The MOD Cold War Plans to use the Channel Tunnel
The Channel Tunnel is one of the great engineering
projects of the 20th Century. Linking France to the United Kingdom,
it provides a rail link deep under the English Channel, enabling high speed
passenger trains, cargo and shuttle trains to transit dozens of times per day. An
aspiration for many centuries, and finally delivered in the early 1990s, the project
is a genuine engineering marvel. It is also a vitally important strategic
asset, and during the 1980s scene of significant debates across the British
Government about how it could be used in wartime.
The goal of this blog is to provide a brief look at the military value of the tunnel, its potential role during Transition to War (TTW) and wider challenges. It is not, and does not pretend to be a history of the Channel Tunnel, nor a discussion on rolling stock technicalities. This is a defence blog, not a railway history blog! The last note is that the phrase “Channel Tunnel” here is used interchangeably with “Fixed Link” which is a term present in many UK documents of the period.
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| UK MOD © Crown copyright |
In the late 1980s the UK was a leading NATO power, and
committed to providing a significant proportion of its land and air strength to
defending continental Europe. In normal peacetime, the British Army of the
Rhine (BAOR) was approximately 56,000 troops built around three armoured
divisions, while the RAF operated from five airfields (including Berlin) and 12
fighter jet squadrons plus supporting assets. As a measure of scale, there were
more RAF front line jets based in Germany in 1989 than the RAF possess in its entirety
today. The role of the force in peacetime was to defend elements of West
Germany from a Soviet led offensive, acting as a ‘speed bump’ for long enough to
enable reinforcements from North America to arrive and defeat the Soviets,
although in reality the war would probably have gone nuclear very quickly.
During the ‘Transition to War’ (TTW) phase, it was
expected that the UK would rapidly reinforce troops in Germany, growing BAOR to
its full war size (approximately a Corps), of over 100,000 troops, built around
four divisions and operating from the front line in Germany all the way back to
the channel ports. A complex, but regularly tested series of exercises was
carried out to ensure that reservists could be called up, equipped, transferred
to the continent and issued vehicles before transiting to the front line to
reinforce BAOR in a matter of a few days. The TTW process is all but forgotten
these days, but it should be a source of considerable professional pride that
until 1991, the UK would have been able to roughly treble the size of its armed
forces, and fully equip them, in under a week. This is now all but impossible due
to decades of neglect and disinvestment in mobilisation capabilities by the
British Army.
While most ‘orders of battle’ focus far more on
front line forces, and count the number of tanks, guns and missiles that an
army may have in its possession, far fewer focus on the logistics and support
required to enable the force to fight and be sustained for more than a few
hours of combat. Logistics was the vital tail that would have ensured that BAOR
would have had the ability to keep supplying itself during the initial battle
and then the likely fighting retreat west. To deliver this a vast network was built
linking the front line forces in Germany to the UK, through a complex series of
‘Rear Communication Zones’ that saw British forces operate fuel and supply
depots across Germany and the Low Countries, as well as vehicle storage depots
in Belgium. These were reinforced by regular movements of cargo through shipping
between the UK (usually Marchwood Military Port) and Antwerp or other major
ports, bringing equipment from the UK depots to support BAOR. The sheer scale of the operation was incredible,
and arguably far in excess of anything that the Army could do today.
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| UK MOD © Crown copyright |
In a 1989 MOD paper called “Peacetime military
use of the Channel Tunnel” the
MOD explored the potential offered by the tunnel and what it could do to save
costs and support the UK presence in Germany.
The paper noted that in 1989 the UK had no less than 250,000 peacetime individual
troop movements between the UK and forces in Europe (roughly 2/3rds to BAOR,
1/3rd to the Rear Communication Zone – RCZ). In addition there were
a further 28,000 ‘block moves’ through 250 different flights covering the
airlift of troops and their families between the UK and Germany as part of unit
rotation between Germany and the UK. Op Banner (British Army ops in Northern
Ireland) saw a further 5000 troops moved. When other moves were added in, approximately
300,000 individual moves occurred each year by air between Germany and the UK,
while the numbers of troops going on leave in private vehicles was beyond
counting.
The logistics tail was also vast, and made exclusive
use of surface freighting routes. It was noted that for vehicle maintenance
support (e.g. the vehicles, parts and assets needed to support the Army), a
Landing Ship Logistic (LSL) sailed every four days from Marchwood to Antwerp as
a regular shipping schedule, carrying over 9000 ISO containers per year between
the UK and Germany, just for spare parts. A total of 300 Type A (armour / APC /
artillery), 4500 Type B (soft skinned trucks etc)( and 150 Type C vehicles (engineering
plant) were moved to Germany ever year, not counting exercises or operations. There was not enough military shipping
capability available for all of this work, with a roughly 15% shortfall
identified, that was filled by commercial shipping providers. A further 20 tons
of general defence cargo (e.g. tank tracks etc) went on each sailing too,
representing the bulk of stores needed to support operations.
This was just for routine freight – there was also a
daily ISO container flown into Germany from the UK containing priority stores,
while every day a truck drove from RAF Stafford, a major logistics hub to RAF
Wildenrath, home of the freight distribution centre, containing high priority
stores that needed urgent issue within Germany to the Army and RAF.
Ammunition was handled separately and moved by
vehicles and service shipping between the UK and Germany. Most ammunition was
shipped into Zeebruge, Emden or Nordenham port, where it was moved by rail to
the ammunition depots within BAOR. In 1988 over 9000 tonnes of ammunition was
moved this way, using sea lift and rail movements to deliver ammunition to the front
line.
As can be seen there was a huge logistics tail that required a complex network of land, sea, rail and air assets to support the front line. This was both complex and vulnerable during transition to war, as well as reliant on a potentially fragile system to keep going. The loss of an airfield or port to sabotage would have a dramatic effect on the ability to get reinforcements to Germany during a crisis. To that end, the Channel Tunnel was seen to offer significant opportunities for the Army as a way of reinforcing Germany while also saving money. The key areas of interest were in passengers, cargo and medical evacuation.
From a passenger perspective, the MOD assessed that once
the Channel Tunnel was open, it wouldn’t necessarily be viable to replace
existing air contracts for passenger transport to Germany. At this stage there
was a daily air trooping service operated from Luton airport, at a cost of £50
per head (£136 in 2024 sums) which looks surprisingly competitive. But it was
felt that for troops moving to Belgium, the tunnel was a good option. The sheer
flexibility of the tunnel was noted that it offered far more frequent departures than an aircraft
and would be quicker too. In turn this would enable savings in operations at
Wildenrath, for example shutting passenger handling facilities or reducing
passenger coaches – a good example of how you can generate knock on savings
from a single innovation.
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| UK MOD © Crown copyright |
The key area where the tunnel offered opportunities
for the MOD was in the movement of cargo. The paper noted that:
“The original requirement was to move 125
containers per month along the Dedicated Line of Military Communication (DLofMC),
a figure which was subsequently increased to 300 containers per month from 7.5
sailings. The present requirement far exceeds this capacity…
LSL’s are not designed to carry containers
and therefore containers do not make best use of capacity of LSLs. LSLS are
service ships with TTW and war roles and related high priority training and
exercise tasks…
The four day sailing interval requires a
large number of containers which spend much of their time in transit waiting to
be moved…
The priority freight system is wasteful
because 85% of the cargo does not need to be moved at the speed achieved
It was suggested that the Channel Tunnel could be
used to instead carry the military logistics requirement in a far more efficient
way than others expected. Figures indicated that an ISO container moved by rail
freight could expect to be delivered in 24-30hrs versus 5-8 days under the shipping
system. It was also noted that:
“With the exception of Main Battle Tanks, all vehicles
currently moved to BFG could use railfreigh trainload from manufacturer or the rail
served deport at Lugershall to a BFG depot. Such a move would be cheap and fast
and remove any requirement for handling in transit, with most vehicles being
moved in containers”
The overall finding was that other than ammunition,
which was unlikely to be allowed to be moved via the tunnel, there were huge
potential for savings by using rail freight to move pretty much every aspect of
BAOR equipment to and from Germany. The savings would include a reduction in
the need for priority shipping, as well as increasing capacity on LSL’s for ammunition
carriage, reducing the need to charter commercial shipping. From a logistics
perspective, the tunnel was seen as a huge benefit for the MOD.
There was also a more grim need identified for the tunnel,
which was the evacuation of dependents and wounded personnel. During the TTW period,
tens of thousands of families would need to be moved from Germany back to the
UK to avoid being caught up in the conflict. The planning for the evacuation
was grim to put it mildly, with the inference being that people were to be put
on buses and moved involuntarily, leaving their husbands behind to die, while parties
of troops were assigned the role of going through the now empty housing estates
to shoot any remaining pets. It is difficult now to imagine the traumatic
nature of such an evacuation or how families would cope being moved back to the
UK at practically no notice, leaving their homes and possessions behind, and to
find themselves dumped in a now empty barracks. The planning envisaged using
fleets of buses to move the families back to the ports, where they would use
empty ferries and possibly aircraft to be returned to the UK. The tunnel would
offer a potentially good chance to move families in large numbers back, and
potentially more quickly than using existing plans.
Similarly the Channel Tunnel offered a chance to evacuate
wounded personnel back to the UK for treatment in hospitals. Another now forgotten
aspect of planning for TTW is that the NHS would have essentially closed to civilian
patients, with hospitals discharging all but the most desperately ill, and
in turn emptied to receive incoming
wounded troops. BAOR did have a small number of hospital trains assigned to it,
which were scheduled to move troops in a precisely planned operation from field
hospitals to the RCZ, and in turn by ferry to the UK where they would be moved
into an NHS hospital.
Given that in the 1980s the MOD was expecting that BAOR
would take approximately 8000 casualties per day, the scale of the challenge
would have been huge. It is clear that the ambulance train would have not been enough,
and the Channel Tunnel, with its intended fleet of high speed trains operated
by British Rail (BR) and French operators may have presented an opportunity to
move casualties at greater speeds than previously imagined. Accordingly in the
late 1980s the MOD tentatively inquired with BR as to whether it would be
possible to convert the planned Eurostar fleet to carry hospital stretchers.
The response from the BR Director of Operations was a fairly emphatic ‘no’:
“The design of the vehicle would not enable
their use for the transport of stretcher bound casualties, nor is it considered
possible that these vehicles could be altered to fill this function.
The use of the Channel Tunnel for this
purpose does of course depend on the overall content of the military plans
involved. As you know I have been concerned at the mulitiplicty of approaches
to us on this matter, particularly in concern to the BAOR Ambulance Train
problem…
It could be that in times of war the
Tunnel might be used for the movement of casualties by through working of
British Rail coaching stock. This however would require further technical
consideration and special permission on the day. In addition as you will
appreciate the locomotive provided would have to be compatible with the rolling
stock for heating etc and questions of driver knowledge would also have to be thought
about..”
This letter conjures up two marvellous images- the
first of a Eurostar train converted to carry wounded troops as a modern day
ambulance train, while the second is of a British rail driver being sent in a ‘BR
blue’ engine across the channel tunnel to emerge amidst the chaos of wartorn
Europe to collect injured troops and bring them home in BR issue coaching
stock. One must only hope that they weren’t collected in a Pacer!
By the late 1980s then the MOD had identified its requirements
for the Channel Tunnel in wartime. In a formal memo, it broke them down into
the following areas:
“The aim of this note is to set out the
planning assumptions for the Channel Tunnel in time of crisis or war.
Military requirements for movement from
England to France include:
a.
Logistic support for UK forces operating
on the continent.
b.
Subject to the agreement of France,
logistic support for US forces operating on the continent.
Military requirements for movement from
France to England include:
a.
The evacuation of service
dependents (NEO)
b.
The evacuation of sick and wounded service
personnel
c.
The backloading of containers to
the UK base
Conclusions
On the assumption that the Channel Fixed
Link remains in operation for crisis and war, Departments should further assume
that its capacity will be uilised as follows:
a.
Before UK reinforcements of its
forces on the continent.
b.
During UK reinforcement
c.
After UK reinforcement”
It is clear now that the UK was far more advanced in
its thinking about how the tunnel would have played a key part in its military
transition to war than is perhaps popularly realised. There was without doubt
clear plans in place, and it was seen as a significant opportunity to improve efficiency,
while also saving money too. But the tunnel also posed some significant
defensive challenges, so how was this to be factored in?
The complexity of the Channel Tunnel is that it is a
bilateral cooperation between the UK and France, and has operations on both
nations soil. During the 1980s France was a political member of NATO, but not a
military one, meaning that its forces were not integrated into the Alliances
command structures, and their participation in the run up to war could not be taken
for granted. This posed a significant challenge for planners who could not be
certain that the French would be present on the day, or permit operations via
the tunnel.
In addition the site is a large fixed set of infrastructure,
with railheads and tunnel entrances that would be vulnerable to sabotage or air
strikes. A key planning assumption for the UK was that as TTW began, Soviet
special forces would infiltrate and attempt to cause mass disruption through attacking
key points, or destroying military infrastructure to delay reinforcements and
disrupt the chain of command. Extensive plans had been drawn up to protect much
of the national infrastructure through a series of ‘Key Points’ that would be
protected by military and police forces, with troops armed and equipped to
repel attacks by hostile forces.
Ports, for example, would have been protected by the
Royal Navy, with extensive use made of patrol ships, quick reaction forces and
other assets to stop any attempt to block the ports or sink shipping. The
Channel Tunnel by contrast would have been a huge target for Soviet saboteurs,
who would have, if they could disrupt or destroy it, been able to potentially
cause chaos to UK plans to reinforce BAOR in a crisis as the rail network was
destroyed or the tunnel flooded. Similarly in wartime the tunnel entrances and
associated railheads would almost certainly have been a target for airstrikes
and ballistic missile attacks in an effort to destroy them and prevent their
use.
These concerns were recognised from the outset, and
when the decision was taken to sign an international treaty in 1986 to build
the tunnel, part of the terms of it covered the planning for tis defence.
Article 5 of the Treaty explicitly stated that:
“Defence and security matters relating
to the Fixed Link and the implementation of this treaty shall be subject to special
arrangements between the two governments. Such arrangements shall include the
provisions for the free circulation throughout the Fixed Link of public officials
and other persons, so far as it is necessary for the exercise of their functions
in relation to the defence and security of the Fixed Link and for the protection
and assistance to be accorded to them.
Such arrangements will provide for the
designation by each Government of the authorities empowered to take any decision
necessitated for the defence and security of the Fixed Link. The agents, so designated
by their Governments, or their agents, will so far as possible coordinate their
activities within the framework of such arrangements.”
To overcome this, the British and French governments
signed a classified agreement in 1986 on how they would protect the tunnel in
both peace and wartime. This was intended to provide clarity to both nations
around how to plan for defence, under stand the legal issues around operations
under the sea and ensure that reinforcement would not be impeded. The purpose
of this special agreement was defined in Article 1:
“The purpose of this special arrangement
is to define the arrangements both for the defence of the Channel Tunnel Fixed
Link, and for its use, in exceptional circumstances, for defence purposes and
to agree on various provisions for defence matters relating to the Channel fixed
link”.
This separate agreement laid out in detail how the
UK and French governments would be responsible for their sides of the tunnel
and how it would be defended. It was agreed that separate command chains would
govern the response to the threat in both nations. In France, the military
authorities responsible for the defence of the tunnel were the Commander in
Chief Atlantic for maritime forces, and the Commander of Air Defence Forces for
the air threat. In the UK the CINCFLEET and AOC Strike Command were responsible
for the defence of the tunnel.
It was also agreed that detailed plans were to be drawn
up for the defence of the tunnel in wartime, which in France included:
“The General commanding the 2nd
military region with drawing up the tasked operational defence plan for that part
of the fixed link which is under French jurisdiction. The plan will specify all
measures intended to secure the Fixed Link against enemy action and to prepare
for the conduct of defence operations”.
Meanwhile in the UK it was intended that the Chief
Constable of Kent constabulary (the police) would be responsible for “the
maintenance of order and internal security” while the CINC UK Land Forces
was responsible for “drawing up military home defence plans”. All
combined it meant that there was intended to be comprehensive planning in place
for the defence of the Channel Tunnel as a military asset.
The agreement went further than perhaps some expected
in enabling the two nations to be able to defend the tunnel. One clause noted:
“At the request of one of the two states,
the defence of all or part of the Fixed Link may be undertaken by the forces of
the other state.
The forces of the sending state whilst
in the Host State will remain under national command, but will be placed under
the operational control of the Host State”.
This is an interesting clause in that it envisaged a
scenario where had TTW begun, but the French were still outside of NATO military
command structures, then the UK could have operated troops on French soil to protect
the Channel Tunnel. Its hard to think of many other agreements signed in this
period that the French acceded to placing their forces under the operational
control of another power in this way – making it a particularly significant agreement.
The agreement also stipulated that both Governments
could request the use of the Channel Tunnel infrastructure for defence use in
exceptional circumstances. In particular:
“Consent to make the Fixed Link available
must in particular allow the movement of Defence Forces or of their supplies, the
movement of civilians or the evacuation of casualties. The forces and their
supplies will include personnel, vehicles, weapons, provisions and conventional
munitions”.
In other words the UK could request to use the tunnel
for the movement of its forces during TTW and beyond, and hypothetically the French
could do the same but in reverse.
The agreement also confirmed that the UK and French governments
would draw up plans for the joint use of the Channel Tunnel for defence
purposes and put in place a comprehensive exercise regime to test them. Other
measures cover the safety of personnel and equipment while using the tunnel and
how to sort insurance claims out and giving governments the agreement to put in
place reasonable measures for defence purposes to regulate access to the tunnel.
When brought together it is clear that the agreement provides considerable power
to both the British and French governments to plan for the defence of the
Channel Tunnel and to ensure that it can be accessed when required by their
armed forces. The agreement was signed in early 1986 and requires a years
notice to withdraw. It is unclear whether this agreement remains in force to
this day or not.
The MOD response to this agreement was to analyse
what it meant for the armed forces and operational planning. It quickly
identified several challenges that it needed to overcome. Some of these were
legal concerns about how to force Eurotunnel to include defensive features into
the construction of the tunnel, or incorporate defence needs – such as strengthening
the loading bays for vehicles to be strong enough to include Challenger tanks and
whether it was legally possible for this to be included or not.
It was also caught up in the usual round of bureaucratic
inertia and arguments. In 1988 an MOD committee review the agreement and noted challenges.
This included debates about Eurotunnels head of security (an RAF Air Commodore)
requesting that the site be given ‘Key Point’ status to enhance the ability to
protect it and get French engagement early on to invest in defensive measures,
but the MOD refused to do so on the grounds that it couldn’t designate a site a
Key Point until it was built, which would be too late for this request. Similarly
there was complexity over planning counter terrorism operations or enabling the
deployment of UK troops to visibly protect the site in response to concerns
from the Kent police. Other concerns
raised were around whether the French would be trustworthy if the tunnel was
needed. There was a note of suspicion around French intentions – for example:
“D of D Cts (UK) said he would like some reassurance
before 1991 that if the UK wanted to use the CFL (Channel Fixed Link) for reinforcement,
that the French would defend their end of it”
Overall though the MOD felt that the agreement was
workable and would allow the UK to operate through the tunnel as required.
There was also a realisation that the tunnel would be extremely helpful as wider
arms control agreements came into force – for example the CFE treaty would
place holding limits on various vehicle types, so the tunnel would enable
speedy reinforcement of Germany during TTW of vehicles moved out of the BAOR
area.
The final issue of concern to the MOD was that of
destruction of the tunnel for defence purposes. It was noted that: “D of D
Cts said that he had also asked about putting the tunnel out of action for
defence purposes. He had been advised that the tunnel could be closed quickly (by
explosives) or rather more slowly by flooding. He was satisfied that it was not
necessary to produce plans to immobilise the tunnel”.
These documents provide a fascinating rare glimpse
into MOD thinking for the Channel Tunnel. To this day the majn MOD files in the
National Archives on the subject remain resolutely closed and inaccessible to
the public. These files only emerged by chance from an entirely different departments
archive, but they point to the importance of the Channel Tunnel and the serious
concerns about its role in defence during the 1980s. What is less clear is whether
they lasted beyond the collapse of the Berlin Wall, or if the planning has long
been put into abeyance. There is no doubt
that the Channel Tunnel remains a vital piece of critical national infrastructure
to this day, but whether it has a role to play in reinforcing British troops is
open to question. It is worth remembering
the importance of the tunnel, and to consider what may have been. Had the Cold
War gone on, then its likely that over time significant investment would have occurred
to see the bulk of UK military stores sent by rail freight to Germany, while ambulance
trains would have remained in use and potentially been regular exercise users
of the tunnel.
As the UK completes the Strategic Defence Review
this is a time to reflect on whether scarce resource should be focused on the front
line in large strength, like tanks and artillery to visibly deter an opponent
from attacking, or if a more credible force is smaller but better supported by
a properly resourced logistics system. If anything, this file reminds us both
of the critical importance of logistics in wartime planning, the vital nature
of rail in military operations and how even the most powerful of formations
rely on humble spare parts to operate.
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