Learning to Let the Past Go...

 

The loss of the Type 42 destroyer, HMS SHEFFIELD in 1982 as a direct result of damage sustained in an Exocet attack by the Argentine Air Force remains one of the most significant moments in post war British naval history.

The attack, which came 37 years after the end of WW2 in which the Royal Navy was the second largest in the world and had operated fleets across the globe, and whose senior leadership had served in that war, represented a humbling blow. It served as a timely notice that the world had changed, and that navies could take on the most potent of global navies and give them a bloody nose.

As a legacy of the attack, the Royal Navy changed out of all recognition in its attitude to training, damage control and focus on survivability at sea. Even now, four decades later the losses from the Falklands, including the SHEFFIELD continue to be taught in order to ensure that the Royal Navy does not experience a similar loss in future.

There is no doubt that the loss occurred due to a variety of factors, from ship design (e.g. lack of redundancy and loss of key systems) through to sheer bad luck (there is suggestion that the two other Type 42s spotted the incoming missile and took action, but for various entirely understandable reasons SHEFFIELD did not).

One reason why the Argentines succeeded in their attack though was the fact that thanks to British sales efforts, Argentina operated two Type 42 destroyers with the Sea Dart SAM. Sold some years previously, as part of wider British efforts which included discussions on Harriers too, the Argentines knew intimately well the performance of the ships, their advantages and also their weak spots. This knowledge ensured that they could plan, with a high degree of professionalism, their attack.

There is no doubt that the loss of the SHEFFIELD occurred due to several factors, some of which were quickly remediated, while the lessons from others reverberate to this day in RN design and philosophy.

It is depressing then to see that the Telegraph has made outrageous claims, seemingly without foundation that the French Government hid knowledge of a ‘kill switch’ from the UK. These claims seem to imply that France had sold the Exocet missile with codes built in that could have enabled the UK to shut down the missile in flight. The French government firmly denied these allegations, and they seem to be baseless.

The claims stem from a well understood reality that when military equipment is exported, the customer usually gets a reduced specification variant that doesn’t match the full characteristics of the parent nation. This is usually degraded performance, reduced range or capability or other characteristics that means that the kit is not as good as its parent. The Russians, for example, are well known for exporting lower spec variants built for export to client states.

What seems to being suggested is that the French government sent missiles to Argentina, with these codes but refused to give them to the UK in time to avoid SHEFFIELDs loss. The problem with this nonsense is that it seems to be utterly without credible foundation.

As far as can be seen, they stem from a single nameless ‘expert’ at the time of the war making these claims to a former Telegraph journalist, which then turned it into a story. It seems extremely odd that 40 years after the event, this ‘expert’ has never gone on the record internally, or provided advice or material to support their claims in any of the lengthy official enquiries or inquests into the war. This would seem rather remiss of them.

What on earth is the gain here from publicizing these nonsensical claims? The SHEFFIELD was lost due to a variety of factors, not one specific one. What we are instead getting into is a dangerous version of alternate history where we start going down the road of ‘if only’. This genre is often seen by wistful conversations about pictures of HMS ARK ROYAL in the 1970s, going ‘if only she had been present in 82 then the war would have been different’ – the answer of course is realistically, yes it would have been different as she’d have been in appalling material state, probably broken down and the weather conditions were so bad that she’d have been unable to conduct flying operations, making the war much harder to win…

If we go down every ‘if only’ we just end up writing bad quasi-historical fiction which takes no account of what actually happened. We have no way of knowing if the ‘kill codes’ could have been provided, or if they would have made the blindest bit of difference. Frankly. Its exceptionally unlikely that they would have done.

These claims would be funny were the reaction not so serious. To turn the ramblings of a pensioner into a front page story that winds up MP’s who are now calling for an official inquest is problematic. At a time when UK/French bilateral relations have been under strain due to issues like AUKUS, to throw this accusation onto the fire, and engaging in a spot of ‘uppity frog bashing’ seems little short of incendiary.

At a time when western unity is under challenge, and when we need NATO members to work together to jointly support Ukraine in her fight against Russia, trying to pick a fight with France over events of 40 years ago seems little short of supremely pointless. If we go down this highly dangerous path, then presumably the French Government may respond with an inquest into whether British shells could have had kill codes in them that would have prevented them from impacting when the British Fleet bombarded and sank French Warships at Mers-El-Kebir, when the Royal Navy killed nearly 1300 French sailor

More widely it builds suspicions that nations are not doing their all in wartime to help others. At a time when exported surplus equipment is being sent to Ukraine, stories like this help generate suspicions that the recipients are not getting the ‘real’ kit, and that something is being held back. A reasonably competent Russian (arguably an oxymoron) information campaign could potentially exploit this to sow seeds of doubt  about whether the NLAW we gift Ukraine is fully functional, and help fan discord and mistrust. 

Finally we need to reflect on the wider human picture here. It is 40 years since British sailors died in an attack. Their families have sat through years of inquests and inquiries and those that survived have lived with the memories of that day ever since. Reopening these wounds, to falsely suggest that this could have been avoided is cruel and pointless – it inflicts harm on the vulnerable, hurts those who survived and does a great disservice to the SHEFFIELD.

Could SHEFFIELDs loss have been avoided? Possibly, but then even if it had, there is no certainty that in some alternate time frame, another bomb would hit at the wrong point, destroying her entirely. We will never know, and it is utterly futile to go down this path.

The fact is that trying to blame the French is a convenient pretext to forget that the Argentineans knew practically everything there was to know about these ships because they bought a pair off the British. To suggest that some mythical code could have been transmitted (assuming of course this was technically possible or feasible) and save the day is pathetic.

There were many reasons for the loss – these are readily available to find – this Times article is a good precis for example. Not one person, prior to this ‘expert’ has ever made such a claim.

This story should not have been written, let alone published. It is at best the ramblings of an elderly pensioner convinced of a ‘secret conspiracy’. There is no evidence to support it in any of the lengthy British official files which are freely available to view. It feels like red meat, tossed in to distract from a plethora of problems during an election campaign. It is not far off the equivalent of a portly faced mustachioed character in your local pub trying to tell you about how he ‘was in the SASSSSSSS’ and telling tall stories, except that they’ve been published on the front page of a national newspaper.

 The veterans of 1982 and their families deserve better than this.