Will the President Take His Call? Thoughts on the UK/US 'special relationship'.

 

The news that Joe Biden will become the next President of the United States has led to deep analysis in the UK about what this means for the ‘Special Relationship’. Some focus on whether the personal links between the Prime Minister and the President will work, others worry that there appears to be no link between the Biden camp and UK officials.

The reality is that every four – eight years the UK press has an outpouring of worry, largely unreciprocated by its US equivalents, about whether the new Administration will be good or bad for Anglo-American relations. It seems to worry people far more than it should for what is a fundamentally mature relationship in reasonable state.

Much of Humphrey’s career has been spent working with different parts of the US Government, from visiting the White House (under both Republican and Democrat Administrations), liaison work in the Pentagon and State, working in multilateral arms control negotiations in Brussels and Vienna, to serving embedded or working with US HQ’s in Baghdad, Kabul and the Middle East, and working on the front line with US military and intelligence organisations. This blog is built as an observation based on many years of working alongside and with the United States Government and armed forces.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The debate in the UK often focuses on the question of whether the two leaders will get on on a purely personal level. A sense of importance is ascribed to this link by many in the media, believing that the chemistry between the two is vital.

You can look back to previous changes – for example Clinton/Major, Blair/Bush or Cameron/Obama to spot very similar newspaper articles to the ones we see today. A sense of believing that the relationship will be weak, that they have little in common and that the UK will be left in the cold as a result.

The reality is that the relationship between the two leaders is perhaps the least important part of the Anglo-American relationship. Of course its good when people get on – it makes talks more pleasant if you can have a good working relationship with someone, but this doesn’t make it the be all and end all.

As leaders the President and PM will probably speak on a reasonably regular basis, but that doesn’t mean that they have to get on. Frankly if they were speaking regularly then this would imply a sense of crisis or that something wasn’t working in the working level links between the two governments that needed the PM and President to personally take charge and fix.

There is no other relationship that we seem to believe has to have personal chemistry – you rarely if ever see articles speculating about how the Prime Minister and the new President of country X get on – because it doesn’t really matter that much. Senior leaders will rarely meet in person, and when they do it is usually a fairly heavily choreographed event on both sides.

The reason though that the personal relationship is probably the least relevant part of the equation is because the relationship between the UK and US is built on far firmer foundations than whether its leaders get on – and this is a good thing.

Ultimately good international relations is about the ruthless determination between two states of the relative value a relationship brings, and if the wider benefits are worth it relative to the cost.  For the US, the relationship with the UK is arguably built around several factors that have remained constant for many years, and which show relatively little sign of changing.

For starters the UK provides a range of discrete real estate and accesses to the US Government that enable it to carry out missions at a time and place of its choosing. These facilities range from sites like RAF Lakenheath, Fairford and Mildenhall, which play host to significant USAF combat airpower, including the B2 bomber through to facilities in remoter locations like Ascension and Diego Garcia.

For the US, access to these facilities is incredibly helpful because it knows that the UK is a trusted and reliable ally. International military basing is a complex web of memoranda of understanding, status of forces agreements and at times political pressure to permit overflights or activity.

A country may happily host a US military facility right up until the point that the US Government needs it to launch an airstrike, and then refuse permission for its use or overflight of its territory. They are happy to accept the benefits, but not the costs of friendship.

Over the decades since WW2 the US has found the UK a willing and reliable partner, prepared to offer access and permissions. While questions may be asked, or assurances sought, the UK continues to offer the US certainty of access, and certainty of employability for its armed forces when operating from UK soil.

The UK/US alliance was formed in wartime to achieve military success against Germany and Japan. It perpetuated beyond this point into the Cold War, when both nations played leading NATO roles and then the post Cold War world, when they operated jointly together on a range of operations.

The UK continues to be seen as a credible military power, able to bring a good combination of capable, trained and self-sustaining forces to operations, and a willingness to employ them effectively. As an ally, the UK is one of the very small number of partners that the US can rely on to provide troops able to integrate and work with their US peers, and operate at fundamentally the same level.

There is a very high level of interoperability between the two nations armed forces, and an extremely high number of exchange postings. Both nations work closely together on a range of areas and co-operate closely on areas like nuclear weapons and propulsion, a link that no other nations share.

When it comes to using forces, the UK has shown for many years a willingness to deploy them and use them. Unlike some participants in coalition operations, who come with a lengthy list of caveats and restrictions on what they will, or will not do, the UK is seen as a consistently reliable partner. This matters when the US is looking for not just a flag on a powerpoint slide, but someone prepared to risk their troops lives too.

The UK then does add value to the US by both its real estate and also its armed forces -both of which are genuinely highly valued. They may be much smaller, but they can work at a level of interoperability almost unmatched by other nations.

This level of links extends into the intelligence sphere, where the UK’s intelligence community continues to operate as a vital part of the ’5-Eyes’ arrangement. This relationship, which dates back to WW2 remains a unique alignment and grouping, permitting these nations to share intelligence in a genuine atmosphere of trust.

UK commitment to 5-Eyes and the significant successes of its intelligence community over the years means that there is a strong link to the US – particularly in the relationship between GCHQ and NSA, for which both countries gain significantly. This continues to ensure that London is seen as a credible partner, because it can give insights that sometimes the US lacks.

This insight too extends to the fact that the UK and US share a significant alignment in terms of foreign policy interests and goals. As modern democracies, both countries want to work together to meet mutual goals and interests. This means that Washington will instinctively want to get London on side, where possible as two nations speaking together carries more weight.

Ways in which this can be seen include the use of joint attributions on cyber activity, for example jointly holding nations like China responsible for inappropriate conduct in cyberspace. A joint attribution carries a lot more weight because it shows more than one country is prepared to call out another, and helps build the case for other partners to join in as well.

To that end, Londons extensive access and diplomatic networks can be an enormous boon to the US. When both nations share common interests, the ability to ask the UK to lobby friends and partners, particularly in sites like the Commonwealth or where deeper links exist than the US enjoys is helpful- State can rely on the FCDO to work on behalf of the interests of both countries and further US goals.

This joint working extends too into the multi-lateral space, where UK and US diplomats work closely together on a range of issues regularly. There is an instinctively close working relationship (borne if nothing else out of the fact that the UK and US usually end up sitting next to each other in all talks where the seating plan is done alphabetically by nation). Again, the UK brings value here as much by its ability to lobby, and also its presence – the UK has embassies in many countries where there is no US diplomatic presence, providing much needed insight into how a country may be thinking about a situation.

Perhaps the most important part of the equation is that the UK and US have a genuinely close working relationship at staff level. Many diplomatic and military staff have spent their careers working alongside US peers, helping build a relationship of mutual trust and respect. There is a genuinely close working relationship and level of access between the two nations civil services and military that does not extend to other countries.

This pool of shared experience needs regular replenishment, but do not underestimate its importance. The UK is seen to matter to the US as much because of the deep personal links as because of the wider operational, diplomatic and strategic goals of the two nations.

There are regularly suggestions that the UK doesn’t matter anymore, and that the US is looking for a new ally, and the ‘special relationship’ is dead. To be honest, its almost become a rite of passage for a new President, to have the UK media to loftily pronounce that the ‘special relationship’ isn’t special anymore.

Commentators in the UK tends to fixate on the phrase ‘Special Relationship’ as if this is the sole basis of the links, and feel that this is the only way we can judge our alliance. In fact many countries have special / close / intimate relationships with the US – the difference is not the way we declare the relationship, as if it’s a social media declaration, but rather assess the underlying access, benefits and investments that we get from it.

It is reasonable to say that the UK enjoys an exceptionally close military and diplomatic relationship with the USA. This provides a level of access that few other countries have in this field, and where the links are deep and genuine, and carry on regardless of who is occupying the White House or No10. But there are plenty of other countries which enjoy a close relationship with the USA.

For example, as American interests turn to the Asia Pacific region (again), we would reasonably expect to see Australia and Japan increase their relative importance to Washington. Likewise, while Russia remains a challenge, and NATO fractured, it is reasonable to expect that links with the EU will need to be sustained.

That the US can enjoy a close link with other nations does not mean that the UK does not matter. International relations is not a zero sum game, or league table of importance where nations change places and move up and down the league. Rather all nations have interests and links, and these ebb and flow as required.

Similarly, we should be extremely wary of assuming that because we have a close diplomatic and military alliance, that this means that both nations are entirely aligned across all areas of policy. In fact the UK and US can, and do, disagree on many aspects of global trade, links and policy. That doesn’t diminish the links between the two nations, but it means that we should not assume that there is an utterly coherent relationship across all parts of it.

The challenge for the UK then is to continue to ensure that its relationship with the US remains pertinent and relevant enough that Washington feels it is worthy of maintaining. That means continuing to fund investment in a global diplomatic presence, engaging closely in international organisations, and showing that the UK has a diplomatic clout that can be used to help Washingtons interests out.

It also means trying to show the US that the UK is not a nation in retreat. Whatever your views on Brexit, there is no doubt that the departure of the UK from the EU has weakened its influence in Washington. Suddenly London can no longer be used as an access point to lobby EU capitals, and other partners will be needed to influence on this front.

To that end, Brexit (particularly in the event of a no-deal Brexit) will have a long term reduction on UK influence in Washington on European policy matters. What the UK needs to do is define how it will rebuild this influence in other ways. For example, could investment in the Asia Pacific region through more defence and diplomatic activity increase value there – after all, its not clear what level of importance the EU holds in future US planning.

Is the UK prepared to invest more widely in defence and other engagement in the Far East, or to continue to deploy troops in the Middle East if this is what it takes to continue to enjoy long term influence and access in Washington DC?

Likewise, what prioritisation is it prepared to make on military matters to ensure access – in the Middle East, the presence of the Royal Navy Mine Warfare force is genuinely seen as a critical force asset by the US Navy. If a decision were taken to scrap these ships, or change the posture, what damage could a very tactical decision have on the long term strategic standing of London in the eyes of Washington policy makers?

These decisions need to be done against a perspective of other nations vying for influence and access. Many countries jealously begrudge the fact that the UK enjoys privileged access and roles in US led HQ’s, and the associated benefits that this brings. The risk is that the UK takes this for granted, while other nations push hard in their regions to gain similar access.

In those circumstances the risk is that the UK influence may drop if a decision is taken to gap a post, not invest in a deployment or close down an exercise or facility at a time when others are only too willing to fill the gap. Striking a balance between financial balance and  sustaining long term strategic relationships is essential here.

Its striking this balance that will be so challenging in the years ahead. Presidents and Prime Ministers come and go, and all will want to maintain an effective (and if possible cordial) relationship – but the UK has to show that it is serious about investing and continuing to prioritise the working level and routine activity to mean that when the Prime Minister rings, the President takes their call.