Tanker Wars - Analysis of The Seizure of MV Grace 1

On Thursday 4 July Royal Marines from 42 Commando seized a supertanker off the coast of Gibraltar, suspected of smuggling oil on behalf of the Iranian regime. This has led to an increase in threats to UK shipping in the Middle East as a result.

This operation is notable for several reasons. Firstly, the use of 42 Cdo personnel provides an excellent demonstration of the value in refocusing part of the Corps towards the maritime security role.

In 2017 the RM underwent a significant change, losing around 200 posts and refocusing their efforts away from being a light role infantry force that was in danger of losing its distinctly naval identity, to one far more closely linked into the future of the Royal Navy.

These changes included a deep look at the value of the amphibious shipping force, for example did the UK still need to retain the two LPD’s ALBION and BULWARK to conduct amphibious landings, or was the future far more about small discrete commando raids, rather than trying to re-enact D-Day on a smaller scale?

Other changes have included trying to make the Corps inherently more linked into the maritime domain in a manner that has perhaps slipped for some time. During the TELIC and HERRICK years the role of the Corps seemed to be to provide an elite light infantry Brigade to generate forces to go to Afghanistan or Iraq, and not necessarily to go to sea to conduct amphibious operations.

There was perhaps a growing sense not only of disconnect between the RM and the wider Naval Service, but also a sense that the Navy was perhaps paying to fund a fundamentally land based organisation that although very good, did not seem to be particularly distinguishable from its Army equivalents in terms of capability.

To help protect the RM and ensure their long-term future, some difficult decisions were taken to put the force back towards a predominantly naval future. This has included getting the RM to spend a lot more time at sea, often in smaller detachments, to help rebuild the ethos of the Corps being naval based light infantry.

Similarly, rather than just providing 3 light role infantry battalions and supporting arms, the decision was taken to increase their specialisation to provide highly niche skills and capabilities that were of wider value to defence.

One of the first decisions made was to refocus 42 Cdo as the maritime security unit, delivering a range of discrete tasks to ensure the UK could support operations such as boarding of ships, providing maritime force protection teams and also joint personnel recovery. This refocusing, although controversial in the media at the time as it was linked to wider cuts to the overall Corps headcount, has made the unit an invaluable asset to MOD planners.

Boarding ships underway at sea is an extremely risky operation that requires a lot of skill and practise. It is not something you can just improvise on the day, and there are potentially very significant risks attached. Traditionally this sort of role sat far more in the Special Forces arena. The use of 42 Cdo helps validate the concept of the maritime operations role, and also eases the pressure on the wider SF community by providing assets which can take on this sort of task.

A key takeaway from the operation is the fact that the UK has successfully demonstrated its ability to mount, at distance and in short order, a successful ship seizure at a time and place of its choosing. It also points to the effectiveness of information sharing between allies and co-operation agreements, ensuring that the UK was able to work with partners to conduct an operation that was legal, and in keeping with our wider obligations. Again, this sort of information sharing isn’t something that happens quickly, or easily, and is an ongoing reminder of our ability to work very closely with allies.

Another key reminder is the continued critical importance of Gibraltar as a strategic asset for the UK. The presence of a naval base and runway plus support facilities helps ensure that ‘The Rock’ is one of the most important operational facilities in use by the UK today.

This operation could not have occurred without support from the team in British Forces Gibraltar, and it is a good reminder of the value of maintaining outstations in places like this to help facilitate operations in a hurry. It is also a helpful reminder of the legal importance of being able to make use of its territorial waters in the region to conduct operations like this too. This incident is yet another example of the value of Gibraltar and its facilities to the UK.

HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH visiting Gibraltar

- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

More widely the incident has drawn a strong response from Iran who are threatening to seize a UK flagged tanker in retaliation. The potential for misunderstanding is high – on Sat 6 July reports suggested a UK tanker (Pacific Voyager) had been seized, only for it to become clear that it was merely was merely drifting due to running early on its schedule.

The response to this incident though highlighted the ongoing value of the considerable Royal Navy presence in the Middle East region, able to provide support to UK entitled vessels if required.

For the Merchant Navy perhaps the most useful capability provided locally is the ‘UK Maritime Trade Operations’ team in Dubai. This small team, derived from volunteers in the Royal Naval Reserve provide timely and accurate liaison advice to merchant ships operating in the Gulf region, advising on risks and threats.

This capability has been in place for many years, and even featured in Hollywood movies (Captain Phillips) as a means of informing mariners about the region. Hugely valued by the shipping industry, this small low-cost operation relies on the skills and personnel of the RNR to maintain an effective link between the Royal and Merchant Navies. An example of the sort of  reporting they produce can be found HERE.

More widely the RN presence in the region includes a permanently based escort (HMS MONTROSE), who is base ported in Bahrain, and several MCMVs and RFA’s. This force is able if required to support UK interests in the region, including escorting UK entitled shipping if needed, or if required dispatching additional force protection teams too.

This escort role was last carried out in 2017 against the threat from Houthi milita armed with Iranian provided anti-ship missiles in the Southern Red Sea. Over 800,000 tonnes of UK entitled shipping was escorted by HMS DARING. If required, then a similar escort mission today, particularly in somewhere like the Straits of Hormuz could provide helpful support to prevent a foolish strategic miscalculation by an overeager local unit commander.

More widely the UK also benefits from significant international co-operation in the region. As a leading member of the ‘Combined Maritime Forces’ HQ based in Bahrain (for which the RN provides the permanent deputy 1* role), the UK can tap into the coalition efforts of several international Task Forces which play a key role in supporting maritime security.

In the unlikely event of further escalation, then the UK is well placed to draw on these international assets and command structures to help provide additional resources to provide an escort to ships if needed. One of the many benefits of working as a leading player in an international alliance is the leverage and ability to draw on friends to assist you if needs be.

This is a good reminder that the RN plays a leading role in Middle Eastern maritime security, and has done so for decades. Not just in the physical presence of ships, but also in plugging in key staff to international operations, or as working as part of the US 5^th Fleet.

The presence of a Type 23 in theatre on a permanent basis now helps serve as a wider affirmation of the importance of this forward basing policy. It is easy to forget just how large the region covered by the UK Maritime Component Commander (UKMCC) – the 1* permanent RN officer in region – is, and how long it can take to sail between areas.

Having on call access to a frigate on an enduring basis, and not constrained by programmes and the need to return her home or get the replacement out in the same time frame makes a significant difference to availability, and in sending a message to others about the UK’s continued commitment to the security of the Gulf region.  When combined with the other UK defence assets across the Middle East, such as the facilities in Oman or the growing level of air and land exercises, then it is clear that the UK remains one of the leading military powers in the region.

Overall though this incident has helped remind us of the ongoing transformation going on in the Naval Service and its route to a new look approach to operations. By highlighting the importance of our permanent joint operating bases overseas, the value of the changes made to the Royal Marines to make them of continued relevance, and the value of permanently based warships and the ‘whole force’ of RN, RM and the Reserves all adding different contributions, we can get a glimpse of how significantly things have changed.

This is just part of a wider change process that is going to revolutionise how the Naval Service does business, with the next exciting step change being the re-generation of the Strike Carrier force, and the potential acquisition of the Littoral Strike Ship which will provide a home to the Royal Marines to operate globally in support of key operations.

This incident is a timely reminder of the UK’s global reach and willingness to uphold and enforce international law. It is also good to remember that so much of this impact comes down to individuals though, from the reservist taking time out on their career to mobilise to work in the Middle East to liaise with the Merchant Navy, to the courage asked of every Royal Marine who willingly went into the unknown to board the MV Grace 1. Regardless of the technology, this comes down to people, and this incident was a good reminder that ‘the Team works’.