Presence - The British Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific

Penny Mordaunt has delivered a major keynote speech at the Shangri La dialogue in Singapore, setting out the British Government vision for future engagement in the Far East. This significant speech acts as a timely reminder of the UK’s substantial broader commitment to the region, and also of the current trajectory of UK military engagement across the area.

To some though, the UK presence does not seem enough, too small, too isolated and in stark contrast to the French, who maintain a widespread presence from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. According to an infographic issued this week by the French MOD, there are some 7000 French military personnel based in Djibouti, the UAE, the Indian Ocean and Pacific, supported by around a dozen military vessels and around 40 aircraft and helicopters at any time.

HMS ARGYLL on FPDA Exercises late 2018

0 Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

On paper this sounds a formidable force and led to comments by some Defence authors that it was in marked contrast to the UK approach to the region – in their eyes ‘Paris Understands what presence means’. When backed up by the announcement that the French Government is sending their aircraft carrier ‘Charles De Gaulle’ into the region for exercises, one is left with the impression that compared to the UK, the French military is light years ahead. But is this really the case, and, for that matter, can you even directly contrast the two nations presence and posture?

For starters, there is a considerable difference between the UK and French goals across the region. The French military presence is built based on protection of French sovereignty across a diverse range of overseas territories. Unlike the UK, there was a far less pronounced decolonisation process, with the various colonies being absorbed into the French State. To this day they remain part of France, albeit non self-governing, and there remains independence movements- such as the recent independence referendum in New Caledonia.

This means that the French military presence is built around the protection of sovereignty and national security, such as protection of the often enormous EEZ, and providing support to the French authorities. There are over 1.7 million French nationals encompassed in this area, an enormous footprint of land and maritime space to protect and a diverse range of interests to consider.

What this means is that the French require a reasonable sized military presence in the area in the way that the UK does not. Between the Red Sea and the shores of South America, there are just UK territories – Diego Garcia and the Pitcairn Islands. The total civilian population that may require support is around 50 people.

We should be wary then of assuming that somehow France has an edge on the UK because it has a military presence locally. The reality is the French military presence in the Asia Pacific region is the equivalent of the UK presence in places like the Falkland Islands, Ascension Island, Bermuda, Gibraltar and Cyprus, where a series of forces are in place with varying assets and capabilities to meet the prevailing threat.

For example the French Navy may maintain a dozen ships permanently in the region, but other than two ‘frigates’ (which are essentially OPV’s with a bigger gun and 2 anti-ship missiles and a flight deck ), the rest are primarily OPVs or Antarctic patrol ships. (the fabulous twitter user Engaging Strategy’ has a write up with images of the capability here – he’s also well worth a follow too)

This is not to do down this capability, but it is helpful to remember that this forward deployed force exists to carry out roles like those carried out by HMS CLYDE in the Falklands, or HMS PROTECTOR in Antarctica. Similarly, there are a range of patrol craft in places like Gibraltar to deal with unwelcome visitors too.

There are also more UK owned vessels in region too that do not fly the White Ensign – for example there is a Fishery Protection vessel based in Diego Garcia under contract to the FCO, while the Falkland Islands Government has an armed fishery protection vessel which has apparently used force at least twice.

So, be wary of assuming that the presence of a dozen French warships somehow equates to a presence that the UK cannot match. Rather the French military presence in the Asia Pacific region in many ways is akin to the UK laydown in its own sovereign territories.

It is perhaps useful too to get a sense of context about scale and resources – while the headline figure of some 7000 personnel from the Red Sea to Tahiti may sound impressive, its size is actually barely the same as the UK garrison in Hong Kong, which until the mid 1990s hosted an impressive tri-service garrison of both UK forces and locally enlisted personnel to protect the territory.

This force comprised multiple OPVs (the PEACOCK class), and a considerable air presence including an RAF detachment of Wessex helicopters, and a large resident garrison. There was also local forces, such as the Royal Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force which operated multiple aircraft too.

Yet despite the UK presence there being substantial, it made little difference to UK standing in the wider region – the force was preoccupied with defending Hong Kong, not enhancing UK interests in the area. So, when asking whether presence equals wider capability, remember that the answer is not as clear cut as you may think.

Likewise, it is worth remembering that while France may deploy military capability into the region to protect its sovereign territory, UK deployments can focus primarily on support to allies instead. But, due to the different philosophical approaches embraced by both nations over the years, the French footprint gains more attention due to its permanency, reliance on fixed infrastructure and longer-term outlook – made possible by the very fixed nature of its duties.

By contrast, the UK presence in the same area has been for many years focused far more on short term operational deployments, underpinned by training exercises and ship visits than it has on supporting a substantial garrison. But, were you to look at the typical forces deployed in the region on any given day, a very impressive picture begins to emerge.

In the Middle East the UK has got a substantial naval and air component operating across the region. The major permanent facility in Bahrain is home to several hundred Naval Service personnel supporting the long-term deployment of MCMVs, the RFA ‘BAY’ class mothership and the frigate HMS MONTROSE.These ships alone displace more than the entire French naval force in the whole of the Indo-Pacific region.

This is supported by wider detachments of aircraft that change daily but has seen the UK make use of discreet presence in a variety of areas. Unlike the French there has not been a major public policy commitment to publish how many aircraft may or may not be operating in the area, but Humphrey is certain that the capability that all three services have operated there, including, for example, the RN and RAF have been operating in Oman for many years in a low key and discrete (but publicly confirmable) manner.

In a similar vein, in Africa where the presence of a French garrison in Djibouti is proudly proclaimed, it is easy to look and compare the public UK presence in a negative manner. A quick glance suggests very few UK forces permanently deployed – but in reality, it is more complex than this.

The UK has not had a permanent garrison force in Africa for decades, but to this day it remains one of the busiest continents for the British Army and operational deployments. There are nearly 100 troops deployed in Somalia right now on OP TANGHAM, and several hundred more in South Sudan, while nearly 10,000 troops a year deploy to Kenya, supported by a wide range of capabilities including aviation.

These troops may not be relaxing in a colonial garrison on a permanent deployment spending their days ruminating on liberty, equality and the menage a trois, but they are working incredibly hard to support wider UK national security policy goals.

That sounds flippant, but it is important to understand when trying to look at which power ‘matters’ and understand that it is about more than just having some fancy permanent garrison pictured on a map, and that it is about having persistent capability that is valuable and not just a colonial police force for other Governments.

The UK presence across the wider Indo-Pacific region is actually pretty substantial and includes a variety of fixed facilities, such as access to naval facilities in Bahrain, Diego Garcia and Singapore. It includes a permanent garrison of acclimatised troops in Brunei, and it includes access to a wide range of permanent training areas in Kenya, Oman and Brunei that help support UK military capability.  It may lack the perceived glamour of a sexy powerpoint image that shows bases, command chains and little infographics suggesting numbers, but it does provide real and tangible capability in a credible way.

Why does all of this matter? Well because to some people the UK somehow no longer seems a relevant player because it doesn’t have a fixed set of colonial era garrisons across the region. Whenever you look at an internet ‘Fantasy Fleet’ discussion, there are usually long posts about how the UK needs to establish squadrons of ships in Singapore, with detachments elsewhere, and how all of this will help British goals.

What you don’t see is a wider set of discussions about how the UK operates more widely in the region and how military power is just one angle to consider. As Penny Mordaunt made extremely clear in her speech to the audience at the Shangri La dialogue, the UK is hugely committed to the Far East – it has over 50 diplomatic posts in region (a vital tool in building relevant and credible relations) with more opening all the time. The UK aid budget is also committed, helping fund everything from disaster relief to adapting to Climate change – a genuinely pressing issue for nations such as Tuvalu which face the very real prospect of sinking beneath the waves.

While the military presence is always useful, what is more rarely considered by internet fans is the deeper analysis of why the UK needs a wide-ranging military presence in the region. For some, the sheer ‘because its there’ nature of saying that there should be a squadron of Royal Navy warships in Singapore is reason enough.

This seems to be founded on deeper nostalgia – the fact that until 50 years ago there was an RN fleet based in Singapore seems to be a reason to return. Yet when you look at why it was there (defend UK and allied territory, support wider alliances and help conduct warfighting against Communist targets), it is hard to spot a similar situation today.

Deploying ships overseas permanently makes sense if you have a job for them to do that needs to be done day in, day out. For example OPV patrolling an EEZ or territorial waters– such as the UK does in the Falklands and France does in the region. But, this sort of routine work needs to be done – and if your ships are doing this, then they can’t be off operating with a variety of allies on other jobs.

Similarly, if you have a permanently deployed vessel, then its value diminishes over time as it becomes the new standard. In much the same way as if you drink regularly, it takes more and more to get you tipsy, if you keep a warship permanently in a region then over time its constant participation in exercises will just not cut the mustard anymore – it will be seen as the baseline minimum acceptable level.

The UK approach for many years now has been instead to participate in different exercises and operations with different units. For example, the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) sees different levels of commitment over the years, ranging from Carriers and LPDs through to staff observers. But, the changing presence of ships, the arrival of new capabilities to offer something of training value to the planners and the diplomatic messages that can be sent as a result of tweaking commitment is extremely valuable.

If a state is planning an exercise and knows it will just get a low capability OPV or frigate, then this reduces the value of participation. By contrast operating with a new high-end destroyer or frigate significantly alters the equation. The UK approach has been to try and balance of multiple invitations to participate with avoiding over committing too much, and not becoming stale in their involvement.

This matters because the UK has to ask why is it in the region and what is the long term operational benefit of training with other nations? In NATO it makes sense to regularly participate in exercises with partners where developing joint procedures and testing mutual doctrine in action is critical to sending a message to potential aggressors of our readiness to respond.

But globally we have to ask who are we likely to operate with, and where is the best place to do this? Outside of the FPDA, the UK has few mutual security obligations in the region, and any defence relationship is going to be built on identifying areas where mutual opportunities to work together credibly exist.

For the UK this is realistically at the moment going to be joint operations in the Middle East, conducting counter-piracy work and other operations under the auspices of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), or participating in UN work off Korea to enforce sanctions.

What this means is that the UK needs to find opportunities to enhance regional security in an appropriate way. For example, by supporting the training of other countries like Korea and Japan to take on a leadership role in commanding multi-national task forces like CTF150 and 151 in the Middle East, or operating bilaterally with Japanese or Korean partners in exercises.

The UK approach is built around practical hard-nosed effort to find opportunities to work together effectively, not maintaining a garrison or fleet for the sake of national prestige. While this may dismay some who hanker for a global presence ‘like the French’ it also means that UK efforts are far more effective – because more resources and units are available to be directed into these operations and not just garrison duties.

 At the same time though it is worth remembering that for all the frustration at comparing France to the UK and seeing French carriers in the Far East as some kind of intense statement, the UK is also heavily in this game too. Last year saw a persistent UK presence of highly capable British warships all year in the Far East region on actual operations, and not just training deployments or flag showing trips – this year there have been similar deployments.

The presence of the French carrier is good news, but its also a timely reminder that the French Navy, as a single carrier force, has been without a carrier for the best part of two years as she refitted. Its also a timely reminder that the UK carrier force will also be making regular trips to the Asia Pacific region too – and that, unlike the French, once the PRINCE OF WALES enters full service the UK will have a carrier permanently available at high readiness to deploy globally.

In the rush to do down the UK and bemoan our lack of presence, we sometimes lose sight of the basic facts. Yes, France has a large global network of military bases where they have territory – but so do we. The UK has never had a large military presence in the Asia Pacific region for garrisons alone, even at the height of empire.

Similarly, we focus too heavily on pure numbers and not actual capability. There is no doubt that for the job they are intended to do, which is primarily support to the state internal security role (e.g. on Reunion Island last year the French army was deployed to support public order), or to patrol the EEZ, the French forces in the region are appropriately equipped.

But what we must not do is look past the permanent deployments and compare them to UK capability in region and realise that actually the UK has on a general basis got as many, if not more, troops, ships and aircraft operating across this vast space. The only difference is that they are not permanently assigned there, and instead can come and go as required.

We also focus far too heavily on the military capability being the only part of the solution that matters, rather than it being just one tool of many open to policy makers. To tiny Pacific Island states, the fact that the UK has a destroyer or frigate in the region is irrelevant. The distances are huge, the ship massively outweighs their maritime constabulary capability, and any visit will be of little operational value.

What matters far more is how the UK is seen as a wider player in the country – the reopening of High Commissions and embassies after years of closure matters a great deal. The investment in aid projects or training to help improve the quality of life, or support freedom of speech is equally key. In an era where Chinese financial largesse can open many doors, the UK military presence is far less important than a High Commissioner with access to the HMG cheque book.

The really interesting question will be how does the permanent deployment of an RN vessel into Singapore (as is reportedly going to happen) change things? Will the presence of a Batch 2 OPV in region materially change how capitals perceive UK policy and prestige? Will Heads of State be more likely to listen to the UK now as a result of the permanent presence of a RIVER class, or will they be pleased, but more interested in who is going to match the Chinese offer of funding and easy credit?

There is no doubt that having a vessel able to permanently use the facilities at Singapore would make a real difference in the ability of the RN to put ships across the region on an exercise and operational programme. It opens up the prospect of renewed ship visits to new locations, long neglected by the RN, and in deepening the maritime security relationship with other partners perhaps not usually engaged with.

But it is not going to be a magical solution that will change how the UK is perceived in region. It will help, but only as part of a much wider package of engagement and activity across all spheres of Government work, and not just defence. In other words, a fusion doctrine.

The French Government may, in the eyes of some commentators, recognise that presence matters. But so does the British Government, and arguably its long term commitment to training, operational support and exercises and deployments with other nations is a far more visible and tangible sign of that recognition of presence than maintaining a limited force for local constabulary duties. The UK clearly has an effective Indo-Pacific strategy, and it is working well – it may lack the glamour of the French approach, which to cynically sum can be summed up as ‘le Gloire de powerpoint’, but it remains remarkably effective at what it does.

But this strategy works because it does not rely heavily on fixed assets, and instead a drumbeat of commitments at different times and for different reasons. It may make it harder to produce a sexy looking slide of big flags on small maps, but London understands what persistence means…