The Joy of Six? Thoughts on the New British Army Divisional Structure

The British Army has announced that, under an internal restructuring, it will be standing up a new Divisional HQ to be responsible for the units that deliver combat support to the armed forces. This new HQ, to be known as ‘6 Division’ will replace the previous ‘Force Troops Command’. Is this a significant announcement though, or is it merely a case of a reshuffling of badges and titles with little significant real change?

In practical terms this move is about reflecting the very different ways that the British Army is expected to operate now and affirming that the nature of operations has changed. The new Order of Battle sees the Army built around three Divisional HQs – 1, 3 and 6, each headed by a 2*.

1 Division heads up the lighter response forces that handle firefighting and defence engagement around the world. The force is intended to train, augment and operate alongside a variety of nations, but is not intended to deploy as an armoured division. It would be realistic to see 1 Div as a unit intended to handle the variety of low intensity, peacekeeping and potentially kinetic roles that the Army has handled for generations.

Training in Africa- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The role of 3 Division is to be the Army’s heavy force, and the one around which most warfighting deployments will be based. This force consists of the traditional heavier units like armour and artillery that are commonly associated with the Army. Its role is essentially to ‘smash the door in’ and operate alongside NATO and allied forces to fight in a conventional war.

The ability to deploy an entire Division able to fight in high intensity conflict was a key goal of the 2015 SDSR, and the Army has invested heavily to meet this challenge. The force provides a useful ability to enable forward deployment and engage in coalition operations against a variety of forces – and the fact that its deputy commander is a US Army Officer is a good reminder that any future deployment will see it integrated as part of a wider US/coalition force.

6 Division by contrast seems intended to cover the multitude of roles that are not warfighting, and which don’t necessarily require large numbers of boots on the ground, but which do require a niche set of skills and experience to bring to bear.

It encompasses a few very specialist skills and roles that don’t comfortably fit into a Divisional Commanders ‘golf bag’ but which can have effect at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. For instance units like 77 Brigade which provides the information exploitation capability, or 1 Military Intelligence Brigade which provides the analytical support to operations.

The reality of future Army operations is that much of what will occur is likely to be in the so-called ‘grey zone’ where an issue arises which may require a uniformed response or involvement, but which is not necessarily a conflict. For example, cyber operations or engaging in information operations against a potential foe who is adept at exploiting the media environment to their own ends .

These operations rarely involve much glory, but do require a lot of niche assets and skills that are in short supply. When operating as a ‘supporting command’ providing units to the main forces, the risk is there is a battle for control over them by commanders keen to exploit these assets for their own purposes.

By creating a Divisional structure to own these assets as an equal partner alongside 1 and 3 Divs, it makes it easier to co-ordinate deployments and ensure scarce assets are properly employed and not tasked in the wrong way.  

Similarly a clearly defined structure like this helps work out who ‘owns’ the response. Much as 1 Div is seen as the lead for some issues, the establishment of 6 Div helps ensure the Army knows who ‘owns’ the response on specific threats. This may sound mildly bureaucratic but is a helpful way of ensuring that the system works as intended.

In practical terms little will change at the coal face for the troops, beyond their now having a badge that resembles a mysteron. But in high level terms this is a good structure to help pin down the future way of Army operations in a really coherent way.

For the first time in some years Commanders can easily show how the Army is structured to cover the full range of operations from highly discrete influence tasks, through to training teams or preparing for high intensity war. It puts what could be perhaps described as the successors to the Chindits and the ‘Funnies’ on a level playing field alongside their peers and shows that these units are seen as equally as important as maintaining heavy armour and artillery.

The Army faces a significant challenge over the next few years as it adapts to becoming a force that has to operate in a very different way to the past. It needs to be ready to fight a heavy war in Europe or elsewhere if required, using skills and roles that while more modern are an evolution of its past history in WW2 and the Cold War.

But at the same time as maintaining heavy forces it needs to be able to cover all manner of ‘thinking operations’ where combat power is less important than discrete presence – for example the ability to put a few defence advisors into a country to help shape how a nations armed forces evolve, or a training team to upskill (or ‘train the trainer’) is equally as important.

A Division at home buys influence in NATO, but a platoon of specialist infantry on the ground in Africa training units in counter poaching work can have equally significant impact on many host governments (for a good example of how effective this work is, a follow of @2PWRRTigers on Twitter is a good way to see how the Army operates effectively in Africa).

Similarly the challenges of operating in the Cyber domain, or in trying to win the battle for influence against Russia – for example during the Novichok incident where dozens of increasingly mad narratives were deployed against the UK – helps serve as a reminder of the vital role played by the Royal Signals and others.

The Army has to ensure that it continues to be able to recruit, train and retain people with the right skills to fill these roles and put them into gainful employment. The curious paradox facing the Army today though is that while it has to train for heavy operations, it is most likely to require people with very niche and specialist skills to conduct operations in a very different way.

The establishment of 6 Div fills a specific goal of providing a home and organisation to support and oversee much of this critical training and specialist work. It makes a clear statement of intent about the seriousness with which the UK takes it, and also makes clear that mentoring, training and information warfare is seen as being as important to UK operations as having a deployable Divisional HQ.

So, overall while this change may appear to be about little more than an internal re-organisation and name change, it actually heralds a significant shift in the approach to the way that the Army will conduct its operations in future. The move to establish 6 Div then is a good and timely move that will help protect these skills and ensure they are used properly and to good effect. By making a clear statement of the critical importance niche units play, and in putting them front and centre in the Army’s ORBAT, it will hopefully ensure that the UK continues to benefit from their skills. This is a small but meaningful change for the better and should be welcomed.