OPERATION DEERSTALKER.

The National Archives in Kew is arguably the finest archive record store in the world. Filled with files dating back centuries, it is a location that one can go and spend a day reading through historical paperwork, picking up files containing paperwork handled by some of the great figures in history and learn about lesser known triumphs or deeply unsettling activities of the British State over many centuries. Its online archives are equally potent, containing much information that can be downloaded at home and read – often these are files that have been ignored for decades and long since forgotten about.

This blog is the short account of a file that shines a very different light on the UK at a time when the wider political environment was not welcoming to immigrants, and where social values were utterly different to today. It is perhaps a mark of how far things have changed for the better that this file now is so repulsive in its intent. The aim here is to highlight thinking and views that have long since been abandoned, but which still shine a light on wider military thinking and leave questions about modern capability gaps.

In 1971 the UK had left Africa as a colonial power, with all the territories once ruled across this vast and diverse continent gaining independence over a period of about a decade. It is a sign of how long that Her Late Majesty The Queen ruled, that at the start of her reign, She or members of her family were the Colonels in Chief of Regiments such as the Kings African Rifles and the Royal West Africa Frontier Force. Notwithstanding the unpleasant situation in Rhodesia, there was no British colonial presence left in Africa by 1971, and the wider Empire was in full retreat as British forces withdrew from the Far East and the Gulf. Despite this ending of the Colonial era, the UK retained interests globally, not least the significant diaspora of UK nationals who lived around the world in a variety of nations and who would, in a crisis, required evacuation or assistance.

The planning for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) is one of the most difficult tasks a military can ever carry out. It requires flying people into a volatile and dangerous situation to find and recover people entitled to be evacuated, and then maintain an airbridge or sea lift access while the nation around them collapses. It is a difficult and dangerous operation that can go very badly wrong. The UK, much like most other major powers, planned, and continues to plan, for how it can conduct evacuations in the event of things going wrong. These plans are complex and require a lot of work to deliver- but like all plans there is a balance between openness, telling people what is going on and discretion, to ensure that operational security is not compromised in the process.

In 1971 British planners were focusing on how they would evacuate UK nationals out of Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya in the event of a total collapse of one, or all, of these states to the extent that a UK NEO was warranted. This did not mean that they assumed it would occur, rather that they were thinking through how it would be conducted if required. These plans were collectively known as OPERATION DEERSTALKER. This planning was commissioned by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Under this were a variety of individual plans for each country such as OP ARGENT to cover planning as needed.

Under this plan it was assumed that the UK military would be responsible for having to airlift out around 83,000 ‘UK citizens of UK origin’ from these countries and instead move them to either ‘South Africa’ or ‘Portuguese East Africa’ (what is now modern Mozambique). The plans called for a significant commitment of RAF airlift capability (9 x VC10, 14 x Britannia, 24 x Hercules and 4 Belfast aircraft) – this is not far off the bulk of the RAF’s operationally available strategic airlift capability during this period and roughly half of the Hercules force too). They would be supported by the RAF Regiment on the ground for “crowd control duties”, as well as Royal Signals and RAMC detachments, as well as any RN/RFA units that were available.

The plan in essence called for the UK to surge forces into these countries with the support of the host government (and on assumption of no interference) and take around 10,000 people per day, flying them to reception locations in South Africa or Portuguese East Africa. At its heart this was a relatively simple plan – fly into the airhead, embark the entitled people and fly them to safety, with a complete evacuation out of all four nations possible in about 8 days. There were though several problems with this plan that made it more complex.

The first issue was that due to ‘sensitives’ the planners noted that it had not been possible to consult with the recipient countries. No approaches were made either to the South African or Portuguese authorities to confirm if the RAF could operate out of their territory, how they could operate and perhaps most importantly of all, whether they could evacuate 83,000 people into these nations. These conversations didn’t happen or if they did, they were so opaque that the nations didn’t know something was going on. Its also possible that other nations were planning similar operations (e.g. France and the USA) but no joint conversations were held – the potential for chaos was high as tens of thousands of people jostled to escape conflict and reach safety – think Kabul Airlift but many times worse.

The next problem was that the UK only wanted to evacuate the right kind of British national. There is no easy way to put this, but the files talk about how there were 83,000 UK Citizens of UK origin and 170,000 ‘UK citizens of Asian origin’. What is most chilling here is that the plan openly states:

“No provision is made for the evacuation of UK citizens of Asian origin, of which there about 170,000, although account is taken of the problems they could cause at the assembly points”.

 In other words, if you were not a ‘white UK national’ (as the files described it) you would have been abandoned by the UK in the event of a NEO going on amid the complete collapse of the country you lived in. On arriving at the evacuation point, you would have been told that despite holding a British passport and citizenship, the RAF would not take you to safety and you were on your own.  Put simply, in 1971 the British Government made contingency plans to evacuate 83,000 UK nationals and intentionally abandon 170,000 more to their fate due to not being White UK nationals. These plans were approved at the very highest levels of Government.

That this plan was sensitive was made clear in the files by plans to deliberately cover up that the UK was going to not evacuate British nationals. Clearly a deal was going to be done with South Africa as the documents repeatedly state that:

“The political sensitivity of this plan could be reduced by removing the terms ‘White United Kingdom citizens’ and by deleting all reference to the sale of arms to South Africa. Accordingly the term “United Kingdom Citizen” should be substituted for “White UK Citizen” throughout the plan and all references to the sale of arms to South Africa removed. The High Commissioner will detail the persons to be evacuated and the FCO will ensure that he is aware of the categories of evacuees to be covered by United Kingdom Citizen. The number of evacuees will remain unchanged”.

What this statement meant was that the UK was clearly prepared, in extremis to offer to sell weapons to South Africa, breaching the UK arms embargos and policy towards the South Africa regime, if that helped smooth the way for access to their airports in an emergency for a NEO. No details exist in the MOD file on what these arms sales may have consisted of, although the optics of the UK supporting the Apartheid regime in acquiring weapons while evacuating white UK nationals out of Africa and abandoning non-White UK nationals to their fate is an unpleasant picture to conjure up.

It is also clear from these files that the UK was prepared to engage in deception to reduce understanding about their intentions in times of evacuation. It is chilling to think that the FCO would willingly cover up who was being evacuated, only discreetly notifying the High Commissioner who the ‘right people’ were. This, coupled with the decision to remove the ethnicity description to make things less sensitive shows a deeply cynical approach to NEO planning.

It isn’t clear from these files why the decision was taken to exclude 170,000 people from the NEO plan. No discussion of it survives in the file where this plan was seen. It is possible that it was linked to the wider immigration debate in the UK at the time, where there was a hostile attitude to immigration from Commonwealth nationals, and legislation was passed in 1961 and 71 intended to make it much harder for some categories of people to enter the country. Perhaps there was concern that moving these people to South Africa or Portuguese Africa would cause too difficult a time with the host nations – although it is likely that many would have fled there anyway in the event of a collapse. However you look at it though, it is a horrific document to read.

What is also not clear is when these plans were amended or changed to be inclusive of all UK nationals. NEO plans are doubtless regularly reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and fit for purpose, but at some point, in the 1970s or 80s, a conscious policy decision must have been taken to include this diaspora in planning for the first time.

In the 21^st Century the problem of how to do a NEO has not gone away. What these archive plans highlight though is the difficulty of NEO’s – the sheer scale of airlift required to move people out of danger is an ongoing problem. While the UK population in these nations is probably far smaller now than it was in the 1970s, NEOs remain complex and challenging. As was seen in Sudan in 2023 trying to get the right people to the right place is at times extremely difficult. The challenge today is one of working out which nationality is entitled to help, and which must be left behind – as was seen in Sudan and Kabul, sometimes this can result in tough and heartrending decisions being taken.

It is fair to say that the UK would find itself stretched to breaking point to deliver an Op DEERSTALKER equivalent now, particularly with the incomprehensible loss of the C130 without replacement. The sheer number of aircraft needed to move people out of danger is significant – OP GALLEON (the plan for Zambia) estimated that it would need 6 x VC10 and 19 x Hercules to deliver properly to evacuate 44,000 people in the worst-case scenario, at a rate of 6,000 per day. Today the total number of known UK nationals requiring assistance is thought to be nearer 6,000 but across the region, there are still estimated to be some 43,000 UK expatriates entitled to assistance (roughly half the level estimated in 1971). Were the successor to OP DEERSTALKER ever to be called, the UK has a much smaller airlift capability than in 1971, (8 x C17, 14 x A330 and 22 x A400M is the entire airlift force these days) so it remains to be seen whether such an operation would succeed or not.

These plans are deeply uncomfortable to read because they show, in writing, the attitudes at the time by the most senior military and diplomatic staff in the country towards the safety of UK nationals. They are not the product of a passed over officer in some obscure backwater post, but rather the considered view of CDS and the Commanders In Chief Committee, approved at a meeting on the 5^th floor of the MOD in 1971 attended by CDS and two of the three Service Chiefs.

Do these plans represent the modern UK attitude to planning and people – no, they do not. The idea today that UK nationals would in all planning documents be divided into the ‘Whites’ and non-White groupings is absurd and abhorrent. Anyone stupid enough to suggest such an outrageous idea would quickly see their career come grinding to a halt. Although only 52 years old, these plans represent a UK attitude to world affairs and ethnicity that has, thankfully, long passed un-mourned into history.