Why BRITANNIA no Longer Rules the Waves. The Story of the Replacement Royal Yacht.

The Royal Yacht BRITANNIA remains one of the most timeless and beautiful vessels ever built in the United Kingdom. Designed in the early 1950s to replace the previous Royal Yacht ‘VICTORIA & ALBERT’, she served for over 40 years as a very visible symbol of the British Monarchy and State. Cruising the world, she was present at fleet reviews, independence parades, state visits and even participated in an evacuation. As a floating palace, embassy for the United Kingdom and location for diplomatic talks and trade deals, BRITANNIA was the embodiment of the phrase ‘Soft Power’. Yet she was also to be the last of 83 Royal Yachts and was paid off without replacement in 1997. This blog article explores the near decade long sage of the decision not to replace her, and for the first time ever, brings together the full story of the Royal Yacht replacement that was not to be.

Commissioned in 1954, the BRITANNIA was designed in an era when long haul travel was mostly carried out by ship. Travel by air was far rarer than it is today, for example the British armed forces maintained a network of trooping liners, designed to move military personnel and their families around the world between postings. The yacht was intended to convey the Sovereign or her family around the world to Royal tours, which at the time may have lasted many months, enabling them to travel to far flung parts of the remaining Empire, and wider Commonwealth, and be entirely self-sufficient throughout, rather than reliant on foreign hospitality and accommodation.

The 1989 Replacement - Crown Copyright

Crewed by sailors from the Royal Navy, the vessel was often seen as part of a very ‘private navy’ by others. Ratings drafted to the Yacht joined the Permanent Royal Yacht Service (PRYS), and usually remained with the Yacht for the remainder of their career, foregoing promotion and wider opportunities ashore to stay as a permanent member of the crew. The ships Commanding Officer was a Rear Admiral, Flag Officer Royal Yacht (FORY), who seems to have been at times almost his own 1^st Sea Lord, responsible for the Royal Yacht, which while technically part of the Royal Navy, seems also to have been very separate from it too. FORY had significant power, responsible for the Yacht, elements of her programme and in balancing the relationship between the  Palace, the Royal Navy and wider stakeholders to ensure the Yacht could deliver when required.

The ship displaced approximately 5700 tonnes, and was 126m long with a crew of some 270, and the ability to embark a further 250 guests. Unarmed in peacetime, she was ostensibly designed for conversion in wartime into a hospital ship. Although there is some scepticism that this role would ever have been carried out for real, it is notable that there are files in existence which indicate that the RN seriously considered the hospital ship requirement credible, and sought ways to occasionally practise and exercise it, until the late 1980s.

On a day-to-day basis BRITANNIA’s core role was to support the Royal Family on national business. This included embarking HM The Queen for both State and personal visits. During the 1980s She embarked on BRITANNIA for a total of 57 days for official State visits, and a further 445 days for wider visits and passage to locations (roughly 7 weeks per year). This represents a decline on previous decades as Royal travel patterns changed, and they increasingly used air travel to get to a Royal tour, prior to embarking on the Yacht abroad for the duration of their tour. The yacht spent a significant amount of time on passage to these visits, (675 days in the 1980s).

Of note is the very limited amount of time allocated to supporting British industry – despite the narrative that the BRITANNIA was an ideal platform to support trade deals, throughout the 1980s, she was only used to hold events in support of UK industry on 11 days – barely once per year. In addition to spending about 500 days in refits in the 1980s, the ship also spent nearly 50% of her time alongside in Portsmouth – 1578 days in total throughout the 1980s, for maintenance and routine work. The view of FORY was that due to her unique drafting pattern, this was the only time when members of the crew could take leave or carry out wider training. But it does speak to a vessel that by this stage of her career seemed underutilised in her core role.

By the late 1980s it was becoming clear that a decision would need to be taken about the future of the Yacht. By then she was well over 30 years old and was at the point where a decision on replacement or very major life extension refit would need to be carried out. The ship had dated internal equipment, her engines were increasingly mechanically challenging, and needed engineers with ever scarcer experience to operate them. Internal systems were beginning to fail, and overall BRITANNIA was approaching the point where a replacement would need to be ordered, to avoid her materially failing on the job. An RN paper noted that:

“A major refit in 1987 (which had been intended to enable her to run on for 10-15 years after its completion), highlighted the fact that the vessel fell well short of modern standards in a number of important respects (e.g. fire safety, electrical safety, pollution control) and that it would be increasingly costly to maintain her obsolescent equipment. It was also noted that the Yachts endurance limit of 2300nm made her dependent on tanker support or frequent fuelling stops”.

In 1988 the Palace approached the MOD seeking to open discussions on the future of the Yacht and any potential replacement decisions. In turn the Secretary of State for Defence approved work to consider the options for running the ship on, carrying out a SLEP or replacing her with a new build design. The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher MP was informed and asked to be kept aware of the work.

The initial consideration for what to do about BRITANNIA looked at four different options for when she hit her planned out of service date in 1997 – namely:

a)      Run  on BRITANNIA for 5 – 10 years respectively. (OSD of 2001 / 2006)

b)     Carry out a SLEP on the hull, extending her life by 20 years (out to 2016)

c)      Construct a new build vessel.

The MOD considered these options and by 1989 had completed its preliminary analysis and design work. It identified that the most cost-effective option was to build a new Royal Yacht rather than carry out a SLEP of BRITANNIA. Both Ministers, and the Prime Minister, were made aware of this in late 1989, at which point the decision was taken to progress into designing a replacement ship.

The work was carried out at this stage by the MOD team in Bath, who put together a small package of proposals on what a replacement could look like. They examined three  different new hull design concepts, as well as the options for SLEP and running the BRITANNIA on and produced some simple line diagrams for them, as well as a set of deck plans for their preferred design. The main design will be discussed below, but it was clear that the driver for the project was to create a similarly timeless vessel to replace BRITANNIA to serve for at least 30 years.

The goal of the design brief was to create a vessel that could meet the following broad requirements:

Peacetime Role	Royal Yacht Secondary role: Hydrographic vessel
Wartime Role	Forward medical support ship
Speed	Max 20kts,  Cruise 15kts
Endurance	6000nm 45 Days stores
Aesthetics	3 masts (to enable standards to be flown when HM and HRH are both embarked) 1 funnel Counter stern Stepped profile bridge High quality hull surface finish
Royal Features	As BRITANNIA with the exception of: Delete Royal Chart House Delete Garage Delete Ladies in Waiting sitting room Royal clerks office to main deck

 

One amusing note in this story is  that within the MOD briefing pack, the document stated that “As the external appearance of any new design would be crucial to its success, an independent aesthetic design consultant was contracted to provide advice to the design team” – to which a senior RN staff officer wryly noted “never heard of one of these before!”

The design work was briefed to the Prime Minister in late 1989, setting out what had been done, and the concept design as it stood. At this point the PM did not appear fully convinced of the need to replace BRITANNIA, with her Private Secretary noting in a letter to the MOD that:

“She has noted that there is a long way to go before any decisions are made.  In addition to refining the studies, it will be necessary to examine whether there are other ways of meeting the requirement. After that it will be necessary to consider whether what is proposed is affordable within the Defence budget”.

Despite the PM’s misgivings there was also wider Whitehall drama at play. It was identified over the summer of 1989 that when the proposals had been put together, they had been shared, by accident, with the Queens Principal Private Secretary (Sir William Heseltine), without being shared to Ministers or others. This left the MOD in the embarrassing position where the Palace was aware of the options for replacement before Ministers and the Prime Minister were, which in turn led to hurried negotiations whereby the Palace agreed to not brief or look at the proposals until they were told that they could do so!

Comparison of design aesthetic - Crown Copyright

The direction to the MOD was to work up a range of replacement options and seek to progress the development of a formal staff requirement for a replacement Royal Yacht. This in turn led to more work on  the development of a concept design that was formally presented to the MOD Equipment Policy Committee in early 1990 as part of feasibility studies to replace BRITANNIA, it was not certain that replacement would occur – the paper noted that “One option, that the Treasury last year (1989) were anxious should not be discarded) might be to not replace BRITANNIA at all”.  

The formal paper presented to the Committee was called “SRS 7089 – The Replacement Royal Yacht” and for the first time laid out what the MOD requirement would be for this new vessel. The core statement of requirement for the ship was as follows:

“The Royal Yacht is regarded as a high profile and prestigious symbol of the Crown, the Kingdom and its maritime traditions, and a suitable venue for State and Royal entertainment at home and overseas. It is required to provide:

a.      A comfortable and prestigious residence. The Royal Yacht provides a Residence as well as a means of Sea Travel for the Queen and members of the Royal Family, member of the Royal Household and Officials on State Visits and Royal Tours overseas.  On many occasions the Yacht has been used when appropriate accommodation is not available ashore.

 

b.     A Secure Environment. No Royal visit can be conducted without some security risk to the Royal Family.  The Royal Yacht, with its attendant guardship, provides a safe haven offshore or alongside, complete with dedicated and secure communications.

 

c.      A venue for Official Entertainment. It is conventional that hospitality is returned during a State visit, and the Royal Yacht is a floating palace wherein a return banquet or other official entertainment can be offered by the Royal Family in an appropriate manner.

 

The document went on to state the need to provide a vessel that would be able to accommodate a Royal Party, built to modern accommodation, hospitality and wider marine standards, and in turn be secure and survivable. The design was to  be unarmed, but ‘fitted for but not with’ 20/30mm guns for wartime use. It was also noted that:

“The appearance of any Royal Yacht reflects not only on the Head of State, but also the country as a whole. If BRITANNIA is to be replaced by a special purpose vessel, she should exhibit the same elegance and style as the current vessel, albeit appropriate to the late 20^th century and beyond”.

The requirement was intended to increase the ships range, reducing the need for refuel so frequently (during the 1980s the BRITANNIA had carried out a RAS on over 80 occasions), and in turn reduce the pressure on the RFA tanker fleet. Similarly, fitting bow thrusters was seen as a good way to reduce the need for tug support, generating significant savings.

There was also recognition that as Royal travel patterns were changing, so too was the need for the utilisation of any replacement during peacetime. Recognising that the new vessel would probably have spare capacity, and to help justify her wider role in the RN, the MOD proposed three different secondary roles that she could carry out – namely:

a.      Oceanographic vessel in support of UK hydrographic surveys globally.

b.     Support to British industry, having a more dedicated focus on supporting UK export campaigns globally.

c.      Support to environmental research, embarking researchers to carry out marine work.

Consideration was given to the successors potential wartime role as well, noting that BRITANNIA was never employed as a dedicated hospital ship. In this area it recommended that the successor may be suitable in 3 different roles:

• Small hospital ship able to provide a floating field hospital and ward accommodation for 200 patients. The design was recommended to have a Merlin capable helicopter pad to enhance this aspect.

• MCMV Command & Support Ship designed for wartime use to function as a platform similar to other STUFT vessels to enable a squadron of mine warfare vessels to be supported. This was seen as a harder requirement to meet due to the need to have workshops, craneage and other supporting tools to hand to carry this out

• Casualty Evacuation ferry to move wounded personnel to another safe port for onward treatment. This was a key wartime role for cross channel ferries as part of wider Transition to War activity, and would have been a good cost effective measure for the design.

Of note, the planners did not discuss the use of the ship as a floating command platform as part of the existing ‘Machinery of Government in War’ plans. Under these stratospherically compartmented plans, the actual war role for BRITANNIA was to have been to embark a ‘P Group’ of Government Ministers and supporting civil service and military personnel, able to take over as the remaining elements of central government after a nuclear attack had occurred on the UK. Given how classified these plans were, it is unsurprising that the designers did not know of them in their work.

The MOD examined and discarded the proposals for a 20 year SLEP beginning in 1996, that would have run the Yacht out until the late 2010s. Its rationale for doing this was that to do so would have been costly, required a near total gutting of the ship, including replacement of the electrical, steam and air conditioning systems, as well as wider refurbishments including provision for a temporary flight deck. It was assessed that to carry out this plan carried a high risk that the SLEP wouldn’t resolve long standing issues like the substandard accommodation for the crew, and could potentially uncover larger problems. To that end, it was agreed that the SLEP proposals did not make coherent sense and would have cost (in 1989) at least £85m  to complete, but would have added relatively little and cost more than a new build.

The ‘run on’ options were also dismissed on the grounds that they would require a lot of money to keep the Yacht going, but wouldn’t address any of the underlying issues. The failure to replace the Yacht would also mean that in 5 or 10 years past her nominal decommissioning date, the MOD would have the problem of buying a new Royal Yacht, having spent a lot of money in the intervening period.

 Instead, the MOD felt that an entirely new design that would resolve the many design challenges that a SLEP would have to deal with, and also provide a significantly longer lifespan, was the best outcome.  The costings supported this view, with the cost of a new build ship coming in (in 1989 prices) at £82m (approx. £212m today), while a SLEP would cost £89m.  Running the ship on would be cheaper, but not solve the underlying problem of replacing the Yacht.

The overall concept for the new design can best be described as a ‘like for like’ replacement, providing an elegant yacht design that would neatly replace BRITANNIA. A comparison of the designs shows significant similarities:

 

	New Design	BRITANNIA
Length at Waterline	122m	118m
Beam at Waterline	17m	16.75m
Deep Displacement	4800 tonnes	5300 tonnes
Range	6500nm	3000nm
Top Speed	20kts	22kts
Flight Deck	YES	NO
Royal Party	50	50
RM Band	25	25
RN Complement	175	250
Total  Military Accommodation	225	275
Boats	6	6

 

The result would have been a ship similar overall to BRITANNIA, albeit slightly lighter and slower, but with over double the range (thus reducing the need for tankers) and fewer crew. The addition of a flight deck would also have made a significant difference both in military operations and for Royal transfers.

That said, even at this stage in the process, where the MOD was seeking approval to take design work forward, it was not necessarily wedded to a direct replacement. It was made clear that other options were under consideration, to ensure that taxpayers got the best value outcome from the process. These other options included:

• Direct replacement, albeit with reduced capability to BRITANNIA.
•  ‘Minimum viable reduced design’ – replacement with significantly reduced capability compared to BRITANNIA.
• Second hand conversion, or charter of another vessel.
• Fitting Royal Yacht fixtures onto an RN warship in build.

The first option considered would have allowed a range of ‘salami slicing’ to the above design to further reduce costs. This would have included removing accommodation for the RM band (saving some £3m), deleting the Helicopter deck, or deleting the Bow Thrusters. If all of the proposals had been adopted, then the design would have dropped in price to around £70m.

What is notable though is these were very much ‘false economies’ that would have saved short term funding in the procurement budget, but the costs would have been quickly incurred again elsewhere. For example, there would have been a need to fly the RM Band out to a tour location, and the T&S costs of this would quickly dwarf £3m. The bow thrusters would save £500k, but as the paper noted, a single tug charter in the West Indies in 1983 cost £35,000. Fitting the bow thrusters would reduce the need for tugs, so losing them would result in longer term spending – a real false economy.

The Minimum Viable Design was intended to look again at the deeper rationale for a yacht in the first place. It noted that “HMY BRITANNIA entered service when passage by sea was the accepted means of global travel and air transport had yet to come into its own. In an age where air travel is the norm and current passenger liners are employed primarily for cruising; it may appear incongruous to procure a direct replacement for HMY BRITANNIA”.

Instead it was suggested that a more cost effective design could be built that would see Royal parties join the ship in the country they were visiting, and the vessel be used as local accommodation, versus a means of undertaking long ocean voyages. This would enable considerable crew savings, and also enable reductions in other aspects of the design. In this scenario the MVD would have had the following characteristics.

	Minimum Viable Design	New Design	BRITANNIA
Length at Waterline	90m	122m	118m
Beam at Waterline	14m	17m	16.75m
Deep Displacement	2500 tonnes	4800 tonnes	5300 tonnes
Range	6000nm	6500nm	3000nm
Top Speed	18kts	20kts	22kts
Flight Deck	YES	YES	NO
Royal Party	25 (permanent) 10 (contingency)	50	50
RM Band	0	25	25
RN Complement	60	175	250
Total  Military Accommodation	70	225	275
Boats	2	6	6

 

Clearly such a design would have been more austere than the main replacement but would have potentially been significantly more affordable. It would have kept the main state elements of the vessels function, but at the same time reduced in other areas. For example, there would not have been a Royal Marines band embarked.

The next alternative considered was perhaps the least plausible but needed to be at least looked at. This was the possibility of a major conversion of a second-hand vessel from the open market into a Royal Yacht. This plan immediately hit problems when it was noted that any vessel converted would need at least 20 years of hull life left, but that there were no modern vessels of that size and type available for sale.

Another challenge was that any conversion would involve working around existing parts of the chosen ship’s hull, and this may make adding Royal elements to the vessel challenging. One of the key strengths of the BRITANNIA design was felt to be the extremely effective layout of the Royal apartments, which enabled the ship to excel in her state functions. A conversion would probably result in a less-than-optimal outcome for probably a similar amount of money.  Charter was also dismissed for similar reasons, namely it would require a lot of money to be spent on a ship which there may be no guarantee of availability when required.

The final option considered was to look at using an RN warship converted in some way to carry a royal suite. There was precedent for this, with both the battlecruiser HMS RENOWN and the battleship HMS VANGUARD having carried out this role. The constraints of using a modern warship though were deemed to be significant:

“Ships of the modern Royal Navy are much smaller, more technically complex, more manpower efficient and relatively more expensive than their predecessors. As a consequence, the scope for using them in support of Royal Duties is very limited, and should they be used, there must necessarily be a significant compromise of the stated requirement. The need to support Royal Duties would, of course, limit the use of the ship for directed tasks, training, trials and general fleet duties. It would place special demands on the ships company, who are not normally used to support Royal Duties and reduce their effectiveness”.

Despite these clear constraints, the RN considered what could be done in practical terms. It identified that any warship converted would need to provide more than just sleeping accommodation, and would need to provide, as a very minimum:

• Direct replacement, albeit with reduced capability to BRITANNIA.
•   A ‘Minimum viable reduced design’ – replacement with significantly reduced capability compared to BRITANNIA.
• Second hand conversion, or charter of another vessel.
• Fitting Royal Yacht fixtures onto an RN warship in build. 

This equated to a need for around 600m2 of space onboard a ship to cover the Royal duties requirement. The problem is that most RN ships didn’t have anything like this level of space available – the paper noted that of the 4000m2 onboard the Type 23, the living space for the whole 170 crew took up 800m2, meaning that any such fit would essentially remove the ships fighting capabilities, rendering the vessel pointless. It was also noted that BRITANNIA had 2100m2 of space for Royal duties, compared to 2200m2 for the direct replacement and 1300m2 in the MVD.

One option was to put the Royal fit into another design – but the challenge here was the lack of suitable platforms. The ‘H’ class survey vessels were looked at and ruled out, leaving the only remaining design that could be used as the ‘Aviation Support Ship’ requirement (what later emerged as HMS OCEAN):

“It might conceivably be possible to accommodate a “Royal fit” in a large vessel such as an Aviation Support Ship, although this could only be achieved at the expense of capability or by stretching the design to provide the additional dedicated space. In view of the standard and décor required of Royal Apartments, it is thought very unlikely that they could be employed for an alternative purpose in the absence of the Royal Family.”

Brought together the paper made clear that it needed endorsement from the MOD to step up design work into the next phase, and that it wanted to consider the various options proposed. But it seemed clear from the outset that most would need to be discounted. The challenge though was getting approval from Ministers to proceed.

This is where things got a bit challenging. In 1990 the world was changing rapidly with the collapse of the Soviet Union and mass reductions in defence spending across NATO. Making the case for, and finding the money to pay for, a new Royal Yacht would be extremely difficult and politically unpopular. Allied to this was a general decline in the popularity of the Royal Family at the time, which coupled with a febrile political situation meant that the Government of the day was not prepared to progress from approvals to placing a ship on contract.

The early 1990s were marked by the fact that even though no decision had been made about whether to replace BRITANNIA or not, a decision was needed on her future. She was approaching the end of her life, and by 1997 would need to be decommissioned, given that the decision was made not to invest in SLEP or run on updates. Eventually following much internal debate in Government the decision was taken to decommission BRITANNIA and in 1997 it was confirmed that a replacement would be ordered for her.

This decision was taken in the last months of the 1979 – 1997 Conservative Government and reflected a view that there should be a new Yacht commissioned, although funding solutions remained unclear.  The MOD assigned the project the title Staff Target (SEA) 7048, and set about putting together a clear requirement for the design. The four main goals of the new ship would be:

•  To provide a safe, secure, comfortable uniquely British base for The Sovereign on State Visits abroad.
•   To provide a setting for State occasions, conferences and receptions, during visits overseas and in the United Kingdom
• To facilitate visits to parts of the United Kingdom and short coastal transits when overseas to enable the Sovereign and other members of the Royal Family to entertain guests in a manner similar to Royal residences. There is no requirement for the Royal Party to be embarked for long distances.
•   To provide an opportunity for British business to mount prestigious seminars for the promotion of British exports and investment. By providing an example of excellence in British design, to assist in the promotion of British economic interests overseas.

Of note in this requirement is the significant shift in focus for the vessel to carry out local voyages, and not embark for long distance cruises. This points to a vessel that would be very different to the old BRITANNIA.

1997 MVD Crown Copyight

To meet this requirement the Royal Navy dusted off the plans from  the late 1980s and began work on refining them again. There appears to have been a new design invented under the less than auspicious acronym of CELERY (Cost Effective Luxury Royal Yacht), which seems to have been intended to take forward proposals for the new design. This was an evolution of the Minimum Viable Design and not the ‘full fat’ replacement envisaged by the MOD in the late 1980s. The result was a new Minimum Viable Design (1997) that was intended to fil the roles identified in 1990, but remain compliant with new legislation like the MARPOL requirements to avoid maritime pollution (such as a double bottom and the need to be able to process and store dirty water).

There were several changes made to reflect wider concerns raised about the 1990 MVD – for example marine regulations changed considerably in the 1990’s following the ‘Herald of Free Enterprise’ and ‘Estonia’ disasters. The MOD too placed more emphasis on safety at sea and following consultation with experts in the Marine Safety Agency and beyond confirmed that the new ship would need to meet legislation intended to protect passengers at sea. In other words she was both technically a warship, but also a passenger vessel at the same time.

This view caused a minor legal crisis in Government between the MOD and FCO as to whether the new Royal Yacht would have sovereign immunity, or if as a passenger vessel it could be boarded by other nations. The view eventually settled on the fact that were the Sovereign to embark then it would be immune, but it was harder to tell when non-royal civilian passengers were onboard.

A key change too was the growth in ships company size compared to the MVD (122 vs 74 in the 1990 design). The reason for this near doubling was based on analysis of the requirement, realising that most crew work for both husbandry and diplomatic / Royal activity occurred in a compressed window, and that it was often common for the ship to sail on completion of a State event. This meant that sufficient crew were needed to get the ship ready to host an event, carry out the event and then sail shortly after, rather than remain in port. The blunt assessment of the 1990 scheme of complement of 74 was:

“It is now clear that the complement number proposed would not have allowed the vessel to support Royal and State functions, would not have been possible to provide full Emergency and Security parties, nor would it have been possible to maintain the required level of presentation”.

The 1997 MVD was intended to provide a platform that would operate similarly to the 1990 design, but reflect more experience of what the Royal Household may require. It was recognised that the 1990 design was probably fatally flawed due to a variety of small issues that cumulatively would have made it hard to operate as an effective Royal Yacht.  For example, the design reincorporated accommodation for a Royal Marines Band, accepting that that cost of repeatedly flying the band, and their instruments, out to ports was vastly more expensive than building in accommodation for them from the outset.

Even so, the designers offered up a range of potential cost saving options that could have been taken to reduce the overall cost, including a reduction in range, reduction in conference facilities and removal of the flight deck. Other reductions were more challenging, for instance reducing the Royal Party to embark down to just 8 Royal Family members and 24 staff would save significantly, but would require the approval of Buckingham Palace, particularly as it was noted that HM The Queen had never embarked on BRITANNIA with less than 31 staff.

	1997 Minimum Viable Design	1990 Minimum Viable Design	BRITANNIA
Length at Waterline	104m	90m	118m
Beam at Waterline	16.8m	14m	16.75m
Deep Displacement	3280 tonnes	2500 tonnes	5300 tonnes
Range	6000nm	6000nm	3000nm
Top Speed	18kts	18kts	22kts
Flight Deck	YES	YES	NO
Royal Party	34	25 (permanent) 10 (contingency)	50
RM Band	TBC	0	25
RN Complement	125	60	250
Total  Military Accommodation	N/a	70	275
Boats	N/A	2	6

The 1997 MVD was intended to be introduced to service in Aug 2002, and built with a design life of 30-40 years. The 2002 entry to service date was of concern to the MOD, which was worried that inevitable programme slippage would mean the new vessel missing the major events of the Golden Jubilee, including the 2002 Fleet Review (planned, but never held). The MOD assessed that the cost of procurement would be about £76m in 1997 prices  (approx £149m in 2025), and then cost about £6m per year to run (approx £11m in 2025). The total cost over her life was assessed to be around the equivalent of £250m.

1997 MVD Deck Plans - Crown Copyright

The challenge facing the Royal Navy though was that the public mood was shifting against the procurement of a new Royal Yacht. The arrival of Tony Blair MP as Prime Minister in 1997 as the first leader of a Labour government since the 1970s saw a real shift in Ministerial mood against a replacement for BRITANNIA. Funding was tight and there was little appetite for the public purse to finance a new Royal Yacht.

In the early days of the Government officials looked at how to fund the replacement and what options would be appropriate to finance the new ship. Direct expenditure from the MOD budget was ruled out. Another approach was to take on funding by a Public Private Partnership, whereby industry would have funded the procurement of the vessel and sought a return on their investment. This was not supported by officials who felt that it would result in the new Yacht being required to generate commercial revenue, which may be unsuitable for the images of a national flagship.

There was also a difficulty in making the Yacht financially viable in this option. The Dept for Trade & Industry assessed that it may be possible to use the Yacht for private commercial use (e.g. trade days and the like) for up to 59 days per year, but that this would not generate much income, and nowhere near enough to cover running costs. One suggestion was that when not being used in a Royal or State capacity, the Yacht could have been used for private commercial hire (Below Decks Britannia anyone?) – but as was noted: “It is difficult to see how a ship used in this way could retain the dignity and status required to fulfil its representational role”.

The Paymaster General approached the chair of P&O, Lord Sterling, to conduct some analysis on the cash required to fund a new Royal Yacht worth some £70- £80m. The results showed that the Yacht would need to generate a revenue stream of £11.6 - £13.9m per year to return the investment. It was, in the judgement of Lord Sterling, “impossible to recover the capital cost of a new Yacht from commercial use and that PPP was therefore not viable”. In a meeting with Geoffery Robinson  (paymaster general) in September 1997, Lord Sterling made clear his views that the only option open was for HMG to fund the new vessel directly, and that P&O would not get involved in funding a new Yacht. His view was that:

 “HMG should itself finance, build and operate a new Royal Yacht, which if it was worked hard in support of British diplomacy, commerce and industry - particularly with Royals on board – would prove a fine investment for the country. If it was not possible for HMG to finance a new Royal Yacht, then the best outcome was no Royal Yacht”.

The Government considered a so-called ‘public subscription’ whereby the public could offer to put money forward to replace the Yacht, but this was dismissed as it “would not be viewed favourably the Palace because of the “begging bowl” implications”. There was also concern that it would not raise the full amount needed, forcing HMG to step in.

Another suggestion was to fund the ship via funding from the sale of National Lottery tickets, which could have made a major contribution to funding the vessel. This was dismissed as apparently financing a new Royal Yacht this way would not “fall within the definition of the National Lottery’s five good causes – (the arts, sport, heritage, charities and the Millenium fund)!  The Lottery could only have been used to fund a new Royal Yacht by passing primary legislation to change their good causes – something that would have been a political minefield at the best of times.

Finally the private sector was looked at for funding the replacement directly. The clear conclusion was that this would be very difficult to do as they would need to see a return on their investment, difficult with the structure of operating a Royal Yacht, and paying the annual running costs of £6m per year. There were few companies with the pockets deep enough to cover these costs, and it would have incurred significant public embarrassment had things gone wrong.

In the run up to the decommissioning of the BRITANNIA several other options were considered, mostly from industry approaching the Government with proposals that were often utterly unsuitable. This included a major Sail Training Ship, which would have housed both Royal Apartments and accommodation for young people taking part in sail training events. It was dismissed due to the impracticability of merging two very different roles in one design.

The Bibby Cruise Line offered to build a yacht that would not need to be paid for, for the first 3 years of the vessels life, and which would be on contract charter to the MOD, before becoming Crown property after 12 years. This was dismissed on both cost concerns and reputational grounds. Other commercial cruise companies made similar offers, keen to provide hulls that would carry a ‘Royal connection’ to generate revenue, but which would have been of presentational and financial concern to the Government.

The DML Proposal - Crown Copyright

The offer of most interest to Ministers was by the company DML – the firm that managed Devonport Dockyard in Plymouth. They made an unsolicited bid to provide a SLEP for BRITANNIA, taking ownership of the vessel and then providing it back to the nation via a charitable trust being contracted through the Government as a Public Private Partnership.  The DML pitch was that the Yacht would have a 20-30 year life extension, and that it would cost no more than £50m to deliver this SLEP – significantly below the cost of a new Yacht.

While superficially attractive, these proposals were greeted with scepticism by the MOD, which assessed that in reality a rebuild, while technically feasible, would cost closer to £90m. It was also not clear how DML would cover shortfalls of running costs and other issues, and whether charters and other contract work would be needed to make the SLEPed BRITANNIA financially viable. It was also unclear how it would be crewed – with the MOD taking the view that it would not be appropriate for the RN to crew her, meaning that either civilians, or potentially some kind of Sponsored Reservist may be the only outcome.

The overall view of the proposal was that while it held significant appeal (for example running on a much loved vessel), the risks were high, and the costs likely to balloon as the refit continued. The other challenge was that as crew numbers reduced as part of the SLEP, it would make it much harder for the remaining crew to carry out the necessary ships husbandry to keep the vessel looking immaculate. Running a 40+ year old vessel on, with only 50% of the original crew would be almost impossible to the same standards as before.

Eventually it became clear that the DML proposal was not viable, and that there was no outcome where industry could provide a meaningful alternative. Ultimately it was assessed that the only funding option open to the Government was to fund the new Yacht from the Treasury reserve, used for contingencies and emergencies, rather than any other source funding, with the MOD picking up the running costs.  The problem was that HM Treasury was not prepared to pay this.

HMY BRITANNIA

By late 1997 the end was in sight for both BRITANNIA and her replacement. A ‘wite around’ across Government had failed to find any departments able to justify the long term use for a vessel for their sole use. While there was some limited interest in the value of the Royal Yacht as a platform for activity by FCO and DTI, it was not possible for them to afford to run it. With no MOD funding available, George Robertson was keen for the situation to be closed down as quickly as possible.

In September 1997 the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was written to by Treasury officials advising him that George Robertson wished to discuss the future of the Royal Yacht replacement at the Labour Party conference, noting that “he wishes to gain broad agreement with you on the way forward before writing to colleagues”.

The submission went on to note that “the best solution is no Royal Yacht. Public funding is not available to replace or refurbish BRITANNIA and, subject to Pay Master Generals views, private finance options do not seem viable. The decision is, however, a political one.”.

The briefing went on to note that there seemed no easy way to fund a replacement – without public money, and with the high risk that a commercial refit or operation would require public bail out, there seemed little case to fund a replacement. The die was cast as both the Chancellor and Secretary of State for Defence seemed strongly opposed to funding a replacement for BRITANNIA. Time was of the essence as a decision was needed before the Yacht sailed on 20 October for her final voyage before paying off.

On 30 September 1997 Robertson wrote to the Prime Minister, setting out the case. He made clear that there were three options – a new Yacht, a rebuilt Yacht or no Yacht. On the commercial side, it was clear that no credible options existed to operate the vessel without considerable risk and reputational damage. As Robertson put it:  “The more commercially orientated the use of a future Yacht becomes, the less will it be seen to be a prestigious national asset”.  The problem was that if commercial funding wasn’t available, neither was public funding either.  He went on to note that:

 “The key issue, in my view, is whether we can justify using public funds for the provision of a future yacht at all. The Palace has made clear that any requirement for such a vessel is not driven by Royal needs or preferences. No Government Department has a requirement for such a Yacht (although the FCO and DTI would make use of one on an occasional basis if it were available). There is no defence need. We have made statements both before and after the General Election that public funds would not be available for this project. Funding a new Royal Yacht would be at variance with the broad thrust of our priorities for public expenditure”.

With this damning assessment, there was only one possible recommendation that could be made.  He stated that “we should decide neither to replace nor rebuild BRITANNIA and announce this decision before BRITANNIA departs on 20 October. Although this may have some presentational difficulties in the short term, indecision, or an ultimate decision in favour of a high risk PPP solution, could generate far worse in the long term”.

That simple note drew to the end the story of the Royal Yacht, as the Prime Minister, supported by others including the Chancellor endorsed the decision. In a letter from the PM’s Private Secretary dated 7 October, it was stated that:

“The Prime Minister believes that the conclusions of the Defence Secretary are right… We should neither rebuild, nor replace BRITANNIA”.

Years of planning, procrastination and political developments had made the retention of the Royal Yacht untenable.  Although plans were announced for a new Royal Yacht under the Boris Johnson administration, they were quietly shelved in 2022 as part of wider spending cuts. It is difficult to see how a new Yacht in the 2020s would have fared differently to the problems experienced in the 1990s though. 

Today BRITANNIA rests in Edinburgh, a floating reminder of a different age and time. She is well worth a visit, to see both the stories of the past, and to reflect on what might have been had she been replaced. It is perhaps better though  to let bygones be bygones and look back fondly on the BRITANNIA as the final representative of a tradition of Royal Yachts going back centuries, rather than build a new vessel that would be without a clear role or value in an era of slimmed down Monarchy, and where there is limited interest or value in such a platform for either exports, or as a national flagship in the same way as the past. On balance the cost saved to the nation was, at best around £250m but the long term ‘soft power’ damage of the decision is incalculable. As with many major decisions, the short-term financial gain is often far worse than the long-term intangible pain.