Defence in the Round - Thoughts on the Integrated Review

Last week marked the third anniversary of the PinstripedLine restarting and becoming an active blog again. In that period, covering some 225 articles and almost two million page hits the blog has continued to comment on UK and wider defence and national security issues.

It is perhaps timely then that this weekend has seen more articles and press releases emerge about possible options for defence going forward, and a variety of ‘doom and gloom’ scenarios emerge. The most high profile of this is built around what would happen to Defence if a 5% budget cut was forced on to the MOD, and some of the radical steps that would need to be taken to balance the numbers.

The result is a leaking of what can be described as ‘usual suspect’ scenarios, talking about removal of capability X or Y and cuts in headcount. The suggestion appears to be that cutting the budget means no more meaningful Royal Marines capability, far fewer soldiers and reduced numbers of aircraft fleets and airbases. The article should also be seen in the context of saying that there needs to be significant investment in advanced technology and cyber capability instead.

Flying in Basra - Authors Picture

It is perhaps an interesting phenomenon to observe that over the last three years the debate on defence, and defence cuts, has, when played out either in this blog or the media focused on numbers and quantities, and not actually a debate about what it is that we want our armed forces to do.

Everything seems to relate to numbers and how many of X we have, versus how many of Y. The debate is also closely supported by a separate debate around how we will no longer matter because suddenly the UK has only Z numbers of whatever platform and now ranks 123^rd in the World – for example, how many fighters, tanks or destroyers we have usually makes an easy story to say that we suddenly rank lower than Groombolia (on paper at least.

What is frustrating is that very rarely does the debate move away from this, or arguments about why River Class Batch 2 OPVs need to have 16” main batteries fitted to be effective in the newly created Far East Fleet created on some tediously dull fantasy fleet discussion to instead ask the most basic question of all which is ‘what do we want our armed forces to do’?

With this in mind it is interesting to spot that the MOD has issued a surprisingly defensive press release talking about how the Secretary of State for Defence has held an away day to discuss the preparation for the forthcoming Integrated Review and wider comprehensive spending review due to be held this year.

It seems likely that it is leaks from this meeting (sorry, background briefing) that have helped shape some of the articles emerging today as the Armed Forces attempt to build popular support to shield them from potentially difficult cuts. But, Humphrey is actually incredibly sympathetic to the argument of asking some very deep and probing questions about what it is that the Armed Forces do, and whether things could, or should, be done differently.

If you were to take a ‘bottom up’ approach to UK national security, you’d quickly realise that the UK possesses a global range of interests – varying in nature and importance. A comprehensive diplomatic network staffed by able diplomats, combined with an effective aid and development programme and membership of a wide variety of international bodies and organisations.

There is no doubt that on a diplomatic or economic scale the UK remains an extremely potent and valued nation – its membership of a variety of organisations gives it access and influence which are of value to other countries. People want to hear the UK’s view because, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, leading member of NATO and leading member of the Commonwealth, as well as having close but strained links to the EU, means that the UK is a country whose views do matter.

This is coupled with possessing an extensive economic and industrial footprint, with UK companies having global interests and investment potential, as well as possessing a variety of genuinely impressive world beating companies in a variety of technology and industrial areas. This global footprint matters because nations want UK companies to invest in them, in the same way foreign companies have invested in the UK.

Finally the UK enjoys a strong legacy as a nation with a variety of strategic interests and the presence of real estate and relationships around the globe which lends itself to taking a strong interest in other regions. This ranges from close links to some foreign leaders, through to territories which wish to remain aligned with the UK, and also legacy links to locations whose people and situation still matter to us.

But bring all of this together and what this doesn’t then say is ‘why does this situation warrant retaining the British Armed Forces as they are constituted today’?  

There is perhaps a regular inferred negativity about the state of the modern armed forces – every conversation that is had on capability often seems to stray into a well worn rut of ‘isn’t it depressing, when I joined we had X of this, and at least twice the headcount’ – people perceive the debate about defence not as one of saying ‘what is it that the armed forces are here to do today’ but instead look back at times gone by and wonder why there is so much less.

The debate has become stuck on being framed around capabilities and numbers and not roles. When the Navy is worried about funding, it leaks about losing carriers, or the Army will threaten the lose of Battalions or tanks. There seems to be a perpetual fear of less money meaning less kit, but not a sense of having a deep discussion about what does this change for what Defence can contribute to UK national security objectives?

The wider challenge too is not just an obsession with ‘back in the day’ but also perhaps a constant desire to be seen to compare ourselves to the US and then assume we don’t matter. It is a source of immense frustration that we constantly seem to look at what the UK has, count up how much of the same that the US has and then reach the conclusion that somehow we don’t matter.

Of course the US has more soldiers, aircraft and ships than we do – they have a vastly larger economy and a population almost 6 times greater than our own. It would be somewhat worrying, and economically scary, if we were to seek to match the US person for person, ship for ship, because it is economically and logistically almost impossible to do so.

This constant obsession with deciding we are irrelevant compared to the US is tedious because it is so utterly pointless. Every nation, with the exception of China, is probably militarily irrelevant compared to the US – very few other countries seem to struggle with this as a concept though.

What we see far less of is a rational debate explaining the focus on why we matter to the US – we don’t see coherent explanations of our offers of real estate access, diplomatic leverage and support and also some very niche military capabilities that complement their own in certain ways. Instead there seems to be an assumption that we don’t matter.

Humphrey’s strictly personal view is that there is perhaps a combination of both ‘back in the day’ wistful memories and also a desire to safeguard capabilities that drives much of the UK defence debate.

Instead of seeing a sensible debate openly around where UK interests lie, what benefits are gained from one approach or the merits of it over another – for example the discussion around whether UK interests lie in defending Eastern Europe via NATO or a more global role as peacemaker / enforcer, there instead seems to be a sense of going ‘we matter less if we do these cuts because we have less of the people and kit’ without asking whether there is actually any UK interest in us mattering in the first place.

A good example to offer of this is the subject of the deployable division. This is seen as central to the British Army’s offer to national security – that it provides policy makers with choices around how they could put significant amounts of heavy metal on the ground to do ‘stuff’ if required.

But as a taxpayer, it is perhaps hard to discern what is it the national security question or goal that requires the answer to be ‘deployable division’? There seems to be a relentless focus on showing off the shiny stuff and hyping up how good it is, and how much more at risk we would be as a nation without it, without perhaps explaining what it is that this does and why it matters to our national security policy.

What is needed is perhaps some genuinely honest and painful discussions about why we have the armed forces that we do, and move to actually remodel them in a way that is best for our national security needs.

If you were creating the British Armed Forces today, you would not end up with either the organisation or real estate that it currently has. The MOD has to waste huge amounts of public money on upkeep of an estate that is far too big for its needs, and spread the maintenance budget far too thin.

A major win for the MOD would be the ability to radically shrink the built up estate to a fraction of the size it currently is, but to do so in a way that frees up money for investment. Usually when the word comes out about bases to close, you can all but guarantee a long line of talking heads moaning about how bad it is, and how awful the outcome is for national security if the site closes.

But wander round large parts of the defence estate and you’ll see ancient buildings closed off due to health and safety problems. There are lots of areas literally falling apart because there is no money to fix them. Accommodation in many sites is in a shocking state, and it has become a reality that in many RAF bases, hot water for showers no longer happens because they are unable to fix the problems as the money isn’t there.

The estate is far too large and unwieldy and in many cases relies on buildings that are being run on far past their natural life cycle. If you want to recruit, train and retain the best people the nation has to offer, you need to offer them a modern safe working environment and accommodation that isn’t trying its hardest to kill them through freak accidents.

Many of the sites are not in good locations and are a legacy of WW2 that have yet to be disposed of. There are all manner of now positively ancient airfields and other locations that don’t make much sense to retain, but which all drain the maintenance budgets down to keep them vaguely compliant with health and safety standards.

A genuine debate on defence and making it fit for the 21^st Century needs public buy in and support for the idea that the estate badly needs downsizing and made for the 21^st Century. It also needs really tough decisions on how much is needed – there are probably too many RAF active airfields out there, and the Royal Navy could easily reduce its shore infrastructure and consolidate the fleet in Portsmouth and Faslane, leaving Plymouth purely for refit work like Rosyth.

The difficulty is though that this requires decisions that are politically unpopular and which cause dissent. Why bother causing grief with the backbenches over closing a site when you could instead just run it on quietly and hope it doesn’t fall apart in the next few years? Its worth remembering that every pound spent on the defence estate is a pound less for more pay, or more equipment. What matters most for the needs of UK defence?

The other issue that the review needs to grasp with is where is the UKs strategic priorities and where needs investment now and for the future? The armed forces we have today are arguably a product of decisions taken 30-40 years ago in order to develop ships, tanks and aircraft and bring them into service against a very different set of threats.

We have to work with the hand we’ve been dealt, but is the discussion on defence planning going to focus on retaining what we have, accepting that what exists isn’t the answer necessarily to every problem, or walking away and reinvesting in new areas?

The challenge for the military is that as threats evolve and grow, they move increasingly into murky domains where it is much harder to spot a direct military role or organisation. For all the focus on cyber warfare, the armed forces have yet to really embrace this in a way that is effective – there has been much talk of cyber forces, but little in the way of action.

Notwithstanding the suggestions around the importance of the Law of Armed Conflict when it applies to cyber warfare, there is perhaps a sense that cyber is seen as a difficult sell because it breaks the existing career models, needing people who are not necessarily natural officers and leaders, and it needs talent that is not necessarily drawn to a career in a structured and disciplined military.

At the same time, pushing the case for cyber is hard because it isn’t something tangible that you can design a uniform for or put on an ORBAT. Saying we have invested in cyber means investment in infrastructure like PCs, not investing in easily quantifiable metrics like more tanks or planes.

For Defence the challenge ahead is to show that it is the right organisation with the right mixture of skills and people to solve these sorts of challenges, and that its force structure accurately matches the needs of national security now and for the future.

This will require a narrative shift away from talking about assets and numbers and instead focusing on outputs. It requires talking about Defence as an enabler that solves strategic challenges by providing a variety of options, and not about Defence as a long list of equipment in search of a mission.

It also requires an explanation that reducing capability in some areas does not threaten national security – rather it requires a more adult explanation that national security is about trade offs, and reducing in one area allows uplifts in another, and setting out the overall benefits gained from the decision.

This also requires the ability to explain that national security is more than just the defence budget. Cuts to Defence may be needed to enhance other areas outside, but it needs to be shown how this benefits the UK clearly – and not just rely on leaked angry documents suggesting that fewer soldiers automatically means that the nation is in a more difficult place.

One has to hope that the Integrated Review genuinely means an integrated review. It hopefully means that the discussion reaches above that of force structures into a wider discussion around what it is that the British Armed Forces bring, and what they no longer need to do in such a way that we can set the stage for the next 20-30 years of operations.

The worst possible outcome for Defence is that more of the same continues – that there is a lack of tough decisions taken on stepping back from roles, that the budget continues to fail to balance, and that salami slicing on the pretence of doing a little bit of everything continues rather than radical reinvention and change to survive.

The next few months will be critical, for they mark a real chance to have a genuine debate about what role armed force plays in the security needs of a globally focused 21^st century power, and whether these forces are properly configured to handle the tasks ahead.

Finally, its been a fantastic three years commenting on all of these issues, and hopefully there will be a lot more to comment on in due course. The most significant challenge in recent months has been finding material to comment on, as COVID-19 has significantly reduced defence coverage. But the intention remains that PSL will continue as a blog offering objective opinions, reasonable challenge and alternative views that pushes the positive vision ahead for UK defence and national security issues.

Thank you to all those who have supported the blog in the last 3 years. It is an amateur labour of love done in my spare time at home and enjoys no official backing, patronage, or status. Nothing is discussed here that cannot be quantified via google, and it remains at heart a chance for me to sound off on issues I find interesting, and not act as a mouthpiece for the establishment.

If the blog supports MOD or HMG position, it is because I fundamentally and genuinely believe that their actions are correct, not because I believe in defending the party line at any cost. The blog is also not some kind of underground view of the inside of the MOD or leaking material that should not be in the public domain. I write under a pseudonym, partly as it has defined this blog since it launched in 2011 and also because, like most people on the internet, I value a modicum of digital privacy, although I have happily met with and enjoyed many pleasant drinks with many readers over the years.

The blog continues to exist to express strictly personal views and offer alternative views, usually on media reports that are of interest. I know some are uncomfortable that this blog offers reasonable challenge to media reports, particularly as it is done under a pseudonym. I would ask why they feel it is okay to complain about someone critiquing their work via a pseudonym on a private blog but feel happy that they rely on anonymous defence sources when writing their work.

This blog is about offering alternative views in a respectful manner, and challenging opinions to offer a different perspective of the situation, and not acting as a ‘digital policeman’, as some portray it to be. Over the year it has been a bit odd to be on the receiving end of what can best be described as (and certainly felt like) ‘cyber bullying’ by certain public figures who seemed uncomfortable that their word was not taken as gospel, and was instead subject to reasonable challenge. Frankly, it is not nice to be on the receiving end of some people, who have abused their position of public trust by using twitter to attack, vilify and block, rather than engage in civilised debate.

But outside of tthis tiny minority of people, the overwhelming experience of writing this blog has been tremendously positive. Thank you to all those who have engaged and made this such a fulfilling blog to write.

Here’s to the next three years!