Flooding the Airwaves - Thoughts on the HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH leak
The Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH has
returned to her home port in Portsmouth ahead of schedule, following reports of
a leak onboard. The MOD has confirmed that a minor leak occurred, while the
media is reporting that 200 tonnes of water escaped onto the ship, flooding compartments
and causing bulkheads and decks to buckle. How serious is this issue, and is
there cause for concern?
Modern warships are built to go to sea in order to fight in
extremely stretching and challenging conditions. Royal Navy warships are built
in order to operate across the full spectrum of operations and in a vast variety
of conditions. In other words, they are intended to be highly survivable and able
to absorb and contain significant damage and flooding.
There is a multitude of systems and pipes on a warship – you
only have to look around to see all manner of pipework for different purposes
from firefighting mains through to cable runs or air conditioning pipework. It
is an austere, busy and complex environment, where the main focus is on easy
access to essential systems to ensure they can be easily fixed or bypassed in a
crisis.
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Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
Warships are high maintenance assets, requiring extensive
round the clock care and support to keep them safe and functioning properly. In
many ways a warship is a like a newborn baby – it keeps people awake at all times
to look after it, it is prone to unexpected leaks and if the sewage system
fails rather spectacular poonamis, and if things go particularly wrong in bad
weather there can be outbreaks of projectile vomit.
The reality is that sometimes things go wrong onboard –
sometimes through human error, other times through a bizarre combination of
events combining to form a freak accident. When this happens fires, floods and
other events happen which can test the ships company and put them under significant
pressure to respond.
There is not a single navy in the world that hasn’t operated
a ship that has had a flood on board. It is an inevitable part of being a naval
power – you need to expect that things can, and will happen – usually at the
most inconvenient moment possible.
In this case it appears that, for reasons yet to be determined
or publicly announced, a small leak occurred onboard the QE, (reportedly due to
a high pressure salt water pipe bursting) which in turn led to flooding in a
stairwell, reportedly allowing 200 tonnes of water to go where it wasn’t
supposed to be.
Firstly, how much water is 200 tonnes? It certainly sounds a
lot, but is it? In fact, in terms of flooding 200 tonnes is not very much water
at all – it is roughly 0.3% of the total displacement of the vessel. In terms
of scale, it is the equivalent of about 10% of an Olympic swimming pool – or something
that is easily within the scope of a modern warships damage control capability
to pump out and absorb.
In wider context, HMS ENDURANCE took on about 2000 tonnes of
water when she had her incident in the South Atlantic in 2008 (for a great account
of this event this
Wavell Room article is good reading), and yet she remained afloat and was
saved (but never sailed again). So, in terms of the vessel at hand, the total
amount of flooding onboard was tiny and although doubtless unsettling to experience
if you were involved in it, never placed the ship at any risk of sinking.
The Royal Navy takes damage control very seriously indeed,
and trains regularly for handling this sort of incident. All personnel are trained
in how to repair a flood in what is known as the ‘DRIU’ (essentially a
fairground ride that swings from side to side and fills with water while you try
to stop the flooding).
These skills are regularly tested and exercised onboard all
RN vessels along with other emergency drills such as how to put fires out. The
RN learned lessons the hard way in the Falklands about needing timber to shore
up bulkheads and stop leaks, and many ships now look like they have their own
timber merchants business on the side, full of all manner of equipment to stop
the leak, plug the gap and drain the compartment out.
This is topped off by the experience of going through Flag Officer
Sea Trainings (FOST) organisation in Devonport, where the RN trains hard to
remember and practise the skills of damage control. The event onboard was well
within the ability of the crews skills and training to handle.
So, if it was minor, why come alongside early? From a practical
perspective it seems likely that if the ship was near her home port and approaching
the end of the work up period, then there was sufficient flexibility to return home
and affect the minor repairs necessary to ensure she is ready for her next deployment.
Despite the best efforts at dramatization in the media, she did not ‘limp into
port’ and it is very much a case of business as usual.
There will be some who may ask whether the RN has somehow
failed in this case – having to put a ship alongside early to fix this issue.
In reality were the ship deployed, or on operations then it is highly unlikely
that they would have gone into harbour. She is a ship intended to fight and survive
taking damage, so in an operational environment the ship would have continued
to operate. But, when you are near to home and not operationally deployed, why
not return home, address the issue and carry on as planned in due course?
There will be others who think that the RN has somehow
failed here in having this experience and that this sort of thing doesn’t happen
to other navies. The internet is full of tactical geniuses and armchair
admirals who assume that this could only happen to the UK. In reality, leaks
and accidents onboard ships are remarkably common.
In the last few years the US Navy has sadly experienced
several incidents involving collisions where damage has occurred and sailors
have been lost. Only last week the Russian Navy experienced a major accident onboard one of its
submarines (and over the years has a long history of accidents and losses at
sea), while last year the Norwegian Navy lost a frigate due to a grounding.
Operating at sea is inherently difficult and occasionally dangerous
and sometimes things go wrong. What is essential is that people recognise that
this does not mean that the ship, or the Royal Navy, are failures. There will
doubtless be a robust investigation into the incident, which will ensure
lessons are identified and, if necessary changes made to prevent it happening
again. A good example of such an investigation is available online – the report
of the Board
of Inquiry into the HMS NOTTINGHAM grounding.
It is a shame that this has happened now as it perhaps distracts
attention away from the significant success that the ship has had recently. For
several weeks she has been working up off the South Coast, embarking a variety
of helicopter types to continue trials and ensure that the ships is able to
embark a wide range of UK military helicopters.
For instance the British Army has embarked Apache, successfully
completing trials to see this lethal attack helicopter embark onboard as part
of the air group. Likewise the RAF have once again embarked Chinook helicopters,
which look like ants on the enormous flight deck. Finally the RN has been
flying Merlin helos too off the ship.
This matters for two reasons – firstly, it’s a really good
reminder that the UK excels at doing joint helicopter and aviation operations. Many
nations would really struggle to embark, let alone operate aircraft from
another service on one of their warships. Here, the UK is happily embarking RN,
RAF and Army helicopters and happily operating all of them as part of a single
airgroup off one carrier. This is a level of jointery that makes a massive operational
difference, and which few other nations (if any) can effectively emulate.
Additionally this is a good chance to test the concept of
the tailored air group. While the internet is still full of extremely boring
people whinging about ‘carriers with no planes’, the reality is QE will deploy
with a mixed airwing of aircraft and helicopters to deliver a wide range of
effects.
It may upset some, but she is highly unlikely to deploy as a
classic ‘strike’ carrier with just jets embarked. Rather her career will be
spent with some jets, some attack helicopters, some ASW and some transport helicopters
embarked on one platform as a fabulous operating asset. Helping build familiarity
with the ship, ensure the plans and routines to operate and support all these
aircraft type makes sense and is safe and also get the crew able to cope with
this is a vital part of generating the carrier for operations.
The next step, which will happen over the summer is the trip
to the West Atlantic to embark additional F35s to help expand on the trials and
ensure the ship is able to handle embarked fixed and rotary wing aircraft ahead
of her maiden deployment.
This may seem a slow pace to some, but it’s a complicated business,
and not one that you can skimp or cut corners on. Getting it right and ensuring
that the ship is able to do this, or identifying how you need to change things
to do this, is central to ensuring 50 years of carrier capability with these
vessels. Take it slow, and get it right – don’t rush it and screw up.
The final observation to make is that this incident perhaps
shows how much the world is changing, and the ability to have time to comment
on events has reduced. As noted, the RN has a long history of ships having
floods and fires onboard and dealing with the situation. For example in the 1980s
HMS ILLUSTRIOUS experienced a very serious gearbox fire that nearly caused the
cancellation of a global deployment.
The difference now is the speed and ability of people to
report and note what is going on. An event at sea 30 years ago would take time
to filter ashore, and even if the crew went ashore too, then it would be days before
scuttlebutt started to filter out. Today it is possible to instantly know what
is going on and begin speculating about the problem.
In the case of the QE, there is such significant interest in
her and her movements that any return to harbour is noted, and she is constantly
having photos of her uploaded online. This can cause a very strong sense of demand
for news, and for rumours to take hold quickly.
In this febrile atmosphere, it is worth noting that Royal
Navy media team did its usual excellent job of communicating quickly what had
happened and putting to bed speculation and rumours. This helped calm
speculation, which was rife in some quarters about the situation. To those who
want news on the ship, the best thing to do is follow the MOD and RN webpages
and news sites, as they provide the best possible official news sources and
updates.
More widely, if you want timely updates on the vessel and
her movements, with authoritative comment, then the Facebook page run by David
Simpson (called ‘Queen Elizabeth Aircraft Carrier Class & Airpower) is an
exceptional source of trusted objective news and updates and well worth
following to keep informed. Also well worth a follow for trusted updates would be
the ‘Save the Royal Navy’ website
and the UK
Defence Journal – all of which provide good updates by volunteers on the
carrier and her situation.
There will always be interest in the QE and her activity,
and it is right to be open and honest when something happens. Not all nations
are as willing to be open about their naval challenges, which can perhaps
create a misleading perception at times. But it is important to keep these
things in context and remember that the ship is remarkably capable, has an
outstanding future ahead of her and helps herald the bright future that lies ahead
for the modern Royal Navy over the next few years.
One for the experts, if, as reported, the source of the leak was a salt water pipe why was the pipe able to discharge 200 tonnes of water before it was stopped? Are there not automatic sensors and controls which would detect that there's tonnes of water not where we expect it to be, so stop sending more?
ReplyDeleteApart from that, I think this highlights the danger of building up a warship's profile too high. Yes, QE is an important ship, but it soon won't be the only aircraft carrier in the RN and it certainly isn't the only ship in service capable of operating a variety of aircraft. Maybe it's time to tone down the hype, so these minor problems don't get blown out of proportion.
Only guessing, but it was probably the HP sewater main, which is for fire fighting (and would be used for counterflooding). It's designed to put out a lot of water very quickly. Yes, sections of the HPSW main can be isolated, but it can't be done instantaneoulsy. The sensors for the most part are sailors. There are flood alarms, but it is impracticable to put them everywhere. IMHO it sounds as though QNLZ had a fault, and it was dealt with expeditiously.
DeleteThanks for the reply. When I was reading the post from Sir H it did feel like this could be an example of where the desire to lean man ships hit the historical design assumptions of warships - there was an assumption from the systems designers that if, for example, a pipe burst someone would notice it and call it out before too much damage was done, but if you have a vast ship with a small crew maybe you need to look at alternative means to make sure things are where they are meant to be.
DeleteIt's fairly sad that the nation's principle broadcaster always seems hot off the press when there's a problem, but you have to rely on the local rags to get regular and balanced feedback. However, with the acknowledged speed with which such 'sensations' can be promulgated, the RN (and other services no doubt) still need to get on top of the story first i.e. within the time it takes to sail back to port, by reporting the facts quickly, accurately & in a context. When the beeb splashed this story, I for one assumed it was going to be the shaft gland again; and even the subsequent details over buckling & injury caused by 200 cu mtrs of water deserves more than a vague 'minor' comment for general public consumption in my view.
ReplyDeleteYours,
Gavin Gordon
Buckling of bulkheads due 200 tons of seawater suggests need for detailed design and structural review
ReplyDelete