Small States Big Problems?

 

Being a small nation is challenging when it comes to working out how to afford armed forces and what you want to do with them. Being a small nation without enemies is even harder when it comes to answering this question. This was brought sharply into focus this week through media articles focusing on the states of the Irish Defence Forces, with a Foreign Policy article suggesting that Ireland was the weak link in European security – the problem with that statement though is what is it defending against?

Armed forces are always expensive to maintain, they are consume resources that could be spent on other projects and where you are a small nation, are likely to see procurement for most major projects done abroad, meaning the taxpayer sees little economic benefit of financial largesse. The scale of requirements that a modern military needs to be capable of meeting is also equally challenging – from infantry able to conduct basic attacks to air defence to maritime constabulary work and then to the cyber domain. The scale of threats faced are enormous and to do one domain well means sacrificing credibility in others.

For Ireland this challenge was starkly laid out when a 2022 report into the state of the Defence Force noted major short comings in intelligence, air defence, strategic airlift and so on that would render the defence forces unable to properly defend the nation. This sounds extremely concerning, but the ‘so what’ question that seems unanswered in some of the media coverage on this was ‘what nation would invade Ireland in isolation and why would no other nation lift a finger to help defend it’? The international outrage and anger seen among the international community to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia clearly demonstrates that there is no tolerance in the West for unprovoked invasions of western nations by other nations. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to conceive a credible scenario where Ireland would be attacked in isolation without any form of rapid and overwhelming international assistance. More to the point, why would any nation seek to invade Ireland in the 21^st century?

If a militarily small nation like Ireland can be comfortable that they can rely on external assistance in a crisis, then why invest more in defence? This is perhaps the big problem to find an answer for – it is easy to identify possible threats that could materialise, but these are very specific in nature – for example threats to subsea cables or cyber attacks could threaten the financial and data infrastructure of Ireland and the EU but the response to this doesn’t need a major military build-up, more targeted investment in very niche areas. Similarly, the Foreign Policy article bemoans Ireland for its lack of maritime and aerial surveillance capabilities but struggles to explain what it is that they are trying to spot and why? The biggest maritime concern in the wild waters of the Atlantic will be Russian warships, whose presence will already be well understood by NATO, whose forces are doubtless keeping a wary eye on them by many different means. There is no meaningful military maritime threat to Ireland and any operation is likely to be in the counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics space, where OPVs are the ideal operational answer.

In the same way the article attacks Ireland for having a relatively static army with limited artillery and other support available to it, and which requires international assistance to deploy anywhere. But is this really that big an issue? Ireland is a pragmatically neutral nation and highly unlikely to deploy warfighting forces on operations abroad – while the Defence Force has a long and very proud tradition of supporting UN Peackeeping operations, these require military assets that don’t necessarily need artillery or armour to deliver success in the field. Why would Ireland want, or need, a strategic airlift force given how relatively rarely it would need to employ it on operational duties, when it can just as easily call-in support from allies in the EU to assist them when needed with military assistance?

There seems to be a tendency in some quarters to assume that a States worth comes from its arsenals and that nations who lack all the modern assets needed to fight full spectrum warfare are somehow not serious players. This is a very ‘fantasy fleets’ way of thinking as it rarely asks the question ‘what is the threat that the nation needs to defend against and what is the best way to do this’. Attacking Ireland as not being serious on security due to it not possessing equipment that it has very little operational need for is pointless- it is far better to look at the way nations balance out their shortfalls in other ways – for example Ireland has an agreement with the UK to provide fighter air defence if required – rather than investing in a squadron of exceptionally expensive fighters, why not get another nation with far better military aviation capability, from the interceptors to the air to air refuelling tankers to the radar network and access to NATO radar and intelligence feeds to do it for you at no cost? That’s not a weakness, that’s a level of pragmatic success that has saved the Irish taxpayer hundreds of millions, if not billions of Euros in spending and delivers a better outcome for them.

Elsewhere in Europe we see similar cooperation – the Dutch and Belgian armed forces for example are now so closely interlinked that they are practically one. With huge levels of cooperation between the two nations on military planning and procurement this is a great example of where nations accept trade offs and pragmatic compromise to ensure they retain a reasonable military capability overall compared to a barely affordable one. Ultimately it boils down to asking what is reasonable and appropriate – is it to maintain an armed force capable of doing a little bit of everything and retain sovereignty, although in reality such a force would probably collapse once operationally tasked – e.g armed forces in name only, or to compromise, share assets or focus on specific capabilities in the knowledge that while you cannot go to war unilaterally, you do benefit from much greater support when you participate in international operations?

We’re unlikely to ever see unilateral military operations occur again in Europe, and any commitment of troops will be done through NATO, EU or UN sponsored and led operations. Having a small but competent force you can offer up to participate in a niche way (for example an OPV or a mechanised infantry unit) buys you a seat at the table and brings you diplomatic access and credibility. You don’t need large armed forces to be influential, but you do need them to be usable with allies – and you do need people to serve in them.

This is perhaps the biggest challenge facing Ireland and other nations – how do you get volunteers to join up and serve? Right now the Irish Navy is so critically understaffed that all but one of their vessels are alongside due to lack of trained crew. The decision to send an Irish naval vessel to support EU operations off Libya is a good example of using specific military assets to gain international credibility, but it has come at the price of putting all the remaining ships alongside. In the short term this is embarrassing from a PR perspective – “join the Navy that doesn’t go to sea” is a strapline that may appeal to plenty of more cynical sailors in the Royal Navy tired of being trawled at no notice to fill gaps in the fleet, but it is unlikely to appeal to people on civvy street.  There is little point having a large navy or armed forces if you don’t have the people to use and maintain the equipment and assets you’ve bought. The danger is that the more people leave, the worse the problem becomes and in time it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy – people leave because they are tired of covering gaps, working stupid hours and being constantly moved around at no notice to fill the next crisis (again this applies as much to the Royal Navy as it does the Irish one).

Getting people to join when there is a clearly defined threat in place is easy – just look at Estonia which this week saw news that they’ll be mobilising and exercising 10,000 reservists later this year. Given their Russian neighbours it is easy to get people into a mindset of total defence and being ready to serve to guard the freedoms you hold dear. It is no exaggeration to say that Estonia is probably able to put more reservists in the field now than the UK, which despite having more on paper, has no equivalent ability to step up and field reservists in this way.

If you don’t have a threat on your doorstep or you have a military which doesn’t see the need for reservists to deliver its day to day tasking, then it becomes much harder to persuade people to give of their spare time. Trying to find ways to motivate people to serve is hard when you cannot explain what it is that they will be required to do – it is telling that during the Cold War the UK, for example, did not struggle in recruiting volunteers for the reserves as people knew their unit would deploy to a certain location and carry out a specific role as a formed force. Today it is much harder when there is no clear threat or operational requirement to talk about and the possibility of mobilisation is much less clear. Having a threat concentrates the mind and makes the recruiters life a lot easier.

Perhaps this is the biggest challenge of all – trying to make people in small safe states feel the desire to want to serve. Why sign up to a job that you won’t necessarily be well paid in, offers little chance of operations and glory and which is unlikely to see you doing much by way of exciting ‘cool stuff’. This is the problem facing policy makers in capitals like Dublin – how do you build a credible armed force that people want to join when if you do your job right and leverage soft power tools effectively, there is very little need for you to possess a credible armed force in the first place?  The challenge of how small states contribute to their defence is only going to be more pronounced as nations struggle to afford equipment and people and to work out how best to use them in a world where help is almost certainly coming from others better placed to keep you safe.