Turbulent Times - Brief Thoughts on the Gulf Security Situation

Events in the Gulf are continuing to pose a real challenge to regional and international security. In recent weeks the intentional sabotage of merchant vessels near an Emirati port, the explosions on oil tankers at sea in the Gulf, seemingly conducted by Iranian forces, and finally the recent shooting down of an unmanned US drone have all led to a deterioration in the security situation.

This is an extremely complex, fast moving and challenging situation without a clearly identifiable end state or ‘off ramp’ immediately at hand. While the hope must remain that events calm down, and that wider conflict is averted, it remains a challenging time. Already there seem to a number of wider lessons and implications that are worth considering.

HMS DARING on operations in the BAM- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

Firstly, these events help remind us that for many years now Iran has essentially been engaged in a proxy war against both the West and its Middle Eastern allies. Across Iraq, into Syria and now in Yemen, there is clear evidence of the Iranian provision of munitions and force, and potentially manpower to help further their own interests, in direct contravention to the Wests. It is clear that the Iranians are willing to use force by proxy against us, and continue to support movements which pose a clear threat to Western interests.

When considering the use of force, we often think of the move to all out conventional warfare, but in reality it is more complex than this. The Iranians are clearly able to exploit unconventional movements and rebel organisations to help undermine those whom they perceive as a threat – for instance provision of IED’s to Shia militias to use against UK and US forces in Iraq, or advanced missiles to  the Houthi to use in Yemen.

What we are now witnessing is another escalation in this proxy war, which is becoming increasingly risky to wider international stability. The challenge though is what can be done about it – Iran seems to have found the ‘sweet spot’ where it can use force to further its own interests in a manner which does not cross the threshold for a widespread military response, and where the West and Middle Eastern allies do not (yet) want to go to war over the issue.

From a policy perspective the challenge is to find a path which encourages Iran to exercise restraint from use of force, and also helps de-escalate the situation, while also sending a clear message that such acts will not be tolerated. This is an extremely delicate and complex path which is not easily fixed by retaliatory punitive airstrikes or cruise missile offensives.

It is also a good reminder of the importance of geography and choke points, and the dependency of the global economy on a fairly small number of maritime straits, the closure of which could have an enormous impact on the wider economy.

The potential risk to shipping in both the Southern Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz in the event of wider conflict escalation is not inconsiderable. Within the last 3 years HMS DARING was responsible for escorting UK entitled shipping through the Bab-Al-Mendab straits, with the ship repeatedly closed up at action stations and ready for incoming attack by anti-ship cruise missiles. For this work, the Ships Company was, rightly, awarded a medal.

The challenge for the West is that Iran is far more able to exploit geography in its favour, putting pressure on the Straits of Hormuz, and more widely the Southern Red Sea through the use of proxies, mines and Anti Ship Cruise Missiles. The Iranian economy, buffeted by sanctions is less likely to be directly impacted in the short term by any closure than the Wests, and it would have the added benefit of hurting other Middle Eastern economies too.

In the event that the ongoing situation deteriorates but remains short of conventional war, then this poses a significant challenge for Western navies, who will need to find escorts to support shipping in the region.

It is likely that the West would need to provide additional ships, both conventional escorts and MCMVs to support operations in the region. The question is whether the Iranians would be willing to escalate further and target manned warships (unlikely) or unmanned surface vessels (e.g. MCMV related capabilities) in order to disrupt their work.

The loss, accidental or otherwise, of a major merchant ship to an Iranian attack would potentially have grave consequences on the global economy, and in the worst instance, could lead to a major recalibration of shipping routes as vessels went round South Africa instead.

This is a valuable reminder of the importance of land geography as an offensive maritime weapon – Iran can use terrain to its advantage to shape the wider campaign at sea, making life difficult for merchant ships, and forcing warships into highly constrained waters where their inherent survivability through mobility is reduced by having to remain in close company of other ships in tight waters.

Beyond the world of proxy fighting, we have also been reminded of the importance of the internet and information operations as a key way to engage in proxy conflict. For the West, trying to pin the blame on Iran has been built around an effective messaging campaign in the media, using film footage and other messages to shape public opinion.

In a world of instant communications, the ability to get a timely message out there to ‘win’ the minds is key. Communicators need to keep pushing a coherent credible message and be absolutely sure of their position and facts. Already there is a challenge in beating public cynicism associated with the ‘dodgy dossier’ and trying to convince the world that Iran is behind this, even when the evidence is overwhelming.

Of equal importance is the continued use of information operations to shape how messages land across the region. The internet has paradoxically made the world more open, and more cynical than ever when provided with overwhelming amounts of information to digest. Convincing people of Iranian complicity, and providing objective and truthful information on what actually happened is vital here.

While messaging and IO may be less high profile than discussing how many CIWS an armoured division should be fitted with on the internet, it is arguably one of the most important capabilities in the UK and wider Wests arsenal. Spreading the message and the truth convincingly, against cynical audiences is key here.

Underpinning this is a reminder of the importance of credible intelligence analysis and the importance of sharing information. When handling this sort of issue, such as identifying the sources of the limpet mines, having a competent and capable analytical community able to identify the film footage and provide analysis of it is vital. For both the UK and US, investment in good intelligence analysis capabilities and training is key here – having staff with the knowledge and competence to confidently predict what a tactical level issue, which could have strategic ramifications is, is vital.

The shootdown of a highly expensive US asset (over $131m per airframe according to some sources) is a timely reminder that truly capable cutting-edge unmanned airframes are rarely that much cheaper than manned airframes. Determining an appropriate response is going to be a challenge, and another key emerging issue is the challenge of defining the threshold for retaliation for violence against drones.

While the US initially prepared a strike against certain Iranian installations, they did not proceed with it – reportedly due to concerns by President Trump that over 150 lives may be lost. The question of whether a drone is worth the taking of human life and escalation of a proxy war is intriguing because in cancelling the strikes, the US has potentially shown that, at present, it places more value on human life than it does unmanned aircraft.

For foes of the US, the defining of this position is helpful in letting them determine their own policy positions on what to do in the event of future operations near their own airspace. By understanding where the US response may be more constrained, it makes it easier for other nations to understand the limits of their own operations. It is likely many other countries with capable anti-air defences will watch the US response with interest and think very carefully about the implications of this.

Much like determining how to respond to a cyber-attack with physical violence is challenging, deciding how to respond to the shooting down of an unmanned aircraft is likely to pose similar questions. Is it worth escalating a tense situation to avenge the loss of a capable asset, even if nothing other than national pride (and a very expensive ISTAR platform) has been lost?

Determining the off ramp, while still preventing the loss of face and handing of a significant propaganda victory to Iran is going to be a complex balancing act here – it remains to be seen what will be done, and what the longer term implications are for deterrence policy as a result.

This remains a complex and fast moving situation, and more events will surely follow. But, for now, it is worth trying to capture some of the bigger issues as it moves along, and in time consider the lessons and impacts more broadly. Whatever else happens, the hope must be that this ends peacefully and not with an escalation into an ever more challenging proxy war, where the new threshold of gradually accepted use of low level violence suddenly leads to an accidental escalation of something significantly more widespread by accident.