The UK/US Relationship at 245...

 

On this day 245 years ago, events occurred that would change the world, with the declaration of Independence being signed, and the American colonies breaking away from the UK, to set out on their own voyage. It was an early version of what later became known as a ‘no deal Brexit’.

Since then the relationship between the UK and USA has had both its ups and downs. For many years it was a relationship of mistrust and suspicion, and at times occasional physical violence. It perhaps sums up the nature of the links that to this day there isn’t perhaps unanimous agreement as to who won the war of 1812, with both sides claiming victory, depending on how you define it.

Yet over time the UK learned to live with the USA, and eventually formed a reasonable working relationship – it had to on pragmatic grounds. While Canada remained a UK colony, Westminster retained a strong vested interest in ensuring practical relationships were workable and effective.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

In 1917 the USA entered the First World War on the side of the allies, helping decisively shift the balance of power firmly in their favour. The supply of fresh troops and munitions helped mark a significant impact on the war, ensuring that victory was secured. Even after WW1 though, some mutual suspicion remained, with navies of both nations planning for war against the other.

It took the events of WW2 to really solidify the linkages between the two nations, with combined military operations and the building of personal links at working level that would last a lifetime. Victory in the Cold War came about in no small part due to the close links between senior leaders that were forged in the darkest days of WW2.

Throughout the Cold War and beyond the UK and the USA have found themselves strategic allies and partners. Both nations share a similar vision of the world – fundamentally democratic in nature, mercantile in outlook and one where their views on foreign policy and security align more often than they diverge.

There is no doubt that there is an unparalleled military link between the two countries, and extremely close links too when it comes to foreign policy and international security matters. Is it though a relationship which is drawing to a close, or is it one that continues to power the global policy agenda?

Historically it is easy to see why the UK and US were both natural bedfellows, and continued to work closely together. Throughout the Cold War, western Europe was the most critical national security priority for the US, and preventing it falling to Communism and Soviet aggression was key to ensuring their own national survival.

To that end the UK filled an invaluable purpose, both as an off shore ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ to provide access, ports, stores and airfields that were less likely to fall victim to attack, and also as a significant power in its own right with influence and access.

More widely the UK’s residual colonial presence, and influence in new commonwealth states meant it could be used as a proxy to work with Washington around the world to further foreign policy goals. London was not just an ally in its own right, but a means to help extend American influence more widely.

As the Cold War concluded, memories of Empire faded and a new set of global issues emerged, the question invariably becomes – is the UK of the same value to the US as it previously has been?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

Today an objective look at the state of the alliance would suggest that the UK brings value in four distinct ways.

Firstly, it provides real estate access to US government assets around the world in a secure manner, and in a way which provides maximum flexibility for the US Government to carry out its own work. There is a plethora of real estate out there in various parts of the world owned by the UK, but which has a US presence located in it.

This access matters because it provides a level of reassurance that the US can invest in somewhere, placing particularly sensitive capabilities, and know that the host nation will neither cave into pressure from other actors to boot them out, or find itself having to constantly find funding and gifts to keep the host nation on side. The UK represents a stable landlord, and one who is prepared to grant considerable freedom of action to its guests.

This freedom of action also matters – to stage intelligence missions or airstrikes from a third party nation risks bringing them into an issue they have no desire to be involved in. Or, in times of pressure, the host could come under significant diplomatic pressure from another state to quietly refuse permissions for some missions, or close a site down.

It is easy to see, for example, a future event where US forces in Indian Ocean islands are unable to carry out missions over a central Asian country, because China or Russia place significant pressure, or inducements, on the President of the nation to refuse US military assets the freedom of manoeuvre to do as they wish. By contrast, no such issue is likely with the UK.

The UK also provides a range of diplomatic accesses and reach that continues to help further shared interests. The ‘soft power’ of the UK in providing a global hub for education, travel and shared links means many rulers and government ministers globally have been educated in, or own houses in London or beyond. There is a strong network of informal diplomatic links that can be drawn on for the UK to lobby discreetly on issues that benefit US goals.

Similarly the UK membership of, and leading roles in, a wide variety of global organisations means it remains a significant diplomatic power, and one capable of exerting significant influence should it need to do so. It is a natural ally of the US in foreign policy terms, and a valuable partner to draw on if required – the British ‘soft power network’ of diplomatic reach and influence is considerable still, and its value should not be underestimated.

There is a wider value too in the UK’s investment in not just conventional forces, but wider intelligence capabilities. The considerable investment in  wide range of policing, counter terrorism work, cyber security and other niche areas, coupled with significant investment in the UK’s formidable intelligence community means that in these areas, they remain invaluable allies of importance to their US peers.

There is an enormous amount of trust and co-operation in place between British and American intelligence agencies, which generates real successes on the ground. This trust has been hard won over many decades, but continues to pay dividends. The level of mutual access and sharing which exists is unlike any other relationship out there in this space, and is of enormous operational value to the US.

Finally the considerable reach and capability of the British Armed Forces and their ability to fight globally continues to be of real value. There is an extremely close working relationship between all the services, and again one which is built on both trust and mutual respect. The UK enjoys an extremely close relationship that provides access and insight to US thinking, and an ability to play leading roles in shaping coalitions and military operations.

To that end then, the UK continues to provide the US with a huge amount of value. This is not a relationship though where nostalgia counts as a credible currency, and it cannot be left to rest on its laurels. There are challenges ahead, and the UK needs to decide the level to which it wants to remain relevant, or start to take steps back.

From a diplomatic and lobbying perspective, regardless of your views on Brexit, the decision by the UK to leave the EU has weakened its diplomatic relevance to the US. Previously the US could lobby the UK to try to shape EU regulations or thinking – now it needs to find partners inside the EU to do this. To that end, Brexit has led to a reduction in the diplomatic value and clout that the UK holds compared to even a few years ago.

But, there are opportunities – a renewed UK push for ‘global Britain’ has seen an opening of outposts around the world in areas long neglected by the FCDO – particularly in Africa and the Pacific rim. This renewed presence helps provide diplomatic counterbalance to the presence of nations like China, and helps provide a more coordinated lobbying and influence approach. Its much easier to persuade a nation to support you, particularly small and remote ones, when you’ve opened an Embassy or High Commission and invested in permanent presence there.

The UK challenge is to identify how to move forward, seeking areas where upping the diplomatic presence could be of not just direct benefit, but also be seen by Washington to materially benefit their interests too.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

From a military perspective the UK has to take difficult decisions about where to invest resources – does it matter more for spending on projects and capabilities that add mutual benefit, or should the UK focus on delivering niche capabilities well? By this, the more that the UK invests in capabilities that add real value to the US, the more likely it is that the UK will be sought out as a partner of choice.

From an economic and industrial perspective this is extremely good news – if the UK can demonstrate an enduring scientific and industrial ability to design and manufacture leading edge military and intelligence products, then not only will it be good for industry and jobs, but will ensure the UK’s continued relevance to the US.

But this spending comes at a cost – get the balance wrong and become too specialised or niche and the balanced force becomes one that is dependent on others to help it operate in the field. It is all well and good to think ‘international by design’, but if your fighting capabilities require you to have brought along multiple NATO allies to reach your full potential, you are in deep trouble if they decide not to turn up.

There is also a question of basic credibility – if in planning rounds decisions are constantly taken to take risk on something, or cut something else, “because we can rely on the US to provide it”, then this diminishes the UK’s value. The US have historically liked working with the UK because it turns up as a self supporting player that can take care of itself. Taking too much risk to save money risks damaging hard won reputations.

In a similar manner there is a risk that the UK may be on the verge of losing its reputation as ‘credible in all domains’ to US planners. Historically all parts of the British military was able to operate on a peer / near peer basis with their US counterparts, bringing advanced equipment into play and being able to operate and fight against peer opponents.

Right now there is a growing risk that a combination of cuts and failure to equip properly is calling this reputation into question. For example cuts to projects like Wedgetail, and a failure to expand the P8 fleet suggest that the UK is expecting the US to provide ISTAR support for many future operations.

Similarly, the utter and total failure of the British Army to deliver any new major armoured vehicles into service for decades is now not only a national embarrassment, but also threatens the credibility of the Army to work alongside the US Army as a peer in major operations.

At its most basic, the British Army of 2021 is not materially differently equipped from the OP TELIC 1 Army of 2003, and many of the vehicle designs used also saw service in OP GRANBY in 1991. There is a real and growing risk that the British Army will be left behind compared to its peers, and that even if it can deploy a Division, Washington will try to quietly demur when offered it, for fear that its presence could do more harm than good for their interests.

Urgent corrective action is needed to ensure that the British armed forces remain credible across all domains, not just some, to ensure that the UK continues to be seen as a military partner of enduring value.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The final challenge is trying to determine where UK and US interests align compared to other partners. The move away from a heavy focus on Western Europe, to an increasingly complex world, and one where different partners are emerging who may be of more value to Washington.

To that end, the UK needs to take steps to be clear on what its offer is to the US, and show how it continues to warrant London being ‘the first place to call in a crisis’.  Both the French and Australians are demonstrating an increasing level of investment in defence, and quietly ensuring they have the ability to support Washington and have good access into areas of strategic interest to the US (both Africa and the Pacific rim) – in both cases these are areas where the UK’s interests and influence have significantly diminished in real terms in recent decades.

London needs to be clear about the challenges of retaining its credibility – shared interests are fine, as is the ability to do shared diplomacy. But it needs to show a continued willingness to foot its share of the bill, and be prepared to not take risk on capabilities and issues that matter to Washington. If it does this then the relationship could find itself quietly but inexorably downgraded by the US, particularly compared to other peer nations.

Britain needs to be clear about defining its role in the Ango-US relationship. In the post Brexit world, it has to show it brings diplomatic clout, reach and a willingness to continue to take risks and be prepared to operate globally as a policeman that doesn’t mind taking casualties. The US does not want a vassal state, it wants a friend who can shoulder the burden as a peer, not a client that needs help and assistance.

For all this though, it is perhaps nice to finish on more positive thoughts. 245 years ago our predecessors inexorably split from each other, yet somehow links have flourished. Today British and American sailors, aircrew and marines are jointly embarked at sea onboard the Carrier Strike Group, conducting air operations over Syria, jointly working together as a truly integrated force to help police and support international security.

No other nations enjoy a similar level of defence integration and co-operation, and these are links built on trust and understanding, and of similarly shared values. The story of our two countries is that of an alliance built on a shared past, a turbulent adolescence and an unwavering commitment to securing global stability and freedom together around the world, no matter the cost in blood, toil or treasure. Hopefully the signatories of the Declaration of Independence would be proud, not only of the nation that they helped build, but also of the relationship between the Old World and the New.