Most Magnificent Minor Warships - The Royal Navy and Coastal Operations

The phrase ‘Coastal Forces’ brings to mind gunboats charging across the Channel in WW2, engaged in brutal combat with enemy forces at near point-blank range, and conducting highly dangerous missions in hostile territory. It evokes a mindset of small ships, working in a co-ordinated fashion to enter difficult waters and bring the fight to the enemy.

The role of Coastal Forces was to attack enemy forces and convoys or insert small patrols of troops and agents into hostile territory. It was also, where possible to launch assaults against larger targets of opportunity as well. The Royal Navy formally disbanded its Coastal Forces assets in the 1950s, recognising that the nature of the fight had changed. But to this day it continues to operate a reasonable number of patrol craft whose missions carry the legacy of this force.

This force is primarily made up of some 16 ARCHER class ‘Coastal Training Craft’ (or sometimes known as the P2000s) is the modern day successors. Each vessel is a commissioned RN warship, but in the eyes of some, these smaller craft do not count as ‘proper’ warships.

P2000 on manouveres- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

This was illustrated recently when it was announced that several of the ships participating in the BALTIC PROTECTOR deployment, a key deployment for 2019 involving multiple RN ships, aircraft and Royal Marines were seven P2000s. This is a follow on to 2018, when seven P2000s conducted a similar exercise. 

Cue a lot of comments, mainly negative, that somehow a P2000 wasn’t a ‘proper warship’.Part of this attitude probably stems from the mindset that the primary role of these vessels for many years was to train the RNR and University Students from the URNU and give them basic sea experience.

A simple design at heart, the P2000 was designed to operate in coastal waters, in relatively benign sea states and conduct navigation and other seamanship training. This made them ideal for use with students as training platforms to conduct deployments around the UK and Europe.

While working with URNU students still forms a reasonable part of their employment, the force (administered under the First Patrol Boat Squadron – PBS1) is far more widely tasked than some may think. Over the years it has seen its vessels assigned to a variety of roles, from the soft power (e.g. conducting port visits into small ports that no other RN ship could reach), to providing a patrol capability in UK sovereign waters (e.g. off Cyprus as part of the short-lived ‘RN Cyprus Squadron’) and also providing visible deterrence to potential hostiles – for example two vessels are used to support movements of SSBN’s on the Clyde. They have also been used as ‘exercise purposes only’ Fast Attack Craft to support multi-national exercises.

The deployment into the Baltic is an excellent example of the flexibility of the ships in a variety of roles. The vessels will offer the RN staff a variety of options for employment. For example, they will be able to go into smaller ports that would not usually see an RN vessel, helping deliver valuable defence engagement, reinforcing messages to allied nations of British support and helping represent the UK. These visits may be low key but generate goodwill and help reinforce wider work by local Embassies to further British interests. To have seven P2000s available to offer up for port visits over this period will be a fantastic asset for the UK.

As the deployment is likely to include some students from various URNUS, it also provides an excellent opportunity to train and influence the next generation of potential recruits and industry figures. The URNU system is a low-cost way to help flag up the work of the Royal Navy to new generations who may not be familiar with it, and also give them skills and confidence to succeed in life.

Giving someone the chance to spend their summer sailing across the Baltic, while working as part of the Royal Navy is a great way to help positively shape wider images and messaging of the work the RN is getting up that will last a lifetime. To this day Humphrey can recall his own URNU days, including deployments abroad and taking part in exercises with the wider RN too.

This may sound a bit ‘fluffy’ but in an age of growing sea blindness, and a constant battle to attract good talent, the URNU is a good opportunity to help the RN shape how the next generation of decision makers view it.

More widely the vessels will provide good command opportunities to young officers. In previous decades the plethora of OPVs and MCMVs (such as the near ubiquitous TON and RIVER class vessels) provided good chances for an early ‘drive’ by younger officers. Today the earliest point most officers would get to command is of an MCMV, when they will usually be a reasonably experienced Lieutenant Commander.

The P2000s provide a great feeder pool to give young Lieutenants an opportunity to command a proper warship early in their career and give them the ability to understand the responsibilities that comes with this. It may be a small command, but each vessel is still run on the same lines as any other RN ship, and a young CO taking an URNU deployment may find themselves representing the UK in all manner of challenging situations.

More widely, P2000s (and in Gibraltar the similar SCIMITAR class) provide a chance to conduct difficult operations in both the Clyde and Gibraltarian national waters. Deploying armed vessels into situations that, if not handled appropriately, could quickly escalate is an excellent training opportunity for a younger Officer. This can pay longer term dividends, as many of the more senior RN Officers still serving today have gone on post P2000 Command to excel in a variety of other posts and Commands.

Beyond the clear soft power and personnel training value, the P2000 provides genuine flexibility in the Baltic to take part in a variety of exercises where it can simulate Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC), a constant threat in many operational environments. The ability to operate in very shallow waters, and to lurk where larger ships cannot go poses a variety of interesting operational challenges for any Task Force commander, who will need to think carefully about how to negate this threat.

The Baltic is in many ways the perfect operating environment for the P2000. As anyone who has been to sea on one can attest, they are lively in even mild weather, and positively hideous in anything other than calm conditions. They do not operate comfortably in deeper waters, and while transits such as down to Spain, or across the North Sea to Norway are possible, they are also potentially quite choppy – which impacts on crew effectiveness. The relatively calm sheltered waters of the Baltic coupled with plenty of ports to spend the night make it a great place to work at peak effectiveness.  

It is in this environment that the P2000 can work as an asset to skulk in island archipelagos, simulating an SSM carrying FAC, it can prove itself an elusive target to sneak out and disrupt coastal convoys. Alternatively it can be used to discretely insert small patrols onto hostile shores for wider operational effect. In other words, the Baltic is an environment that enables the P2000 force to fully live up to its legacy as the worthy successor of the WW2 Coastal Forces organisation.

This does not mean that the P2000 is a vessel capable of standing up to an enemy and engaging in a straight-out fight. It is an inherently small vessel which can only ship a very limited range of weapons, and which would be a relatively easy picking for a larger vessel that happened upon it in wartime. Does this mean that they are not warships though?

In reality over 99% of a warships life is not spent fighting the enemy. The P2000 class are a very good example of providing a small, cheap and robust capability that meets the requirements of the RN without proving too expensive to operate or maintain, while still providing considerable flexibility to operational commanders. The challenging spot is trying to explain to people that, for the RN at least, there is no real requirement for an uparmoured slightly larger class of ship to fill the ‘FIAC’ role.

All too often on ‘fantasy fleet’ threads people will suggest that what the RN really needs is a mid-point vessel that is a fast attack craft or small corvette with anti-ship missiles and a medium calibre gun (e.g. 76mm) to do patrol tasks. Frankly, Humphrey cannot think of a less suitable platform for the RN, nor an easier way to waste public money for no good purpose.

The challenge with FIACs is that in certain circumstances, they have the potential to be extremely useful. But these circumstances are relatively limited and rely heavily on local conditions. For example, in the Adriatic or Scandinavian countries, with long coastlines and plenty of inlets, a FIAC force (particularly during the Cold War) was a sensible investment, as it provided a force of ships that could use the local terrain to hide, and attack enemy forces when necessary. This was underpinned by a lot of construction of underground facilities to house them in, or investment in coastal defences and minefields to provide a properly layered defence that would give any attacker a bloody nose. Any effort by the Soviet Baltic Fleet to break out into the North Sea, or conduct amphibious attacks would have been threatened by the existence of massed FIACs with anti-ship missiles.

But, the FIAC also has a lot of weaknesses too. Endurance is usually limited, and they would struggle to stay at sea for any great length of time (e.g. it is rare to see P2000s at sea overnight). The habitability beyond a few days is debatable, and in wartime their survivability in open waters against a credible foe is questionable. In recent campaigns, where FIAC have put to sea in the open waters against an enemy with air superiority, they have usually been destroyed.

These ships are too small to receive the full range of combat systems, electronic warfare suites and other items which could aid survivability, but which also come at a considerable price. This results in a vessel which is essentially considered to be disposable in wartime, but which in peacetime is fairly constrained in how it can operate by the weather.

While a FIAC is a good solution for some countries, for the RN it would not be remotely ideal. Practically, UK territorial waters are rarely the benign conditions that are optimal for FIAC operations – rather they are difficult and deeply unpleasant. Going to sea would be difficult, let alone being able to fight the ship.

The endurance is another challenge – these ships are too small to do anything long term at sea, which leads to a requirement for good shore support solution. In UK waters, it is hard to see what operational value they would add compared to the existing highly capable mixture of P2000s/MCMVs and OPVs, or what threat specifically requires their presence.

Were they to be deployed overseas, they would require significant shore support, including ammunition facilities, crew accommodation and maintenance facilities – essentially a similar set up to what is seen in Gibraltar or Bahrain. Finding a nation willing to host an RN FIAC force, and that is prepared to provide the UK with the ability to build a base to support this is going to be a challenge, as is finding a reason or part of the world for them to operate in that existing RN ships cannot already work in.

Finally from a personnel perspective, a FIAC force would require significant increases in maintainers and operators for whichever anti-ship missile was mounted. Not only would this in the medium term have a long term impact in wider fleet manning (e.g. a ship mounting 8 Anti-Ship Missiles is going to need the same maintenance and support for the weapon whether it is a FIAC or a Frigate). Regardless of how easy it is to type a proposal that the RN should buy a class of 8 FIAC, it would take years to generate sufficient extra bodies with the right training to deliver this, assuming a manpower uplift was approved, or the RN would need to gap posts in other ships to deliver it. Manpower does not just appear out of nowhere.

RN SCIMITAR Class

The reality then is that procuring some kind of ‘mid range’ FIAC for the RN armed with a gun and anti-ship missiles is that it is an answer in search of a problem. When you look at the work the RN does, it is practically impossible to find a credible role for such a vessel that is not already being done equally as well by other RN platforms or allies.

The beauty of the P2000 is that it is cheap to operate and simple to maintain. It is a flexible training platform that is not intended to go up in armed combat against a Russian warship, but which can provide a very valuable source of training and experience, and help prepare the fleet and allies against this threat.

Sometimes keeping something simple is more important than people realise. A ship that doesn’t need many people to take it to sea, which can visit small ports and which is reliable and easy to maintain is an extremely useful asset to have available. The RN does not need a vessels like FIACs that are too cheap to be survivable but too expensive to be expendable. The current structure seems to work remarkably well for the RN and the specific operational challenges it faces. While FIAC may work well for other nations, that does not mean the RN needs them too.

So, instead of looking at the RN P2000 as some kind of ‘wannabe’ warship and dismissing its presence out of hand, perhaps pause and reflect on the work that these small ships are being asked to do. Capable for their intended role, deployable to support NATO Allies and able to provide invaluable training and exercise support, they are in every sense a valuable and real ‘warship’.