Reserved Occupation? Thoughts on the RF30 Review.
The Reserve
Force 30 review has been published by the MOD this week, setting out a
possible vision for the future structure and operation of the British Armed
Forces reserve forces component.
The paper, written by former Minister,
now Lord Lancaster, puts forward a series of recommendations about how the MOD
should look to transform reserve forces into a very different body, and one
that is more able to reflect the modern military.
It is important to note that this
paper is not final policy, it is proposals for Ministers to consider, and
identify whether they wish to adopt, but it is worth considering this review in
more detail and thinking about what it could mean for the future of the Reserve
Forces.
![]() |
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
The UK has had a curious
relationship with its reserve component for many decades. The Territorial Army
was responsible for holding the line in 1915, when its volunteers stepped
forward after the attrition of the original regular British Expeditionary
Force, and managed to form the core of the Army for long enough for to generate
reinforcements and replacements that in turn began to form the Army that won in
1918.
After WW2 and throughout the Cold War there were large reserve forces, drawn from both volunteers, and also ex-regulars. In theory, for much of the later Cold War, the British Army could draw on a nearly 70,000 strong TA, and a regular reserve that could number several hundred thousand people, on paper at least
Throughout this period regular
exercises were held testing the ability to call up large parts of the system,
ensuring that mobilisation worked as planned, and that people could quickly
return to units to bring them up to full strength. On paper this worked,
although it was highly reliant on people keeping contact information up to date
and being willing to return if called on to serve.
On paper at least this regular
reserve commitment continues to this day, with people leaving the military being
liable, in theory at least, to be called up for a reserve liability long after
they have left the military. Whether they are of any value though is perhaps a
more valuable question to ask.
At the same time the volunteer
reserve has remained in existence, although significantly smaller – todays total
force numbers some 33,000 reservists in total, roughly 20% of the overall
strength of the British Armed Forces.
The force exists to provide both
individual reinforcements, and some formed units to step into the line to
augment the Regulars. Reservists can be employed in their spare time (evenings
and weekends), full time on a contract (e.g. multi-year service), and also as
mobilised reservists (called up for a determined period of time), as well as
operating as company sponsored reservists (e.g industry or contractors who don
uniform at times of crisis).
Reservists are employed in a
variety of ways, from supporting individual units, through to enhancing exercise
battlestaffs or being mobilised in support of operation as well as on full time
contracts. There is no single way of employing a reservist, and each service
has very different views on how they should be employed – the Army relies on
formed units, the Royal Navy uses them as individuals for the most part.
The challenge facing the reserve
is how to stay credible though, and this is what the RF30 paper is trying to
address. At its heart is the challenge of trying to work out two things –
firstly, what does the military want from a spare time capability, and
secondly, is it possible to be a credible member of the armed forces in your
spare time?
Defining what the reserve brings
is not easy, and requires a clear understanding of how it can enhance the
regular forces. In the Cold War the plan was reasonably clear – provide several
divisions of troops for fighting in BAOR and home defence, as well as support
to clearing mines and keeping ports open, as well as discrete support to air
operations.
It was simple (in relative terms)
to plan for the activation of a plan that would see people sent to clearly
defined roles and places on a map in order to do a job that would fit into a
much bigger plan involving total war.
In the modern environment though,
it is much harder to explain what it is that you want a reservist to be. Is it
someone with no relevant skills who can augment a rifle platoon? Is it someone
with hugely transferable skills from industry that can use them to the benefit of
the military at a fraction of normal cost? Or is it some kind of fusion of
people who can be helpful as a pool of bodies, but who are not needed to be on
the books full time?
![]() |
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
These are very different
requirements and call for very different models of operation. A reserve of
rifle volunteers is easy to run, but you need to be certain you can get the
bodies when required, and have them for long enough to make useful – the full
OPTAG process for a tour these days is several months long, so you are
realistically looking at a 12-18 month mobilisation for many people – at a time
when the Army is short on op tours, is it better to use reservists or send
regular augmentees who need less training time?
Finding people who are experts is
a good one on paper, but is hamstrung by a military system that, except for a
few small outliers, does not approve of direct entry – you could have a world
leading expert in some areas brought in as a private and not recognised, except
by chance. The RF30 report refers to examples like this, and notes the
difficulty of trying to capture the skills data of the workforce, and employing
people in a way that makes them usable.
The problem is trying to square
the circle that the military place a high value on earned credibility by a
combination of courses, training and other ways of promoting that means that
outsiders (e.g. anyone who hasn’t done the same) are seen with some suspicion
and afforded less credibility.
Direct Entry Colonels may be
listened to, but would they be credible in the eyes of the people they
represent and have power over, or would they wear the rank without credible
credentials? This is a real challenge – if you want your reserve to be a source
of skills, how do you persuade people to join in a way that means they will be
listened to and treated with respect for their knowledge?
The report proposes getting around
this by creating a series of ‘specialists’ who will not wear rank but who will
instead be brought in and able to speak with credibility on their chosen subject.
On paper this seems elegant, a way to bring people in without the challenge of
rank debates and upsetting those who would see it as ‘jumping ahead’.
But paradoxically such a move
could backfire. The military like an established order and hierarchy and they
like to know how things stand. Go to a military meeting and the first thing
established in the opening 30 seconds is the pecking order – people use either
their rank tabs, or introduction by rank to determine who they are, and where
everyone fits into the system. Saying “Hi I am specialist Bloggs” will disrupt
this and cause confusion – are they officers, other ranks – how special or
senior is a specialist and are they really a proper military person if they don’t
hold a real rank?
Although this seems minor, it is a major issue in what is an existentially hierarchical movement, where all aspects of engagement and interaction are governed by rank titles and relative position to each other. Introducing a non-ranked ‘rank’ inside the military could cause confusion and reduce the desired impact.
Also more pragmatically stripping rank
away also may reduce the incentive to join the armed forces for potential
volunteers. Many people join the reserves for a new skills or adventure, or to
escape the day job. To find yourself without a rank, and doing your day job in
uniform may seem distinctly unappealing to many people.
The challenge that has also not
been defined is what is the ask of the military on the reservist and is it
sustainable? In the Cold War it was easy, people joined knowing they would only
be called up for WW3. Today people can be called up for many different reasons,
and the military expects to have a significant share of your professional time.
For some this is fine, they lead
lives or work in roles that permit them to give freely to the armed forces when
required. But others do not – their circumstances are more complex and they
cannot down tools for a 9-12 month mobilisation regularly.
Is it feasible to expect that
people can be credibly spare time members of the armed forces in a time when
the skills and training required to be competent are time demanding? The
potential problem is that in assuming the reserves will shoulder more of the
regular burden, you have to assume that the reservists are able to commit the
time both for training, continued development and to mobilise as required and
when required – this is little short of a very intense full time ‘spare time’
job.
![]() |
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
This is the problem – 21st
century defence operations are complex and need people at short notice to be
ready to do challenging tasks. Are reservists always going to be available in
the right combination of skills and experience to take on sophisticated roles,
or should aspiration be scaled back, and instead turned into a call for
volunteers to fill general roles?
Employers may not welcome their
staff joining the reserves, particularly if called into highly specialist
roles, if the expectation is that they will regularly be called on to support military
operations. The more staff are away, the harder it is to fill their role, and
the less supportive many employers may become of employing someone who has a
spare time job which has full time aspirations on their time.
Striking this balance is crucial,
and trying to steer a path whereby the military can define what it is it wants
from its reserve, without breaking it. There does seem to be a good opportunity
to create a body of people who can support defence in a variety of ways, but it
has to be clear on the demands on their time and resource and support them
properly.
One of the most intriguing parts
of the RF30 report is the way it discusses making much better digital use of
skills of reservists and trying to put them in the right roles – e.g using
expats to work abroad in local embassies, or creating a ‘LinkedIn for Defence’
to allow volunteers to put their skills up and be contacted to go and support
local units on specific tasks.
This sounds both fantastic and
also likely to be counter intuitive to many military who like clearly defined
roles and admin. The idea of having a reserve structured so that people are
essentially kept on the books and only brought into to random work matched to
their digital skills advert may be a step too far – what happens if person X
has a great skill set but is ‘only’ a Lance Corporal? Will volunteers want to
join knowing they will only be employed to do their day jobs, or will they want
a wider challenge?
If implemented the move to this
digital skill link up could be really potent – it is a real frustration that
Defence isn’t great at finding people with some incredible skills due to the
silos in which useful information is kept. How many undiscovered skills and
talents lie inside Defence right now, lost because people cannot share their experience
easily? If this could be fixed, it could
be the start of quite a powerful change to how the MOD uses its talent and
really enhance the reputation of the Reserves as a result.
The report proposes three sets of
reserves in future – essentially individual augmentees, such as those discussed
above, those serving in formed capability units who will deploy as a unit, and
finally making deeper use of the regular reserve.
![]() |
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
This last proposal is intriguing
because it goes to an area long neglected by Defence. This gigantic pool of
people, far larger than the modern military, who possess experience and
training, but who have long since walked away from the system.
Is it realistic today to assume
that Defence can call on them, and that they will answer this call? The idea
that someone could leave the military and move on with their life and then find
themselves brought back into service years later seems unlikely, but remains
theoretically possible.
The question is what value does it
serve for the military to draw back legions of retired stalwarts into service?
How useful today is someone whose last job in the armed forces was as a SeaDart
maintainer, and whose knowledge of the regular military right now is close to
zero?
As people step away, their
relevance and contacts diminishes to the point of their value to the system
being close to zero. To actively tap into this pool of long lapsed staff seems
unwise, if only because so many would no longer meet medical entry standards,
or have lost all useful knowledge that it may be faster to train a recruit from
scratch.
But this pool represents a cadre
of people who have served, who could act as local assistance in the event of a crisis
or natural disaster and who could act as representatives of the military in
areas like local schools, talking about what service means. There is perhaps something
that could be done to better tap into this network of people in a non military
manner – perhaps as the cadre of a civilian reserve, or as military ambassadors
who could provide support and insight when required.
What isn’t clear though is what is
the military benefit of having regular reservists still in existence as a
concept? Fundamentally all but unemployable, and without any real operational role
to fill, there seems little value in retaining this legacy role and title. Far
better to encourage those who wish to retain links to act as affiliates of the
volunteer reserves, than maintain a nominal but utterly unworkable system of
regular reservists which could never credibly be used.
![]() |
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
Overall though the RF30 paper is a really thought provoking read that does a good job of trying to grapple with the question of ‘why do we need a reserve at all’? That there is a need for some spare capacity in the system is undoubted. Its also clear that having the ability to draw on niche skills, only occasionally needed is helpful too. But how is this best employed?
The reserve represents a link
between the very closed world of the armed forces, and that of wider society.
It is the best way to enable regular military personnel to engage with people
who can shape public views of the military outside of the ‘bubble’ that the
regulars exist in.
It is a good way to raise
awareness of the military and help people understand what can be done, and
provide some form of ability to respond. But it is much harder to do now than
it was in the past. Paradoxically the smaller the regular forces become, and
the more complex their operating environment is, the harder it is to bring
reservists up to speed. To be an effective reservist working alongside the
regulars is almost a full time job these days.
There isn’t an easy answer or
quick fix here – instead the solution seems to be to continue to draw on
volunteers giving of their time to help the military, and to so in a way that enhances
the regulars ability to do their job. To get this right though will call for
probably more engagement by the regulars with the reserve than has been the
case in the past – rather than treating it as a bolt on of people who may or
may not be there, to get this right really calls for a step change in how the
regulars manage their reservist colleagues.
This may include more postings
into reserve units, shared training, having individuals work inside regular
units and so on. Its really important to ensure that both groups understand one
another and how they think and work, to minimise friction and increase the
ability to get the most from the talent they have access to.
Ultimately the RF30 review should
perhaps be seen as a good discussion on how best to do talent management. There
is a pool of people out there with skills and experience of real value to
Defence, whose personal circumstances mean that they are not full time members
of Defence. The trick is to work out what needs to be done to get the best from
this talent pool, and ensure that Defence reaps the benefits from it, and doesn’t
squander it away by mistake.
An interesting read, and some of the proposal you touched on (better use of expats for example) is something that is slowly being looked at already. With pressure on T&S budgets I know as a reserve abroad I am a significantly cheaper option, but again it comes to the trade off between recent experience and cost.
ReplyDelete