Reacting to the RUSI Speech...

The Secretary of State for Defence delivered a keynote speech to the RUSI on February 10 that, depending on your point of view could either have been an inspired piece of setting out evidence-based policy making, or providing a capability-based shopping list of ideas for the Departmental credit card to buy.

Intended as a heavy hitting speech, it gained widespread attention for many reasons, and perhaps some unfair criticism for what was contained in it. The purpose of this article is to consider some of the speech and what it may mean for UK defence policy in the years ahead.

The first point to note is that this was a speech that did not really announce any substantive new policy shifts.  The Minister was keen to set the tone of an attitude shift towards global presence, suggesting that he felt Brexit provided the best opportunity in 50 years to redefine the UK’s global role. This date is significant, harping back to the 1968 Defence Review that saw the ending of the UK’s global presence and began the withdrawal of forces ‘East of Suez’ and focus primarily on a NATO mission instead.

Arctic Allied Operations (UK Apache, Norwegian Leopard 2)

- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

While Brexit undoubtedly will see a shift in how the UK attempts to operate globally, this is not necessarily new policy. Since 2010 there has been a steady increase in the reach and aspiration of the UK to return to areas long neglected. The 2015 SDSR in particular was notable for its focus on establishing regional defence staffs (such as highlighted in this speech from 2016), and in increasing the permanent presence overseas.

Since 2010 there has been a significant uptick in deployments to the Asia Pacific region, culminating in last years year round presence by the Royal Navy including sanctions enforcement against the DPRK, and wider exercises by the British Army in Japan and regular deployments by the RAF too. There is a real sense that for some years now, the UK has been taking deployments to the Asia Pacific more seriously.

What the speech did do was reaffirm the ongoing commitment to the region, and demonstrate the UK’s continued global interests and reach. This led to a wider discussion about the current global presence and reach and where it could be further enhanced still. The most notable part of this section was the ‘announcement’ that the MOD was proposing to send HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH to the South China Sea in 2021 on her first operational tour.

This announcement received a mixed response, both within Government and externally. It was telling, for instance, that No10 quickly nixed the idea, gently reminding journalists that the Prime Minister of the day will make the final decision as to where the carrier will deploy. While some saw this as a snub to the Secretary of State (or perhaps a veiled compliment on his potential career plan for the early 2020s), there is a wider picture here too.

The bigger picture is the reminder that for all her importance to the MOD and the Royal Navy, HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH is, at heart, a strategic influencing asset par excellence, and is regarded as a capability whose deployment and utilisation is a question for wider government and not just the MOD. It is clear that many different Departments will want to see the QE used to full effect during this deployment, on tasks that may range from supporting US operations in the Middle East (e.g. filling the so-called ‘carrier gap’) through to acting as the backdrop to trade and industry demonstrations in other nations to support export campaigns or visiting ports to enhance diplomatic relations.

The future use of the QE is going to be about bringing together the many disparate views of Government and ensuring her programme is a truly ‘one HMG’ evolution, and not just about sending a ship to steam where the Royal Navy sees fit. So while she may well deploy to the Asia Pacific, it is right that the final programme will remain the prerogative of the Prime Minister, based on the guidance of the National Security Advisor at the time.

More widely, and not particularly noticed was the news that the QE would be deploying with a squadron of USMC F35 jets embarked. To some commentators this represented affirmation that the UK has continued to embark on the bold strategy of buying carriers without planes to operate from their decks. But to rational observers this is actually a very significant announcement indeed.

Put simply, fixed wing naval aviation is a difficult and highly challenging business and one that requires the highest standards of safety, operational standards and interoperability with the host ship and her crew to ensure that a squadron of aircraft can effectively embark, operate and sustain itself for the long haul.

The US armed forces are rightly proud of their reputation and capabilities, and in being able to deploy globally with very advanced equipment. To deploy a full squadron on a foreign warship for a sustained period of time as an integrated part of the air group is something that has not been done since WW2 (when HMS VICTORIOUS embarked US aircraft for operations in the Pacific in 1942 – for a good account of this, try this link here).

   

While there have been occasional deployments involving either training qualifications (for example the French Navy deployed a squadron of Rafale in 2018 on a US carrier to maintain currency), or isolated detachments –for example the Royal Navy now annually deploys a Merlin helicopter detachment on a French training cruise in the Asia Pacific, this is not the same as deploying for an entire operational deployment.

US Navy on HMS VICTORIOUS in WW2 

What is occurring on QUEEN ELIZABETH is that the USMC is embarking and able to operate from the outset alongside their Royal Navy and RAF peers on the F35 force. This matters a great deal because this implies the US feels confident it can embark the right spare parts, tools, munitions and conduct appropriate mission planning on their own national IT networks while embarked on the ship.

The level of work required to achieve this level of true interoperability is astounding, and a real tribute to the ability of the UK and US to work together to make this happen. Simply put, this embarkation is something that no other nations do together – it is a testament to the strength of the Anglo-American relationship that it is possible.

The wider significance of this announcement is that the UK is helping pay back the US for the support offered during the ‘carrier gap’ years when the exceptionally generous help of the USN ensured the continuance of a cadre of carrier qualified fixed wing pilots from the RN and RAF, and their associated deck staff. One of the reasons the trials on QUEEN ELIZABETH went so well last year was because of the support of the USN in keeping these skills alive.

The payback is that the US would now like to regard the CVF force as an extension of their own carrier force. In a time when the US CVN force is aging and requiring more maintenance, while the newer FORD class carriers continue to experience challenges (see LINK here for more information), the presence of two RN supercarriers is a valuable source of deck space, particularly for the US Marine Corps. It is reasonable to expect that the UK will spend time operating both carriers in the Middle East and Asia Pacific while embarking US aircraft in order to help support US and UK policy goals.

One specific area where this will matter is the challenge of China and how to approach it. There was some mixed coverage ahead of the speech from commentators who thought the deployment of the carrier into the South China Sea was a pointless gesture from a hollowed out navy. In reality it is more complex than this – Freedom of Navigation Operations are a useful means of asserting and upholding the Rules Based International System (RBIS) where the UK and China have subtly different views. A FONOPS deployment into the South China Sea, particularly if US aircraft are embarked, serves as a timely reminder to China that the world does not uniformly share their attitude towards territory in the region.

As China becomes more assertive globally, pushing back against a Chinese approach which seems designed to restrict legitimate access to international waters, and in turn send a clear message to other nations thinking of acting in a similar manner, is a vital part of the UKs role in upholding the RBIS. This sort of deployment is as much about exemplifying the difference of civilisation values between the West and China and setting clear boundaries, as it is about flying the White Ensign in far off lands.

The broader policy challenge for the UK though is how to balance holding China to account in order to work as a responsible actor on the international stage and continuing to ensure an effective trading relationship with one of the world’s largest economies. There is a difficult balance to be struck here and while the deployment of an aircraft carrier on FONOPS may send a strong political message, it will also doubtless see substantial wider repercussions too.

The challenge for UK policy makers is to tread a fine line between ensuring China is held to account, while also not damaging the UK’s long-term economic prospects in the country. This is particularly important more widely as Chinese influence extends, particularly into smaller nations where the Chinese may seek to exert pressure on a third party to take action against the UK or lose Chinese support. It is notable and important to see this deployment in the wider context of an increased level of UK diplomatic engagement in the region, seeing the reopening of Embassies and High Commissions in places like Vanatu and Tonga.

This quiet shift in interest is almost certainly tied into wider desire to strengthen relationships and counter growing Chinese influence across the region (for a very good account of this situation, this 2018 article from the Lowly Institute is well worth a read).

It was perhaps an interesting insight into two different perspectives of national confidence that some commentators in the UK attacked the proposed deployment of QUEEN ELIZABETH as some kind of post imperial fantasy (for example Simon Jenkins in the Guardian), yet at the same time the current deployment of the French carrier Charles De Gaulle to the Far East (likely to be accompanied by a Royal Navy Type 45) is taken as entirely acceptable.

The curious situation whereby the French sending a carrier to the Far East is seen as routine business, passing without comment, yet the UK doing likewise causes immense frothing at the mouth by naysayers is an interesting insight into the two countries very different public attitudes to their place on the global stage.

While the UK is increasing its diplomatic presence in the Asia Pacific, this is not the only increase in presence. During his speech, the Secretary of State made the surprise announcement that he intended to use ‘transformation funds’ to study the feasibility of bringing into service a ‘Littoral Strike Ship’.

At its heart this appears to be a concept built around the development of a pair of ships designed to embark a small Royal Marine detachment with aviation and other support and operate at very high readiness to conduct discrete operations. From a practical perspective the proposal is intriguing as it will essentially provide the UK with a discrete capability to conduct certain operations, either alone or in concert with others. The likely type of operations may range from training and support through to more kinetic activity.

This announcement has caused a flurry of speculation from the ‘Fantasy Fleeters’ on some parts of the net, who are already embarking on incredibly in depth speculation about what this ship could look like, its design, load out and equipment etc – all rather impressive for a design announced 4 days ago.

The plan as is understood seems to be that the ships will form the nucleus of a small task group, supported by escorts and RFAs as necessary to be permanently based in a region and work with other allies. This could be an intriguing step to improving defence and security co-operation, particularly with low level training of national militaries, or providing some very niche capabilities to support exercises and regional operations.

The wider questions though are considerable – at one level there is a question around how likely it is that the force could be used to participate in major operations without requiring the commitment of other UK assets. While the Royal Navy has a history of conducting littoral operations in the Far East, is the appetite realistically there to permit a small raiding force to go ashore outside of a general conflict?

It is hard to find genuine examples of a ‘strategic raid’ being conducted with only a small number of troops and limited local support in recent decades. The closest analogy is probably Sierra Leone, but even there a low level hostage rescue operation (such as OP BARRAS ) required a substantial tri-service commitment.

A wider debate would need to be had about how this force would be supported and accommodated – while the UK has permissions to use Singapore as a naval base, it is not clear whether it is possible to bring a combined arms force together involving land, sea and aviation assets in the region, or if it would be a major challenge. It would definitely place significant stress on the logistics chain to establish relatively small forces overseas on a permanent basis, as sufficient stocks would need to be built up to ensure the force remained operable.

There is also the wider challenge that with only two vessels available, and most likely not fast steamers, the ability to get to a crisis in a timely manner is limited. While maritime power is inherently flexible and able to redeploy, there is a risk of politicians and media types assuming that possession of a single ship ‘east of Suez’ provides you with a national capability to cover half the planet – an assumption that may backfire when told that the nearest ship is two weeks away at best speed. It is often forgotten that the world is a very big place, and relatively speaking, ships steam rather slowly – if a crisis erupts near Indonesia, while the Strike Ship is in the Gulf, then the chances are that by the time it is in position to do something, the crisis will be long over.

There was some criticism too of the suggestion that somehow the UK would be buying second hand ‘ro-ro’ ferries as a cheap substitute for proper warships. In reality there is a very long history of modern navies converting merchant ships into operational vessels for their navies.

MV OCEAN Trader 

 For example the US Navy recently converted the MV Ocean Trader into a special forces mothership capable of carrying approximately 200 personnel plus support craft including boats, jetskis and an aviation detachment (a large amount of information is perhaps inadvertently publicly available on the vessel courtesy of the US Govt procurement website). The total cost of the conversion was around $73m suggesting that when tightly controlled, these projects are relatively financially reasonable to deliver. In a similar vein, the Royal Canadian Navy introduced a new tanker to service recently (the MV ASTERIX) that was converted into a fleet support ship.

The Royal Navy has long made use of conversions too, such as the RFA ARGUS (a former container ship) – RMAS NEWTON, a cable ship also spent many years working as a Special Forces support vessel, while her successor, the SD VICTORIA reportedly also does work to support SF too, having been seen in curious places with SBS vessels reportedly embarked.

Therefore the use of a converted merchant ship for this role is neither new, nor an indication that the RN is doing something desperate. Instead it’s a sensible means to provide capability quickly and cheaply on a platform that probably doesn’t need to be built to full naval standards, but which could be converted easily to support operational requirements.

The wider benefit of such a move is that it provides a good package of work for the UK shipbuilding industry in the next few years at a time when orders may be slowing slightly. If, as reported, the RFA FSS contract goes overseas, the ‘consolation prize’ of converting these two vessels may make a significant difference to UK industry.

More widely this idea has benefit in the sense of it providing a coherent future for the Royal Marines. What is coming about now seems to be the fruition of several years work to refocus the Corps away from being ‘just’ an infantry brigade with amphibious skills into a much more focused organisation. Creating specialist platforms to host units that have deep knowledge of maritime security or littoral warfare in turn is a strong vote of confidence in the future employment of the Corps – particularly when combined with the planned retention of the LPD force.

The big challenge though in all of this is the simple question ‘where is the money coming from to pay for it all’? While the transformation fund (which seems to be elements of the extra funding awarded during the most recent budget) will host the initial spend on this and other capabilities such as RAF drone swarms and arming ISTAR platforms, there is not enough in this by itself to fund procurement or operations.

Given the huge problems the MOD defence budget is currently facing, with the risk of the programme being some £7-15bn over committed in the next few years, there is a reasonable question to be asked about where the money is coming from the pay for all of this?

Whether this is the opening and very public gambit to secure money at the Comprehensive Spending Review to prevent embarrassment of cancelling a public project, or if there is just an expectation that ‘money will be found’ is not clear. But, this does pose challenges for the MOD financial planners, already tasked with trying to find efficiencies and balancing the books in a coherent manner.

It also poses too questions about over commitment. While the aspiration is laudable to increase lethality and mass (both utterly sensible ideas), it doesn’t solve the short term challenges of both insufficient manpower and also an overcommitted set of forces.

When set against the wider element of the speech that focused on commitments to NATO (and in particular the announcements later in the week of increased deployments to Estonia), there is a question to be asked about whether too few assets are being spread too thinly?

While there is no doubt the UK can support a globally deployed military, arguably second only to the US in terms of overall global reach, by continuing to focus on a multitude of ‘penny packet’ deployments that will tie up assets and people across the globe, expectations of allies will rise, without the certainty that assets will always be available to assist.

The challenge faced is to convince allies in NATO, the Gulf, Africa and the Far East that the UK is a credible military power intent on providing support to their security. Previously the non permanent but regular visit model meant that the UK was able to demonstrate reach, without physical commitment. Now there is likely to be increased physical commitment on a permanent basis, expectations of assistance will grow. There risk must be that around the globe other nations planners will be starting to factor in UK support that may not necessarily be available.

So the challenge for policy makers in taking this speech forward is to balance out three different issues. Namely the desire to make the UK a globally deployed military with more mass and lethality, while doing so in a manner which avoids inadvertently committing the UK to serious actions overseas but does not isolate us from our main allies, and in buying more unfunded but vital equipment to make a step change in capability while trying to save up to £15bn from the current procurement budget.

This is a fiendishly difficult ‘wicked problem’ to resolve and one that will require careful thinking to deliver. Whether this plan comes to fruition and sees UK forces deployed globally in line with the ‘Williamson Doctrine’ in the next few years in the manner envisaged, or if it will involve a small amount of extra cash, a lot of powerpoint slides and then a quiet demise as a new SDSR kills off the good ideas due to lack of people and funds to do anything about it is open to debate. This is going to be a fascinating debate to observe over the next few months and years, and it is not remotely clear which way it will end up going.