What Value Does Land Power Offer An Island Nation?

 

General Sir Patrick Sanders, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), delivered a keynote speech on the importance of Land operations at the RUSI this week. The speech was a thoughtful and at times surprisingly (for an official speech), honest take on the state of the British Army today. It gained attention for some of its carefully crafted phrases, clearly written to land as soundbites to the media (e.g. describing Challenger 2 as a ‘rotary dial’ telephone). There were several themes emerging from it that are worthy of comment and further analysis.

The first thought is that the speech majors on the poor material state of the British Army right now. There seems to be a growing narrative about the state of the vehicle fleet, its old age and its poor condition that seems to, in the eyes of some, imply that only more funding would make this right. Is this a fair assessment to make? There have been the usual range of articles and comments unfavourably comparing the procurement of two aircraft carriers (long since paid for) to the state of the Army and asking whether priorities were right.

This is a slightly dangerous narrative road to go down – the Army is not a downtrodden service, unable to control its destiny. Under the various delegations and empowerments offered to all three services, the Army was master of its budgets. The failure of the British Army to deliver meaningful new capability lies predominantly with the British Army. The many years of false starts, decisions to invest elsewhere or descope funding in other areas means that we are living now decisions taken 10-15 years ago. This is coupled with a culture of requirement creep that is best typified in the Ajax, where the official report into the procurement debacle highlights a loss of control of requirements management and the growth of the vehicle from a light recce unit into something that seems able to dabble in many things, but master none. This may sound uncomfortable, but the Army had many opportunities to exercise self-discipline and leadership, at all levels, to make programmes like Ajax get back on track. Instead, a near endless round of mission requirement creep means that the vehicle remains a totemic reminder of all that is wrong with Defence procurement.

The narrative that the Army is relying on the 1980s also perhaps ignores that in the 2000s and 2010s there was extensive re-equipment of the Army to fight the war that Army planners assumed they would be fighting. Look at the way that the UOR system responded superbly to needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing a wide range of highly advanced vehicles in a short time frame. Not all were perfect for Europe, but many could have been. It is a shame that the decision was taken to dispose of so much of this force, acquired at significant cost as a ‘bonus’ funding from the UOR budget, which at times represented nearly 10% of MOD procurement budgets each year, and from which the Army benefitted hugely. The decision to not bring the vast majority of the UOR force into core funding, update it and make it an 80% solution is one that is regrettable. Blaming others, such as HM Treasury, or politicians or the other services is dangerous – the Army in the early 2000s confidently tried to refocus its efforts to COIN based on their own analysis and assessments. The politicians supported, the Treasury funded, and the Army got what they thought they wanted. Perhaps the question here is why did staff analysis on future operational trends fail so spectacularly?

There is no doubt that the next 10 years heralds an exciting time for the British Army though – a lot of new equipment should show up that will help it restore its place as a capable force able to operate in a high intensity conflict. One must hope that the system will deliver it on time, with the right training and support and that it will work as intended. The worry is that the same trends demonstrated time and again with Ajax will reappear – how do you force the cultural change through to get the Army to be able to deliver complex and expensive projects that succeed in a way that the RN and RAF seem able to do far more effectively? Looking to the future too, the pathway to completing reequipment is fraught with challenge – to successfully land a wide range of projects will require success in various defence reviews and planning rounds and making the case for Land over other environments.

Part of the challenge in making this case is defining the proposition of what these forces should do once they arrive in service. The speech was long on aspiration for trying to focus the Army back into operating two Divisional HQ’s to command forces. The ability to operate at this level, and in particular command at this level has been of totemic importance to the Army for many years – the speech confirms that both 1 & 3 Div will be optimised to command forces at this level and have their HQ strengths bolstered. But what is the purpose of the Division and why does it matter so much to the Army? If you took a long-term view, you could strongly argue that the British Army right now is doing what the British Army excels at in policy terms – providing training, equipment, and materiel to friendly allied nations to fight wars against our foes. The training delivered to Ukraine highlights that the Army can help other nations in being able to operate effectively and with considerable battlefield success. These are skills though that mainly affect at the tactical and operational level, so why focus on a strategic HQ like a Division?

One of the difficulties is trying to define what a large and deployable Army gives politicians and policy makers as a tool of effect and influence. Having the ability to deploy it is one thing, but how will it be used, where will it operate and what will it do? The challenge with so much of the debate around the role of the Army is that we struggle to define when and where it can be used – this is more than a rhetorical question. Air and Maritime power can far more easily be deployed across a multitude of environments and nations and operate in a variety of ways – just look at the RAF which is simultaneously holding QRA in the UK, operating across much of Europe with ISTAR and logistics platforms as well as fighters, and in Cyprus is operating Typhoons to conduct kinetic operations on OP SHADER. All of these assets could quickly and easily be redeployed to support operations elsewhere.

By contrast the Army is unclear on what its role seems to be or where it will operate and in what conditions. Are we ever realistically likely to see a British Army armoured division operate in a warzone as a formed body, conducting an invasion of a hostile nation or defending a foreign one outside of the NATO area? Realistically, no we are not – it is hard to see any circumstances where this could easily occur. It is easily possible to see a need for a British Army force to operate in Europe as part of NATO deterring Russia, but it is hard to see any chance of them engaging in combat operations against Russia. Given this, do you need the highest level of command capability or would less suffice.

We’ve seen generals talking about how the UK only matters in NATO and elsewhere if it has a powerful army but has this really been tested. Having a large army is fine if you have a clearly defined need for it and plans to use it. But if you look historically, the argument that Divisional HQs are essential to buy influence seems to wane slightly when you look at the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan – in both cases large HQ’s were deployed, for example in Basra where the UK ran HQ MND(SE). But what actual influence did it buy in a coalition and how did having a 2* commander really influence the political and policy makers plans for withdrawal?  It would be a genuinely interesting exercise to look at UK operations over the past 20-30 years and try to determine the relative levels of national influence in shaping the outcome against levels of commitment. It may be that the operations where the outcomes most closely aligned with UK policy goals are the ones where less powerful forces were deployed.

It would be an interesting exercise to define what the ‘value proposition’ is that the Generals could offer to a new incoming government. To use the Army to its full effect means not only sending the regular forces, but also stepping up and using the wider element of Reserves – very much tapping into the wider national consciousness to deploy troops to meet the nations need. Understanding what value, the Reserves bring is essential here because they are seen in the speech as central to supporting the Army moving forward.

The Army Reserve is a genuinely fascinating organisation comprised of thousands of dedicated people who have committed some part of their time to supporting the regular Army. It relies on the goodwill of volunteers to turn up and commit and on the Army to train them to the standard required to be effective on the ground. This was once a simple thing to do – during the Cold War it was relatively easy to train TA soldiers to a reasonable standard to do their job – which was to reinforce BAOR during a crisis and die a quick death stopping the Soviets before the world ended in a nuclear blast. Since Options for Change the Army has struggled to define its vision for the Reserve – it has operated large formations at up to Bde level, but hasn’t really deployed in a formed manner in decades. It has excelled at providing both subject matter experts and individual or platoon size reinforcement forces to deploying units.

In the post-Cold War world military operations have become ever more complex and require more training than ever. Even an infantry section now operates with a rapidly increasing range of technology and weapons and does so in an ever more networked manner. To be able to soldier effectively at this level requires both access to the right equipment, but also doing so on a regular basis. It is very hard to balance off being a spare time soldier and also hold down a full-time career.

This challenge is tacitly acknowledged in the CGS speech, which recognises the problem of trying to get a career and training model in place which is time bound and cannot do the courses that the Regular force does. How do you use a mass reserve in an era when you are not going to mobilise quickly for transition to war, and where it may be faster and easier to recruit from scratch than it is to try to mobilise and upskill units? Defining a role for the citizen soldier is also hard – is it to keep the Army in the public eye, conduct MACA, train to augment on various operations or something else?

There is doubtless much valuable work the Reserve can, and should, do. It is a link between the public and the armed forces in a way that the Regular Army is not. It can provide people of immense skill in their real lives to support the nation when required in a variety of ways. But is it still a body who can provide reinforcements when required to serve their nation, or is it time to look again at this? The other question that hasn’t been really explained is the scale and ambition with which the Army Reserve should operate. Is it an organisation that exists to provide singletons or is it one that will send formed units?

The ‘whole force’ concept appears to have been seen officially now as something of a failure. You cannot rely on a volunteer reserve, where the clue is in the title, to always be available to put their lives on hold to support military operations. But if you can’t use the Reserve, then what point is there in having it? Is a better use for the Reserve for it to function as the ‘reconstitution Army’ – a force that exists so that in the event of the regulars being deployed and taking casualties to a high level, the Reserve can be mobilised and turned into the follow-on force? This model closely mirrors the TA of 1914-15 whose members held the line after the evisceration of the BEF in the early part of WW1. Is this a more accurate use of the Reserve, to use as a force only to be deployed, in the main, when things have gone very badly wrong for the Army? It may concentrate decision makers minds to know that the Army they send to war is a ‘one use only’ force and that the AR is all that will be left if it goes wrong.

A final observation is that the speech focused on things like reducing bureaucracy and focusing on empowering people to do their job. The Haythornwaite review of the armed forces is an outstanding document in many regards, and one worthy of a full blog of itself. But it is telling that CGS admitted to not having been able to cut process – if as the head of the British Army you are unable to affect even simple change to empower and make your soldiers lives easier, then who else in the system can deliver this change? Most senior officers speeches going back many years have urged cutting red tape and process and making things easier – yet has anyone of them succeeded in doing so? It feels these calls are an almost religious mantra, chanted out loud in the hope that if you say ‘reduce paperwork and process’ three times in front of a mirror, then people will magically get a car pass without having to sell the souls of their first-born children. The reality is that the system is not getting easier to navigate and if anything, getting worse.

Perhaps the answer to getting real change for process in the Army is to ensure that all generals and Ministers get the same experience that junior privates get. Turning up, waiting in line to be told they’re not eligible for a car pass or experiencing the hassle that comes from being given the run around because ‘its not in the contract mate’. If their official quarter needs maintenance, let the General wait on the phone for hours to speak to Pinnacle and then wait days for a repairman to not turn up. The downside of being senior is that you become isolated from the lived reality of people through an outer office that will do anything for you to make your life easier. One must wonder if all the soft perks and easy access was removed whether process would move much faster with a grumpy general tired of being called ‘mate’ by a bored car pass contractor…

So what state is the Army in now and where does it go from here? There is no doubt that in many ways the Army is in a good state – there is light at the end of the tunnel when it comes to new vehicles. Ukraine has spurred an urgent revaluation of needs and will hopefully lead to a real increase in new equipment capability. The challenge ahead is arguably threefold retention.

Firstly, the Army needs to retain its people- there is no doubt that morale is tanking at the moment. The ongoing delayed pay rise is a cause of growing concern to military personnel wondering how bills will be paid. Rumours that it will be less than forecast or recommended will only lead to a surge in PVR. This coupled with frustrations over housing and relatively unexciting career opportunities won’t help – as the General noted, yes much of the Army is deployed compared to 10 years ago, but candidly these aren’t exciting deployments. The lack of opportunities to go and be a real soldier in combat is telling – there is no Northern Ireland and GSM for OP BANNER up for grabs. The days of TELIC and HERRICK are long gone, and no matter how important deterrence is, it is rarely exciting.

The Army needs to not only be able to retain people, but also its expertise. It is now many years since it was last engaged on widespread kinetic operations  and there is a real reduction in operational experience. Trying to work out how to keep hard won knowledge in the system and ensure the Army doesn’t become stale is really challenging. The risk is that within 5-10 years almost all of the TELIC and many of the HERRICK veterans will have left, leaving very little real experience among the ranks. Other NATO armies (and the US) are in a similar position, but it is telling to consider that the current British Army is probably the least operationally experienced Army in recent British history – through no fault of its own. This is only going to get more pronounced in coming years.

Finally, the Army needs to retain its sense of purpose. It has done enormous good in Ukraine helping train and equip allies to fight. But right now it needs to define its own proposition to government about what it can do. Land power matters less when you are an island nation, without threat of invasion and where land wars are a discretionary matter, not one of national survival. Making the case for the Army requires being able to explain why the UK needs to send troops abroad to fight, and if needs be die, in large numbers. What is the benefit to our national interest of being able to do this. Politicians are increasingly averse to long term and bloody commitments that yield little but cost treasure and blood. Trying to steer a path that retains the Army’s ability to act as the national conventional deterrent through its force structure while also being able to sensibly predict the future and find causes worth fighting for is going to be challenging. There is unlikely to be much call for wars of conquest, so defining the value that land power brings to an island nation will be key here.