Crisis Response from a Global Navy
The shocking attacks by Hamas terrorists in Israel on the
weekend 0f 7/8 October were a truly appalling, barbaric atrocity that has
rightly been condemned by all civilised nations. As Israel contemplates its
military options and the immensely complex game of geopolitical chess that is the
Middle East continues to be played, other nations look on with concern. It is
against this backdrop that the UK has taken the decision to deploy elements of
the armed forces to provide support in the region. The package, announced formally, on 13 October will involve two Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, Royal Navy
helicopters, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force P8 aircraft operating out of Cyprus.
In addition, wider military planning teams will be operational across the
region to support British interests. This is a not inconsiderable deployment,
particularly at short notice and it highlights a significant number of impressive
facets of UK military capability.
The two RFA vessels (ARGUS and LYME BAY) are well placed to
lead the maritime response. ARGUS is perhaps the most venerable vessel in the
current surface fleet, having served in the Falklands War and undertaken a
range of roles from aviation training ship to medical platform to LPH. In
her current guise she is focusing on providing a littoral response capability,
embarking Royal Marines and aircraft to carry out, support and training with partners
as well as a contingent capability to carry out discrete operations. This is a
new lease of life for an old ship, but demonstrates the fundamental flexibility
of the design, which arguably is probably one of the most flexible ships ever
deployed by the RFA. Meanwhile LYME BAY is a modern BAY class LSD, able to embark
troops, vehicles and supplies through her amphibious dock, and who also has
modern accommodation and hospital facilities onboard.
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RFA Lyme Bay (Crown Copyright) |
Both ships were due to have deployed this year as part of a wider test of the Littoral Response Group (LRG) South capability, which is a key part of the refreshed Integrated Review output. This short notice tasking highlights the strength of the LRG concept, which has been tested this year through deployments of the LRG North to the Baltic, where HMS ALBION and supporting vessels took part in a range of exercises to assist NATO allies, prior to returning to the UK. ARGUS and LYME BAY were already due to forward deploy to the Middle East, and the fact that they sailed ahead of this week’s events was fortuitous, putting both ships in the Med at a time when they could quickly redeploy to the Eastern Med and monitor events and stand ready to assist if required. It is likely that these ships will proceed through to the wider Middle East in due course, transiting Suez and providing a capability to support UK interests in the region, bolstering the existing BAY and Type 23, as well as supporting MCMV forces operating there. This will make the UK one of the largest and most capable foreign naval powers in the Middle East region, able to support wider tasks as needed.
There has been some suggestion that the UK is at fault for
not deploying an LPD into this scenario and that the lack of ALBION or BULWARK
is an issue. Arguably, it is not. For starters, ALBION has spent a large part
of this year deployed and is now alongside for essential maintenance and repairs
ahead of entering reduced readiness, while she is replaced by HMS BULWARK. It
is unlikely that ALBION could have exited her current situation and proceeded
to sea in a fully worked up and safe manner without taking very substantial
risks and in a timeline that met Government needs. At the same time BULWARK is
working up and is still not in a place to rejoin the fleet. There has been some
criticism online of the ‘LPD gap’ but the RN has often had an LPD gap in the
decade or so of single active LPD hull running – there will always have been
times when an LPD isn’t available.
The next criticism is that an LPH hasn’t been deployed, and
that HMS OCEAN would have been useful. There is no doubt that OCEAN was one of
the most versatile and useful ships in the RN, and was very hard worked during
her time in service. But we have to accept that OCEAN would have been long gone
in whatever scenario is envisaged here – she was built with a finite lifespan
which had been reached and was in need of significant modernisation and refit
work to have kept running. This represented a cost that the RN didn’t need to
spend, particularly as both the QEC were entering service as she paid off. In
addition the significantly changed approach to amphibious warfare by the UK (and
many other nations) makes it hard to see any credible scenario where the UK
would need to employ an LPH operationally, particularly given the many other
assets available. OCEAN was designed to conduct a lift of the RM to Norway in a
hurry during the Cold War, but proved herself useful in other roles. The UK is
highly unlikely to ever conduct an amphibious operation again that would need
the scale of lift she provided, meaning the need for an LPH is vastly reduced.
It is telling that at no stage did the RN ever publicly plan or programme an
LPH replacement. LYME BAY and ARGUS are
well equipped for the role at hand, they have the ability to embark and host
large numbers of troops. They can support aviation operations in ARGUS hangar (something
ALBION cannot do) and they both possess good medical facilities onboard. Both
ships provide a credible capability for the job they are being employed to do –
which is littoral operations, not invading another country. Some have suggested that RFA ARGUS is ‘ancient’
and that she is too old to be credible. Tell that to the USS EISENHOWER,
deploying at the moment to the region, a vessel who entered service 46 years
ago, but which remains central to the defence of the United States.
This deployment helps showcase the likely direction of
travel for the Royal Marines and the Future Commando Force. The days when the
UK would look to land large forces on a beach are gone forever. Instead
deployments like this, using existing shipping, but in turn likely to be
vessels like the future Multi
Role Support Ship (MRSS), which will deploy much smaller forces in a more
dispersed manner. It is helpful to think of this deployment as showing what the
future is likely to be for British littoral ops, and in turn how this may
influence future thinking on procurement and operations.
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RFA ARGUS (Crown Copyright) |
There has also been comment that they are vulnerable because they lack a surface escort and may be at risk. The danger here is twofold, firstly we have no idea what the actual threat is, or how capable these ships are internally of defending against it (both hard and soft kill). We also do not know what plans are in place to operate alongside USN partners, who with two Carrier Strike Groups in, or shortly to arrive in, the region, provide a comprehensive area air defence package. This is not the place for speculation or ‘whatabouterry’ – UK military planners will understand the risks, the mitigation plans and given clear advice on the art, and limits, of the possible. Acting as armchair admirals and saying ‘send a Type 45’ is pointless as we are in no position to know what the true situation is.
One useful reminder of this crisis is just how useful both Gibraltar
and Cyprus are to joint operations, providing runways and supplies at crucial
locations. The strategic importance of these operating sites cannot be overstated
enough. They are invaluable patches of sovereign real estate to enable the UK
to conduct both national operations, and provide support to allies, like the
US, in providing a safe runway and discrete support for wider missions. It is
likely that both sites will be busy in the coming weeks supporting operations.
Another issue that this crisis has highlighted is the critical
importance of the P8 fleet to defence operations. Having got past the near inconceivable
decision to remove the Maritime Patrol Aircraft from service in 2010, it is
good to see it being openly deployed in this way to support UK interests in the
region. The only note of concern is just how thinly spread this force is likely
to be, with just 9 airframes available and far more work than they can easily
do. Hopefully growth of this force is seen as a key strategic priority for the
MOD in coming defence reviews.
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Merlin Mk4 - (Crown Copyright) |
The final note is that this crisis demonstrates just how busy the Royal Navy is right now. In addition to the LRG (South) deployment occurring and turning into a live operation, the RN has also got HMS DUNCAN deployed in the Med participating in NATO operations, while in the Baltic, the second major RN deployment of the year is underway, with HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, supported by HMS DIAMOND, visiting Gothenburg after several weeks at sea operating the F35. Meanwhile in the Eastern Atlantic HMS PRINCE OF WALES is embarking special trials and test variant F35s to carry out the next stage of trials in carrier strike operations while training with US Navy vessels. HMS DAUNTLESS is operating in the West Indies, so it seems likely that she too will link up at some stage. This means that right now the UK is one of only two nations on earth to have multiple carrier groups at sea right now, both operating 5th generation jets for both key trials and live operations. This is in addition to NATO commitments, support to MCMV operations and wider maritime operations in the Middle East and the ongoing forward deployment of all five Batch 2 RIVER Class OPVs. Also of note is that no less than 50% of the Type 45 fleet is at sea, worked up and deployed on operations, a level of availability that many nations would love their own fleets to achieve.
There are plenty of grumblers out there who seem to think
that this is somehow disaster, that the RN is useless because even if it has
two carriers at sea, they’ve not got enough jets on. This ignores that the PWLS
deployment is about trials, embarking special jets operated by a multi-national
unit to work in an integrated way to deliver this capability. Meanwhile QE is
operating 8 British jets, plus helicopters, which means that the F35 force is sustaining
this deployment as well as building up a wider pool of trained personnel and
aircraft to enable future operations. Unfortunately, the grumblers don’t seem
to understand that no navy on the planet can embark 100% of its aircraft all
the time, and that in the real world what matters is less the number of planes,
but the overall levels of crew understanding, capability and the ability to
carry out fast jet operations safely and in a sustainable way. Its about long
term credibility, not short-term photo ops.
We should reflect that amidst the chaos and confusion of a
very violent global order at present, the British Armed Forces are well placed
to respond quickly and effectively when required. That the UK could deploy a pair
of capable ships at short notice to respond while also sustaining wider maritime
and defence operations across the world speaks volumes to the reach, breadth
and capability of the Armed Forces and their ability to deliver when required.
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