Thin Pinstriped Line

  During the Cold War the British Government expended an enormous amount of effort to put plans in place to secure the survival of the machinery of government in wartime. Extensive plans were made that covered how the Government would disperse to the regions, shelter and then emerge to regain control in the aftermath of a nuclear attack on the UK. In the first part of this series (HERE), the basic principles of planning were covered, along with an insight into the challenges of preparing for the worst – including whether to invite the French Ambassador or not (arguably after the last few weeks, that would be an easier problem to resolve these days). One of the biggest challenges that faced Government in this period was the difficulty of keeping the secret of where its main wartime location would be. The headquarters in Corsham, known by various codewords over the years including STOCKWELL, TURNSTILE and BURLINGTON would be the wartime location of the War Cabinet, and the Prime ...

The fallout from the decision by Australia to cancel procurement of 12 French designed submarines continues. The French Government, seemingly incandescent with rage over this decision has embarked on a global diplomatic campaign of withdrawing Ambassadors, and trying to implicitly insult the UK. The purpose of this response remains unclear. It is hardly an edifying spectacle watching a nation with a long and proud history of international co-operation, and which is a longstanding ally of all three nations behave in a way that can in diplomatic terms be best described as a ‘toddler tantrum’. The reason for this response appears to break down into three distinct pillars of concern. The first is the loss of the contract itself, the second is the concern about the lack of consultation and the third is the concern on the impact on French influence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is entirely understandable to be frustrated about the loss of a prestigious defence contract, particularly whe...

  The Royal Australian Navy is likely to become the next nation to join the nuclear submarine operators club. This is the key headline emerging from the surprise tri-lateral announcement on Wed 15 September by the Prime Ministers of Australia and the UK, and the President of the United States. The move, forming a new ‘three eyes’ club known as AUKUS is a genuinely significant development intended to provide a significant uplift in capability in the Indo-Pacific region. For the first time in nearly 70 years, the US has agreed to share some of its most sensitive technology with a third party, to help Australia become a ‘naval power underway on nuclear power’. There are several ramifications of this decision, that will be felt for many years to come. The first is that from an American perspective, this is a good opportunity to take steps to increase burden sharing in the Pacific. Arguably for many years the US and Royal Navies have carried out a similar level of burden sharing whe...

  The National Archives at Kew are one of the great treasures of the United Kingdom. The ability for anyone to request and view the files of the machinery of government, from the mundane to the terrifying, and see first hand the thinking that went into the business of state is incredibly powerful. Last week, Humphrey spent a morning at Kew reading through some of the most terrifying and grim files in the history of the British State. These formerly TOP SECRET documents laid bare the grim realities of planning for the survival of Government in a post nuclear strike environment. The thinking that went into this is both astonishing, depressing and deeply macabre, but also illuminating at the same time. Having reviewed these files in detail, a number of themes and observations emerge that remain relevant to this day. From diplomatic mistrust, to the eternal Government goal of reinventing wheels, or quibbling over the smallest of pennies, the planning for officialdom in the aftermat...

  The Royal Navy is to accelerate the decommissioning of its SANDOWN class MCMV’s, with all five remaining ships paying off over the next four years. This is potentially good news. The debate about naval power focuses and is fixated on hulls as a broad measure of capability. It is seen through the prism of having X of this ship type or Y of that ship type. People understand metrics that equate to tangible physical presence as it is something that can be easily quantified. While this is understandable, we need to look past the vision of the warship hull as the capability itself, and regard it as the physical means to deliver a variety of missions. When these hulls were designed, the sole way that the mission could be done was by taking a crewed vessel, putting the mission systems onto the platform and then adding the requisite life support, propulsion and survival systems needed to ensure that the ship could move from location to location. Our vision of what maritime power compr...

  There are few things in life more certain to garner debate among fans of the armed forces than the subject of medals. Be it the case for a ‘national defence medal’, a ‘Cold War’ medal or the awarding of a medal for discrete operations, the subject always garners strong opinions. It was perhaps inevitable then that shortly after the final shut down of PITTING, the debate has quickly turned to the practical issue of medallic recognition. A variety of media articles have been run, making arguments for and against, and considering the criteria that could be used. To start with, its important to understand that no decisions have been made, nor are they likely to be made for some time. The discussions on medal award criteria is complex, strictly governed and takes time to get right. There needs to be time to agree whether any operational awards or honours will be issued for the Op, as well as a wider discussion on the medal earning criteria. Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown co...