Suffren in Silence - The French Response to AUKUS

The fallout from the decision by Australia to cancel procurement of 12 French designed submarines continues. The French Government, seemingly incandescent with rage over this decision has embarked on a global diplomatic campaign of withdrawing Ambassadors, and trying to implicitly insult the UK. The purpose of this response remains unclear.

It is hardly an edifying spectacle watching a nation with a long and proud history of international co-operation, and which is a longstanding ally of all three nations behave in a way that can in diplomatic terms be best described as a ‘toddler tantrum’.

The reason for this response appears to break down into three distinct pillars of concern. The first is the loss of the contract itself, the second is the concern about the lack of consultation and the third is the concern on the impact on French influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

It is entirely understandable to be frustrated about the loss of a prestigious defence contract, particularly when it will cost French jobs, and damage longer term campaign prospects. After all, its much easier to sell a submarine design to others when it is in widespread use – just look at the success Germany had with the Type 206 and 209 class of submarines.

The loss of the order will have a damaging impact on French industry, particularly as it was one of the largest submarine export orders on offer globally. There is unlikely to be a similar requirement for many years to come by any nation for 12 SSK’s, which in turn places real pressure on French exporters to find credible ways to win further orders.

The French perspective appears to be that they were under the impression that all was well with the contract, and that the US and UK have stolen it from them under their noses. This is one interpretation, but an equally valid one would be that the contract has been under pressure for some considerable time – there is a wide range of media articles out there indicating concerns being expressed on the programme, the significant cost growth and the failure by the French to meet their customer needs.

Perhaps the problem here is that the French may have made the mistake of assuming that they heard what the customer was saying to them, rather than listening to what the customer was actually saying and acting on this advice. It was clear Australia was not overly happy with its experience, and has acted decisively to address this.

Although the UK, US and France are allies when it comes to promoting international security, they are also bitter rivals when it comes to winning export orders in the defence space. For example there have been many years of bitter clashes between the F35, Typhoon, Rafale and Grippen fighters as they compete for the attention of different countries.

The UK is well placed in this space, having a significant export interest in three of the four fighters above, whereas the French government has all its eggs in one basket – and knows that the credibility of its own internal aerospace needs is dependent on the Rafale succeeding at being sold abroad.

This has led to serious dogfights between the nations as they compete to secure the coveted contracts and export opportunities. France has a reasonable track record of success in this space, with Rafale notching up wins in areas where the UK has a strong vested interest – for example managing to get a win for Rafale in India over the Typhoon aircraft.

The French industry plays a very aggressive game to keep itself in competitions and forcing itself to remain a player – for example the author remembers being at a major international airshow when news was leaked that the Rafale was the preferred solution for a Middle Eastern nations fast jet competition. The fact that this was completely untrue, and appeared to have been leaked to force the nation in question to clarify how the competition was going is irrelevant. 

One of the key challenges with modern defence projects is striking a balance between buying advanced equipment from abroad, versus supporting your own domestic industry. Nations keen to buy the latest in advanced hardware face a difficult balancing act – do you buy abroad to get the best kit, or develop something internally that will enhance your own industry – one gets capability, the other develops your national ability.

A way to offset this is for the nation purchasing the equipment to look for guarantees or deeper promises of partnership to help strike a better deal. For example, technology transfer, or offers of training and a thickened security partnership may be helpful – by binding the providing nation into the purchasers security, it provides an extra level of reassurance, and helps provide guarantees of security.

France has become a master of offering enhanced security partnerships to nations that are interested in purchasing their defence products. For example media reports show French offers to India, Egypt and various Middle Eastern countries are all built around the premise of offering both equipment, technology transfer and an expanded security partnership.

It is an extremely sensible way of offering a good deal and also providing wider security guarantees – the offer to deploy French troops into Middle Eastern countries helps as a useful additional layer of security with the US appearing more reticent than before to defend the region.

The French response therefore to the AUKUS pact seems on the face of it to be somewhat hypocritical, given that the UK and US are essentially doing exactly what the French have been touting around the world – offering technology transfer under the framework of a wider agreement.

The anger at the idea that the UK and US did not consult with allies is too overblown to be taken with much credibility. At its heart the AUKUS project is not a mutual defence treaty in the manner of NATO or other similar mutual security treaties.

It appears to be a platform for the sharing of technology and materiel, enabling the safe and legal transfer of information, products and nuclear capabilities between the US, UK and Australia in a way underpinned by a legally binding agreement.

This makes considerable sense – sharing of the technology for nuclear submarines is not something that should be done lightly, and inextricably binds nations together, as they are privy to some of the most sensitive and priceless secrets held by each other. The knowledge of propulsion, sonar, silencing technology and so on is vital to preserve the battle winning edge of western nuclear submarines – if there was any risk of this being compromised, nor or in the future, then it would not be shared.

Putting this under the auspices of a treaty, rather than a simple sales deal, is also easier from the perspective of longer term sharing of information between the ‘three eyes’ community when it comes to shared nationalities. Given the significant overlap between all three nations, the existing high level of information sharing between the UK and US and the fact that Australia draws on crew from both nations, it makes sense to ensure there are proper arrangements in place to share this material.

There is a risk that AUKUS is portrayed as something that it is not – it does not appear to be a treaty committing the members to going to war together, nor does it appear to be committing to joint military operations, forces or planning. It appears to be a legally binding framework to permit the transfer of knowledge and material to enhance individual nations capabilities, both now and in the long term. The impact will be to significantly increase defence capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, but not create a new NATO.

To that end, why would the UK or US consult with France ahead of time on these proposals? As noted, while allies, we are also rivals when it comes to export sales and hinting that this would have been an option under consideration could have jeopardised the prospects of the treaty being set up – to do so would be the equivalent of showing your battle plan to the enemy ahead of combat.

The French pique at losing is also perhaps a tad hypocritical given that in the 1980s they were extremely keen to sell their RUBIS class SSN’s to Canada, as part of the short-lived Canadian Navy plan to acquire an SSN capability. In these plans though, not only would the French have insisted on building the first 4-5 hulls in France, but the vessels didn’t meet Canadian specs, hence the move to the TRAFALGAR class.

This perhaps is a good reminder that when it suits them and their needs, the French would be happy to share nuclear technology with partners, as long as it is on their terms. So, to complain about this, given that any RUBIS order would have required a similar international treaty of sharing seems hypocritical at best.

French anger also seems to be linked to the concern about the position of France in the region as a security partner of choice. One of the many unexpected outcomes of Brexit is that it has led to a closer Franco-Australian relationship. Previously Australia heavily relied on the UK for access and influence in the EU decision making process – with the UK withdrawal, Australian diplomatic links have had to be built with new partners, thickening the links between the two nations.

The submarine order was a good way of widening Australian links, and also expanding this relationship, particularly given that in geo-political terms, the two nations are neighbours (for example via the territory of New Caledonia). There was a strong and compelling argument to ‘Buy French’ if only to help ensure a longer term joint working relationship in an increasingly tense space.

The Australians have made good use of French technology in the past including fighters, supply ships and helicopters, so this would have been an extra boost for co-operation as a result.

The French reaction seems though to be considerably over the top and may have left many countries actively wondering whether courting French business is worth the hassle of proceeding with them or not. Not every defence contract signed is always delivered, and cancellation is always an option – governments change, costs rise and budgets fall – sometimes cancellation is the only game in town.

By so visibly acting in a fit of pique, recalling ambassadors, trying to insult the UK and cancelling dinners, the French response appears to border on the infantile. The message they are sending to others is ‘buy from us and stick with us or else’. Frankly this may backfire as countries may feel that the French offer isn’t worth the hassle of putting up with French response – far better to not buy from them and keep relations productive and civilised.

It also feels like a level of escalation that is hard to back down from – what do you keep in reserve to show your displeasure on other occasions if you’ve withdrawn your ambassador over this move? It leaves nothing in the diplomatic arsenal, and also diminishes the impact of future withdrawals – if you keep recalling your ambassador, it will become an expected part of the playbook nations plan for when considering your response, and mitigation measures will be expected.

The wider risk too is that by reacting too strongly, France runs the risk of gaining a reputation as an unreliable international partner. There are some media reports suggesting hyperbolic language that NATO unity is at risk – that the French Government would even consider trying to undermine the worlds most successful security alliance for the sake of a submarine order feels like an escalation beyond the point that other nations, not party to the deal or its aftermath would consider appropriate or reasonable.

There is a sense that this is a storm in a teacup, but it is hard to understand the French strategy here – what is going on feels an extremely intense emotional reaction, not a logical considered response. What is their end game, and what effect are they seeking to have?

By any reasonable measure the last few days have seen the French emerge as enormously petulant bad losers. They have chosen to snub the US and behave in a way that is enormously unhelpful, while also show to their customers that the French vision of security partnership is that to work with the French means doing exactly as they wish or else…

At some point France will need to calm down, back down and work out how best to deal with the next stage in this process. It would be entirely appropriate to privately in diplomatic channels express frustration in terribly polite diplomatic language (for example “no Mr Ambassador, I will not offer you a Ferrero Roche with your coffee”), and for a public display of disappointment and lamenting of missed opportunities.

France has to still work with the UK, US and Australia on a wide range of security and international issues. Right now, British troops and helicopters are deployed in Mali, putting their lives on the line to help support French troops – is insulting the UK in such undiplomatic ways really an appropriate way to make the case for continued joint operations?

France will remain a neighbour of Australia for the foreseeable future, and it will need to work with both the UK and US on other operations. By responding so forcefully, it makes it harder to win back the trust and goodwill that has been so publicly trashed in an effort to make a domestic political statement – standing up for French interests may make good domestic press, but damages international standing no end.

The danger for the French is that if they overplay their hand, they run the risk of damaging their standing, reducing their prospects in wider competitions and making it harder to get support for co-operation in other areas.

The most likely response is that France will need to calm down, and respond in a more measured way, while the UK, US and Australia look on with mild bemusement at their overreaction and work out if that hassle of dealing with the French outweighs the benefits of doing so.

Specifically with the UK their response seems calculated to play into the worst of stereotypical reactions. Snide insults, measured contempt and trying to make out the UK is a bit player is fine in the internet world of social media, but less helpful in trying to conduct measured security dialogue and bilateral relations.

The fact is that this deal is unlikely to be a significant game changer for the UK in the short term. It helps cement the UK as a returning player in the region, whose interests and views may pose a threat to French goals. But, the agreement is unlikely to see short term major changes to how the UK engages with the US or Australia – it is exceptionally unlikely that there will be a UK design variant SSN used by the Australians – far more likely that they will seek to use US derived designs due to economies of scale and the fact that the USN is dominant in the region.

The prime opportunity for the UK is perhaps in other fields, enhanced information sharing, enhanced co-operation on intelligence and other fields which the French would not have been consulted with in any case. It also expands the diplomatic linkage by the UK with Australia, potentially threatening the French position in their own bilateral relationships.

Much of the French response and vitriol to the UK seems to come from a sense of both anger and puzzlement that a relatively small island nation which on paper appears to be a peer rival, enjoys at times a significantly greater level of success in international relations and diplomacy than they do.

There is no equivalent to ‘Five Eyes’ for the French, nor do they enjoyed any close or privileged relationships when it comes to information sharing and intelligence with other nations. They are tolerated, but not trusted by most countries, whereas the UK continues to enjoy significant diplomatic leverage and access globally. What do they have that Paris does not?

This is a shame as the UK and France could, and should, be much closer military and strategic partners. Possessing similar levels of capability, shared mutual interests and capable intelligence and diplomatic services with global presence, the UK has been keen to work with the French more closely for some time now.  It would be a great shame if for the sake of short term anger, the French chose to behave in a way that left them isolated, and unable to further these links.

Where this goes next is difficult to predict- at some point French tempers will cool, Ambassadors will return and life will resume. But there is no doubt French international standing has been damaged badly here, and it may take some time before France is seen by allies and potential customer nations as a measured trusted partner worth the hassle of doing business with.