Thin Pinstriped Line

  The newspapers in the UK have been full of news of shortages of fresh fruit and vegetables in recent days. To some this is a fact caused by climate change and events beyond our control, while to others the fact that the UK is experiencing shortfalls while EU nations remain well supplied is yet another tangible reminder of the toxic legacy of Brexit. There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, little consensus on the issue on social media. But whatever the cause of the problem, the issue highlights the reality of the interdependent world that we live in, and raises questions about what this means for Defence. The root cause of the shortages of fruit and vegetables lies in a combination of weather, political pressure to reduce exporting to ensure home food supplies, conflict in Ukraine and inflation. Suppliers are reluctant to export without ease of access to markets in some cases, while in others their governments are unwilling to let them do so for fear of causing unrest on the home food...

  Is the military an organisation capable of change, constantly reinventing itself to face the challenges of new threats and problems, or is it a static organisation that talks a good talk about change, but finds itself unable to do so? The question is one that has been asked probably since armed forces evolved, and is one that will continue well into the future – the same questions asked of the Roman Legions will be asked of the Space Marine Legions (and their trusty FV432 ‘Rhino’ steeds). This issue came to mind when the author was reflecting the other day that of his peer group who chose military service as a full time career, many are now in increasingly senior positions of influence and authority. They are in roles that, when they joined, seemed to hold significant power and span of control and they could (and should) have the power to effect meaningful change. Yet those same self-assured young officers of 20-25 years ago who were adamant that “when they were in charge thing...

  Reports on Sky News indicate that the MOD may not see an anticipated rise in the Defence budget. If true, this would make t he UK the only major NATO nation not to increase defence spending since the start of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, and due to strong inflationary pressures lead to a very substantial cut in the Defence budget. How realistic is this outcome and does the UK even need a rise in defence spending? During defence reviews there is always a litany of leaks and ground shaping underway from different quarters. It is not hard to spot the ‘subtle as an AS90 shell exploding next to me’ briefing by various parts of the Army that they think they badly need more money (quietly ignoring the last 10 years and approx £14bn they’ve so far managed to mess up spending on Ajax and other projects). We’ve not yet really seen the RN and RAF break cover in the same way – the first sign of this will be the “Royal Navy to sell HMS PRINCE OF WALES” or “RAF to scrap Red Arr...

  The Public Accounts Committee has issued a damning report on the MOD efforts to digitalise, stating that the Department must fundamentally change the way it is trying to deliver digital transformation. While not a hugely glamorous subject, nor one that attracts much attention online when you could be arguing over how many anti-ship missiles a Batch 2 RIVER class should have (the correct answer is, of course, none), this is probably one of the most critical parts of the defence portfolio. Failure to get this right could leave the armed forces trailing behind their peers and foes. At its heart digital transformation is about taking the some 2000 IT systems used by the MOD and by 2025 achieving three core goals – the creation of a ‘digital backbone’ that can effectively share and use data across the MOD, the development of a ‘digital foundry’ to ensure the Department can properly use and exploit this data, and finally the creation of a workforce of digital specialists who can us...

  The British Army is in trouble. Equipped with increasingly obsolete capabilities, suffering from a chronic lack of new vehicles, struggling to deliver an ever changing vision of its role and with an elderly estate that is starting to be as dangerous to troops as enemy fire is, the Army is, in the eyes of its critics no longer first rate, and struggling to be second rate. Is this a fair characterisation of a complex problem? There has been growing coverage in the media and disquiet in many corners about the state of the Army recently. The seemingly endless saga of Ajax, a program that feels almost as old as its Greek god namesake is now an easy story to write for any defence correspondent. There are regular articles focusing on the fact that the Army has been hollowed out, that even Ministers seem to think that it needs more investment and the events of Ukraine have forced into sharp contrast the state of the Army versus the reality of modern combat. One is not the equal of the ...