For Those In Peril on the Sea - thoughts on the loss of HELGE INGSTADE
The tragic loss of
the Norwegian Frigate HELGE INGSTAD is a timely reminder of the peril on the
sea. The maritime environment is an inherently difficult and dangerous place to
operate it, when even very routine operations have the potential to go disastrously
wrong.
Over the coming months
we will no doubt learn a great deal about this incident and what happened, but
for now Humphrey wanted to capture a few initial thoughts.
Firstly, the
reaction and the fact that no lives were lost is not only a minor miracle, but
a good reminder of the value of the Sea Training conducted not only by the Royal
Norwegian Navy, but also the Royal Navy at FOST (with whom the Norwegians
regularly train).
To undergo a collision
at any time is difficult, but to experience it in the darkest hours of the night,
with most of the crew probably sound asleep in bed is incredibly challenging.
The actions onboard in the hour between the collision and the decision to ground
and abandon ship, when people had to quickly move from sleep to conducting damage
control for real in order to save their lives is a testament to the training the
crew was able to receive.
This helps
reaffirm the critical importance that the Royal Navy places on damage control training,
and to ensure that everyone on board is capable of fighting fires and flooding.
While the lessons of the Falklands War and firefighting may be nearly 40 years
ago now, the RN has a long history of groundings and collisions to draw on and
learn from. It is likely that there will be many lessons shared here on what
worked, and what didn’t work.
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Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
What is clear
though is that the decision by the Captain to intentionally ground the ship was
a phenomenally brave action. To take the measured decision to run your vessel
aground on rocks must go against the ingrained instincts of every mariner. It
demonstrates that huge faith is vested in relatively junior individuals to take
genuinely difficult decisions quickly, and that they have the confidence to
know they can potentially write off 20% of their nations escort fleet if that is
what it takes to save life.
The decision on
what happens next is unclear. The vessel now lies almost completely submerged
in water and is essentially a write off. Even if the hull could be salvaged the
size of the refit required to repair her fully (which would include completely
rewiring the vessel and fitting out from scratch with new electronic components
and weapon systems) is such that scrapping her is the only likely action.
The RN has also effectively
lost a vessel this way in recent years, with HMS ENDURANCE being flooded so
badly during an incident some years ago that she never sailed again. HMS NOTTINGHAM suffered enormous damage during
her grounding off Lord Howe Island, and it was reportedly only the fact that
the cost of repairing her was less than refitting another vessel to her level
of capability that stopped her from being scrapped too.
For modern navies
that go to sea, collisions and groundings are an occupational hazard, but they
also pose a challenge to navies as fleets get smaller. The Norwegians have now
lost 20% of their frigate force in one incident, many years before a new build
programme was likely to have occurred. Even if repaired, it will blow an
enormous hole in the center of naval programming for their navy for years to come.
Some have asked
what would happen if this had been an RN warship – would it have hurt our own
operational commitments? Ironically right now had an RN warship gone aground
that badly, it probably would make relatively little difference on operational
output. The lack of manpower that has left two escorts in active reserve for
some years now means that a spare ships company had essentially become
available to send the other one to sea.
While not a
perfect solution, the Royal Navy is in the curious position of essentially running
a plot of 17 ships with 19 in the force, thus buying it a little bit of space for
attrition against this sort of problem.
In the medium term
the RN would also benefit from the existence of a credible long-term
shipbuilding plan. Both the Type 26 &
31e have a building plan stretching out well into the 2030s. While the loss
would be felt, one of the benefits of the current shipbuilding strategy is that
the scope is there to replace the loss in the medium term. A similar situation occurred
after the Falklands War where additional Type 42 and 22s were ordered for the
RN to replace losses from the war.
The wider lesson
for the RN is the critical importance of maintaining an effective salvage and
mooring organisation able to respond quickly to events of this nature. While
hardly the ‘glamorous’ side of naval business, there is a body of well trained
and capable people working out of DE&S to ensure that in a crisis, the means
exist to recover our vessels. The ongoing importance of this work cannot be
underestimated – the ability to ensure an RN vessel in trouble can be recovered
is vital.
For those
interested in the underpinning policy of such situations, then the link HERE
to RN salvage policy is worth a read. One gem is the discovery that in 2015 the
MOD stated that:
“The only award now payable
under the Naval Prize Act, 1864, is for prize salvage for the recapture of
British property in war. It cannot be claimed if the recaptured vessel has been
used as a ship of war by the enemy…”
One perhaps more delicate issue is the subject
of faith in testing times. While not widely talked about, faith is inextricably
linked to the Service, and all new recruits are required to attend Church Parade
or some religious service during basic training. The first Article of War for
the RN was about ensuring that CO’s enable their Ships Companies to engage in religious
worship.
It is inevitable
during times of great stress that people may find they seek solace and comfort
in a religious figure. Not everyone does, but the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Service
has evolved into a critical spiritual and welfare service to help provide this
guidance when sought. This can range from a communion through to delivery of
much needed morale on operations (as BRNC Dartmouth tweeted today with images of
Chaplains carrying mini mars bars for tired cadets on a field exercise).
In a week where
much of the media attention has focused on Remembrance, the spiritual element
of Service has rarely been far from the front pages. Today it was intriguing to
see that the RN was caught up in this when keen eyed historians noted that the
announcement of the naming of the 8th Type 26 frigate as HMS LONDON
included a subtly changed motto.
There is some debate by former RN personnel
as to the specific nature of the motto. Reportedly previous HMS LONDON’s have used the same motto as
the City of London – “Domine dirige nos”,
which roughly translates as ‘Lord direct (guide)
us’. The announcement for the new vessels name includes a reduced motto of ‘Dirige
Nos’ or ‘Guide (direct) us’.
There has been some debate as to whether
the motto was used in full, or partially abbreviated, and there is no clear answer. The MOD believes it hasn’t been used since the
1920s, yet other evidence, such as copies of Navy News suggests it was in use
as recently as the COUNTY class and Type 22 namesakes. One has to hope that the MOD hasn't tried to bluff its way out of the situation...
Notwithstanding the question as to who is supposed to direct the new HMS LONDON (presumably the Directing Staff), it seems a bit strange to delete the reference to the Lord. One has to hope that this represents an accidental omission and not a calculated decision ‘not to do God’.
Notwithstanding the question as to who is supposed to direct the new HMS LONDON (presumably the Directing Staff), it seems a bit strange to delete the reference to the Lord. One has to hope that this represents an accidental omission and not a calculated decision ‘not to do God’.
The RN is rightly
proud of its history, heritage and traditions. The names of ships stretch back
for hundreds of years, usually carrying the same motto throughout use. For the
RN to arbitrarily change a motto used for centuries, and which reflects the deep
links to the City of London seems not only unnecessary, but deeply disrespectful
to the City of London and to those of the Christian Faith.
A motto is a small part of the ships identity, but it still serves as an occasional
source of inspiration, a timely form of words for a ships t-shirt or just to be
ignored as people see fit. For ships with older names, the motto can often be
used as a history lesson, talking through how the values espoused in the motto
were seen in the activity and actions of their forbears – building a sense of identity
and shared values.
It seems a great
shame to cast away part of this shared history because perhaps the use of the word
‘Lord’ was not seen as appropriate by
some committee. More widely it makes Humphrey mildly uneasy because it reflects
a wider sense of changing to be seen to be popular and trendy, not because you
need to change.
Some things in the
past have required gripping or altering to bring up to modern values. There
have been cultural practises that were deeply inappropriate, or ships names that
these days would probably not pass muster, no matter how respectfully the intent
was behind the name (HMS EMPEROR OF INDIA?). But, to start gently chipping away
at the history of the Service over the use of the Latin word for Lord does seem
a little excessive. It also seems at odds with the professed fact that faith
plays a central part in military life and culture.
One deeply has to
hope that a genuine mistake has been made and that HMS LONDON will commission with
her proper motto. Otherwise one has to wonder what the committee will make of
the centuries old motto of the new HMS DREADNOUGHT :
“Fear God and Dread
Nought”…
As you say we will find out more over the coming weeks and months, but was there anything which could have been done to prevent the sinking, could flexible bags have been inflated in affected compartments to improve buoyancy? Also, given a ship is a metal structure, with many holes, hopefully closed, but inevitably not always, bobbing around in water, is there no protection of electrical systems from water, other than the hull of the ship?
ReplyDeleteI recall a certain comedian ending every performance with the phrase 'may your God go with you'. While I agree some might be offended by the absence of 'Lord' or 'God', I do not see why it would only be those of the Christian Faith.
ReplyDeleteThe Frigate was run aground deliberately 484 seconds after impact, and effectively then sank. This simply looks to an experienced observer as a set of compounding incompetences -
ReplyDeletefirst, the collision was eminently avoidable by any OOW with even a smidgeon of proper training.
second, the ship was clearly not in a basic state of watertight integrity - the speed with which she sank suggests that w/t doors were not shut.
Third, the speedy "abandon ship" suggests that her crew had no expectation of damage control, and appear not even to have closed up w/t doors before leaving (witness the fact that she has now sunk completely).
I cant see a single mitigating circumstance here.
For ships of this type how many compartments would have to be compromised for it to sink this quickly?
DeleteWarships have a reserve of buoyancy of about 50% of displacement,if properly "closed up" for watertight integrity, so about half by volume. The machinery spaces are of course the largest compartments, but nowhere near 50%.
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ReplyDeletePS a submarine's reserve of buoyancy is of course much smaller - less than 10% of displacement, possibly as little as 5%.
ReplyDeleteThanks, that's interesting. It does tie in with what I had seen of the incidents with the US Navy in the Pacific where the damage was extensive but there was no loss of a vessel (although obviously they were different designs of ships). The speed of the sinking has to suggest something very wrong with the ship or crew or both.
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