The Value of British Sea Power - the Royal Navy, the Gulf and Maritime Flexibility.

Media outlets are reporting that the Royal Navy is to send a further escort ship (HMS KENT) to the Middle East later in the summer, supported by an RFA tanker. This on paper represents a significant scaling up of the existing RN force in the Gulf, which has already been bolstered by the despatch of HMS DUNCAN last week to the region.

This force increase is coming on the back of the growing tensions between the UK and Iran over the  detention of the tanker MV Grace 1 by the Royal Marines off Gibraltar has led to threats from Iran to seize a UK vessel in retaliation.

Last week HMS MONTROSE was involved in an incident with Iranian forces, robustly ensuring that some small attack craft did not threaten the legitimate passage through the Strait of Hormuz by the tanker MV British Heritage. Following this encounter, it was announced that HMS DUNCAN would also be dispatched to the region too.

The question is whether this further breaking news, yet to be officially confirmed by MOD actually an escalation or does it represent merely business as usual and a demonstration of the inherent flexibility of maritime power?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The Royal Navy presence in the Middle East has been built for the last 10-15 years around three core elements. An MCMV force (usually four hulls strong) which works exceptionally closely with US equivalents and which is usually based in Bahrain with rotating crews and led by a small battlestaff. This force is intended to enhance regional capabilities and provides a good ‘in theatre’ Mine Warfare presence in the event that regional choke points like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab-Al-Mendab were closed due to mines.

One reason for this forward basing is in part due to the slow transit times of minesweepers in a crisis – the RN prefers to sail its vessels to and from the region, and while they may be magnificent vessels, they are also never going to win any speeding tickets. In a crisis, having a forward deployed force will make a critical difference to opening up any blocked waterways quickly, by crews who are used to working in the area.

There is an RN escort usually based in Bahrain, currently HMS MONTROSE, responsible for providing a long term surface escort presence. This is a relatively new development, with the RN having relied for nearly 40 years on sending ships out and returning them home on 6-9 month rotations.

The intention to maintain two hulls in the region is something that has chopped and changed over the years – even as far back as the 1998 SDR some of the force reductions were based on reducing the numbers of vessels in the Gulf.  But until around 2015 the RN aimed to maintain two escorts (usually a 42/45 and a 23) in the region to fill a variety of roles from working with the US Navy and allies, through to UK national duties.

This meant that on any typical day you could see anywhere from 2- 4 hulls ‘east of Suez’ depending on how many ships were being relieved and were either working up or heading home. Since around 2016 the UK presence has been based on one hull permanently in theatre, expanding to two when replacement ships or visitors passed through. For example a couple of years ago HMS PORTLAND spent time in the Gulf while on a much wider global deployment.

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Today the presence is built around a single hull (HMS MONTROSE), but due to her permanent presence in region, plus the removal of the need to shut the ship down for 4 weeks every deployment for the Mid Deployment leave period, arguably there is very good availability of the hull for general duties in the region. This presence is usually augmented by other hulls passing through on deployment on a regular basis as part of their wider operational schedule.

The final component is the RFA presence – for many years this has comprised an RFA ‘BAY’ class landing ship used for general duties and predominantly Mine Warfare support  as well as wider support to the region. The RFA also maintained a tanker and supply ship for many years too – usually a tanker (most commonly either the WAVE or LEAF class) and also a stores ship (FORT class).

The role of the supply vessels was a combination of support to UK interests (eg keep the fleet at sea, provide a fuel, stores and ammunition capability) and also support wider operations by coalition forces. RFA FORT VICTORIA for instance was successfully used as both a command platform, and also host to many drugs busts using her not insubstantial aviation capability.

The RFA presence in the region has been gapped for a couple of years now – presumably down to the combination of the manpower challenges affecting the RFA, plus introduction of new ships (the TIDE class) and also lengthy refits of existing ships (such as FORT VICTORIA).

This presence is supported through the Naval Support Facility Bahrain, which houses a number of workshops, accommodation spaces and also the 1* UK Maritime Component Commanders staff who co-ordinate the work in region.

Is then the news that these additional ships are to deploy realistically a significant escalation or just business as usual? From an RFA perspective the news of a tanker deploying back out to the region is not an escalation, it is merely buying back capability into a region which has been lacking it for some time.

The presence of a tanker will be keenly welcomed by many navies regionally as a means of supporting ongoing maritime operations, particularly in the Indian Ocean and Southern Red Sea where coalition forces are engaged in both counter terrorism, counter narcotics and counter piracy work. An RFA tanker provides a combination of aviation platform, fuel, stores and also a useful deck to do work with to help keep ships at sea, and not having to return to harbour.

The UK’s decision to invest heavily in new RFA tankers is key here, as after a few years with reduced numbers, the UK now possesses one of the worlds most modern and numerous tanker fleets built around the TIDE and WAVE class. The presence of a large capable tanker will be a real force enhancement for both the UK, but also allies. It does not necessarily represent an escalation against Iran, mainly because the sort of work that the tanker is needed for (e.g. RASing) is often for duties outside the Gulf where friendly ports are harder to find.

The presence of more escorts raises the question of if the UK is escalating the situation or not? From a practical perspective having a second hull available is very useful – particularly if one of the escorts needs to go alongside for refit or repairs, or a crew change. At the same time, in the highly unlikely event of things getting significantly out of control, it represents a useful extra hull.

It is perhaps more a timely reminder that no matter how capable the ship may be, it still needs to come alongside occasionally for rest and repair, rather than the sense that the UK is building up some kind of Falklands era Task Force.

As a sense of contrast, the UK has often sent significantly larger forces into the Gulf region in the last 10 years – for example the COUGAR deployment saw a carrier go into the region, while HMS ALBION and BULWARK are regular visitors. In 2016-17 the UK was operating an LPD and LPH in the region, as well as its usual force, and already it is likely that HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH will deploy with her battlegroup into the Gulf in due course in the early 2020s. The Gulf will almost certainly play host to Royal Navy strike carrier battle groups over the coming years as they stand in for US carriers as required.

So, in practical terms what is going on here is very low level, very routine and also a very good reminder of the flexibility of maritime power. In this case we are seeing prudent planning ahead that the UK can, if required, dispatch additional resources to support a situation. But equally, this can be switched off very quickly too if the need disappears.

The beauty of maritime power is that it allows the UK to flex its response, if needs be escalating, but also switching off without ever having put boots on the ground or overflown sovereign territory. This is textbook use of gunboat diplomacy, as HMS KENT can change course or deploy into an entirely new programme of activity at very short notice.

There are those who worry that this deployment indicates stretch on the RN and the sense that ‘a ship can’t be in two places at once’. This concern is understandable, but look at it from a different view – the RN is proving that it is fully able to generate vessels if required to quickly work up to the high standard of readiness needed to ‘go through the ditch’ and enter the Middle East area ready to work in a high intensity situation at very short notice.

Not many navies have the flexibility or resources to be able to quickly switch a vessel off one set of tasks, send them to another and have them ready to potentially ramp up to conduct very challenging operations. While a ship can quickly change locations, having sailors equally capable of changing their mindset and training to operate in a new environment with very real threats, and a support network capable of ensuring they can operate in a sustained way, is something that is a real hallmark of Royal Navy capability.

It is entirely possible that some of these plans will not come to pass, and that the crew of HMS KENT (or whatever platform is assigned) end up on a totally different programme. But what we are seeing here is the Royal Navy doing what it does best – demonstrating global reach (e.g. tasking, retasking and reprogramming ships plans for vessels based across the globe to operate in a high threat environment thousands of miles from the homebase) to prepare for contingency operations and to do so at very short notice. This is a good reminder of the UK’s genuinely superb ability to use seapower effectively.

This is also a good time to reflect on how hard these vessels work on behalf of the nation. A House of Commons question today suggested that between July and June this year, the Type 45s only managed to spend 479 days ‘at sea’.

This is an interesting question as it focuses on all 6 ships, but doesn’t really focus on why this was the case. On paper it looks like the ships don’t do very much – only spending 479 out of 2190 days at sea seems awfully low. But, dig a little deeper and a few things become clear.

Firstly, two of the ships were either in long term reserve or refit (DARING and DAUNTLESS) so had no crew, and no reason or ability to go to sea. That immediately reduces us to four hulls actually sea going.

Of these four hulls, between July last year and June this year, there were a total of 1460 days available for them to be at sea. HMS DEFENDER spent 118 days at sea, but only returned to Portsmouth in August after a refit, after a nearly 2 year long refit. Since then she has been conducting trials, working back up to full capability at the start of the operating cycle and also conducting some escort duties too. It is likely she will deploy in the near future.

HMS DRAGON and DUNCAN have both been deployed across the Middle East and Med, with both vessels working extremely hard on a variety of tasks. Finally HMS DIAMOND was on a major deployment in 2017 (9 months) so had to regenerate and get ready to deploy again, hence she did a two month med tour in late 2018, but has also been used for UK work too.

Its important to realise that many RN ships do not spend their entire lives at sea. In home waters week long training is the norm for ships not on immediate notice to sail or operational tours – sailors at lower readiness need time with their families and a ‘work life balance’ too. Also, sailors just back from 9 month long tours need leave, and they need time to recuperate, train and get the ship ready to deploy again.

The process of having a ship deploy is far more about ensuring that the people are fit, trained and ready to go than it is about ensuring that the ship has an extra CIWS fitted ‘just in case’. To that end when you look at the availability of the four ships, you can see a force that has been worked extremely hard for several years (three of the four has done 7- 9 month deployment in the last two years).

It is also slightly misleading as the statistics count ‘sea days’ which mean the ship actually going to sea. If you look at the time spent in ports on defence engagement visits, operational stand downs and mid deployment leave, then that ship would have been away from home, working hard for the UK, but may have been alongside in a port.

Do not make the mistake of assuming that because a ship isn’t at sea, it isn’t earning its keep for the taxpayer. A great deal of work gets done in ports on deployments, from hosting staff talks and major defence engagement opportunities, through to training local naval personnel or hosting an industry day to showcase UK capability. This is before the rounds of ‘ship open to visitors’ or embassy receptions. In practical terms going into port is actually hard work and the opportunity to let hair down is very limited – while runs ashore happen, its not a constant party from dawn to dusk.

This answer is perhaps a useful reminder that anything can be proven with statistics, but without doubt the RN’s force of Type 45 destroyers is proving itself extremely busy, very heavily utilised and keenly valued by allies around the globe. It is also proof of how much the RN sweats its assets, as each ship is averaging consistently a third of its time at sea, usually on deployment doing busy jobs. This is a utilisation rate that ranks as significantly better than many navies, who use their ships far less, and often in far less active conditions.

The RN works its ships and its people hard, but it also offers the Government of the day significant reach, flexibility and options. This latest news is a timely reminder of the constant value of sea power and the value of having a world class navy at the disposal of the Government of the day.