Do You Need A Gunboat to do Gunboat Diplomacy?

 

It is an old adage that sending a gunboat is a remarkably effective form of diplomacy. It is a means of building influence, sending a message and helping maintain a presence and interest in events around the world. Gunboat diplomacy is a favoured tool of many nations who possess capable navies and are keen to use them as a key tool in their national toolbox of influence.

The Indo Pacific ‘region’ (in reality an area that comfortably takes up more than 50% of the Earths surface) is where gunboat diplomacy really comes into its own. With dozens of nations separated by huge distances, maritime power is vital as a means of travelling between islands, and helping provide assistance, support and diplomatic reach. For the UK, the Integrated Review of 2021 set a clear direction to help improve the military presence in this region as part of a wider ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ that will see British policy makers take an increasingly deep interest in this region.

HMS SPEY at Pitcairn Island -Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

A key part of this change is the stepping up of the permanent presence of Royal Navy warships in the area on an enduring basis for at least 5 years. HMS TAMAR and SPEY are operating across the region, taking part in a diverse range of exercises, operations and visits to help improve defence and diplomatic relationships, and work with other like minded partners.

In the roughly 12 months since they have deployed, both ships have sailed across the globe, supporting visits to nations which have not seen a Royal Navy visit in many decades. HMS SPEY played a crucial role in both delivery of COVID vaccines to Pitcairn, the most remote of all UK Overseas Territories, and also providing disaster relief to Tonga earlier this year. HMS TAMAR has undertaken exercises and operations including sanctions enforcement and built strong links to Japan and other regional partners. In both cases these ships have been able to take host nations military personnel to sea for joint training, helping upskill local coastguards and fishery protection missions, and helped ‘fly the flag’ for the UK – for example supporting Royal visits in the region.

There is no doubt that in terms of cost effectiveness and impact, the presence of these two OPVs has really delivered ‘bang for buck’. The ships have helped demonstrate the UK’s enduring interest in the region, sustained military cooperation and also helped show presence where it is required. But, these ships are not, and never will be, ‘warfighters’ in the sense of a larger frigate or destroyer.

To some the idea of deploying an OPV into a region where the Chinese Navy is growing in strength is pathetic. Is this the best the Royal Navy can muster – a pair of vessels with a 30mm cannon apiece? Where is the CIWS, the Anti-Ship Missiles, the Ships Flight and all the other items that would make these ships able to ‘hold their own’ in a wartime situation? The answer, thankfully, is that cooler more sensible heads have prevailed and these ships are not intended to be operated in this manner.

If we look at the risks in the Pacific region, we see the challenge posed by an increasingly assertive and aggressive Chinese Navy, gaining in strength and capability on an annual basis. The PLAN is now operating multiple aircraft carriers at sea, and its forces are assertively seeking to push forward Chinese presence. To counter this, the United States is seemingly determined to build an alliance of like minded powers able to deter Chinese efforts. These efforts include building forums to unite Pacific Island nations, offering them a voice and access to Washington, Canberra and other powers, while trying to persuade them of the risks of accepting Beijings financial support. It is hard not to feel that the rise in tension is palpable and that the US and China are squaring off for a possible conflict.

HMS TAMAR in Singapore -Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

To supporters of the Royal Navy, having a pair of OPV’s present seems akin to having floating targets, ships that will be sunk in the opening moments of a war and which seem almost valueless militarily. The ships should be upgunned, or even better replaced by larger more capable frigates (like Type 31) or even better, there should be a carrier group permanently based in the region, or other similar fantasies. To this group, the presence of the RIVER class adds little and seems in their eyes to be ‘embarrassing’ at best, particularly when compared with other nations navies locally. There is though a compelling counterview which is that actually not only are the RIVER class ideal for the region, but more widely, does the RN even need a ‘gunboat’ at all deployed in this theatre?

The challenge of the Indo-Pacific region is not being ready to fight a war tonight (at least not for the UK). This is a much longer term and strategic game of helping build coalitions, shape diplomatic positions and try to isolate China (or at least neutralise her influence), and in doing so create a body of like-minded nations, or at least ones amenable to our perspective on the world. This is done not through deploying HMS MEGADEATH to show off all her superior missile systems and overawe the locals, but by deploying vessels that help build capability and shape positive diplomatic outcomes.

For example, one of the big strengths of the OPV deployment is their ability to go into a plethora of ports that are too small for larger vessels. Being able to deploy a British warship into a small harbour, show the flag and have cocktail parties or support investment is incredibly powerful – what local politician doesn’t like being invited to be guest of honour at a cocktail party onboard a warship belonging to Her Majesty The Queen? Being able to get alongside and host this event helps build goodwill and enables discrete networking and messaging.

This is further enhanced by the proportionality of the visit. An OPV is at the top end of the level of scale and aspiration that most Pacific Island nations will look for in their navy. There is no chance that these states want, or need, a frigate or destroyer. There is a sense that an OPV can help deliver engagement as peers and equals – sending a ship whose capability is able to solve problems that the nation has is valuable – for example, sending a RIVER on fishery patrols in national waters, perhaps with coastguards or law enforcement officials embarked, helps build trust. It shows that the UK is willing to support these nations, and help them police and enforce their natural resources, particularly against overfishing, for which the Chinese are notorious offenders.

By contrast, a heavily armed frigate will be unable to get into many of the local ports, making the visit remote and less likely to attract attention. Will the members of the Government drive for an hour or more down to the container port for a reception? It is less likely than if a ship is moored alongside the harbour of the Capital… It is also a less efficient use of resources, sending a highly capable frigate to conduct a fishery patrol and potentially more confrontational.

West Indies presence -Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The use of warships in policing needs to be carefully managed to avoid escalatory action. Sending a Royal Navy frigate to support policing of overfishing in another nation’s waters may lead to accusations of militarising the situation, or increasing tensions. The image of a frigate looming over a Chinese fishing vessel, particularly if it has been detained on suspicion of breaking the law will create a stir that is unhelpful both for the UK, and the wider nation – it gives the visual image of overkill. By contrast, sending a small patrol vessel to do the job it was designed to do is immediately less confrontational and keeps tensions under control.

This is where the OPVs come into their own – small enough to reduce tensions and not escalate matters in some areas, but big enough to help support allies that need assistance. The use of the RIVER class both in fishery protection and disaster relief shows that they are ideal platforms for the job we want them to do – which is raise and sustain British influence with our allies.

There is a danger that we assume that the only answer to gunboat diplomacy is a gunboat. Actually, given the sorts of missions that the Royal Navy is carrying out in the region, perhaps what is needed is not a gunboat at all, but a combination of ships and support vessels that can carry out disaster relief, send aid, assist with training and support to maritime constabulary work and the myriad of other tasks that make up naval work. For example, in the last 48hrs (at time of writing), the US Coast Guard has deployed a cutter to carry out drought alleviation in Kiribati, sending water to a nation stricken by climate change and suffering from serious water shortages.

In terms of helping buy influence and support, perhaps the single most useful set of ships that the RN could deploy in the region at not warships, but water carriers and vessels able to carry out disaster relief and deliver aid as needed. These ships need not even be warships, but vessels charted, painted grey and given a pennant number. There is a precedent for this, through the use of a BAY class LSD(A) in the West Indies to embark tri-service support and respond to natural disasters. The US Navy similarly relies on hospital ships like the USNS MERCY, a hospital ship that helps deliver aid as required as a response to disasters.

This sort of influence deployment is already underway, with both TAMAR and SPEY committed since Mid-June to the ‘Pacific Partnership’ exercise, intended to build support for local island nations, while there are RN staff embarked onboard USNS MERCY too as part of an international coalition presence. This sort of work is not high profile, it does not involve cutting edge warfighting, but it does build the support and goodwill that may be needed at critical times in the future.

What does this influence buy us and why is it worth doing? In simple terms, we should never forget that each of these tiny island nations have a vote, both in the UN and more widely. They can shape election outcomes for international organisations, and help the UK and allies deliver outcomes amenable to our interests – by drawing on all the levers of power open to us, it helps increase the likelihood that when their support is required diplomatically, these nations will be more inclined to align with us, rather than China or Russia. The presence of these vessels helps us secure soft power victory across the globe.

There is a wider perspective too that these nations can, in a small way, help secure denial of the sea and air. We think of denial in terms of missiles or weapons, intended to create ‘no sail / no fly’ zones that others dare not sail in. But equally potent is denial of diplomatic access. As the Chinese Navy grows its reach across the globe, and is more reliant on a fragile chain of supply ships, they will need port and airport access to ensure their logistic supply lines.

It is often forgotten that the RFA matters because its ships can pull into a third party port, restore, often from a friendly airhead that has allowed military flights to bring in munitions and return to sea to restock deployed ships. This is only achieved through both maintaining strong diplomatic links to enable the host nation to let us in, and also in persuading these countries, and others, to permit military overflight through our airspace (e.g the so-called DIPCLEAR process). Building links now at low level, helping create positive relationships and generating goodwill may well in future ensure that these same countries deny port access to Chinese ships, or refuse their aircraft access to their airspace, denying their logistic chain the ability to support their deployed forces. While hopefully unlikely, it is still a very potentially powerful win achieved primarily through soft power and small ships.

The final point to make is that the likelihood of the UK being in a naval shooting war in the Indo-Pacific region is slim at best. Were a war to start, then unless the UK had a carrier strike group deployed locally, it would take months to get a task group out to the region – by which stage the war is likely to be over. For all the dreams of RN carrier task forces operating in the Indo-Pacific, the hard truth is that this is a war that we are unlikely to take part in in this way. Far more potent and valuable to our friends and allies like the US and Australia is not whether we have Frigates there, but instead that we have smaller ships, able to build big positive outcomes with their work.

The RIVER class is perfect, just the way it is, for the work we would like this ships to do. They are without doubt the best diplomatic influencers for the region, and we should be wary of wishing for bigger ships, for this may come at a cost. Sometimes the best gunboat to send isn’t even a gunboat at all…