Is the Carrier Strike Concept Worth It? Thoughts on the NAO Report.

The National Audit Office has published a report into the ability of the MOD to successfully deliver Carrier Strike capability. The report, published today focuses on the fact that while the carrier project is proceeding well, there are concerns around the many enablers that underpin it to make it transfer from being a ‘show force’ to a credible carrier strike group.

Given that the Royal Navy has effectively ‘bet the farm’ on acquiring the Carrier Strike Group concept and buying into it in a significant way, this report does make for challenging reading. The purpose of this article is to assess it and ask ‘how bad is the problem’ and ‘should we worry’ and ‘was it all worth it’?

In many respects the report focuses on much of what has gone well – it notes that the project has delivered to within 3% of final budgeted costs, a variance of costs for a project that has now been running for 20 years that is not unimpressive given the many changes that have occurred during this time.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

It also notes that the UK will be rightly back in the carrier strike game shortly, and sets out a compelling vision for what a Royal Navy carrier strike group will look like in just one or two years time – a force of 24 UK aircraft (plus allied), multiple escorts and support ships brought together to provide a genuinely potent level of reach and capability. The challenge is whether this vision may occur just as the money to deliver it runs out, and the MOD must make deep cuts as part of the defence review.

The first issue of interest is the identification that the MOD has perhaps not fully developed clearer ideas of how much it actually expects to spend on running costs for the carrier strike group. The report notes that in 2017 the MOD tried to work out the costs of carrier strike, but didn’t work out how much all elements of a carrier strike group will cost – and it will not know this in more detail until after the first deployment next year.

In some ways this makes sense, if you are interested in buying a car, you can do the headline figures, but you cannot reasonably know how much it will cost to run through life until you’ve actually owned it for a while and know its actual running and support costs.

It is made clear in the report though that the sort of figures the MOD may need are probably underestimates – the NAO has real concerns that the MOD is applying optimise scenarios to costings, and is significantly underestimating the cost of spares and logistics – vital enablers for these ships.

The report highlights that over the next 3-4 years we should see significant increases in availability of the CSG, as the QUEEN ELIZABETH completes her inaugural deployment next year, and then full operating capability for the carrier is achieved in Dec 2023, while the full vision of carrier enabled power projection (CEPP) will be achieved in Dec 2026.

In other words, we are still 6 years away from the Royal Navy having achieved a full CEPP capability as laid out in the 1998 SDSR – from inception to FOC will have taken 28 years. This is the equivalent of the CVA01 class being designed in 1963, but not reaching full capability until 1991…

The key area of concern that the report has is around the supporting enablers. This is perhaps inevitable because for years the focus has been on the carriers and not the rest of the ships vital to their operation.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

There is always a risk of saying that a carrier cannot operate without escorts – but this is perhaps an unfair analogy. The carrier strike group concept is about bringing together ships with a range of capabilities to work in mutually complementary ways – so bringing air defence, anti-submarine, and other ships together to work as one force.

Each ship brings extra skills to the party, but all by themselves can struggle to work in different areas – that’s why so much of naval warfare is about working in task forces or coalition operations to bring out the best of mutually complementary skills. This is no different to Army units operating as battlegroups or air forces relying on a mix of air defence, strike and surveillance assets.

For the Royal Navy the big concerns identified in the report boil down to a few core areas – namely, Crownest, JSF numbers, escort ships, support solutions and wider enablers and the enduring longer term cost and viability of the force.

Concern has been raised that the RN faces significant delays to bringing Crowsnest into service and posing a risk to provision of airborne early warning. This is perhaps overblown somewhat given that the RN has already managed this gap reasonably successfully for some years, and in the event of having to operationally deploy, is likely to be bridged either by initial units or allied AEW capability.

While a challenge, it is perhaps worth keeping a sense of perspective, this is a very short-term issue in what is a 50 year project. All defence projects carry an element of risk and slippage, and while valuable, Crowsnest is also likely to enter service in the near future. This is not to dismiss concerns, but it is perhaps to try and keep a sense of perspective that of all the challenges, this is the one closest to resolution and fixing.

Of perhaps more challenge is the medium term challenge the RN faces in funding and delivering enough escort ships. The report casually notes that the decision on the next tranche of Type 26 frigates will not be taken until 2022, leaving them vulnerable targets for the forthcoming defence review. This coupled with the material fragility of the Type 23 force will make sustaining significant levels of ships a challenge for the next 10 years off.

The most significant concern perhaps noted in the entire report is the situation involving the state of the RFA solid support ships. The current situation is that the RFA has three solid support ships on the books – two of these are now around 40 years old (FORT AUSTIN & ROSALIE) and are both in deep reserve in Liverpool. Neither are likely to sail under the RFA flag again.

RFA FORT VICTORIA is due to soldier on until the late 2020s when she will, in theory, be replaced by up to three new stores ships. This project has been going on for a very long time, initially as the MARS project, which set out with great ambitions to buy a range of ships for various roles, but which has only delivered four TIDE class tankers to date.

The challenge with this project has been a difficult combination of budgetary wrangling, the perspective that less glamorous projects like stores support are harder to get ‘over the line’ in planning rounds and onto project status, and also the real challenge that industry has yet to deliver credible bids.

Part of this ties into wider political debates around whether the ships should be built in the UK or abroad. It will be cheaper to buy abroad, and frankly the debate should be about what is right for national defence as a whole, which would strongly point to a foreign buy if that provides three affordable hulls that can be delivered on time and on budget.

If UK shipbuilders can compete then that is great news, but there is a very compelling argument that the needs of the Royal Navy and the nation must come above needs of individual ships yards, no matter where they may be located in the UK.

The challenge for the RN will be twofold – that the detailed wrangling and bids, and construction will be so delayed that it will prove impossible to deliver new ships in time, or if direction is forced to make the RN take a UK builder at a price that makes only two hulls affordable.

This debate comes to the heart of the challenges facing UK defence planners – what matters more. Is it securing the right capability at the right price, or is it trying to support and sustain a UK defence industrial base for the long term?

Part of the problem is that while stores support is neither particularly glamorous or high profile, it is also utterly vital to keep carrier strike working as intended. These ships, floating supermarkets and gun shops play a critical role in keeping the force at sea for much longer than would otherwise be the case.

If the UK operates a carrier without indigenous support ships, it is either forced to reduce the scope and ambition of what it wants to do with carrier strike, or it is forced to hope that an ally will provide the capability instead. Given how few nations have carrier enabled stores ships, this is likely to be wistful thinking.

It is perhaps for these reasons that the report notes that the MOD wants to review the carrier strike concept as part of the upcoming defence review. Frankly, this makes a lot of sense. Right now the MOD is seeking to deliver into service a concept that on paper looks practical and a valuable tool for policy makers and military professionals alike – but which is going to be extremely expensive to deliver in the short term.

Given the competing range of priorities facing the MOD at the moment, including recapitalising the SSBN force, seeking to reinvigorate the British Army’s armoured vehicle programmes and trying to focus on the next generation of airpower – while doing so against the backdrop of a vastly over committed equipment budget, it is inevitable that very tough questions need to be asked about whether it is still viable for CEPP to be ‘a thing’ for the short to medium term.

The NAO report also notes the real challenges faced by the fact that the MOD has yet to really budget or take decisions on the follow on equipment that much of the enablers for CEPP will need to remain credible past about 2030.

For example, no decision has yet been taken on what to do about Merlin, despite its out of service date being ostensibly barely 10 years away. There is no money in the forward programme yet to replace it, but if the MOD is serious about keeping leading edge ASW and AEW capabilities going, then something probably needs to be done very soon.

This is perhaps where the paper is at its most worrying because it highlights the real risks that there has been a failure to prioritise and take genuinely tough decisions on what matters, versus what has to be abandoned in order to free up funds.

If one wanted to level a criticism of the Armed Forces and the MOD, it is that at times they are too good with an optimistic ‘can do’ attitude, and too reluctant to assume that they cannot do something.

 The equipment programme is paved with good intentions, but it is also full of extremely expensive capabilities for which it is clear that there is not enough money to fund. The problem is that there is seemingly no willingness to have the tough conversation around what needs to stop being done as a military task or commitment in order to free up cash to then allow other projects to be fully funded.

What we are left with is perhaps the worst of both worlds. An overoptimistic defence and security policy which wants the UK to take on and operate at very high levels of military capability, while at the same time sustaining a domestic defence and aerospace industry. But, there is not enough money to fund everything, and industry does not know what matters most to Government, and where it is prepared to be ruthless and stop something.

There are lots of programmes lurching through the system that probably can’t be afforded. But there is no political support to stop the tasks for which they are intended, and the industry sectors affected by any cuts will shout about the need to protect UK jobs.

This is then coupled with ever changing strategic priority shifting, as different problems emerge that require new solutions. The last 10 years have seen UK defence planners oscillate between COIN in Afghanistan, preparing for high intensity warfare to defend Western Europe, prepare for possible conflict in the Middle East, handle demands to be seen to fly the flag in the Far East and also get involved in high intensity COIN operations in places like Mali.

These incredibly diverse policy requirements are a real challenge as it constantly forces a stop/start on funding as different areas need to be accelerated or scaled back depending on the issue of the day and how much political attention it requires. When coupled to the fact that three different Prime Ministers and six different Secretaries of state for Defence have been in post since May 2010, it is easy to see how little continuity of thinking there has been.

The next Defence Review will need to make some incredibly challenging and significant decisions around what it actually wants defence to look like for the next 10-15 years so that funding can be allocated accordingly.

There is an urgent need to determine, for example, what the appetite is for how many aircraft are needed for the force and whether old requirements are still correct. The number of 138 JSF has been in the system as a requirement for over 20 years and has not really been modified in this time.

Yet the MOD has only ordered 48 aircraft, barely one third of the requirement and has no funding in place to place follow on orders. According to the NAO the last MOD F35 will be delivered in 2025/26, which would in practical terms give the UK a force able to deploy one to two front line squadrons of aircraft on a continual basis.

The problem planners face is that with no money allocated for further orders for the next five years, then UK force levels will top out at 48 and it will then be several years before they increase again. Unless there is a marked ramp up in delivery speed, then based on current delivery rates it would realistically take a further 10-15 years to get the force up to target strength.

Practically speaking, the JSF force is likely to spend much of the next two decades operating either on land or at sea. Despite being phenomenally capable, it also won’t have the mass to be able to operate in significant numbers anywhere.

It is also not clear what type of follow on order is planned for the force. The report suggests that the MOD is still reviewing its requirements and may yet go for a different variant of the F35 for further roles rather than just rely on the STOVL type. This would perhaps increase overall capabilities but reduce the number of jets available for carrier operations.

The risk for naval aviation is that over time a relatively small force of just 48 carrier capable jets is that it becomes a bit like the Sea Harrier force. Enough to generate a small sea going force, but as the force ages, maintenance increases and airframes reach their fatigue limits, it will be harder to keep generating it.  Given the UK is looking to keep carrier aviation going for the next 50 years, the risk is that a decision now to not purchase further STOVL F35s could be regretted for many decades to come.

The bigger question for planners is whether there is a requirement for further F35 purchases in the time frames being considered. With Tempest looking like requiring funding for the mid-2030s onwards as it enters service, would the RAF prefer instead to focus resources away from F35 and instead towards more Tempest airframes?

There is an argument that if the UK wishes to remain in the aerospace game it needs to invest heavily in the aerospace industry. Would heavier investment in Tempest be a better long-term gain for UK needs than buying more F35 now?

Brought together these decisions highlight the real challenges facing planners – they have to make short term financial decisions that can have repercussions that will last for decades and fundamentally change how the armed forces operate.

For example the decision in 2010 to pay off the RFA FORT GEORGE made a lot of sense – with the expectation of a reduced need for solid support as a result of a smaller fleet, and the funding plans for FSS orders as intended at the time.  But it now is being keenly felt as FORT VICTORIA has become a single point of failure for the delivery of Carrier Strike due to the failure to order replacements.

The report notes that the MOD needs to decide whether to run a life extension programme for the ship, but this would take her out of the water for time for the refit work. In other words, due to decisions to delay the FSS, the MOD is either going to have to accept a very limited carrier strike ability at some point in the next few years while it refits the FORT VICTORIA, or it has to accept that in 2028 it will be running a hard gap when she pays off.

In other words, the decision 10 years ago to scrap an RFA for the right financial and planning reasons then means that the UK is now not going to have a proper carrier strike capability until this is fixed – which is going to cost a lot of money to deliver.

A similar example of where short-term measures taken to solve in year gaps can hurt is also picked up in the report by the lack of depth in spares and munitions. The report notes that the RAF for example has, for short term financial problems, chosen not to purchase additional spares package for the F35 force. There are only 2 sets of spares packages being bought, not the 3 required, despite analysis and use showing that F35 spare parts demand is much higher than expected. It also notes that due to defence cuts, the RAF has been forced to cut flying hours on the F35 force by a fifth and that investment in the force has been cut to the absolute minimum necessary.

The report also notes that there are real shortages of spare parts for keeping the ships available in general. It states that the current spares holdings mean that there are only enough spare parts available to ensure that one carrier is available for duty at any time, instead of the two that is stated government policy.

When coupled with concerns about the numbers of spare parts, maintenance and munitions levels, there is a worrying trend emerging that while these are capable ships, they also currently lack the depth to make them truly world beating. The problem is that spare parts cost money, and money is in noticeably short supply, and what matters more – spare parts, more munitions or new ships to keep the force going?

In other words, the Royal Navy may have acquired two carriers, but it cannot afford to keep them both ready for operations in line with declared government policy.

Another example of where short term financial pressures have had a wider damaging impact was the decision to pay off HMS OCEAN. Originally the plan was that one of the two carriers would be modified, at a cost of some £60m to ensure they could act as a replacement LPH embarking helicopters and Royal Marines.

It has emerged in this report that instead the work has not been done, with the MOD looking instead for more modest changes like an increase in helo operating spots. It also emerges that 5 years after the task was identified, no decision has been taken on what to do about it, and the MOD has removed the requirement to be able to deploy Royal Marines in an LPH style role as a key part of the CEPP requirement.

In other words the target has been downgraded – CEPP originally included an amphibious assault capability that has now been removed and will not feature in the new plan. For the RN this means that it has sacrificed its sole helicopter carrier without replacement and will have nothing to show for this in terms of new assets or platforms as a result.

What this means is that the UK finds itself in a difficult position with the carrier force. On the one hand it is to be praised for supporting and delivering two superb new vessels into service along with the initial airwing. There is no doubt that these are extremely capable ships and will offer significant benefits for the Royal Navy for many years to come.

But, what seems to be clear is that there is a significant disconnect between the desired policy of what the UK wants its carrier force to deliver – which is an integrated range of capabilities operating as a mutually complementary strike group anywhere on the oceans, and the means to pay for it.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that there is a growing problem ahead for the MOD which is going to get more and more painful to escape from the longer that tough decisions are put off. If the MOD wants to properly fund CEPP and ensure it has a truly effective maritime task group, capable of doing everything it wants, then it must now look to dig deep in its pockets.

This level of investment will mean prioritising maritime assets over the other two services, while at the same time investing in the nuclear deterrent. It would require the Royal Navy to be reconstituted as the twin provider of the UK’s conventional and nuclear deterrent posture, ably supported by the Royal Air Force.

This is feasible and doable if that is the route politicians want to go down, but it means taking decisions to find money elsewhere – and that elsewhere is probably going to need to be other naval tasks and large swathes of the British Army’s programmes as a result. There is not enough money to go around and something needs to give.

The question the defence review needs to wrestle with is whether the UK wants this global twin deterrent footprint – does the benefits of operating a carrier group accrue so significantly as to warrant spending money that could instead be spent on new Main Battle Tanks for the troops in Eastern Europe and reaffirming our commitment to NATO?

Here is the challenge – politicians need to decide what sort of British defence policy they want, and then let the MOD have a period of grace to deliver it. The defence review will probably have to confront the reality that the model is either ‘global Britain with a bit of NATO’ or ‘NATO Britain with a bit of global’ – e.g. focus on the defence of Europe via ASW, QRA and land, or focus on power projection and step back from our land commitments.

This almost feels like a rerun of the defence reviews of the 1960s and 70s – trying to determine the path that the UK should follow and where its natural interests lie. Both outcomes are feasible, but without a substantial injection of funding, they cannot both be delivered

.

Perhaps the biggest question we need to ask is ‘was it all worth it’? The acquisition of the two carriers has put the Royal Navy at the top of the global premier league when it comes to capabilities – operating big deck carriers, nuclear submarines, and a capable escort force.

But to deliver this much has been sacrificed – there are far fewer escorts, the MCMV force is close to expiry, the submarine force is hard worked and fragile and the amphibious force, which even 10 years ago was arguably the second most potent amphibious force on the planet has now been dangerously hollowed out through the loss of ships and capabilities.

The risk is that to deliver the dream of CEPP, the RN has sold itself on a path that has left it bereft of much of what makes it so capable. The worry is that the funding path does not seem to exist to provide so much of what is needed to buy back capabilities, and that the eventual outcome – a carrier with 24 aircraft embarked is not massively dissimilar to what existed on the old INVINCIBLE class, albeit far more capable in scale and ease of handling.

Has the Royal Navy made a strategic mistake in betting the farm on CEPP? There is a strong school of thought that says maybe it has. It has managed to acquire the centrepieces but taken huge risks on the short and medium term enablers that will make the difference.

It is hard to see what other path could have been followed though – the old INVINCIBLES were very much a compromise class, and too small for the role. Many of the cuts which emerged in the early 2000s to issues like hulls 7-12 of the Type 45 class are unrelated to the costs of the carriers, as the spend profiles would have emerged at different times.

But there is a sense that so many cuts have been made, and so many compromises made and focus placed on reducing out of sight issues like logistical enablers, that what has emerged is a navy with a capable carrier, but which will, baring a miracle, run out of capable support for the carrier force within the next 5-10 years.

To fix this requires decisions almost immediately on more aircraft, new helicopters, ordering of support ships, investment in new surface ships and so on. The most worrying aspect of the NAO report is that they do not seem to have been factored into planning, and there is no sense that the money is there for them.

Given that what the Royal Navy has become in return for its two carriers, and given how at present this investment has delivered a part time carrier force with a small number of available fast jets, significant spares shortages, reduced escort fleet numbers and a lack of longer term support ships or escort elements, then perhaps the answer to the question ‘was it all worth it’ is ‘no, it was not worth the pain for the gain’ – at least not in the short term.

When CEPP emerges as a fully capable force, and if it does so properly resourced, with the right ships, aircraft, weapons and support, with clear and coherent plans for the future, along with the funding in place to deliver this capability for the next 40-50 years, then the answer will be different. Right now though, given what has been lost, and given how much of what was scheduled to be acquired to replace those losses has quietly fallen by the wayside, it is, right now, harder than Humphrey would like it to be to find reasons to push an overwhelmingly positive view of the value of the Carrier Strike Group right now.