OPERATION SCOOP - The Top Secret Cold War Mission by HMS OCELOT
The Royal Navy has a long and proud history of sending submarines to carry out highly sensitive missions in places they shouldn’t be, taking pictures of things they shouldn’t see, and listening to private conversations that weren’t intended to be overheard. For very good reasons the vast bulk of these operations remain sealed away, unlikely to ever be seen by the public. Yet occasionally, and for reasons which seem to make no rationale sense, the odd file emerges which casts a little bit of light into this dark and mysterious world. There are other Pinstripedline blogs on naval intelligence collection missions, including one about classified submarine missions and Operation KEYSTONE about operations off Murmansk with the surface fleet. This article though is about the story of OPERATION SCOOP, an intelligence gathering mission carried out by HMS OCELOT in 1968, in the Med, against Soviet naval vessels.
HMS AMBUSH (CROWN COPYRIGHT 2012)
The Mediterranean has long held a crucial place in British strategic thinking. The sea that connects two oceans, for centuries the UK has sought to exert physical control and diplomatic influence in this space to protect the national interest. From the great fortress of Gibraltar to the island of Malta, the unsinkable aircraft carrier of Cyprus and (at one time) the anchorages and facilities of Alexandria and Suez, the Med was home to large swathes of British maritime, air and land power, dedicated to ensuring that the commercial life blood of empire ran smoothly.
By the 1960s times had changed, the UK was withdrawing over
100,000 personnel from ‘East of Suez’ as the post-colonial conflicts ended and
the need to focus scarce cash, resources and personnel on countering the Soviet
threat took priority. The reduction in the size of the Royal Navy led to the scrapping
of the historic ‘Mediterranean Fleet’ in 1967, merging instead with the Home
Fleet to become the ‘Western Fleet’. The permanent RN presence in the region
was diminished, while at the same time the US Navy grew its own presence via
the 6th Fleet, established after WW2. The US Navy had significant strategic interest
in the region, as this excellent 1987 article by Norman
Friedman in Proceedings attests. By 1968
the US usually had 2-3 carrier battle groups operating in the Med, intended to
conduct both ASW and also nuclear strike operations on the USSR. Additionally,
Polaris submarines were deployed into the region from 1961 onwards, conducting
patrols to carry out a strategic nuclear attack if required on the Soviet Union.
To counter this NATO threat, the Russians took steps to grow
their presence and capability in the Med from the 1950s onwards. In 1958 a squadron
of 12 conventional submarines was deployed in Albania, lasting until 1961. The
CIA assessment was that this squadron was intended to provide a forward line of
defence for the Black Sea Fleet, in the event of war. By 1964 the presence grew
with the establishment of a small squadron permanently deployed into the
region. This became “the Soviets only year round naval deployment of a mixed
force beyond home waters’ .
Initially comprising four surface ships, the force grew quickly,
as the growing Soviet Navy was able to assign vessels to permanently operate in
the region, with roughly two thirds of the force coming from the Black Sea
Fleet. Each year the force grew and capability, and by 1967 had expanded to
around a dozen ships. The outbreak of war in the Middle East in 1967 saw a surge
of Soviet naval forces into the region, which according to declassified TOP SECRET CIA briefings on the force
stated:
“As international tensions rose just prior to the outbreak
of hostilities, the Soviets sent four additional combatant ships to join the force,
three of them equipped with guided missiles. The augmented squadron then
divided into three groups to monitor the activity of the two American and one
British attack carrier groups then operating in the Mediterranean”.
The reason for this
growth and monitoring was, intelligence analysts feared, due to Soviet plans to
use their presence in the Med in the event of war to attack and destroy both US
surface ships and Polaris submarines. There was a clear recognition that in
wartime the Med would become a challenging operating environment for both NATO
and Soviet forces, with Soviet provided bombers, anti-ship missiles, torpedo
boats and submarines posing a credible threat to NATO forces, which in return
could potentially launch nuclear strikes on the southern USSR.
It was clear that to the Soviet Union, removing these nuclear
assets from play was a vital requirement as quickly as possible in wartime. A 1973 TOP SECRET
CIA briefing note, signed by Deputy Director of Operations William Colby (who would
shortly afterwards become Director) references an article, published in the influential
SECRET Soviet Ministry of Defence publication “Collection of Articles on the
School of Military Thought” by Soviet Rear Admiral N Gonchar.
“This article published by a Soviet submarine officer
recommends the establishment of a series of zonal defences to locate Polaris
submarines in peacetime so that they can be destroyed just before a war, or in
its very early stages. Specific concepts
which he espouses are the use of specially configured fishing vessels for
submarine reconnaissance and relay submarines using explosive signalling in
ocean channels to maintain communications with hunter killer boats…
Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive,
the report should be handled on a strict ‘need to know’ basis within recipient
agencies”
The article is a fascinating insight into Soviet thinking on
how to tackle the threat posed by Polaris submarines (both British and American)
and their recommendations on how to tackle this threat. Of particular note was
the admission on the limitations of the Soviet understanding of where to find
Polaris:
“At present we consider there are four areas patrolled by
missile submarines of the United States**
-
The northeast Atlantic (South of Iceland and
West of the Hebrides)
-
The Northwest and central part of the Norwegian
Sea
-
The Western part of the Pacific Ocean
(Southeast of the Japanese Islands)
-
The Mediterranean Sea
** Our information on the presence in these areas of the
American missiles submarines consists of fragmentary data, received at different
intervals, and is therefore not always reliable”.
The article goes onto discuss Soviet understanding of US
launch procedures and asks whether these submarines would be required to operate
in special launch areas or not. After considering this, it recommended that in
wartime the role of the Soviet Navy operation would ensure: “the destruction
of nuclear submarines, the defeat of carrier strike large units, and the destruction
of groupings of ships at bases and large shipyards”.
What this meant was that by 1968 the Med was rapidly
becoming a ‘hot zone’ as the growing Soviet naval presence increased in size
and was intended to ensure that in wartime, it could take the offensive to NATO
and destroy both carriers and SSBNs as quickly as possible. Clearly something
needed to be done about this, which is where the Royal Navy submarine service
enters the picture…
On 4 July 1968 the Commodore Naval Collection in the Defence
Intelligence Staff wrote to a range of senior naval colleagues seeking their
approval to conduct a mission to collect intelligence against the Soviet Navy in
the Med. The opportunity was made clear:
“1. The
presence of the Soviet Squadron in the Med, including some of their most modern
ships, presents an opportunity for acquiring intelligence in advantageous circumstances:
a.
The Russian ships are on the high seas
and there is no need for surveillance vessels to penetrate into areas which
could be regarded as waters of special sensitivity.
b.
Weather conditions are normally good,
particularly in the summer.
c.
There is a high probability of locating worthwhile
targets either at seas or in one of the anchorages habitually used by ships of
the squadron.
2. Despite
many sightings, there is still much intelligence to be gained on the
characteristics of the ships themselves. In addition, and more important, we have
insufficient general knowledge on the movements and employment of the Soviet Mediterranean
fleet, especially of the submarines, except when they are engaged in close
surveillance of Western forces. To obtain this requires covert intelligence
which can only be obtained from submarines”.
Having set out the opportunity, the brief then goes to on to
recommend that on 2nd August, HMS OCELOT, under the command of Lt
Cdr Morriss RN, would sail from Malta to conduct an ‘Operation LIBEL’ (presumed
to be an intelligence collection mission). Her mission was to: “Carry out surveillance
of Soviet anchorages and maritime activity in the central Mediterranean as far
east as 27 East, until 14th September”. (27 degrees east is the line of longitude,
stretching roughly from the southern tip of mainland Turkey to Libya).
There was not a clearly defined schedule to follow for
OCELOT, rather she would go where the opportunity presented itself at the time
depending on the Soviet presence. But how do you find this presence if you’re
trying to be covert? The plan was simple, the RAF would deploy a small force of
Shackleton long range maritime patrol aircraft, who would temporarily operate
from Malta to find Soviet shipping on the surface and provide intelligence that
could be communicated to OCELOT for her activities.
The letter noted that this would be the first intelligence
collection operation of its type carried out in the Med, and that there were no
guidelines on limitations of operations (save not entering other nations
territorial waters). There were also concerns about how to avoid detection by the
Soviets and ensure that incidents were avoided. It noted two key challenges for
the operation, namely “the peculiar sonar conditions in the Mediterranean in
summer (and) the underwater visibility.”
The reason this mattered was because the Med is a particularly
challenging environment to operate in acoustically, with the author noting that
detection ranges on sonar could be challenging:
“The effective sonar range will vary from day to day, and
even from hour to hour depending on the locality and depth of the submarine… As
an example, the detection range of a submarine at 60 feet could be forecast as
3000 yards, whereas at 200 feet it could be forecast as less than 1000 yards.
It would therefore be misleading to lay down a fixed approach limit as has been
the practise in other waters. It is proposed instead that HMS OCELOT should be
ordered that if she encounter Soviet naval vessels employing active sonar, she
must endeavour to keep outside the effective sonar range, or 1000 yards,
whichever is the greater.”
At the same time there were significant concerns that operating
in the Med would risk the OCELOT being detected visually by an observant lookout.
The risk was real that in the wrong light or angle, it would be possible to
spot her either from the air, or even on the bridge wing. That said, the DIS
was relatively sanguine about her chances of being spotted:
“The clearness of the water increases the chances of HMS
OCELOT herself being seen, but one can see much less clearly downwards than
upwards, especially if the surface is rippled, and a wealth of experience has been
acquired over many years which should enable the Commanding Officer to gauge with
fair accuracy the depth at which he risks being seen from above conditions”.
Given these risks of detection, why was the Royal Navy so keen
to put one of its most advanced conventional submarines into such a risky
situation in the Med, and so close to the Soviet Navy? The reason was, as
always, intelligence based:
“The clearness of the water and the bright conditions above
the surface afford an opportunity to obtain some unique intelligence. Soviet
security is such that Western intelligence seldom obtains a view of important
modern ships in dock and therefore all too little is known about the underwater
configuration and fittings of such ships. These are very important items. Hull configuration,
particularly allied with the shape and number of propellor blades, is an
important factor in assessing speed/endurance, turning circle, radiated noise
and in the case of submarines, diving depth. Sizes and shapes of sonar domes
provide evidence of the power and frequency used, and hence the capability of
the set itself. If HMS OCELOT could pass underneath (or nearly so), she would
have a very good chance of obtaining unique intelligence badly needed not only
by ourselves, but also the Americans…
It is proposed that HMS OCELOT be permitted to pass under
Soviet ships if the opportunity arises providing that:
a.
The ship is not transmitting on sonar
b.
The depth is adjusted to ensure that the
risk of being seen is negligible
c.
The depth of the submarine is at least
100 feet deeper than the draught of the target
d.
No soviet aircraft or helicopters are
airborne in the vicinity “
Of course, sending a submarine onto an operation that involves
her sailing around the Med for a month requires a good cover story. Diesel submarines
may well need to surface occasionally, and as noted, it is possible to detect
them. To explain the non-routine presence of a British submarine in the region,
it was decided to pass the whole thing off as a NATO exercise:
“In order to preserve the security of the operation there
would be a cover plan, Exercise ROAR, for a series of trials in various areas
of the central Mediterranean. These areas will be located in the approximate
vicinity of her likely real patrol areas, and would be declared to NATO. The patrol
areas and true purpose of the operation would be declared only to US Naval
Authorities, in order to avoid the risk of mutual interference with their
submarines”.
There are several things to unpack from the above. The first
is the inference that by 1968 it was routine for the RN to conduct close in
surveillance of the Soviet Navy in other locations, most likely in the Baltic and
colder waters. That rules existed for other operations suggests strongly this
was not a new game.
Secondly, the strength of the UK/US relationship shines
through here – that the UK saw merit in the operation partly due to the
advantages it would give the US speaks to both intelligence realpolitik, in that
it gives the UK something good to ‘trade’, but also that there was sufficient
closeness of relationships to be really open about intelligence gaps – not something
every nation shared with each other. Additionally,
the willingness to share the operational details points to a level of underwater
water space management that isn’t always shared with friends (think of the collision
between HMS VANGUARD and LE TRIOMPHANT) – clearly UK/US global submarine
operations were already closely integrated by the 1960s. It also points to a wider lack of trust of
NATO – the unwillingness to share operationally sensitive details points to a
suspicion either that the Op would be compromised, or simply a lack of trust of
other navies.
Finally, the sheer scale of the operation is quite
incredible. Imagine for a moment a Soviet KYNDA class anti-carrier cruiser, displacing
some 5500 tonnes sailing along in the sea and drawing some 17.5 feet (5.5m).
Now roughly 33m below that (or 2/3rds the height of Nelsons column) put a 2400
tonne British submarine sitting directly underneath and taking covert photography
of the hull. 33m is not very far – barely a third of the length of HMS OCELOT,
so the margin for risk was high. This was definitely a high-risk contact sport
to play.
With all of the above points considered, the Vice Chief of
the Naval Staff (Admiral Bush
RN) authorised the mission, which was to be known as OPERATION SCOOP. The last
part of the puzzle was to persuade the diplomats in the Foreign Office to
approve the mission itself.
On 16th July 1968, the Royal Navy wrote to the
FCO and sought diplomatic views on the use of HMS OCELOT for ‘the purpose of
surveillance of anchorages now in common use by the Soviet Navy’. The RN
set out a list of anchorages off the coast of Tunisia, Libya, Crete and shallow
water south of Greece that it wished to investigate. It also set out in
slightly less precise terms than those the Royal Navy had agreed to, around the
terms and conditions of the operation:
“Apart from the usual forms of intelligence gathering we
hope to obtain good results from underwater photography… For photography to be
of value it will be necessary for the submarine to approach fairly close to its
target and perhaps underneath though at a depth which should preclude detection
by visual means…
For this reason the normal security and approach
limitations applied to submarine operations would defeat the object of the
operation. Instead we propose the following…
a. No operations east of 27E or within
territorial waters claimed by any Foreign Power
b. The need to remain undetected
would take priority over collection of intelligence, even though all operations
will take place on “neutral ground”.
The RN decided not to set out in more detail that the ‘fairly
close’ approach anticipated would result in sailing barely 30m below the
surface of any Soviet vessels found…
 |
| RAF Shackleton |
With FCO approval being sought, the MOD moved fast to get
the RAF Maritime patrol force onboard. On 17 July 1968 the MOD tasked RAF
Coastal Command to be ready to assign assets from the Near East Air Force to
operate out of Malta to identify shipping targets of interest, particularly in the
key anchorages and wider vessels underway. The mission was simple: “The Navy
department have asked that RAF Shackleton aircraft should provide intelligence
of Soviet movements in order to deploy the submarine to best advantage”.
The tasking though did present a problem. Why would the RAF
be operating Shackletons out of Malta, and what would the reason be for it, and
what should be said to NATO? They would know that a submarine was doing some
trials and exercises in the wider region, but what about the role of the RAF in
all of this? In a classic example of ‘passing the buck’, Coastal Command found
itself tasked by the MOD to come up with a plan:
“It is clearly important that Shackleton surveillance for
this task can in no way be associated with the movement of the submarine, and in
consultation with Western Fleet you are asked to draw up a suitable cover plan embracing
the Shackleton operations…
The true purpose of the operation is not to be declared
to NATO authorities in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, but clearly the aircraft
surveillance will have to be. It will be necessary therefore that the cover
story is sufficiently comprehensive to allow
a convincing justification of the aircraft sorties to be declared…”
Pity for a moment the poor RAF officer at HQ Coastal Command
in Northwood, tasked with working alongside RN colleagues to come up with a
plausible story to explain why the RAF was flying surveillance flights in the
Med using assets not normally assigned to it, and ensuring that NATO would
believe the story being told to them!
The Air Department of the MOD regarded the mission as an intelligence
collection operation, known as OP AMEN, which appears to be the wider code for
intelligence collection flights conducted under JIC tasking. Because this was a
formal intelligence collection mission, and due to the way that the UK state
worked, conduct of missions of this type needed Ministerial approval to proceed.
In 1968 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had approved a paper setting out
the type of intelligence collection missions and who would be required to
authorise them and when. In a note to the MOD Under Secretary of State by Vice
Chief of the Air Staff on 31 July 1968 it was confirmed that Operation SCOOP: ‘comes
under the general category of Maritime Intelligence Gathering under the
recently approved regulations given in the recently approved JIC(68)(5), the codeword
LIBEL” (presumably a codeword for routine intelligence gathering) and that
as the RAF was involved, authorisation would be needed for an Operation AMEN (“which
is also part of the approved intelligence gathering regulations set out in JIC
(68) 5) would need to be authorised”. The note went on to say that:
“normally LIBEL operations can be approved under JIC(68)5)
by USofS (Navy) but as SCOOP involves a relaxation of submarine approach limitations,
it is proposed to seek the approval of SofS and the Foreign Secretary. I am
therefore seeking your approval to Shackleton aircraft carrying out Operation
AMEN in the Mediterranean between 20 August and 14 September 1968; your
approval to this can then be included in a MOD(Navy) submission to ask SofS and
Foreign Secretary to approve the complete operation”.
Clearly JIC(68)5) is a key paper in UK intelligence history as
it sets out both the type of intelligence gathering missions and also the level
of Ministerial authority and oversight required to approve them. What is
notable though is that JIC(68)5) remains closed to the public, 56 years later,
so it is unknown what it did, or did not say.
The final part of the Whitehall puzzle came about on 1 August,
when a note to the Foreign Secretary (Michael
Stewart MP) from MOD sought and gained final approval for the mission. The
advice note is interesting because it highlights how unusual OP SCOOP actually
was at the time:
“It is now our policy (see JIC68 Final) to regard the Mediterranean
as a non-sensitive area for the purpose of surveillance. This operation has one
feature -underwater photography- which
is rather special and before authorising it, I should be grateful to know whether
you have any comments on it. Special safeguards
would be strictly observed. Finally it
would take place entirely on the high seas.
This is a very good opportunity to gain valuable intelligence
that we do not wish to miss, and which cannot be obtained by other means”.
What is telling about the above notes to both USofS and the SofS
is that it seems that SCOOP was unusual, firstly for allowing submarines to proceed
closer than normal to Soviet vessels, suggesting that this sort of close in
approach was not normal in the 1960s. Secondly it indicates that underwater
photography was not in common use as an intelligence tool at this point, hence
the need for special consideration at the highest levels of government for its
approval. This alone should mark out Operation SCOOP as a key mission in the
history of the Royal Navy, for being the first intelligence collection mission of
its type in the Med, and seemingly one of the first times that an RN submarine was
allowed to conduct underwater imagery collection of a Soviet warship.
 |
| HMS OCELOT today in Chatham (Authors photo) |
By 1st August the scene was set for the operation, with HMS OCELOT in the Med ready to depart on her covert patrol, Ministerial authorisation in place and RAF Coastal Command were ready to conduct their missions from Malta. But what happened next? Sadly, it turns out that ‘events dear boy, events’ transpired to make SCOOP less of a success than anticipated.
On 03 October Cdre Hoare from Naval Intelligence wrote to
the Vice Chief Naval Staff setting out what had, and had not, been achieved as
part of Operation SCOOP. The note first commented on the level of secrecy with
allies: “The general area of operations were declared to NATO in the usual
way but only CINC US-NAVEUR, Commander Sixth Fleet and the US Polaris Commander
were privy to the actual details of the operation”.
On the 20th August the RAF Shackleton force had
detected a pair of two Soviet ships in the Hammamet anchorage (off Tunisia), and
HMS OCELOT was ordered to patrol to their station but:
“On arrival on 21st August found the ships had
left. Later the same evening the operation was put into abeyance because of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Twenty four hours later approval was given to continue
and OCELOT was ordered to the Kithera anchorage (NW Crete).”
Interesting the report then notes that while on passage to
Kithera, the OCELOT was:
“Detected during passage by US aircraft from USS FORRESTAL
but contact was only held for a few minutes. Sixth Fleet correctly assessed OCELOT
but reported her as a possible ‘W’ (WHISKEY class)
in order to maintain security”.
OCELOT then remained off Kithera from 27th August
until 5th September when she was forced to withdraw due to defective
foreplanes (a vital part of a submarine). She had mixed success though with her
collection:
“During this period she sighted a Kashin, Kynda, 2 Kotlins,
a Skory and a Don class submarine depot ship but no submarines. Because of the
lay of cables, the Commanding Officer considered it too dangerous to attempt underwater
photography of ships at anchor. A limited amount of COMINT and ELINT were obtained.
OCELOT withdrew on 4th September to make a ‘check’ report, was
detected by a USN Neptune, correctly assessed as OCELOT”.
After repairs at Malta in mid Sep, OCELOT retuned to her
patrol area and then managed to operate in the Scillian Narrows where: “she
obtained recordings of a Petya and a Mirka using their active Sonar”.
All in all for a nearly month long operation, this write up
does not sound particularly exciting, but it actually indicates just how
challenging submarine operations could be. Think for a moment of the pressure
on the submariners operating close in to 6 Soviet warships at anchorage in the
Med, attempting to spy on them and collect vitally needed intelligence for the
UK and USA, while avoiding collection. It is hard to imagine how challenging
this must have been, operating at constant risk of detection and the heat of
the Mediterranean summer. Doing so with a damaged foreplane and still being
able to collect COMINT and ELINT, as well as return to operations and covertly
sneak up on other ships is testament to the skills of the Royal Navy Submarine
Service.
Its against this backdrop that the note finishes,
summarising the longer term value of the operation to the RN:
“From an intelligence point of view the result are disappointing
but we have gained valuable experience in mounting this type of operation in
the Mediterranean and maintaining effective security. Success depends largely
on opportunity - a mere fortnight later
would have seen MOSKVA at the Kitherage anchorage, and we might have made a real SCOOP! Ideally we should be able to
respond flexibly to such opportunities but whilst the Mediterranean is not a
normal operating area for our submarines this is clearly out of the question.
Meanwhile I believe the possible gains merit the mounting of such operations at
least once per year without detriment to other submarine intelligence patrols
which remain of higher priority”.
 |
| HMS OCELOT today (authors photo) |
Looking back at SCOOP, are there any lessons that remain relevant now, some 56 years later? For starters the operation highlighted the ongoing importance of deception, even to our friends and allies. The fact that a cover story was needed highlights the importance of being able to have a really good reason for being somewhere, and also being clear on which of your allies you really trust. Even in the modern context, its arguable that deception remains key, being able to explain or justify actions is vital, even if the reason for doing something isn’t always fully known.
Its also clear that submarines are invaluable tools for
intelligence collection, but they are only as good as their own intelligence
feed. Operation SCOOP highlights the vital importance of the RAF’s maritime patrol
capability, then provided by the Shackleton, today provided by the P8 Poeisdion.
Being able to work jointly to conduct missions to gather intelligence, identify
targets of interest and then vector them in for collection by other assets
remains as important today – for those who advocate disinvestment in one
capability to support investment in their own preferred capability, remain that
the impact can be far more considerable than envisaged. It is far better to maintain
a broader approach, embracing a range of diverse options, as the outcome is
usually far more effective than maintaining something in isolation.
The Anglo-US information and intelligence sharing
relationship remains critically important to this day, built as it is on real
trust. SCOOP was a good example of where the UK felt it could take a genuinely risky
action to collect information that would be of mutual benefit. This approach
continued into the later Cold War, where RN submarines often conducted
operations of breathtaking audacity, such as the 1977 operation where HMS SWIFTSURE
conducted a highly
audacious operation under the new Soviet carrier KIEV. These operations almost
certainly continue to this day, albeit out of public sight and knowledge.
Finally the lesson is that events can always disrupt plans
and that it can be far more complex than one department wants things to be at
times. The file contains correspondence about how the Foreign Office were
concerned at events in Czechoslovakia at the time, and their worries that an
incident in the Med, when things were going wrong could be disastrous. As the
advice to the Secretary of State (Dennis Healey MP) noted:
“The Foreign Office have been consulted at official
level. Their initial reaction was that while they would probably be content
with the proposal provided that a substantial assurance could be given that the
submarine would remain undetected. More recently they have advised that while no
objection is seen to the operation as a whole, they are unlikely to agree at
this time the close approach necessary for underwater photography. The Foreign Office have advanced two main
reasons for their attitude. Firstly developments in the Czechoslovakia
situation have put the Russians in a politically hypersensitive state of mind as
a result of which they are likely to react sharply to any diplomatic incident however
small. Secondly the Foreign Office believe (though DS5 does not entirely agree)
that recent Russian press comments covering the activities of HMS CHICHESTER
and maritime aircraft during Operation RUSTLE
are an indication of Russian sensitivity on these matters and are a direct result
of the relaxation of approach rules introduced by JIC(68)5). They are therefore reluctant to further relax
the approach limitations at this time.”
The Foreign Office attitude has been discussed with
Director Int, who has been invited to reconsider the underwater photography aspect
of the operation. He prefers to press for its inclusion on the grounds that the
opportunity for us to gain this intelligence should not now be lost. Due to
availability of our own submarines and the change in pattern of Soviet
deployments during the winter months (when they do not use the anchorages), the operation if not carried out now, may
need to be delayed for as much as a year. We should be denying ourselves important
information during this time, the loss of which could be serious because it is almost
impossible to gain information on the underwater portion of Soviet hulls by any
other means”.
This advice neatly encapsulates the challenges facing
Ministers in the 1960s, if you know you have a risk from the Soviets, do you
take steps to proactively understand and counter the risk from intelligence
collection, or do you bear in mind the consequences of doing so could be worse
than the gains it provides. Both the Foreign Office and MOD approaches were arguably
correct in seeing their perspectives, but it poses a real challenge for
Ministers on what to do. Arguably these challenges continue to this day, with many
more Departments having a stake in national security matters, and Ministers
will need to balance off advice from all departments in deciding their course
of action. This is where there is a clear case for good advice, and support
from the Civil Service and military to ensure Ministers are properly and
objectively advised on the impact that their decisions will have.
Operation SCOOP’s legacy is likely to have been a change in Royal Navy operations in the Med. Its clear that in later years more submarines were deployed into the Med (both conventional and nuclear) presumably for a range of intelligence collection operations. OCELOT was a trailblazer for the Submarine Service, conducting a range of work in extreme secrecy that helped future generations of submariners learn to operate and collect intelligence in these challenging waters. It also played a part in helping reassure the US about Soviet capabilities, which could have posed a clear threat to their Polaris and carrier forces in wartime, and helped shape future policy direction on intelligence collection and approaches and photography of Soviet vessels.
Should you wish to see HMS OCELOT first hand, then she is open to visitors at Chatham Historic Dockyard - a truly excellent day out for anyone who wants to imagine what life onboard would have been like in the Med in August 1968, spying on the Soviet Navy - ideal if you want to get the inside 'SCOOP'!
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