A Priceless Pittance - The Benefits of the British Indo-Pacific Tilt

As the new year dawns, and the third British Prime Minister in four months tries to grapple with an ever expanding and complex in-tray, questions are being asked about where the UK’s national security priorities should lie. The invasion of Ukraine, now almost a year ago, has led to calls for a reappraisal of British defence policy and priorities, and another look at the findings of the Integrated Review, published in 2021, which heralded a wider strategic shift by the UK back towards the Indo-Pacific, the so-called ‘tilt’ about which much has been written.  There is a growing number of articles suggesting that the tilt is a fantasy and that British national security objectives are best served by refocusing on Europe at the cost of other commitments. The purpose of this article is to roundly rebuff such views.

The arguments against the tilt focus on a couple of main concepts, which were illustrated in this early January article which put forward that the UK should abandon the region and shift as a fundamentally Johnson era legacy, and that the UK should refocus itself as a ‘continental power’ with apparently limited defence budgets and aspiration and instead focus on supporting Kyiv and deterring Moscow. The best use of the British armed forces is closer to home, not far from it. These articles seem to share a common view of both defeatism and a sense that the UK does not matter as a globally focused power. This is a common viewpoint in some areas, which for decades have taken great pleasure in pronouncing the death of UK influence, bemoaning the UK as a small nation that doesn’t matter and suggesting that it is a small island state that has ideas above its station or means.  They are, in the authors view, unnecessarily defeatist in approach.

British presence in the Indo-Pacific region has traditionally, with the exception of the period 1945-71 relied on relatively small scale naval forces, supported by limited land based army and RAF units to deliver presence, if not huge levels of capability. Despite the fondly remembered (and often longed return to) the concept of a ‘Far East Fleet’ by some fantasists, the UK has never been a major military player in the region. Pre WW2 investment focused far more on infrastructure (e.g. Singapore) than capability, and it was the implied threat of commitment and interest through softer presence, be it a gunboat or a governor, that sent a message of support and solidarity.

During the early Cold War there was a significantly larger force in the region, based on a major naval fleet and supported by large scale land and air forces. This was due to the combination of operations in Korea, Malaya and Borneo that formed part of the complex post war colonial drawn down, and were very much coalition in nature. Additionally the presence of the RN and RAF served to help deliver the nuclear mission for the myriad of lesser known military alliances that emerged to counter communist influence (CENTO and SEATO for example) as part of efforts to be able to fight a global nuclear war if required. At its peak in the 1950s there were comfortably over 100,000 personnel based in the region, many of whom were national servicemen. The successful completion of operations in the region and the wider moves to independence, coupled with wider economic problems at home led to the decision to significantly draw down the British presence ‘east of Suez’ in the 1960s, with withdrawal occurring between 1968 – 71, and the UK focussing the majority of its defence assets at home to counter the Soviet Union from this date.

After 1971, the British presence in the region stabilised in a form that has remained relatively unchanged to this day (other than the closure of the garrison in Hong Kong). A small naval facility in Singapore, built around wharves and oil depot, but (other than the Hong Kong patrol ships) no permanently based vessels but intended to support the occasional naval deployments in to the region in varying form from carrier task groups to singleton escorts. A very small naval shore presence in Diego Garcia, but no meaningful naval base. The RAF had no permanently based aircraft or airbases in the area (other than until the closure of Hong Kong). Finally the British Army had a small garrison built around a Gurkha battalion based in Brunei, with supporting helicopters and a jungle warfare school, with the cost of the facilities paid for by the Sultan.  There was a myriad of defence attaches and loan officers in some areas, with the biggest presence being in Australia and New Zealand as part of the 5-EYES alliance. There was also some limited engagement with the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA), the primary defensive agreement that the UK is party to in the region, and also some isolated oddities – for example some personnel were in Korea to support the UN armistice commission work (reference can be found to Gurkha platoons occasionally deploying to the DMZ until the 1980s too).

The UK military presence in this region has been slender since the 1970s and is unlikely to grow significantly again. What was significant though was the scale of diplomatic representation, with the FCDO global network of embassies and High Commissions maintaining a significant representational presence across the region, supported by wider UK departmental interests (e.g trade and industry). Even if Defence was not a key player, the UK has, and will continue, to engage in soft power in this space.

The purpose of the Indo Pacific tilt is not to turn the UK into a regional superpower in the area. There is no suggestion that the UK will be sending large fleets back to Singapore, or that the RAF will be permanently stationing squadrons of fast jets in the region. Instead at its heart the tilt is about increasing the level of soft power engagement and a very limited ramping up of presence to help promote British interests in this crucial space. There will be some who think that the Indo-Pacific is a long way from home and that British interests are best served by being closer to home – leave the problems of Asia to the locals, not to us. But this is to fundamentally misunderstand the global economy of today.

Think back three years and the disruption caused by the shut down of the global supply chain when Covid hit for the first time. The way that problems in China resulted in a hard stop to the global economic machinery, causing shortages of stock in UK shops and making a material difference to our quality and way of life. As a consumer of manufactured goods and as a key user of imported energy, the UK is at the end of a long and vulnerable supply chain that can easily be disrupted by terrorism, conflict and other manmade problems as much as it can by natural disasters or pandemics. We may not want to be involved, but if we are not, then we have no ability to shape the response or take steps to resolve matters when things go wrong.

We also need to accept that this is a region in which relationships and engagement are built over a long period of time and in which sustained delivery of commitment for the long haul matters far more than short term promises of glitzy tomorrows that are not delivered. Being able to build meaningful links that turn into long term benefits means having presence, it means opening doors and it means working with people, often at junior level, so that nations are used to having the UK in the room with a seat at the table. In the medium term this matters because if we have to engage in military operations in the region, be it counter-piracy, counter terrorism or more kinetic acts, or even just humanitarian aid post disaster, then being able to work with people you know and trust is far easier than starting out from scratch.

One of the reasons why NATO works so well is that the member states have worked together in meaningful ways for nearly 80 years. Armed forces understand each others communications, they have shared standards of interoperability and operational procedures, meaning they can work together effectively when required. If Russia were stupid enough to attack the Baltic states, it would find itself opposed by a capable alliance of nations able to work, fight and overcome any military threat. This has not happened overnight, but as a result of decades of exercises, joint operations and closer building of personal relationships. It requires constant engagement and willingness to invest people and resources to make it a success.

If the UK takes a long term view, then the Indo-Pacific tilt is not a KPI on an excel spreadsheet that can be marked ‘green’ in a years time because we’ve sent some ships to the region. It’s a decades long commitment that requires investment of people and presence in a small but meaningful way. Sending Ministers to visit and have bilateral engagements helps bolster goodwill and government links, that in turn is supported by visits from UK industry to win business orders and build long term financial links to the region. The presence of diplomats helps thicken links at working level that can be used to call in support when the UK wants to mobilise international opinion for common cause – for example helping call out Russia for their barbaric invasion of Ukraine in a variety of international fora has been made easier by having existing good relationships to diverse states. If we want to be serious about deterring Russia, then this means taking a global approach and being willing to build links in all manner of places to have the credibility and credit to cash in at a time when we need it. Sitting at home waiting for a crisis is not going to make resolving it easier – when it happens we have the choice of participating without having laid the foundations required to be effective, potentially hampering effectiveness, our influence and ability to shape the outcome and potentially costing lives, or we can engage in a meaningful manner.

The key challenge with suggesting that the UK should embrace its destiny as a continental power and save money by withdrawing from the region to focus on Europe is that the UK has never been a purely continental power, and that the savings from refocusing would be negligible. For starters, the phrase continental power is bandied about without actually defining what we mean bv this – does it mean that the UK is an inward looking nation focused purely on Europe from a security perspective, and that its armed forces should be cut to meet this aspiration and nothing more? Or does it mean that the UK should focus far more on European based defence to deter Russia, investing in more land/air battle centric capabilities and working in these regional spaces to the detriment of wider global reach capability? These suggestions are easy to make but ignore that the UK has historically (other than the period 1945-1991) steered clear of trying to keep forces present on mainland Europe as a standing army of deterrence. Even when it did so in the Cold War, this was purely to buy time for talks in wartime ahead of an all out nuclear release – the existence of the BAOR was merely a speed bump to give officials time to either resolve the crisis, or release the city killer warheads…

Indeed it could be argued that the war in Ukraine shows the UK returning to and continuing to deliver national security objectives via very traditional policy means. Historically, for centuries British support or engagement in land wars in Europe has been through the provision of financial support to one side, provision of equipment, material and uniforms and using the Royal Navy as a way of conducting interdiction far from home to reduce a nations ability to act. The means used by the British in the Napoleonic wars to support allies like Prussia and Russia are little different in concept to those we see today with our support to Ukraine. If anything, the Ukraine concept has proven that the UK is not a continental power, but a global maritime power that relies on soft power to influence kinetic outcomes on continental land wars.

If the UK were to cancel its plans for a tilt and instead focus on Europe, what would this look like? In practise it would save very little money – the troops nominated for exercises and joint work in the region would instead be allocated to NATO, and likely spend a similar amount of time and money deploying on NATO exercises. There is limited cross over though between formations assigned for the defence of NATO (which are mostly heavier land based assets) and those that could be committed to the Indo-Pacific. Bringing home the two RIVER class OPVs would save a tiny amount of money and make no material difference to NATO security – both ships are ideal flag wavers and diplomatic platforms but would die quickly in a NATO conflict environment. They are ideal for building low level military links with nations the UK has historically rarely worked with, but would add relatively little extra to NATO beyond flag waving missions. In other words, we’d end up losing significantly more value from staying East of Suez at low cost to do the same mission, at similar cost, back home but for less impact.

Were the UK to be serious about scrapping the tilt and focusing on being a continental power, then this requires a series of decisions that would fundamentally alter the shape and formation of the armed forces for decades to come. It would mean stepping away from a lot of already paid for power projection capabilities (tankers, assault ships etc) and focusing more on heavy army capability (which does not exist, would cost billions to reconstitute and take years to do) and focusing on being ready to fight an airland battle in central Europe. Would this deter Russia though? It is highly doubtful that Moscow would alter policy or strategic goals were the UK to focus more on investing in European NATO right now – there is already a glut of spending going on from other partner nations, who are rearming and restocking their munitions. Focusing additional defence resources would alter some tactical and operational calculations, perhaps in Russian planners eyes for operations in the Baltics or Finnish border areas, but would not change their strategic intent. The gain would be, at best, an increased level of operational efficiency at the cost of sacrificing long term strategic gains in the wider world.

There is a danger too that we see Russia as purely a European power, and only consider our security goals in that context. We would be wise to remember that Russia is also a Pacific power, and that its growing links to Iran and China make it a challenge to British interests in the gulf and the Indo-Pacific region as well. The security puzzle posed by Russia is global, and we need to be ready to address it globally – be this by talks, engagement or presence, to help build a global coalition of likeminded nations to call out and tackle the challenge of Russian aggression. We cannot boil Russia down to being just an operational front in Europe without considering the other theatres where they operate.

At the same time, we need to take a genuinely strategic approach to how we as a nation approach the challenge of global security. While it is fashionable to paint the UK as a nation in decline, it remains an extremely potent global actor, drawn from its economic interests, its diplomatic footprint and its military reach. We benefit from wider participation in some areas to help us achieve our goals in others. Russia is arguably a declining power that will struggle to pose a credible threat to European security in years to come given its birth rate collapse, the huge losses caused by the war in Ukraine and the decline of their financial and industrial base. This means that in the not too distant future the West will need to think about Russia in a different way to now – as an increasingly depopulated, technologically backward and militarily increasingly obsolete nuclear power. But in the same breath it needs to be able to focus on the wider threats to security.

There is no doubt that the future industrial engine of the planet lies, in the medium term, in the Indo-Pacific and in the longer term potentially Africa. With growing economies, complex security problems and an assertive China trying to stake a claim to territory now before its own demographic time bomb explodes (the Chinese population is on track to drop from well over a billion to ‘barely’ 650 million in the next 80 years, the majority of whom will be over 50), then whether we like it or not, global events will be dictated in the region. Stepping back from it does not make the threat or risk of these events go away, rather it means that they will happen without our ability to influence or shape them. At the same time, a rapidly modernising regional set of economies will look hungrily to much of the UK’s export offering (namely advanced technology and ‘middle class tat’) providing a rich vein of business wins for industry and tourism through soft power if properly exploited.

We need to take a decades long strategic view here that recognises that this is a space where if we are not in it for the long haul, we will not be in it at all. The (relatively speaking) tiny investment of a small number of ships and some troops  - maybe 2000 people if you include the Gurkhas in Brunei, is very low cost and very good value for money. It costs a pittance to run, yet the output it generates is priceless for our long-term national interests. The benefits are significant – the increase in UK presence and engagement in recent years has opened the door to bilateral cooperation with Japan on a 6^th generation jet fighter, something that would have been unthinkable even a few years ago, but which will pay huge dividends for our long term defence and aerospace industry for decades to come. Similarly AUKUS, which exists in part because the UK has shown it has the long term vision to commit to the region will not only improve regional security, through better joint operations, but also benefit the UK industry too – with nuclear propulsion and quantum computing real potential areas of interest.

This level of  commitment extends to our presence in the region – sending a carrier strike group is a low cost commitment that can be flexibly sent where it is required. A carrier can spend time operating alongside NATO peers, then weeks later be taking part in FPDA exercises in a way that land and air based assets cannot do as easily. When deployed with a US element embarked too, the carrier becomes a tool that helps boost UK standing in Washington, showing a willingness to engage globally and share in the security burden, which in turn helps strengthen NATO. Showing the US we are serious makes it easier to push the case for Defence on the hill, and reduces the seductive whispers of isolationism that some preach. Likewise, being present in the region helps keep doors open in Washington as their strategic focus shifts towards potential conflicts with China. When your primary ally is looking elsewhere, you need to be able to remain credible with them to ensure they also keep your own local best interests at heart – to that end it is valuable to see the tilt as much as being about securing long term European security as it is about British engagement elsewhere.

Our presence too is not something that the UK clings to in isolation as a post imperial delusion – you only have to look at the way that France, Germany and other nations routinely deploy ships and military capability in the region to bolster their own national objectives. Most European powers now see security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region, the 2022 Dutch defence white paper for example cites China as a key security threat. It is not some fit of post imperial fancy to deploy to the region and seek to build links there – our European security friends but business competitors are doing just that now – if we choose to step away we leave open an opportunity that others will profit from.  It is also worth recalling that the tilt is a means of helping enhance European security through joint operations – the 2021 Carrier Strike Group deployment included a Dutch frigate, and future deployments will almost certainly include allied vessels in the same way. The UK can package up deployments to the region as a way of enabling our European partners to deliver their own small scale tilt, at lower overall risk – stepping back from this would paradoxically harm our relations with European defence partners too.

The Indo-Pacific tilt has been a very cheap and small-scale investment that has already paid dividends more widely. It mirrors the growing aspiration by our European allies to operate in this region and it is far more about trade and diplomacy than it is about pure military presence. The savings from stepping back from it would be non-existent – fractions of a percent of the annual defence budget, but it would do huge damage. Through low level engagement the UK has been able to bolster links with partner nations that in turn benefit our longer term goals – for example ship visits to remote Pacific island states help generate goodwill, and more importantly increase the potential for being able to lobby and influence these states to support shared UK goals in international fora – be it calling out Russia at the UN, or working together to tackle the problem of climate change.  The danger is we look at the tilt as a purely military thing and not a more coherent national security goal that brings all departments in together. Before decisions are made on stepping back from it, there needs to be a coherent understanding of what soft power objectives could be harmed as a result of withdrawing hard power from the region.

The real risk we face as a nation is that having spent time and invested diplomatic effort and credibility on convincing partners in the region that the UK is a credible returning player, we now for the sake of short termism throw this away to solve a tiny part of the MOD’s financial problems. To do so would do huge long term damage to the UK’s strategic interests, without materially enhancing our security in the process.