The Supply Chains That Bind

 

The newspapers in the UK have been full of news of shortages of fresh fruit and vegetables in recent days. To some this is a fact caused by climate change and events beyond our control, while to others the fact that the UK is experiencing shortfalls while EU nations remain well supplied is yet another tangible reminder of the toxic legacy of Brexit. There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, little consensus on the issue on social media. But whatever the cause of the problem, the issue highlights the reality of the interdependent world that we live in, and raises questions about what this means for Defence.

The root cause of the shortages of fruit and vegetables lies in a combination of weather, political pressure to reduce exporting to ensure home food supplies, conflict in Ukraine and inflation. Suppliers are reluctant to export without ease of access to markets in some cases, while in others their governments are unwilling to let them do so for fear of causing unrest on the home food market – better a glut of supply and prices drop than a paucity and civil disturbances. Whatever the final reason for suppliers choosing to prioritise other nations over the UK when it comes to food, what it does show is that events far from home will be felt at home.

Trade and the supply of goods has long been interconnected across the globe – the only thing ‘dark’ about the Dark Ages seems to have been the lack of light at night. This period saw a thriving exchange of goods and services between nations. The outstanding book “River Kings” by Cat Jarman is a fantastic detective novel showing how a precious stone from India ended up in a muddy field in the Midlands during the time of Viking raids. Look further back to Roman times and you see how in Vindolanda, the Roman fortress on Hadrians Wall goods were discovered that had their roots in the Black Sea and far beyond. Even further back and there was a healthy trade of goods and services even during the Iron Ages and distant past – the simple fact is that for as long as humanity has been trading, it has been passing goods down supply chains, and in turn these have been disrupted by war and events out of peoples control.

During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the UK was heavily reliant on access to the Baltic to secure supplies of timber for the Royal Navy to build new ships. A significant amount of British effort was spent trying to secure access for merchants, protect merchant shipping and ensure that supplies didn’t run out. The superb book ‘Britain Against Napoleon’ by Roger Knight touches at length on the challenges of keeping the Royal Navy and British Army both supplied and able to fight at home and abroad. While the war may have been won on the battlefield, it was only possible due to supply chains and engagements far from home.

The modern world is little changed, and if anything is even more complex. As the events of Ukraine have shown, conflict can cause disruption across the globe and cause a ripple of events that can lead to catastrophic consequences far from the warzone. Russia and Ukraine collectively represent some of the leading global exporters of barley and wheat (some 30% of global exports), vital parts of the global food chain. They also account for 50% production and some 75% of sunflower oil exports – one of the most vital staple ingredients used for cooking. The Ukraine war has made these exports far less reliable and resulted in shortfalls of exports, in turn causing prices to skyrocket and causing food insecurity. In Africa, where some 238 million people live at near permanent risk of food shortages, this impact, coupled with the crippling impact of drought causing crop failure has led to famine and human misery. The result is that Africa is increasingly destabilised as hungry populations cannot afford staple foodstuffs, leading to increased population migration in search of work and food, and further pressure on the land that is still productive.

This level of interconnectivity means  that it is increasingly difficult for modern nations to assume that they can step back from a region or assume that because somewhere is ‘far away’ it is not of strategic interest to them. This is particularly the case for the UK which as a globally focused trading nation with wide ranging security interests needs to decide how to best focus its finite resources to protect its priorities. This challenge is particularly notable at the moment as the UK grapples with the dilemma of where to prioritise defence spending and commitments and whether its focus is NATO or a wider ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. Both are arguably of equal importance, but both cannot be afforded equally.

The case for NATO investment is that security begins at home and ensuring that Russia is effectively deterred from attacking NATO nations and that key partners are protected is powerful. The ongoing deployment in Eastern Europe, particularly by the British Army and RAF to provide a presence and capable force to deter and defend the Baltic states from attack plays a critical role in safeguarding European economic and political stability. A Russian move on any NATO member would be a catastrophic event with wide reaching consequences – but even Russian activity short of that could cause immense disruption – hence deterrence helps build an element of stability. The more the UK invests in NATO, the stronger it is to deter attack, but this comes at a cost of prioritising resources towards Land and Air commitments over a more global presence.

The global presence by contrast offers the ability for the UK to flex its assets more widely to try to shape and influence the outcome of events. For example Army ‘rangers’ could be used to train local troops in peacekeeping or stability to help reduce population disruption. Royal Navy personnel can be used to train and support fishery protection operations, helping reduce overfishing and causing shortages of fish at home that could cause shortages, while the RAF could be used to provide logistical support to disaster relief, flying in aid to provide recovery and assistance when needed. All of these are relatively low level ‘tactical’ types of activity, but they can have a much wider strategic impact – for example the presence of a Royal Navy warship conducting fishery protection duties in remote Pacific Island nations can help send a signal of support and deter illegal activities. This level of small scale ‘softer power’ activity may not be hugely intense, but it can playa real part in helping assure stability where it is required.

For the UK the decision that needs to be taken is how best to spread the influence and assets to prevent disruption to the global supply chain. Looking globally requires a very different force construct, for example more emphasis on people and platforms based in the Indo-Pacific to work with partners in security capacity building – the recent BBC tv series ‘Warship Tour of Duty’ was a good example of how presence builds links that in turn can be used for wider diplomatic benefit. While some commentators may argue that the Indo-Pacific is a long way from home and others are better placed to have local effect, if the UK doesn’t commit to the region, how can it help shape the security outcomes that benefit our national interests?

The wider challenge is defining where the use of military power ceases to be relevant and investment in other arms of government becomes far more valuable. As climate change becomes ever more profound and destructive, investing in aid and support to impacted nations is critical – not just the smaller islands under threat of being drowned, but helping nations that are increasingly subject to drought and famine. The more that the UK can do to help others, the less chance there is of the disruption manifesting itself in a way that damages our own national interests – for example if drought leads to population migration to the coast, and in turn people desperate for cash for food turn to piracy, then what is a better investment -a small amount in aid or the cost of deploying a warship to a region on a long term basis to deter pirates?

Other areas where different parts of government can have a positive impact include investing in investment security, being able to understand the supply chain and use sanctions and targeted measures to prevent equipment being exported. Or using law enforcement officials to target and tackle the risks of smuggling that in turn leads to instability and crime in other areas. Investment in diplomacy and membership of international organisations helps build shared goals and mutual commitments to resolving problems – much as the ERG (for non-Brits, a fanatical extremist ultra-right wing collection of Eurosceptic politicians) may loathe the EU, pooling sovereignty and working together for mutual interests can, and does, result in much better outcomes for all. One reason why the EU was less affected than the UK over vegetable shortages is because it is easier to export to the EU nations than it is the UK in isolation. Had the UK still been in the EU then it is highly doubtful similar shortages would have occurred.

This is the challenge for security – using the armed forces to protect national security interests should arguably be very much a last resort, done only when no other option is on the table. Investment in the dull ‘soft power’ tools of bureaucracy, rule of law and diplomacy may be less glamorous and impressive, but it can arguably achieve far more long term results to improve assurance of supply than the periodic deployment of a warship can. National security policy makers therefore need to balance off what matters more – is it the ability to have a tool of last resort deployed ‘just in case’ or investment in areas where presence and commitment can shape how the situation evolves.

Ultimately the answer is that a blended mix is needed which straddles the whole range from diplomatic presence, use of international agencies and organisations, working with supra-national legal authorities and using the armed forces where appropriate. Look for instance at the Southern Red Sea where in the preceeding few years the UK has played a large part in trying to work to bring a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen, using diplomatic tools and relationships at one level. It has brought aid to bear to assist the suffering of those directly impacted at another, while working more widely to help capacity build law enforcement and military capability in the Horn of Africa to reduce wider security threats, like piracy. Finally, as a last resort it has had warships escort UK entitled merchant shipping where necessary through the most dangerous waters to prevent attacks on vessels, the impact of which could be to disrupt the global supply chain of food, energy and goods for weeks or months at huge cost.

There is no clear cut easy answer on the right mix, but it is clear that in the world we’re in now, the more integrated and engaged we are across every possible medium and outlet, the more effective we will be at protecting our national interests. Sovereignty cannot be eaten, traded for goods or burnt for warmth. It is easy to proclaim the importance of ‘sovereignty’ but far harder for some to accept that protection of the national interest requires compromise and pooling of sovereignty to achieve a  greater good. As we move into a more interconnected world, we cannot raise the drawbridge and pretend that we are an island anymore (except in name). To do so risks disruption and chaos – rather, now more than ever we must be prepared to engage, compromise and be open minded international partners across all parts of the debate to secure our long term national interests. That is how truly sovereign nations thrive.