Changing The Rules Of The Game - Chinese Maritime Power and the Middle East

The growth of the Chinese Navy in recent years continues to be of significant concern to many nations. With the resources and capability that a rapidly growing economy and population of over 1bn people can provide, the Chinese Navy (PLAN) has gone in barely a generation from being a littoral ‘brown water’ navy to being one of the most powerful forces in the Asia Pacific region.

The growth in Chinese naval power has not necessarily translated into a rapid growth into a globally deployable navy. The majority of their vessels have remained based inside the Asia Pacific region, with only relatively limited deployments into the wider world. While there is doubtless intent to reach globally in due course, currently Chinese deployed naval capability outside of their local region is considerably less than that of the US or Royal Navies.

It is significant then to spot the presence of a Chinese amphibious vessel at the NAVDEX defence exhibition, held in the UAE , this week. For the first time China has chosen to send a vessel to participate in this major defence exhibition, which along with its land-based variant (IDEX), is one of the largest defence exhibitions in the world.

A true Blue Water Navy- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

For decades the Gulf has been the preserve of either local navies or units from the West. To all intents and purposes the maritime environment has been dominated by the US Navy, which until recently regularly operated two carrier battle groups in a confined region, to provide a visible deterrent to nations intent on shenanigans. The presence of third-party vessels such as Russian warships, or those of other nations was rare, and the Chinese were practically unknown in the region.

Coming at a time of wider challenges in the relationship between the West and its Gulf allies, the growing strength and reach of Beijing, and the decision to send a significant warship into the Arabian Gulf and berth in Dubai then represents another sign of the growing influence that the Chinese are exerting in the Middle East, and poses questions for Western allies, such as the UK about what to do about it.

There is no doubt that the Middle East is on the verge of a potentially significant realignment of policy as the current crop of rulers well-disposed to the west age and move on, while the next generation do not have the same deep emotional link or blood debts to Western nations. Globally aware, and aware that the Wests power is both diminishing and also the stricter terms by which defence and security material is exported, the next generation of rulers are likely to be less inclined to default and defer to Washington, London and Paris for help and support.

The arrival of a Chinese warship at NAVDEX comes on the back of an increasingly strong relationship between the UAE and China, which last year saw President Xi Jinping make a three day visit, while at the same time the number of resident Chinese has grown from 30,000 to almost 200,000, with almost 4000 Chinese business reportedly operating in the UAE.

This burgeoning relationship is built firmly on the roots of international trade, with the UAE positioning itself as a key part of the Belt and Road Initiative, a key Chinese tool to enhance trade and influence. For the UAE the Chinese almost certainly represent a far less critical friend, one less inclined to ask difficult questions about human rights or impose curbs on what security equipment can, or cannot, be exported through export licences.

Compared to the West, the Chinese represent not only a source of trade, but also opportunity to access high quality defence exports at affordable prices. The clear desire by many nations in the region to grow their own domestic defence industry, and also to have genuine operational control over aircraft, rather than being reliant on a lengthy supply chain that can be held up by Western powers easily means that China probably looks like an increasingly attractive partner at the moment. Easy credit, quick delivery and no difficult questions.

For China this increased trade and rapid growth of the Chinese diaspora is both blessing and curse. On the one hand it provides a good means of securing continued economic growth through more orders, but on the other it begins to mean they have to take a deeper military interest in the region.

Chinese engagement in the short term may include the continued deployment of surface ships to escort merchant vessels in regions impacted by piracy (such as the Horn of Africa), or ensuring that in a crisis sufficient local capability is available to conduct an evacuation of Chinese nationals from affected regions. In the medium term there may be an aspiration to provide forces capable of countering other nations – particularly India and the US, but this requires a very different set of skills and capabilities.

For the Gulf states this poses a curious challenge. On the one hand they have turned to China precisely for economic reasons and access to defence equipment. On the other, their relationship with the West has long been built on the principle that their economic strength and oil / gas supplies would serve as a carrot, and through judicious spreading of this wealth to sustain the defence industry, would help bind Western nations into providing credible defence against external aggression.

Recent events in Yemen have arguably called this into question, as Middle Eastern military forces have proven more successful than perhaps expected at conducting and sustaining complex operations for a long period of time. At the same time the West has proven less reliable as an ally – for example the US unexpectedly pulling out of Syria (there is an argument that this is providing a good opportunity for Chinese industry to secure an opportunity for new sales). But there remains a dependency and assumption that some form of external support would be needed against aggression from nations like Iran in the event of all out war.

The West could, despite challenges in the relationship, generally be counted on to step in to protect the Gulf, particularly in providing niche capabilities in the maritime space to keep the Straits of Hormuz open in times of conflict, such as MCMV and carrier air power.

China by contrast is almost certainly less willing to get involved in such an operation, nor is it likely to sense significant benefits from acting as the guarantor of Gulf nations against Iran. It is also questionable that, given its current military capabilities, it has the reach and means to work to ensure that the Straits could be kept open.

For the Gulf nations then they face a genuinely difficult choice – do they reach out further to China, trying to thicken a relationship that would benefit them in many ways, or do they try to maintain links with the West, despite frustrations, knowing that the West is more likely to come to their aid in a crisis? The next few years are likely to see really difficult debate in this space as policy makers try to  work out how to balance off two very different relationships.  

One of the challenges the UK and others will face in this period is working out how to handle the growing presence of Chinese vessels in the region, and what this means for maritime operations. In a very constricted area of water, where operations are generally co-ordinated between nations via the Combined Maritime Forces HQ in Bahrain (which sits as part of the wider US Navy 5^th Fleet HQ), the presence of Chinese vessels is likely to pose an interesting series of operational challenges that will need resolving.

More widely, the presence of a major Chinese amphibious vessel will play well into the narrative of ‘bigger = better’ that some states place value on in the region. The occasional or semi-regular presence will help send a message that China is interested and cares about the region. It may also serve as a helpful sales pitch to navies that are increasingly ambitious and keen to expand their reach – for instance during the Yemen conflict the Emiratis reportedly maintained a regular naval presence off the Yemeni coast (a significant distance from their normal area of operations) and were poised to launch an amphibious assault too, staging out of Eritrea.

Some reports suggest it was the lack of coherent US support for such an operation that stopped it from occurring. In turn this may help drive the UAE towards China, not only for support, but also for an ability to buy the sort of complex vessels needed for future operations, like landing ships and mine warfare capability. In the medium-term China stands to benefit from the possibility of sales of military capability to nations that are keen to acquire capabilities they feel they have learned the hard way will not be provided by other allies when required.

For the US and UK the challenge is how to respond to this increased presence and what to do about it. If Chinese equipment proliferates in service in Gulf states, it will be increasingly difficult to countenance the selling of the most advanced weapon systems to them – traditionally Middle Eastern nations have been good customers for modern equipment like the Eurofighter. But, would the US really be keen to see the F35 sold to somewhere like the UAE or Saudi if it was felt that the Chinese could potentially gain access to the airframe or its supply and support system and compromise it?

Royal Saudi Air Force Typhoons 

Given Chinas long standing reputation for industrial scale theft of commercial IP and secrets as part of its modernisation programme, it is hard to imagine that they would not try to use their growing presence and leverage in the Middle East to secure access. In turn then this places a real challenge for both the West and the Middle East.

The West will baulk at selling its most advanced equipment to nations that are heavily linked to China. The Middle East will only want to buy the most advanced and modern equipment on offer – second best is not good enough when your chequebook is essentially bottomless. But, if the West is refusing to sell, then you are forcing the Gulf to tread a path that steers them to China, or even more worryingly, Russia.

In the longer term the potential difficulty in arms exporting to the Middle East of the most advanced military equipment could pose a real challenge for the sustainability of many Western defence companies, who rely heavily on orders from the region to launch new products, or fund upgrade work to existing lines.

To try to counter this slide towards the East, the West may have to reiterate certain points to the Gulf and define its ‘offer’ through more than just military sales. Its focus may have to be on providing niche capability, such as MCMV or in supporting and sustaining the development of a genuine long-term industrial base in the region that can only occur if China is locked out of the game.

One thing is clear though, the Gulf is no longer going to be an exclusively Western pond to operate in. There will be long term challenges about how to respond to the Chinese presence, both in the region, and realistically in time in the Med too. For the first time ever, we are on the cusp of an out of region power establishing a credible and sustainable military presence close to our strategic areas of interest.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that within 20-30 years the growth of the Chinese economy and military power sees the establishment of more Chinese facilities in the Med region – to protect trade interests and secure the safety of Chinese nationals. While this will almost certainly not translate into some of the more paranoid fiction of the Chinese military launching coups into small countries, it does represent a real shift in the balance of power.

With the Gulf increasingly torn between its ties to the West and a growing relationship to the East, and Chinese economic muscle proving an extremely powerful tool of influence, there are long term challenges ahead. What happens, for instance, if the Chinese gained enough influence over the Egyptian government to ensure control of which vessels do, and do not, get to use the Suez Canal. In its most extreme, the question must be asked as to whether the West can take long term access to Suez for granted for its warships to head East, or if as times change, so do the rules of the game?