Muzzling the Military?
The Ministry of Defence has been accused of censorship and attempting
to muzzle serving personnel’s ability to contact the press by publication of its
media policy. The DIN (which can be found
here) was seen in some parts of social media as an attack on fundamental ability
of personnel to raise concerns and the press to hold the MOD to account. Is
this fair criticism, is this a new policy and why would the MOD be so
restrictive to how its people communicate about their work?
From the outset, its important to be clear, despite the
perception that some have, this is not a new policy document. In fact,
complaints about this policy surface relatively regularly, with a Guardian
article from 2007 being the earliest example of complaints about it. The DIN
itself was first published online in 2008, so its been around for about 13
years – so hardly a new story. What seems to have occurred is the latest
version of it has been issued online, hence the response.
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4.5 Media Contact Policy - ENGAGE- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
Why would the MOD want to constrain the ability of personnel
to talk to the press or Parliamentarians? There would be several ways that this
could happen – for example, there is a desire to prevent people talking on subjects
of operational significance.
In practical terms, with the plethora of ongoing operations
around the world, there is always a risk that information could be compromised –
often inadvertently. All it takes is one mistimed press release, or a tweet out
of context and suddenly information could be given away that could jepoardise an
operation.
This is easier than you may think – for example a few years
ago there were twitter accounts from the crew of a deployed RN warship who were
posting about the fact that it should have been ‘channel night’ (the last night
away), that instead they were sailing early and that it was 2-3 months before
they returned home. This gets even more concerning when you realise that the
ship in question was in an operational theatre and had been retasked to carry
out a high profile public mission without a stated end date.
Were this being followed by media or hostile foreign
intelligence services, they would have known where the ship was, that she was
off to sea and to expect her presence for some time to come. Giving away
critical information of operational importance through a single tweet chain is
easily done and can have lethal consequences.
Similarly blogging when done without thinking can have potentially
challenging consequences. Humphrey once came across a blog describing in eye
popping detail the mobilisation process and operational details of some RN
Reservists deployed to carry out ship protection duties in the Middle East –
clearly done as a tour record and memories of a deployment, it gave away
equipment, tactics and operational routines, while also being deeply critical of
personalities. In other words an intelligence and media goldmine.
More widely there is a risk of talking to the media without
necessarily having full awareness of a situation. This can often result in
stories that are inaccurate or put the individual in a place where they give
answers that can disrupt the carefully crafted communications campaign around a
particular issue.
For example, during the Novichok crisis, the point where highly
effective UK messaging was lost was during a weekend when an interview was
carried out with a DSTL member of staff who answered questions outside their
area of expertise. The ensuing story, which was spun that the UK had not been
able to identify the source of the Novichok, was quickly turned around to
suggest that the UK had been involved in some way – disrupting an until that
point very effectively run campaign.
From a military perspective, the risk is that people may
want to sound alarms about issues they care deeply about, but not necessarily
having the full picture. For example during HERRICK there was a lot of coverage
of issues involved in getting kit out to the front line, and spare parts.
One of the damning stories involved someone contacting the
media to talk about how their US supplied vehicles had no spare parts provided,
and they needed to ring up the manufacturer to get more. This quickly became a splash,
with concern that the MOD didn’t care, and was dispatching troops to the front
line without sufficient equipment and support.
It made a great headline, but the truth was more complex.
The vehicles did have spare parts, but because they’d been bought in a hurry to
meet the UOR needs, the spare parts needed hadn’t been codified yet to be in
the distribution system to order correctly, because the priority was deemed to
be getting the vehicles at any cost to Afghanistan to support the troops.
Consequently huge work was underway to fix the issue, but in the haste to be
seen to solve the problem, the usual intermediate step of getting a vehicle to
work out what was needed and ensure it was correctly recorded and on the system
hadn’t happened.
It’s a much more dull story – namely admin delays urgent purchase
because process wasn’t followed, but had the person who contacted the press been
aware of this, its less likely they’d have followed through. Suddenly a desire to suggest people don’t
contact the media without good reason and working via their press office seems
sensible if they are going to engage with very professional people, seasoned in
getting a good story, without being in full possession of all the pertinent
facts.
It is perhaps finally worth remembering that one reason for
controlling access to the media is to ensure that people are properly briefed
and go out able to confidently answer questions in full possession of the facts
and not make small errors. The fact that General Carter, the Chief of Defence
Staff referred in his press conference today to ‘HMS ARGUS’ rather than ‘RFA
ARGUS’ is a good example of making a minor mistake that will be noticed and
commented on by a lot of people who will be put out by it, or feel less confidence
that CDS is in full control if he doesn’t know the difference between an RFA
and an HMS – a small but important difference that matters to a lot of people.
The question is though, whether the policy is proportionate
or appropriate to the task? Reading through it there are some fairly draconian
rules about seeking permission to do just about anything, including using the
internet to post. The level of control that the MOD seeks to exert over its
entire workforce at all times is incredibly significant, and potentially quite
unsettling.
On the one hand the rules about contact with the press seem
entirely sensible. Its essentially saying - If you are not trained in working
with the media, are not clued in on an issue or the lines to take, background
and full context, then please don’t go and talk to the press about your work.
It is likely that most companies or organisations of any
size have a similar policy regarding contact with the press. For example, NHS
England has a policy on page
12 of this document requiring staff to not engage in ad hoc manner with
media.
This policy reflects the tensions inherent in the
relationship between an organisation engaged in, at times, contentious work,
and the media who want to get a story. The organisation wants to ensure that
its perspective is put across, the media want a story that tells more – if they
can get a good quote, or an observation that is usable to turn into a story
they will.
Media is an incredibly cutthroat world where you are only as
good as your next story. The pressure to succeed is huge, the reality that if
you fail to deliver good stories or copy means you are impacting on the papers bottom
line is keenly felt, and there is a long line of people willing to come and
replace you if you fail. At times like this, getting good breaking stories,
even if it isn’t the whole story, or if it comes at it from another angle is understandable
– why wouldn’t you want to run with something that gets you printed?
So, setting boundaries for the military on what to do and
not do in a professional capacity makes a lot of sense, and is understandable. Is
it feasible though in a social media age, and how does it square with wider
behaviours?
Part of the problem is that the policy is not exactly the
most speedy or agile of reads – if it was an RAF project, it would definitely
be on the list of ‘things that Astra has to fix’. It is clunky, long and reads
like a policy document that answers lots of perceived problems, without asking
how the intended audience are likely to interpret it.
It gives the sense of being one of those documents that is
going to be stuck on the ‘wall of death’ in most units, right next to the Health
& Safety mission statement notices and other assorted documents that don’t
change from one monarch to the next. Rumour has it that foreign intelligence
agencies encourage their sources to leave Top Secret documents for pick up in
this wall, precisely because no one reads it and would never spot the document
nestling there…
All flippancy aside, the policy is long on words, short on
quick takeaways that you can sell to your people as a junior platoon sgt. It
also feels that it is heavy on cracking down on contact with the internet, as
if it remains some kind of mysterious beast circa 1998 . The Army Digital Social media guide is arguably a much better read in terms of audience accessibility.
The problem is that in an age when people live online,
asking them to avoid contact with journalists, or avoid publishing blogs
without permission, or other such activities represents an effort to control
that is doomed to fail.
For starters, unlike even when the policy first came out,
the ability for people to come into contact with journalists online is ridiculously
easy. Social media is full of threads where people comment and express views –
expecting your workforce to report every contact is doomed to fail – should you
report a ‘like’, a twitter engagement or a DM? Is engaging in polite and
appropriate discussion on defence issues okay on a Sunday afternoon when
talking about an article of the day, or should you stay silent?
The problem is that expecting people to not engage is doomed
to failure, but there is a wider question of trust here. Its one thing to
expect people to not ‘act like a dick’ and break well established rules of engagement
– don’t get shouty, don’t abuse people and don’t leak official papers on twitter
– at least do it with some style on a canal towpath. Clamping down on those who
break an acceptable use policy is one thing – there is nothing worse than
having someone acting in a hugely offensive manner online when they represent
an organisation.
But, where things get more uncomfortable is when the ability
to exploit the internet to shape and debate is lost for fear of what might
happen. Rather than vetoing contact and directing people to DDC, why not give
people some latitude to represent themselves, and talk about their mission /
unit / role?
Would a more effective way of engaging be to give troops a
social media briefing on the limits of what can be discussed with media people,
and when to direct people to speak to a press office, rather than assuming
people are automatically going to screw up? Also, what is media, and how do you train
people to spot a genuine media approach, versus a journalist using a fake
twitter or facebook profile? Where do we draw the boundary – is it fleet street
journalists, online journals or producers of tiktok videos? What is media for
the purposes of this DIN?
There is too not a uniform application of policy – while there
is a strong presumption against speaking out on some issues, or of seeking
permission, sites like the Wavell Room have flourished despite lacking any
official sponsorship. How can the MOD enforce policy of ‘not commenting on
Defence online’ on one person talking on one site if other areas are actively
thriving precisely because they permit troops to comment anonymously online?
In addition there is an issue around how the culture of not
speaking to media and not leaking seems to go by the wayside above a certain level.
There are the long-standing jokes about how you know the progress of a defence
review by the nature of the options being leaked – but it is precisely this
behaviour that encourages and normalises the leaking culture. If you don’t want
people to leak to journalists or speak to them, then Service seniors need to
stop having ‘off the record’ inspired chats or using third parties to speak on
their behalf. There is a strong argument that people should either play the
game fully or stop pretending and let everyone have a go.
That said, Humphrey is genuinely frustrated by those who
leak without using the internal options open to them to raise issues or
concerns. In an organisation as vast as Defence there is always more than one
perspective to a story, hence a range of ways to allow people to raise
concerns, complaints, and if needs be act as
a whistleblower. If you are in a position where you are sufficiently
concerned on an issue to leak it to the press, it has to be asked – why didn’t you
follow the existing tools open to you first to raise your concerns via due
process?
There was some concern expressed by media on twitter that
this latest policy document would act as a form of censorship, preventing stories
from being told. Arguably this is not the case – the policy is over 13 years
old, yet in that time there has continued to be a range of defence stories in
all the major papers – it hasn’t stopped people getting in contact with the
media, nor leaking to them when required.
More to the point, its worth asking if the MOD is exactly
alone in enforcing these sorts of stipulations. The fact is, it isn’t. Most
companies have a social media policy that sets out very clearly the
expectations of people, and how they should, or should not conduct themselves
online.
As part of the research for this piece, Humphrey read
several different public and private sector organisations acceptable use policy
and came to the conclusion that, to be honest, the MOD is not better or worse
than most other employers in what it expects its people to do and say online
when talking on their subject of interest.
A good example of a strong effective social media policy
is one from the BBC which states:
“ You shouldn't state your political preferences or
say anything that compromises your
impartiality. Don't sound off about things in an
openly partisan way. Don't be seduced by the informality of social media into bringing the BBC
into disrepute. Don't anonymously sanitise Wikipedia pages and similar websites about the
BBC. Don't criticise your colleagues. Don't reveal confidential BBC information, including
sensitive stories or deployments you or others are working on. Beware revealing information
that may risk the safety of you or your colleagues.
If you’re deployed to sensitive or dangerous places, switch off functionality…”
A useful summary has always been and remains: 'Don't
do anything stupid’. Considering
you’re on show to anyone who sees what you do on
social media, another way of
summarising it would be: ‘You’re a BBC journalist; act
like it.’
b) The need for care applies all the time, on all
services, regardless of ‘privacy’ settings, the
intended audience, or if it’s a ‘direct’ or ‘private’
message. Posts on sites like Facebook, or
Direct Messages on Twitter, that you may think are
restricted can be easily and quickly
shared with much wider audiences. Assume anything you
do or say can be seen by anyone.”
In other words, a set of fairly strong guidance to journalists
to think carefully before they tweet and not act in a manner which could bring
their employer into disrepute.
Overall it is hard to see that the accusations that the
MOD is muzzling its personnel are fair. There are sensible policies in place
for working with the media directly and how to engage with the public in an
appropriate way. These are entirely in line with wider organisations guidance.
It is fair to say that no matter how you look at it, the
attitude though towards online engagement and presence remains deeply risk averse
and probably neither sustainable nor enforceable in practise. One has to wonder
whether a lighter touch would better serve the overall goals here.
"If you are in a position where you are sufficiently concerned on an issue to leak it to the press, it has to be asked – why didn’t you follow the existing tools open to you first to raise your concerns via due process?"
ReplyDeleteAnd there's the real nub of the question. Instead ask, does the culture encourage a person to raise concerns in an open and transparent manner that doesn't penalize them for doing so.
I suspect the answer to that question is one that's not being heard.
...in addition to which (some) journalists working for (some) outlets...consider HMAF personnel to be fascist bully-boys, and will cheerfully pass on information to those who might be seeking to them (and indeed, us) harm...best to assume many of them have an axe of their own to grind, and helping them to do so is not necessarily in your interest...GNB
ReplyDeleteNice details and article, it will really helpful for me
ReplyDeleteOther governmenmt Services, Health, police, Local Government all manage with just the Official Secrets Act to act as resraint. They also have senior management who are known publc figures who interact with the Press accountable for their actions.
ReplyDeleteThe fact that the gag has been in place for so many years may indicate the members of the Armed Forces are not treated like adults. MOD central PR is defensive viewing the Press with hostility. MOD PR also has a poor track record, remember the first F35 landing on HMS QUEEN ELISABETH! At this time when GDP is likely to diminish and thus funding for Defence fall it is really important to be able to make a case to the public for Defence resources. Could the fact that Sec. of State for Defence had served be the reason for the reissue. We are in a changing world and communication is vital. Much so called classified is easily gathered from outside sources.