A Storm Is Coming - Ukraine and Storm Shadow
The British Government will supply Ukraine with Storm Shadow
cruise missiles, significantly expanding the Ukrainian ability to defend themselves
against the illegal and unprovoked Russian invasion. This is a significant step
up in the military support offered to the Ukrainian armed forces and is significant
for several factors. While it will not, in isolation, lead to the imminent
defeat of the tyrannical Putin regime, it will play a key part in helping secure
the victory of good over evil.
The Storm Shadow is one of the most capable missiles held in
the British inventory. Intended to provide a long-range penetration capability to
hit fixed targets, such as command bunkers, major installations, and
potentially static warships alongside in harbour, the missile has a range of
around 300 miles. Designed for air launch from UK jets including the Tornado
and latterly the Typhoon, it is an extremely capable missile proven in combat over
many years. What is notable is that Storm Shadow is an international design, built
in tandem with France who have also developed sea launched versions, and will
remain in service until at least 2032. (A very good history of the missile is HERE)
Secondly, it’s a good test case for proving the Ukrainians
will adhere to stipulations when provided with military equipment. One of the
key reasons for holding back advanced aid like long range missiles by the West has
been the concern that it may be used to fire on targets in Russia – the West is
content to support a defensive war within Ukraine’s borders but has no desire
to support operations in Russia itself. If Ukraine shows in its employment of the
Storm Shadow that it has been used with the stipulations enforced, then this
may convince the US to open the door to providing longer range and more precise
munitions such as the ATACMS missile, which can be fired from the HIMARS artillery
system. This is a chance for Ukraine to make the case that it can be trusted to
use these capabilities responsibly.
The ability to deploy Storm Shadow will make a significant
difference for the Russians, who will now need to factor in the presence of highly
accurate missiles hundreds of kilometres behind their front lines. A wide range
of command posts, telephone exchanges, munitions dump etc will be far more vulnerable
as a result, forcing Russian commanders to either hold back increasingly scarce
air defence capability, or accept high losses in their rear echelons. Nowhere
is safe inside Ukrainian territory now for the Russians.
If used to target and destroy Russian C2 facilities, then
Ukraine may cause disruption and chaos amid the front-line forces. The Russian Army
performance has been weak at best throughout the campaign, with little
initiative shown and a high reliance on a very centralised command structure.
If the Ukrainians begin to target Russian command posts and kill the Staff
Officers, then the ability of the Army to either commit to offensive operations
or respond during a Ukrainian offensive is significantly reduced. These
missiles could be used to cut off the Russian ‘brain’ at critical times.
It also speaks to the fact that Ukraine clearly has an
effective targeting and intelligence process in place to make the best use of
the missiles at long range. The Storm Shadow is not a missile fired blindly in
the hope of finding targets, rather it is very precise and requires extremely
accurate intelligence to be used to intended effect. Providing this missile to
the Ukrainians speaks to their ability to provide this intelligence and use it
meaningfully – not just local updates, but fuse in strategic imagery and
analysis to identify the key targets that matter and then deliver the strike in
a timely fashion. This speaks to a military that is agile, responsive and able
to quickly exploit opportunities to best effect.
The only key area of risk is perhaps the question around
whether British personnel are assisting in the targeting process with Ukraine
to help them prepare the missile for use, particularly from an intelligence
perspective. An argument could be made that in doing so, they are forming part
of the ‘kill chain’ – although some may argue similar distinctions could be
made for the many thousands of NATO troops who have assisted Ukraine in some
way to prepare for, or use the western equipment gifted to them.
Another way in which this demonstrates Ukrainian agility is that it has proven possible to find a firing solution for a missile never intended to be employed in this way and deliver it in under four months. This shows just how much can be achieved in wartime when safety cases matter less, and risks can be taken to deliver impact in a way that can never be done in peacetime. A cynic may question how it is possible for the British Armed Forces to deliver such impressive effect for allies at pace yet were similar trials to be conducted normally at home, it would take months if not years to do. Perhaps a lesson of Ukraine is that the Armed Forces need to be less slaves of process and more willing to accept risks to deliver speedier effect?
It was mildly depressing to see political attacks made on
the Government by the Opposition over this news. It was implied that having
been announced in February, the MOD has been doing little until this announcement
was made – such criticism is both unfair and unwarranted. Transferring weapon
systems to a new user is not a speedy business at the best of times – the MOD
will have needed to identify the missiles to provide to Ukraine, ensure they were
serviceable and ready for transfer, developed an appropriate training course
for the operators to learn how to use it at speed and worked out a way to get it
into theatre. It also needed to conduct integration work on the firing
platform(s) and ensure that the missiles can safely be fired.
If the platform is a Soviet era aircraft like a Mig jet,
then this has required taking a highly complex Western missile never intended
for carriage on a Russian jet, installing appropriate software and hardware
modifications, trialling it to ensure the missile works without damaging the aircraft
and can operate as planned. This will have been a complex operation requiring
deep knowledge of the Migs (perhaps hinting at international cooperation to
make suitable airframes available for the trials) and an ability to rapidly
integrate the weapon. Integration of munitions is one of the most complex and
expensive parts of flying fast jets – you cannot just ‘bolt on’ a missile – you
need to have the right software, ensure that the missile works as planned and
that it doesn’t interfere with or compromise the safe operation of the jet. It
costs the MOD tens, if not hundreds of millions to integrate weapons onto UK
jets, usually involving extensive flying trials and tests over a long period of
time. The Ukrainians will have done it in weeks – albeit by cutting corners and
taking risk, but they’ve still done it. That
this has been done is also a testament to the flexibility of the UK forces, MOD
Civil Service and wider industry, all of whom will doubtless have worked
incredibly hard to make this happen.
More widely this points to a huge diplomatic effort by the
MOD and FCDO who will have had to work closely with partner nations to get them
to approve the transfer. The export of military equipment is closely regulated
to ensure that missiles sold to one country are not exported without approval
to a second. A typical weapon system may have parts, software or equipment in
it from the UK, France, USA and multiple other countries – all of whom may need
to indicate their support for its legal export or provision to a third party. It
is almost certain that the Storm Shadow will feature international content, and
it is a testament to the British lobbying and diplomatic effort required to
help get speedy approval for the missiles to be released to Ukraine. Such
efforts can be slow at times, requiring diplomacy, tact and a need to
politically engage to get approval. That less than four months after hinting at
the deployment of Storm Shadow we see it being approved to go to Ukraine is a
seriously impressive feat of Civil Service lobbying and effort with partner
nations that will not get the respect it rightly deserves.
For Labour to attack the MOD for being slow is grossly
unfair – the MOD and wider Civil Service has done an enormous amount very quickly
to make this possible and it is a real testament to the skills of those who
work in the Public Sector that they’ve been able to help deliver this outcome.
The question for Russia is what to do about this and how to respond? That the Russian media pundits have reacted with their usual noise about doing ‘bad things’ is to be expected, but it also points to the impotence of the Putin regime to react to the UK effectively. Diplomatically isolated, with no trade to cut and limited diplomats to expel, there is very little that Russian can do to retaliate against the UK. It is hard for Russian diplomats or intelligence officials to reach the UK given the lack of flights to Moscow, making it impossible for businessmen to go and visit Salisbury cathedral, so the ability to conduct a different type of response is reduced. Short of cutting international sea cables, which would do as much harm to Russia as it would other nations, there is little the Russians can do to retaliate meaningful to the UK.
It is telling that Russian isolation continues to grow – in a
week when the sole tank on Red Square was a T34, pointing to huge armour losses
and reduction in available personnel, Ukraine has gained access to some of the
most advanced cruise missiles in Western arsenals. The continued Western
support to Ukraine will help to prepare them for the next stage of the war,
taking the fight to the enemy with advanced weapons, tanks and missiles at a
time when Russian arsenals are being diminished and spare parts running short.
Russia is haemorrhaging military personnel, with casualties now running in the
tens of thousands, and it has very little to show for their losses. As Ukraine
prepares to launch a counter offensive against a military low on supplies, munitions,
and morale, we may see once again the traditional historical sight of a Russian
Army surrendering en-masse or retreating as order collapses. We must be
cautiously optimistic that Russia will find itself outgunned, outnumbered and
out of ways to win in the not-too-distant future. Storm Shadow will doubtless
have been central to this victory when it finally happens.
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