A Right Royal Rumble? Naval Ranks for Royal Marines?

The Royal Marines have been an integral part of the wider Naval Service since the 17th Century.  Throughout centuries of loyal services, the Corps has always been proud of its naval roots and heritage, serving on land and sea with almost unparalleled distinction to keep the nation safe.

But although  the RM have always been proud of their naval heritage and background, the relationship has, at times, been an arms length one, with the rank structures being derived from the Army, and the training at Lympstone and the associated Commando Tests helping define who is a true ‘bootneck’ and in the club, and those who are not.

While historically the Corps made up a very small proportion of total naval strength, particularly post WW2 when its head count as a total part of the Naval Service overall (for example less than 10% of the Service at the end of the Cold War), today the Corps proportionately is a much bigger part of the overall headcount strength. From a regular headcount of some 30,000 people, today the Royal Marines amount for some 20% of the total regular strength.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

At the same time, there has been a sense that the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines have in recent years perhaps been more estranged in their relationships than was historically normal. In the last 15 or so years a combination of 3 Commando Brigade acting  as a Brigade for operations  in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with a decision in the 2010 SDSR to reduce the amphibious lift force from a Brigade to a much smaller force meant that ‘Royal’ was spending much less time with ‘Jack’ than had usually been the case.

This has been less than helpful for the whole organisation. For the RM being out of sight in HERRICK and TELIC arguably led to some in the RN forgetting their existence as part of the Naval family. If you were not part of forces working with 3 Cdo Brigade during these years, when the focus on operational deployment to a landlocked country was so high, you would probably not have seen the Corps as part of your team because you never worked with them at sea or elsewhere.

That may sound easy to say, but it is easy to imagine the hurt and upset this would cause to a force that took heavy casualties on these deployments, and who ensured the White Ensign proudly flew from some of the remotest and most dangerous places on the planet. To  then feel that your parent service was not completely emotionally committed to you in the way you have committed to it is not a good place to be.

This has perhaps been brought visibly home in the way that the Corps seemed to have  become a more distant  relation in terms of shared experiences and values to the wider Naval Service than before. In some ways this was superficially harmless or seen to be team building in nature – for example the propensity to dress up in womens clothing  on a run ashore, or playing spoof at every given opportunity. This strong culture is different to the wider RN and helps distinguish Royal out.

Other incidents though perhaps hinted at a sub culture that did not always act in line with the values and standards of the Naval Service – for instance the initiation rituals involving ‘naked roll mat fighting’ at some units, or increasingly behaviour by some individuals that crossed the line from ‘high jinks’ into downright criminal – perhaps most tellingly  culminating in the activity of Mr Blackman, who murdered a prisoner in Afghanistan. At times like this, it is perhaps understandable that some in the RN would mutter ‘typical Royal’ and feel that the whole Naval Service side had been let down by the actions of the RM (although this would be grossly unfair given the propensity of incidents by other Naval Service staff too).

The challenge is that when you are a member of an elite force, with a long history of achieving the impossible and where you have proven yourself to be masters of land and maritime operations, to work out what to do in a world post HERRICK where the RN isn’t entirely clear what it is it wants you to do.

This has led to a situation in recent years where the Corps found itself increasingly in search of a role, particularly post HERRICK. With the changing realisation that the days of massed amphibious assaults against defended beaches are a thing of the past, even for the US Marine Corps, the question had to be asked ‘the Corps – what is it good for’?

Over the last few years there has been a concerted effort to tackle this sense of isolation head on and properly define where the Royal Marines fit into the modern naval service. It is something that has sat across multiple strands of work, for example completely refocusing the structure to specialise units into different areas.

For instance unlike the structure of 10 years ago where 3 Commando Brigade was essentially a specialist light infantry force with supporting  enablers, the modern force is very different in nature. It has units that have specialised in maritime security operations, working in urban terrain and in the Joint Personnel Recovery space. It has also continued to focus on delivering  the nuclear security role, through the work of 43 Commando in Faslane, and retain an amphibious warfare skill set as well.

These structural changes have  led to a lot of public and media driven comment,  but they have proven essential at  moving the force from being essentially ‘naval paras’ (e.g. light infantry with a penchant for unusual methods  of entry) into a niche and specialist set of units that provide genuinely unique skills and capabilities for the wider armed forces.

At the same time the RM have seen themselves increasingly drawn back  to sea, helping address the challenge that the best part of a generation of recruits had gone through training and initial careers without spending time at sea. The sight of a Royal Marine force embarked is now much more common than before-  for instance HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH deployed on WESTLANT19 with a Royal Marines detachment from 42 Cdo embarked, and it has been worked hard on exercises in the region.

More widely the Royal Marines have provided detachments in support of a wide variety of operational deployments including boarding teams and snipers to support the at times extremely dangerous boarding work conducted in the Gulf and beyond.

The RN too has used the availability of the Corps to once again return to practising amphious warfare, with major exercises going on in the Baltic this year with 45 Cdo deploying en masse to the region as part of BALTIC PROTECTOR deployment.

What this means for the Corps operationally is that it is increasingly capable of justifying itself, and its existence to Defence. This in turn strengthens its case to the Royal Navy which at times has itself been uncertain as to what exactly it wanted or expected from the Royal Marines.

Numerous articles were written over the years suggesting that the Corps could be offered up as a savings measure to merge with the Paras, thus ridding the RN of an expensive force that required complex specialist shipping to be useful, and which cost a lot to run without necessarily adding  much to the important business of sending sleek grey messengers of death to sea.

While this may sound flippant, there is a strong (and at times entirely justifiable) sense in some quarters that the RN doesnt know or understand the Corps, and would happily starve it of funds, or divest itself of it if it felt that this would provide it with an extra frigate or two. It is entirely reasonable to say that at times it feels like culturally there are two separate forces working for a common employer.

With that in mind other ideas seem to be under consideration as to how to better bring the Corps into the naval family more effectively to help end these divisions and create a better relationship. One idea that appears to be being thought about was leaked to the Sun, which talked about how the RM Officer cadre could be rebadged with RN Officer ranks and rank tabs, leaving aside their previous army ranks.

On paper this sounds a bit of an odd idea – why change something that has worked perfectly well for centuries? In reality it bears more thinking about to understand the reasons why. It would help symbolise that the RM are part of the Naval Service, and it would remind RN Officers that their RM counterparts are not ‘pongos with gucci berets’ but their peers from the same organisation.

There is potentially an interesting argument on the psychology of whether the future RN would be so willing to offer up the Corps for sacrifice if people felt that the rank titles were the same, or if the fact that someone is a Major makes it easier for a Commander to propose a paper scrapping a unit – is the psychological link somehow less powerful?

It would also reinforce the message that the RM Officer Corps was expected to compete for wider naval service appointments in the same way – a Lieutenant Commander is a Lieutenant Commander whether they are a pilot, a submarine engineer or a company commander.

The RM have historically held a very different officers career structure to the RN, with until the mid 1990s Officers being treated as one rank more senior than the rank held (e.g. a Capt RM was seen and regarded as an SO2 for career purposes). This was changed roughly 25 years ago, when reportedly the issue of adopting naval ranks was last considered. This is certainly not the first time this idea has come up, although it seems likely there were strong reasons against it in previous consultations.

Were it to be adopted then it would not make the RM unique – other marine forces around the world wear naval ranks, and use naval rank titles. It would help distinguish the RM away from their Army peers and help reinforce the message that they were different and part of something special. It would also be a good nod to the RN Division from WW1 where sailors fought on the Western Front as soldiers, but using naval rank titles.

A good example of where the adoption of common rank titles works well is the RAF Regiment, which shares the same rank titles as the rest of the RAF force (but wags would suggest its personnel are seen as a separate special entity due to their passing the ‘five miler of death’). This sense of one force has helped protect ‘The Regiment’ from being disbanded, and helped secure its future as a key part of the modern RAF.

The wider picture to consider here is the reaction in some quarters to this idea. On twitter there was a huge amount of herrumphing from some areas, particularly those who served in OP CALLOFDUTY rotations. There was a sense that this was a silly make work idea, not a wider idea to bind the future of the RM into the future Naval Service.

But, it is precisely by generating ideas like this that healthy debate can flourish that can create conditions for positive changes. The Naval Service is a constantly evolving and changing organisation and one that needs to remain relevant to the modern society it serves. Part of this comes by creating conditions where the system is challenged and appropriately questioned to see if it is still fight for purpose, or if change would help make it better.

If you are pushing the RM through this change though it needs to be incredibly carefully handled for fear that poorly conceived implementation could have devastating consequences for Corps morale. What is vital here is that this change happens with the support of the Corps, and is not perceived as being hoisted on them by the wider Navy – such a move could cause divisions and damage that would take decades to heal.

The Royal Marines are fiercely proud of being part of the Naval Service – in some ways (and this is intended as a compliment), they are ‘more jack than jack’. They also feel at times though that this loyalty and support is not always reciprocal and perhaps feel, not taken for granted, but potentially forgotten or left out.

Part of this is perhaps self-fulfilling – by its very nature membership of the club is limited to a select few, and unless you’ve won the Green Lid, you will never understand what it means to be part of the family. For outsiders looking in, this can make the Corps at times seem insular and remote from outsiders. In a Naval Service where the Corps makes up 20% of the headcount, this is not necessarily helpful.

The longer term challenge is to build a new generation of Officers in both the RN and RM who are advocates and champions for what it is the Corps can do for the Navy. This will be increasingly important with the putative move to the Littoral Strike Group concept of operations, and as debates begin over how (and even if we should) replace the LPD, LSD and other amphibious warfare assets owned by the RN.

Realistically decisions will need to be taken in the next 5-10 years to ensure that the current force is replaced in a timely and effective manner. It is essential for the RM to ensure that its voice is heard and that its views, interests and capabilities are fully reflected in the planning and budget debates to come.

This perhaps needs to come with wider changes too – for instance, has the time come to look at collocating RM and RN training, and creating one super site for training all recruits in one location? At a psychological level, the RM and RN do not really meet or work closely together early enough in a career to build longer term bonds of understanding and shared experiences – perhaps by training together at an early stage this will help build the sense of being two groups working in the same organisation?

What we seem to be seeing here is the latest in an ongoing series of changes that will help keep the RM central and vital to how the Naval Service operates for decades to come. But, the road ahead will be challenging, and potentially difficult for people with very strong emotional links to the Corps. It must be handled properly and with sensitivity to ensure that those who wear the Green Lid feel that they are truly a vital and valued part of the Naval Service.