Operation ZEUS: A Very British Contingency
The RAF C130 Hercules flew across the night sky as part
of a much larger task force on a clear night in October 1972. On the flight
deck, the pilot could see explosions in the distance, most likely the jets that
the SAS had destroyed earlier during their raid on the airport. In the distance he could see the heat of
afterburners, as the Phantom jets from HMS ARK ROYAL intercepted the lone
surviving fighter jet, that had gotten off the ground and was trying to attack
the RAF armada bearing down on his country. In the cavernous cargo hold dozens of fully
armed paratroopers sat, waiting for the moment when the loadmaster would begin
the process of their jumping out into the darkness. The CO of 2 PARA sat with
his men, mentally preparing for what was to come next, as he and his entire
Battalion were to jump into theatre as part of the biggest airdrop of the
Parachute Regiment since Suez, land at the Airport, occupy it and then “hold it
until relieved” …
The above sounds like a piece of fiction from a Cold War era
military thriller. Yet it is in fact the synopsis of the opening act of
OPERATION ZEUS, the SECRET MOD plan from 1972 to invade Uganda, occupy Entebbe
airport and evacuate up to 50,000 British passport holders from the terror of
the Idi Amin regime. It represents one of the most complex and ambitious
evacuation plans ever drawn up by MOD, yet remains almost completely unknown to
this day. This Pinstripedline blog tells for the first time the story of the
planning for this operation. The images are drawn from modern MOD imagery, which depicts exercise planning for NEOs using the Parachute Regiment in Kenya, in the early 2020s.
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In the early 1970s the UK had all but completed the process of decolonisation, stepping back from its global empire and associated commitments, with all but a handful of colonial era possessions left awaiting independence. This was matched by a withdrawal from Empire, as the armed forces which had been globally deployed until the mid-1960s (with over 100,000 personnel in the Far East alone), supported by a vast network of airfields, ports, communication bases and alliances (e.g. SEATO and CENTO) were wound down. The changing economic outlook, and the growing Soviet threat in Europe meant that Britain recalled the legions from the mid-1960s onwards, unable to afford the price of a truly global military presence.
Yet even as the troops came home, there remained a large
global British diaspora spread around the world. The remnants of the Imperial
governing classes, and those who had forged a life far from the UK meant
hundreds of thousands of UK nationals lived abroad. The UK felt it had a
liability for them and would be responsible for assisting them if events turned
for the worse. An entire library of plans was drawn up, given a variety of
different code names to cover the global evacuation of British nationals when
required by the armed forces.
Many of these plans can be viewed to this day in person, or
online, at the National Archives. They speak to a huge scale of planning, as
British warships, aircraft and troops would rapidly move to forcibly enter a
nation, set up a cordon and enable the movement of civilians to a safe
location. Many seemed unlikely to ever be called upon, but the nature of
contingency planning meant that it made sense to put plans in place, just in
case…
One of the most complex potential operations would have been
for Uganda. This small former British colony, located in East Africa gained
independence from the UK in 1962. There was a large British passport holding
diaspora in the country, estimated in 1971 to be as many as 50,000 people. This
was a mixture of both individuals of White and Asian heritage – something that
today feels utterly ridiculous but was a subject that vexed planners at this
time. As the author has written before, British NEO planning was, bluntly,
racist in its approach, determined only to extract Whites, and not black
passport holders in many African related scenarios.
In January 1971 Uganda experienced a coup d’etat as
President Obote was replaced by the soldier Idi Amin. The horrific details of
much of the Amin regime are beyond the scope of this article, but it is sufficient
to say he was one of the most controversial of all post-colonial African
leaders, Amin was a huge man, former NCO in the British army and arguably
utterly psychotic. He ruled through fear, unpredictability and torture, turning
this once prosperous nation into a ghastly nightmare.
In August 1972 Amin decided to order the expulsion of all
‘Asians’ from Uganda. This referred to a distinct ethnic group who emigrated to
the Colony from India while under British rule, forming a mercantile and
business class alongside the British. The term referred to those of South Asian
origin, and by 1972 it was thought to be around 80,000 strong. Amin gave those
affected three months’ notice to leave the country, essentially dismembering a
key economically critical part of the population. While some 23,000 applied for
Ugandan citizenship, at least 50,000 remained as British passport holders,
entitled to the protection of Her Majesty’s Government.
In Whitehall the decision was taken to update planning for
an evacuation and identify what, if anything, could be done to support their
departure from the country. The problem was what would the exodus be like –
would it be an orderly evacuation carried out in a civil manner, as families
left by commercial airline? Or would it be a chaotic and uncontrolled free for
all, that would potentially require a major military intervention and
potentially direct conflict with the Ugandan military?
To resolve these difficulties, the Foreign &
Commonwealth Office requested the MOD to consider what, if any plans could be
made to prepare for the evacuation of at least some of those passport
holders. Over the summer of 1972 the MOD
rushes to produce a variety of plans that could be executed at short notice to
meet the emerging situation. The first challenge to address was the timing of
any evacuation operation – it was unclear whether Amins decree to leave within
3 months would be adhered to, or if it would slip. Would the UK need to deploy
at very short notice if it looked like conflict was looming or lives were at
stake, or could it support from a distance? In turn what would be needed for
the evacuation – boots on the ground, military aircraft, offensive forces? All
of this needed to be understood to work out how the UK could, if required,
support in Uganda.
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The resulting staff work developed several different initial plans that reflected widely different scenarios. The first plan was known as Operation ARGENT. This was intended to be a consensual evacuation of UK Passport Holders (UKPH) from Uganda, with the full cooperation of the local authorities and staging them via local African countries, particularly Kenya. Another variant of the ARGENT plan was to evacuate UKPH from Uganda using civilian aircraft, flying them to another African country, and then returning them to the UK using RAF airlift. Both variants reflect a classic NEO style plan in that UK aircraft would arrive, refuel and embark passengers and luggage before flying them to a third-party nation and then home. There would have been a small UK military presence on the ground, but it would have been consensual and low threat.
The second plan worked up was initially known as Operation
ZEUS. This reflected the potential requirement to carry out an opposed
evacuation of up to 50,000 UKPH from Uganda, without the support or consent of
the Ugandan government. This was an order of magnitude different from the
ARGENT plans, which were based on a consensual operation.
The concept of Operation ZEUS reads like something out of a
Cold War era thriller. It was designed to provide a military parachute force
capable of taking, and holding Entebbe airport, until relieved by other forces.
Once the airport was held, the RAF would then begin evacuation of the UKPH, a
process likely to take several days, throughout which time the UK would need to
support its forces, and nationals, on the ground. The scale of the operation was made clear in a
briefing note to the Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Carrington), setting
out what would be done:
“Operation ZEUS… provides the dispatch of protection forces
at four battalion strength to Uganda to protect and evacuate British citizens.
In brief the force would be mounted from Mahe in the Seychelles, one parachute
Battalion and one other parachute unit would drop to seize Entebbe and Kampala,
and the remainder of the force would subsequently be flown in. Air support to
neutralise the Ugandan air force and to support land operations would be
provided by HMS ARK ROYAL and/or RAF Phantoms flown in to Entebbe from Gan once
the airfield is secure”.
According to the operational plan, the concept of operations
involved:
““The securing of Entebbe airport by a night Para
assault, subsequent build up and evacuation. 16 Para Bde with a tactical HQ and
two Para Bns would secure Entebbe airport with possibly a simultaneous para
landing in Kampala to provide early protection to UK citizens. Subsequently
forces would be airlanded at Entebbe to bring the total strength in Uganda up
to a brigade group of 4 Bns, with supporting elements but no artillery”.
This operation would have represented one of the most
substantial post war commitments of British airborne forces, with the bulk of
the then available parachute brigade dropped or delivered into action. It was
incredibly ambitious, envisaging a night assault on the airport and the Ugandan
capital Kampala, overpowering local resistance and then seizing control. It is
absolutely the sort of daring operation associated with airborne forces but
could potentially have been lethal to the UK.
The planners identified a range of threats that they were
particularly concerned about, most notably the Ugandan Air Force. Although
small, it had the potential to cause disruption were it to be able to attack
the British forces, or the civilian passport holders, as the evacuation got
underway. A Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) analysis of the UAF suggested
that: “The air force had two or three reasonably well-qualified pilots who
had taken part in the recent air attacks (Comment: Operations against rebel
forces) … the present online strength amounted to 3-6 aircraft. However,
both the Army and Air Force were ill-trained and badly organised, and this view
had been confirmed by the Commander of the British Army Training Team on his
return to the UK.”
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“The force that had been dispatched amounted to 22
officers and 377 men. The aircraft had transited through Cairo, requesting
permission to fly through Sudan as they approached. This had been refused, and
they had been instructed to return or land at Khartoum. It was unlikely that
the President of Sudan would change his mind and permit overflying to take
place, even in the event of a British intervention operation in Uganda.
Agreement to overfly Chad was also improbable. He (comment CDI) doubted whether
the Libyan Air Force Migs had the range to fly direct to Uganda and the JIC had
assessed it highly unlikely that the Libyans could operate and maintain these
aircraft abroad”.
Given these potential threats, it was deemed necessary to remove
any air support before it could disrupt the operation once called. Accordingly,
the plans called for either:
“If HMS ARK ROYAL was available, by carrier based
offensive air operations, and fighter cover for transport aircraft.
In the absence of HMS ARK Royal by:
1.
An SAS operation to neutralise Ugandan
fighter aircraft and supporting facilities.
2.
Two phantom aircraft to be based in
Entebbe as soon as the airfield is secured and fuel is available. These
aircraft would be deployed via Gan using air-to-air refuelling.”
In other words, the Royal Navy would be relied on to provide
vital close in air support to the Army ashore, or it would require the SAS to
operate an airfield raid, not dissimilar to Pebble Island 10 years later,
supported by RAF Phantoms operating from Entebbe itself to be effective.
The military commitment to deliver the operation boiled into
four distinct areas – the maritime, land, air and logistic forces necessary to
make it happen.
The key maritime
assets were to have been both the HMS ARK ROYAL battlegroup, and the Royal
Fleet Auxiliary, supplying a tanker to Mahe. This was a vital commitment as
without the presence of a tanker, with sufficient aviation fuel embarked, it
was likely that Mahe would have run out of fuel quickly, and the operation
ground to a halt. This led to an incredible deception operation to ensure that
for some time, the RFA was present and able to support the operation (more
below).
The ARK ROYAL was a more complex problem – in 1972 she was
available and at sea, but assigned a critical role within NATO, where in the
event of war, her aircraft would have been responsible for tackling Soviet
shipping and potentially carrying out nuclear attacks on the Soviet mainland.
This was a real challenge because if the MOD wanted to use ARK for the
operation, she would need to be removed from her current commitments, and
conduct a Suez transit, heading towards Uganda.
It was estimated that this would take 19 days steaming from
the moment the order was given, a challenge given how short the warning would
likely be if Operation ZEUS was called. It was also noted how difficult it
would be to maintain the element of surprise, particularly if ARK ROYAL was
removed from NATO commitments and sent through Suez – it would be easily detectable
and send a strong signal to the Ugandans that something was up. As the MOD assessment of the plan noted:
“It is considered that it would be impossible to maintain
security regarding this plan once ARK ROYAL had been warned to move from the
SACLANT area and impossible if done before the end of Exercise STRONG EXPRESS.
She is also declared in Category A to SACLANT and her withdrawal from the
ACLANT area would so lengthy as to require notification to NATO. Her withdrawal
should not therefore be undertaken if equivalent alternative arrangements can
be made”.
Paradoxically, the plan for ZEUS highlights one of the
weaknesses of carrier airpower – no matter how capable the ship is, it will
always take far longer to sail there than fly there…
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With the plans for entry into theatre developed, attention turned to how would the evacuation be accomplished? It was assessed that up to 7000 people would need to be evacuated under ZEUS, all embarking at Entebbe on RAF aircraft. The scale of the RAF commitment had the operation been declared is literally phenomenal – the intended forces for the operation simply called for: “VC10, Britannia, Hercules and Belfast aircraft as available”. In other words, every airframe that could fly would be required for the evacuation operation.
The RAF element of the plan involved deploying all available
aircraft to Mahe airfield in the Seychelles, then a British colonial
possession, and operating from there to Uganda. The initial parachute assault force
would be loaded in the UK but would then launch the operation from Mahe. After
Entebbe was taken, Hercules would fly shuttle flights between there and Mahe,
unloading their cargo of people, bringing in supplies as needed to Entebbe and then
relying on the RAF strategic airlift force to fly people home.
The sheer scale of the commitment required for this
operation caused real concern for RAF planners. This wasn’t a ‘computer says
no’ attitude, but instead a sensible reality check that reflected aircraft
needing maintenance, support and having only a certain number of flying hours
each year to sustain the life of the air frame. Were the operation to have been
carried out, there would have been two major challenges from an aviation perspective.
Firstly, it would have eaten into the availability of the airlift
force, reducing the UK’s ability to participate in a huge number of major NATO exercises
and commitments. This presented a real challenge – the UK had recommitted its
forces to NATO and was trying to play a major role in it. It was noted for
example that in the same period when ZEUS was likely to be called, NATO was
conducting exercise STRONG EXPRESS:
“the biggest live exercise ever mounted by NATO; it
involves all three major NATO Commands and has attracted high-level political
interest. Without the ASC airlift the UK elements of the Allied Mobile Force
(AMF) could not be deployed and this would have widespread repercussions on
exercise plans for Northern European Command. This would likely lead to the
cancellation of that part of the Exercise, with attendant political and
military penalties”.
Similar penalties would have been incurred for other
exercises, while the RAF would have been unable to deploy jets and fighter
crews on their ‘Annual Practise Camps’ (APC), a critical evolution intended to
ensure their combat readiness for a variety of wartime missions – “APCs are
vital to the maintenance of the operational standards of RAF squadrons declared
to SACEUR. The APC cannot be rescheduled”.
Meanwhile the British Army would be unable to deploy troops to / from
BATUS Suffield, so in other words, if the evacuation was carried out, it would have
an enormous impact on the ability of the British military to train and prepare
for war in Europe and damage their credibility within NATO.
There would also have been a direct operational impact on
operations in Oman, where British forces were fighting an increasingly violent
war against rebels in the Dhofar region. There were real concerns that had the
operation been conducted, it would have resulted in a massive reduction of
support to troops engaged in combat operations for its duration.
The aircraft flying hours was also a concern to RAF force
planners. They knew that if the aircraft flew too many hours in one go, it
would be catastrophic for the force availability long term. It would
potentially cause major disruption to the servicing schedule of the fleet,
creating a backlog of airframes that would need mandated checks and servicing
before going into service.
This sounds minor, but aviation safety is utterly critical.
If aircraft hit key service milestones, they must be serviced before returning
to the air. The RAF carefully planned its availability of airframes, to ensure
that only a certain number of them would ever need deep servicing at one time,
managing hours carefully to prevent a bulge of aircraft going out of use, and
in turn creating an availability crisis. Had the evacuation occurred, the risk
to the RAF was that its entire tactical and strategic airlift fleet would have
had the carefully planned flying hours go out the window, causing disruption
for months to come, and impacting on the long-term strategic mobility of the
forces. This would not have been a good outcome for anyone.
This really highlights the problem facing planners here – on
the one hand they had the means to lift and carry tens of thousands of people
to safety – it was estimated that the RAF could, in extremis, airlift over
30,000 people out of Uganda if required, in under a month. But to do so would
mean the cancellation of all exercises, routine operations and support and
impose very painful long-term reductions in aircraft availability.
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The final part of the challenge of the operational plan was working out how to provide the necessary logistical support to keep the aircraft airborne and troops supplied for the duration. The key problem was aviation fuel, and the lack of it in the operating area. Planners had quickly realised that Mahe airport was not an ideal location to base the biggest airlift carried out by the UK in decades – it lacked sufficient stores and fuel to keep the airlift going.
To overcome this huge problem, it was decided to deploy an
RFA tanker (RFA TIDEREACH) from the Gulf to the Seychelles, where she could
arrive carrying the necessary fuel for the operation. The challenge was how to
get it ashore and refuel the aircraft. This necessitated embarking the
so-called Emergency Fuel Handling Equipment (EFHE) which was a means of getting
it to shore safely and appropriately. The problem was that TIDEREACH was in the
Gulf, and the EFHE was at Gan, meaning that the ship would need 7 days’ notice
of the operation being mounted to sail to Gan, collect the equipment and then
sail to the Seychelles and deploy it, where it would be operated by trained RAF
personnel flown in from the UK.
The alternative would be to fly the equipment out by air
from UK stores, but this was also hugely problematic. Defence planners really
struggled to work out how to do this without compromising availability of
aircraft and security – it would take 6 Hercules to fly from the UK with the
handling crews and the EFHE kit. They estimated that if a decision was taken to
carry out the operation on 25 September, the aircraft could not get the EFHE
into Mahe until 29 September and would then need 2 days to return to the UK, as
they would be required for the full airlift of 16 Parachute Brigade. Meanwhile
TIDEREACH would steam on the 25th, arriving on the 29th
and it was estimated it would take 48hrs to get the equipment set up and ready.
The result would be a logistical headache, requiring
fuelling parties and RFA’s travelling ahead of the main air assault forces, and
the potential risk of operational security being compromised the moment they
arrived. There was huge concern that as soon as UK troops arrived unexpectedly
in the Seychelles to take over the airport, the secret that the UK was going to
invade Uganda would be out.
To overcome this, an elaborate deception plan was developed
around a joint Army / RFA exercise, which enabled the forward deployment of an
RFA tanker (TIDEPOOL) and Royal Engineers in the Seychelles, ostensibly
carrying out a long-term exercise (Exercise MILLSTONE) while the EFHE was
embarked on the RFA, but due to the way it was stored, was rapidly deteriorating
in the open air. This plan, while helpful, also caused concern to the Royal
Navy as it was noted that tying up TIDEPOOL, to be replaced by TIDESURGE later “reduces
by 25% the number of large fleet tankers available to CINCFLEET”.
The overall complexity of the plan from a fuelling
perspective caused real concern in London, when it was realised that there was
no way to get enough fuel for the aircraft into Mahe, and that TIDESURGE would
quickly run dry of aviation fuel. It was estimated that within four days of the
operation starting, there would be a shortfall of some 600 tonnes of aviation
fuel – a critical issue.
The C130 carries approximately 27 tonnes of fuel and would
need about 24 tonnes of fuel for a single return flight from Mahe to Entebbe
(approximately 10hr round trip), and the RAF estimated it could carry 70
passengers. This meant that to move 1000 people per day would need 14-15
flights per day to evacuate the UKPH (daily requirement of 360 tonnes of fuel).
It was estimated that they’d need to evacuate 7000 people (approx 100 flights)
during the evacuation, needing some 2400 tonnes of aviation fuel. Yet within 4
days of the operation beginning, the UK would be 25% short of the required fuel
needed to carry out the mission – it was, arguably doomed from the outset by
logistics.
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Having drawn up these plans over the summer of 1972, the MOD then conducted an internal review of their viability. Planning staffs were asked to comment on how credible they were, and what the likely risks would be of the operation and passed their advice direct to the Service Chiefs for their own analysis.
The overall view of the defence planning staff was that the
operation was credible but would be extremely challenging. The summary
assessment of the overall assault plan stated:
“The plan anticipates opposition from the Ugandan armed
forces, although this not expected to be so serious as to prevent the para
assault taking place. The operation of the aircraft from… Mahe would require
the waiving of many of the normal peacetime procedures governing the use of transport
aircraft. These factors, together with the possibility of weather interfering
with the para assault indicate this part of the operation could carry
exceptional risk”
They also noted that:
“In particular the plan is based on acceptance:
(1) Of an expectation of minimal opposition from the Ugandan Armed Forces.
(2) That it is not until P + 9 hours that the immediate follow-up force starts
to join the para assault force and not until P + 34 hours that elements of the
first air portable bn would arrive.
e. Any para assault drop on Kampala would
inevitably produce very serious problems of locating and marking the Dropping
Zone with a consequent risk of para casualties in the drop.”
The planners also noted that if ARK ROYAL was not available,
the RAF proposal of deploying two Phantoms to Entebbe would have a very limited
capability. But this was the maximum that could be supported on the ground, due
to the need for all C130’s, that would normally deploy the maintenance teams
and spare parts, to be tasked with evacuating UK nationals. A good example of
the trade-offs required for an operation.
It was noted that aviation fuel would be a major
constraining factor and recommended that in addition to seizing Entebbe and
Kamapala, the British would need to also seize bulk fuel depots as well. In addition,
the plan would require more fuel to launch than was available in Mahe, even
when fully fuelled. But to mitigate this would need an RFA tanker – which was
10 days steaming away. In the event of the evacuation being launched urgently,
there would not be enough fuel and logistics available to carry it out.
It was estimated that it would take at least 5 days before
the evacuation could start moving 1000 British nationals per day out of Uganda
– but this could be delayed if law and order broke down. The reality was that
there were no timelines for planning, and it would be next to impossible to
plan until on the ground – which may suddenly become a very open-ended
commitment indeed.
It would also have posed a huge risk to wider operations –
to mount the operation as intended would have meant withdrawing the PARA Bn
then deployed in Northern Ireland at very short notice, causing a wider force
gap at a difficult time. In turn it would have a major impact on ongoing UK
operations in Oman – there being an enduring and very violent war occurring there,
which the UK was actively participating in. The impact of mounting the
operation would have potentially caused extremely significant risks to UK
troops in the field, as well as disrupted all other operations and exercises
globally.
Despite these concerns, the planning staff felt that the
operation was credible and could be conducted if called. It was against this
backdrop that the Service Chiefs reviewed the plan in late September 1972 at a
routine meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It perhaps sums up the
concerns of the Service Chiefs that the minutes record VCDS (General Sir John
Gibbons) as stating:
“It was unusual for them (Service Chiefs) to
consider a plan in Committee, but it was the first chance for them to address
themselves the exceptional problems posed by operation ZEUS and it would be an
opportunity for their comments and reservations to be recorded. They would also
wish to consider the terms of a submission to the Secretary of State”.
This is a genuinely remarkable minuted statement – it is
essentially saying that the Service Chiefs held such deep and profound concerns
about the ZEUS plan , that they were prepared to place their concerns on
record, and use the meeting where it was discussed to work out how to raise
these concerns with their political masters. In many years of reviewing MOD
archive material, this author has never seen any statement so profoundly put on
the record formally to indicate this level of concern by the Service Chiefs.
During the meeting the plan was reviewed in depth, and
concerns raised. General Sir Cecil Blacker (VCGS) made a powerful intervention
on the risks facing the Parachute Regiment if they conducted the air assault as
planned:
“that there was no chance of maintaining security once
the forces had been brought to short notice. The movement of ships, troops and
aircraft would alert the Ugandans and in particular the involvement of
parachute units would indicate the likelihood of a parachute assault. Entebbe
airfield would probably be strongly defended by troops including armour.
Although a parachute drop by night was planned and would give an opportunity
for concentration, at dawn the force would be very vulnerable. In these circumstances
air support was vital and without it the operation could fail. Furthermore he
believed that in the circumstances envisaged, the implementation of the plan
would precipitate hostile acts against United Kingdom citizens who could be
prevented by Ugandan troops from concentrating at Kampala as the plan required.
This could well jeopardise the achievement of the aim.”
This is an incredibly powerful intervention – it points out
the risk that the Parachute Regiment would be alone on the ground in Entebbe,
vulnerable and at risk of counter attack, and without air support, the mission
would fail. This risk of abandonment without air cover may have resonated with
Gen Blacker, who served at the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940.
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The operational plan was also a chance for a gentle spot of interservice politics – with the Chief of the Air Staff (ACM Smallwood) taking on Vice Admiral Lewin over whether the Phantoms embarked on HMS ARK ROYAL were fit for purpose:
“SIR DENIS SMALLWOOD said he agreed with VCGS'
hypothesis. He appreciated the importance of close air support and agreed that
in the initial stages HMS ARK ROYAL would be extremely valuable. He believed,
however, that land-based aircraft could provide the support required
subsequently and he hoped that it would be possible to position four Phantoms
at Entebbe once that airfield was operating, and not two as the plan provided.
He questioned whether HMS ARK ROYAL's embarked aircraft were fitted with the
most suitable armament for use against targets which included armour.
VICE ADMIRAL LEWIN said that if such armament was not
available in HMS ARK ROYAL at present it could be provided at short notice from
her Underway Replenishment Group. He believed that the air support she could
provide was highly desirable, particularly in the initial stages of the
operation.”
This indicates the strength of animosity between the two
services, whose leadership had clashed in recent years over the scrapping of
the CVA01 attack carrier, on the assumption that the RAF could provide air
cover when needed. If, just five years later and while the RN still had ARK
ROYAL and EAGLE in commission, as well as other carriers in lower readiness,
the RAF managed to fail to deliver air cover to British troops trapped in
Uganda, defending an airfield and without hope of rescue, this could do catastrophic
damage to the reputation of the RAF and call for the carrier decision to be
reversed. This may have been an operational plan, but the stakes could not have
been higher for either Service.
Despite these concerns, the Service Chiefs felt that they
could support the plan, albeit with modifications and changes to its concept. They
undertook to write to Secretary of State, setting out the situation and getting
his endorsement for the plan. The full submission is a fascinating read,
showing how Ministers were briefed and the key risks identified by the
military:
“Operation ZEUS is based on the outline plan contained in
DOP Note 715/72 which you and your colleagues have already seen, and provides
for the despatch of protection forces at four battalion strength to Uganda to
protect and evacuate United Kingdom citizens. In brief, the force would be
mounted from Mahé in the Seychelles, one parachute battalion and one other
parachute unit would drop to seize Entebbe and Kampala, and the remainder of
the force would subsequently be flown in. Air support to neutralize the Uganda
Air Force and to support land operations would be provided by HMS ARK ROYAL
and/or by RAF Phantoms flown in to Entebbe from Gan once the former airfield is
secure.”
The memo went on to note that :
We have a number of serious reservations about the
implementation of this plan. I have already discussed some of them with you and
the Minister of State but consider they are so important as to merit repetition
here:
a. Once forces are brought to short notice, it will be impossible to
maintain security and the nature of the plan will become known. We are
concerned that, depending on the situation in Uganda at the time, measures to
implement the plan could then precipitate hostile acts against UK citizens,
both in Uganda and perhaps elsewhere in Africa, before our forces could arrive.
Moreover, once it was clear that we were taking military action, the Ugandan
Armed Forces would be able to prepare and could prevent UK citizens from
assembling in Kampala and Entebbe. This could well jeopardise the achievement
of the aim.
b. Offensive air support would be essential
to neutralise the Ugandan Air Force and to support land operations. This would
best be provided in the initial stages by using aircraft from HMS ARK ROYAL.
Once Entebbe airfield had been seized and was working, RAF Phantom aircraft
could be based there.
c. Once the forces had been brought to
short notice the parachute assault on Entebbe could not take place until almost
four days (93 hours) had elapsed. But HMS ARK ROYAL, if she is to be included
in the operation, would require 19 days to move to the area. She would
therefore need to be ordered to move at least 15 days before the operation is
launched from the UK.
d. Mahé falls short of being a satisfactory mounting base in many
respects. The weather at dawn is likely to be far from ideal and might pose
problems for aircraft recovering from Entebbe to Mahé at that time. The
airfield facilities are barely adequate and the availability of sufficient
stocks of aviation fuel has yet to be ensured. The team we sent out has
reported that the use of dracones for landing fuel is feasible, but it is
nevertheless a difficult operation and one in which we cannot place complete
reliance. Investigations are in hand to determine whether the dracones can be
prepositioned at Gan or Mahé. If they cannot, eight days’ notice of the
mounting of the operation would be required which is within the time required
for HMS ARK ROYAL to move to the area.
In the light of these reservations, it is our view that
this plan carries a high risk of failure; and, under the circumstances
presently foreseeable, we do not recommend it as a military operation.
This is one of the most remarkable statements that the
author has ever seen in a Ministerial submission. In effect the Service Chiefs
have told the Government that the ministerial aspiration to carry out a
military operation would fail, and that they could not recommend a military
solution to evacuating thousands of UK nationals from Uganda. To contextualise
this, it’s the same as the Service Chiefs in 2021 telling the Defence Secretary
that they could not support Operation PITTING (the Kabul NEO) for similar
reasons…
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There are many lessons from ZEUS that remain relevant to this day. The critical importance of tactical airlift – there is no chance that with todays significantly diminished force, lacking any C130 Hercules, the RAF could mount a similar operation. There is also nowhere near the same level of parachuting capability, with a significantly diminished level of jump qualified paratroopers in the Army, and a major loss of airborne support units and the necessary skills, equipment and aircraft to carry out the operation. Simply put, the UK could not carry out an equivalent operation today.
The wider lessons are timeless – the critical importance of
logistics and fuel – without it, an operation cannot go anywhere. The vital
nature of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) as a support service to provide fuel,
munitions and stores to personnel is crucial, but in the current parlous state
of the RFA fleet, has been all but lost. It will be many years, if at all,
before the UK regains a capability here.
Another lesson is that providing air support is really
complicated. Yes, carrier air power is flexible and fast moving – but it also
needs time to get to the crisis. If you need to deploy outside your normal
operational area with a carrier, you are adding weeks into the planning cycle.
In the case of ARK ROYAL, it would have taken two weeks hard steaming just to
get her into the JOA – yet without her, the RAF would struggle to get just two
Phantoms on the ground due to the wider pressures on the tactical airlift
force. In either case, without enough time, support and airframes, it is very
hard to provide air cover when needed.
Deception remains relevant, as is concealing the purpose of
a deployment. The elaborate lengths that the MOD went to in order to conceal
the true purpose of the RFA presence in Mahe until the end of 1972 shows how
challenging it can be to ensure the security of an operation. In the 21st
Century a key lesson is how difficult it would be to carry out a similar move
now, with the preponderance of social media sites speculating and sharing even
the smallest snippets of military information. It would be next to impossible
to maintain the necessary levels of secrecy now to deliver a covert operation
like ZEUS today.
A key lesson is that of the importance of access to overseas
basing for operations of this type. The plans relied on the UK being able to access
a wide network of global bases to be within striking distance for the
operation, and in turn conduct the evacuation. This would not have been
possible just five years later as the last of the UK legions returned from East
of Suez, and sites like RAF Masirah and RAF Gan closed their doors forever.
A final lesson is that military power can only be in one
place at a time and that the UK needs to decide whether it must support national
or NATO priorities. The fact that ZEUS would have required the reassignment of large
amounts of UK forces supporting NATO exercises and commitments reminds us that prioritization
is hard, and that policy makers face a near impossible choice in deciding where
to focus scarce assets.
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This is where the story of Operation ZEUS starts to run dry. We know that the operation was never carried out, and that further refinements were carried out to the plan. In the coming weeks it evolved into ZEALOUS, a modified version with no emphasis on capturing Kampala, and the ARK ROYAL was removed from the plan. Yet the concerns remained – this was fundamentally an incredibly dangerous operational plan, with a high risk of failure, but with tens of thousands of British national lives at stake, there was no option but to prepare to carry it out.
As best as can be determined, Operation ZEUS was replaced
with a revised plan called Op ZEALOUS in late September 1972, which in turn was
not carried out. It was similar but reduced the level of airborne commitment
and removed the need to jump into Kampala, presumably reducing the risk of
casualties. It also removed HMS ARK ROYAL from the planning, relying instead on
RAF air support. The concept of operations for ZEALOUS was similar, but focused
on using the SAS on the ground and RAF Phantoms from Gan to tackle the threat
of the Ugandan Air Force, as well as conducting the air assault with an ad hoc
unit, rather than a formed Para Bn.
“12. The operation involves the securing of
Entebbe airport by a night para assault, subsequent build up and evacuation. 16
Para Bde with a tactical HQ, specially formed para bn, a reduced para squadron
RAC and a para light battery RHA would secure Entebbe airport. Subsequently
forces would be airlanded to bring the total strength in Uganda up to a Bde
group of three bns.
13. The operation might be opposed by the
Ugandan Air Force which has the ability to mount limited attacks by day with
fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft against transport aircraft or ground
forces. This threat would be countered as follows:
a. A Special Air Service (SAS) para
operation to neutralise Ugandan fighter aircraft and supporting facilities.
b. Four Phantoms to be based at Entebbe if
and when the airfield is secured and the availability of fuel confirmed. These
aircraft would be called forward from GAN using air-to-air refuelling.
14. Para operations would be mounted from
the UK by using Mahé as an advanced mounting base. Air Transport Operations to
and from Uganda would stage through the Seychelles. A strategic airlift would
be mounted from the UK to Mahé transferring to Hercules aircraft, retained from
the para assault, for the ‘shuttle’ between Mahé and Entebbe.
15. When Entebbe Airport has been secured the evacuation of UK citizens could start. Evacuees would be flown from Entebbe to Mahé in Hercules aircraft where they would be transferred to strategic transport for onward movement.”
Regardless of this planning., the Foreign Secretary agreed
that military operations in Uganda (Either ZEALOUS or TOLL – which would have flown
to Kenya not Mahe) would not work and that military activity should be avoided
if possible. Planning continued as a last ditch contingency, but all efforts
went into securing departures by civilian airlines instead. The last UK
passport holders left the country in 1972 voluntarily, with some 27,000
arriving in the UK and resettling here, mostly in army camps and other
locations. Of particular note, the Tonfanau Army camp in Wales was temporarily used,
which had a top-secret role as a final fallback location for Central Government
PYTHON groups in the event of war. The departure of the Asian population from Uganda
by the end of 1972 also marked the end of the NEO planning for OP ZEUS and
associated operations.
Today the story of
Operation ZEUS / ZEALOUS and associated plans are all but forgotten, but they deserves
more recognition as potentially one of the most complex and challenging NEOs
and airborne assaults that would ever have been carried out by the British
Armed Forces. To jump into the night, to land and capture a hostile airfield
and then evacuate thousands of British nationals, while holding the airfield against
determined attack from Ugandan and possibly Libyan forces for over a week,
would be an incredibly demanding task. In particular, the night assault on
Entebbe, where a small group would quite literally be asked to ‘hold until
relieved’ would go down in the annals of history of the Parachute Regiment as a
good example of their soldiers being “Utrinque Paratus”…
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