"The Winning Side Prime Minister" - Direct Entry into the Diplomatic Service
The Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt has caused mild rustling of Daily Telegraphs across Whitehall and beyond with his suggestion that in future the FCO should look to appoint Ambassadors from external industry figures, and not rely purely on internal appointees. Cue much harrumphing from those who feel that this move has the potential to be a disaster.Sir Humphrey: "Now, Minister, if you are going to promote women just because they're the best person for the job, you will create a lot of resentment throughout the whole of the Civil Service!"
Traditionally the
FCO appointed its most senior posts from within its own ranks, occasionally
permitting other departmental staff to join on loan. Today while the system is opaquer
and more open to competition from within the wider Civil Service, it is still exceptionally
rare to see FCO opportunities advertised externally.
Of all Whitehall
departments, the FCO is the one that has perhaps been the most resistant to the
hugely welcome influx of fresh talent from across the private sector recently. In
the last few years the Civil Service has mostly moved from a model where posts
were jealously guarded and recruited inside their Department to one where people
can actively compete from across the Civil Service in open competition – this has
opened up a very healthy flow of people moving around departments to upskill
themselves and develop their experience.
The next logical
steps were to extend recruitment for posts out to external competition,
ensuring that unless there were pressing operational reasons, posts should be
advertised externally as a matter of routine. Almost all Senior Civil Service
(in military speak the band of jobs occupying the 1* plus range of appointments)
are now open to external competition, allowing anyone to apply for them. What
appears to be proposed is that Ambassadorial jobs, previously the preserve of
serving civil servants now be openly competed too and the best person is
appointed to the role. Already Ambassadors have been appointed who have not
spent their career in the Diplomatic Service.
The role of
British Ambassador is a peculiar one – on the one hand it conjures up images of
steely individuals with plume hats and feathers delivering strongly worded
messages implying that their host nation has incurred the wrath of Her Majesty’s
Government. On the other hand many of them are surprisingly normal individuals
who have roles that are as much about networking, business management and
trying to run a small company with a diverse range of staff and roles.
Traditionally the
FCO was almost the sole part of the Whitehall machinery that sent staff
overseas, and the Diplomatic Service was seen very much as the elite within an
elite. These days the combination of reduced opportunities for overseas
postings, particularly for junior staff, as a savings measure (many posts rely
almost exclusively on locally employed civilians for staff), and the growth of
other departments sending staff overseas means the Diplomatic Service has lost
some of its lustre.
Today it is not uncommon
to see individuals from a range of Whitehall departments based in foreign
nations, doing everything from defence policy advice to lobbying for British industry.
While the Embassy or High Commission may be the hub of the UK presence, there
may well be plenty of other small UK enclaves in country too.
A good insight
into the role of Staff in Post can be gained from the BBC comedy show ‘The
Ambassadors’ by Mitchell and Webb, packed with all manner of gentle observations
and very subtle in jokes (such as the security classification of the FCO Wine
list in the credits) that demonstrate just how much research was done when
making it. A finer insight into life at Post is hard to find!
Jim Hacker: Who knows Foreign Office secrets, apart from the Foreign OfficeBernard Woolley: That's easy. Only the Kremlin.
Anyone who has
seen the average CV’s of most senior diplomats will realise they do not necessarily
spend their careers building up knowledge and experience of one country with
the goal of being Ambassador there in 20 years time. The modern Ambassador spends as much time
managing staff, handling financial management, supporting British business,
representing UK domestic policy issues and reflecting in country views back to
Whitehall as they do being a diplomat. The skills required here are not
necessarily hard to come by – a small amount of training, a suitable reading in
period and the support of an effective team who can deliver support to the
Ambassador are as critical as anything else.
The key point is
that diplomats may rely on a skill set to do their job, and prior experience in
the Diplomatic Service is handy, but it is not essential. These skills can be
acquired through other means too, and there is a wealth of talent in the private
sector who may be able to fill these roles equally well.
There is a well-worn
path of former civil servants, particularly Diplomats, leaving Whitehall early
due to a combination of factors, including the realisation that while the pay at
Post is good, the pay in London is particularly bad (the FCO has a reputation
as one of the lowest paying Whitehall departments), and the career progress can
be glacially slow.
Many staff leave
and move onto a variety of interesting and well-connected roles outside of
Government, such as working in consultancies, project management or
international relations roles, all of which test their soft skills, and grow
their network. But currently once you leave, there is no easy way back into the
Diplomatic system, not without either taking a very substantial seniority and
pay cut or applying for very senior jobs in other departments and taking a few
years to transfer over.
Although the wider
Civil Service has an ability to apply for direct entry, as seen by the late Sir
Jeremy Heywood who left the Civil Service for the private sector, only to return
and become Cabinet Secretary, or by John Manzoi who spent much of his earlier
career in the Private Sector.
There is an
untapped pool of talent who could offer more to Government given the right opportunity,
and who could be particularly well suited as Ambassadors – but the system gives
them no way to do this. The suggestion then that some Ambassadorial
appointments should be openly competed is welcome. It will expose to hiring
managers the breadth of talent on offer and could significantly change the way
that the UK develops and sends out senior diplomatic staff.
Bernard Woolley: What if
he demands options?
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Well,
it's obvious, Bernard. The Foreign Office will happily present him with three
options, two of which are, on close inspection, exactly the same.
Sir Richard Wharton: Plus a
third which is totally unacceptable
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Like
bombing Warsaw or invading France.
Why Does This Matter to the Military?
While the subtleties
of the FCO career structures may be of limited interest to many readers of a
military blog, there is an important read across to the MOD here that does
matter. Namely the recognition that direct entry is the best way to ensure the
best possible pool of talent to compete for some of the highest profile jobs in
Government.
The FCO have
realised that to get the very best talent pool, they must open up their processes
to outside competition. Whilst it may be tempting to rely on internal candidates,
this doesn’t take account of the fact that you can only work with the talent pool
you have to hand, and if the person best suited to be British Ambassador to
Obscuristanalonia left two years ago in frustration, they have no way back in.
The question is what
is more important for talent management and filling posts. Is it the idea of ideological
purity in the pool, ensuring that everyone in the system at senior levels is a ‘lifer’
and who may stack up well against their peers, but may not be the best possible
person for the job. Or is it better to accept fresh talent, broaden your
experience pool and take a training risk on getting someone up to speed quickly
but get the right person for the post?
The Armed Forces
rely purely on the former, ensuring that the pool of officers you can draw on at
age 50 is the same cohort that entered the system 20-30 years previously. Their
foibles, skills and limitations are known, and the ability to upskill them to
meet new requirements is limited with the time left in their career.
There are plenty
of their peer group who have left for a multitude of reasons and gone outside
who have done incredibly well, and others who have never served but gained skills
that could be of enormous value. Despite this, there is a strong refusal to
contemplate an idea that entry can be anything other than as a junior officer.
This feels like an enormous rejection of a talent pool, particularly at senior
levels of individuals who may not have worn a uniform for 30 years, but who could
wipe the floor when it comes to change management, project leadership,
logistical improvements or service delivery.
“Sir
Arnold: If once they accepted the principle that senior Civil Servants
could be removed for incompetence, that would be the thin end of the wedge. We
could lose dozens of our chaps. Hundreds, perhaps.
Sir Humphrey:
Thousands.”
At senior levels it is as much about setting visions and empowering your team to do stuff and letting them do it as it is about being a technical expert. It is unlikely that the average General knows much about how to reload a Challenger 2 main gun, operate the winch on a helicopter or dive to clear mines from the bottom of the sea, but we still assume they can rely on the skills of their staff to make sure this happens.
While there will always
be a need for ‘warfighting’ senior officers who need to have a deep background
in the profession of arms and decades of experience in operations, there are
plenty of senior posts (e.g. 1* plus) that probably don’t need this. What they
do need is someone with business acumen, experience of changing things and working
with diverse stakeholders.
With the greatest
of respect to the senior Military, having spent 30 years inside a deeply risk
averse organisation that finds change difficult (just look at the ‘sleeves up
or down’ issue) are these really the right people to be charged with leading
the redevelopment of the ‘business’ side of the armed forces?
We often forget
that much of what the Military do is as much about delivery and project
management as it is about kinetic action. The recent exercise Saif Sarrea 3
could be seen as much about years of project management, logistical planning and
training delivery as it was about showcasing warfighting skills.
One only has to
look at the work of DE&S to realise that a big chunk of the military is
involved in delivering a £178bn portfolio of capability over the next 10 years,
encompassing everything from nuclear submarines to ration packs. This requires
an astonishing range of skills and experience where industry would seek to use head-hunters
and an aggressive talent management system to bring in the right people for the
job. The Armed Forces rely on a ‘can do attitude’ and the realisation that OJAR
glory is just one bright idea to change things up away.
Israeli
Ambassador: It's well
known that in the British Foreign Office an instruction from the Prime Minister
becomes a request from the Foreign Secretary, then a recommendation from the
Minister of State and, finally, just a suggestion to the ambassador. If it ever
gets that far.
Direct entry?
This may sound
harsh, but in a world where the concept of a cradle to grave career in one
organisation is all but dead, clinging to the idea that people cannot possibly
be a senior officer in the Royal Navy managing part of a nuclear submarine
delivery programme unless they’ve learnt to do a Spanish Windlass in Dartmouth
aged 22 (for example) seems ever more out of touch with reality.
While direct entry
wouldn’t work for the more junior officer posts (e.g. SO3/SO2) when people are
still learning their specialist roles for the front line, there is a point when
the talent pool thins as people move to new roles, and fresh blood is needed.
Arguably this is at the OF5 / 1* level, where the direct involvement in many directly
and tangibly ‘military’ roles starts to diminish as people move into far more
managerial posts – at this level your direct knowledge of how something works
is less important than your ability to lead the teams that do.
In many ways this is
like how Ambassadors work – they are required to work across multiple issues, handle
many different responsibilities and lead a multi-national team drawn from multiple
agencies and departments to deliver successful outcomes – usually on a
shoestring budget and under tight media scrutiny.
It would be
particularly ironic if given the howling that occurs anytime the dreaded phrase
‘direct entry’ is spoken that a former military officer applied for and became
an Ambassador. Trying to understand how people could defend saying that you can
have no prior experience in the system but that resettlement training means you
can become an Ambassador, whilst watching usually the same suspects go ‘oh but
its all far too complicated for an outsider to be a Brigadier’ will be highly
amusing.
We do seem to be
approaching a pivotal moment in how we look at the concept of the military
career, particularly at senior levels. While there is no suggestion that you
should run a vacancy for anyone interested in applying to become the Platoon
Commander for B Coy in the Loamshires, there is perhaps a good discussion to be
had around whether the military always produce the right person for the job.
An Officers selection
and capacity is arguably only competitively tested at entry, when the Commissioning
boards assess someone on their potential over two-three days to be a future junior
officer. Once they enter the system, they are never tested or compared again
except to their direct peer group. Career managers are only able to work with
the talent pool that the Boards give them and must nurture and manage it for
the next 30 years.
It is entirely
possible that the people chosen because they demonstrate the right skills and
qualities to be a good junior officer are utterly unsuitable to be a senior leader
and manager. Yet, the system will need to select and promote from this pool
because no other means of putting better qualified or experienced people into
the system exists. How many other industries or Civil Service departments
manage their workforce in such a similar manner?
Providing the
career managers with the ability to bring in people at key career checkpoints,
such as OF5 or 1* not only reinvigorates the talent pool where gaps have occurred
due to wastage, but also sends a clear signal to the people coming up through the
system that they must work hard to secure a deserved promotion.
This may sit
poorly with some, but the fact is that the military is one of the few closed
systems out there where it is almost impossible to be fired for poor
performance, but equally possible to coast along doing very little of tangible
value for decades, safe in the knowledge that a large pension awaits.
By allowing an option
to escape, to do something new and then consider coming back in again later, two
things happen. Firstly the system allows access to new pools of talent with prior
experience and skills at the right point in time – why not, if you need to
appoint 20 Captains, but only have 10 deemed suitable, open up a competition to
recruit 10 more?
Bringing in the
right talent is better than appointing the wrong person to a role – the military
is full of tales of over promoted officers causing chaos as they prove their unsuitability
for a job, causing a chain reaction of unhappiness and PVRs. Not only would
direct entry help make sure the right people are in place, but also allow
people who left earlier a way back in if they want it.
Secondly, it moves
the military to the mentality that it may be a life long calling, but a short
term career for people. Letting someone serve a few years, leave, gain new skills
and come back to offer more to the system grows a culture where they see the
military as a life long career option. Moving to treat the pool of manpower as a
flexible body that ebbs and flows in size and composition over a 20-30yr
period, rather than a homogeneous block formed on entry to BRNC will shift the mentality
about how careers are developed.
People leave for
different reasons, people want to join at different times and for different reasons.
Showing flexibility to rejoiners, applying a common sense approach for 50 year
old new entrants with valuable skills and trying to move to a truly ‘life long
career’ mentality, much as the civil service has done may upset
traditionalists, but it will go a long way to solving manpower gaps in an
organisation that struggles to retain talent.
Ultimately the
decision may be forced on the military as the modern generation, who are far
more focused on ‘portfolio careers’ simply don’t stay in the military system
for long enough to make the future manpower model sustainable. This year sees
the first time that millennial officers can join (e.g 18yr olds), and they have
the potential to be in the system until 2060 plus. To keep them in will require
an entirely different approach to the 20th century model, and one that
if not changed and adapted could cause the collapse of the armed forces manpower
system as we know it.
The stakes are
high, the need for change is even higher, but is the willingness to change there
or is harrumphing and rustling of papers while the system slowly burns going to
win the day?
Hacker: If there were a conflict of
interests which side would the civil service really be on?
Bernard: The winning side, Prime Minister.
Dedicated to the memory of Sir Jeremy Heywood.
Probably because the MOD won't pay enough to attract the civilians with the qualifications/skill sets needed. Then you have to set up a career structure for civilians, and there is also the fact that the "Support" arms also have to deploy/go into harms way when needed. These are likely to inhibit recruitment.
ReplyDeleteI know Senior Officers military are pushing the "Whole Force" concept and say that they regard civilians as part of it, but the evidence is that civil servants are still seen as a lower life form and treated accordingly. Every decision the MOD makes reinforces that, and undermines the message they are trying to push.
It raises a interesting point about where is the front line. If you are in a asymmetric conflict, the attacks will be against the rear echelon as much as the combat arms you would like them to attack. In this case do we need to re think where we employ contractors and have private military contractors do some of the tasks that the infantry/engineers do, ie road opening, sweeping and demining, guarding camps, surveillance monitoring, building defensive positions, training and mentoring?
DeleteKey to my mind is flexibility, a system which says once you're out effectively you can never come back, is one which doesn't work in my opinion. Implicit in the discussion is this boundary between the civilian side of the MoD and the military, break down that and the flexibility which allows a civil servant to work in the private sector then return, will be available to the military staff. Maybe it's time to say there is a single employment contract across the MoD, with skills and experience gained adding to your value account, with 'danger money' paid for those who spending time in operational zones or away from home in the case of a ship. Retirement, terms and conditions, benefits will have to be standardised as will training, so they can be compared across the services.
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