Permanent Opportunity or Permanent Risk? The case for a Type 23 in Bahrain

Summary: The announcement of a Type 23 being permanently based in the Gulf should be cautiously welcomed, but there are many unanswered questions about how the risks to the UKs standing with allies, defence engagement goals and support to the defence industry more widely will be met, and most importantly, how can the RN deliver this without extra people, hulls and cash?

The Secretary of State for Defence, Gavin Williamson announced at the RUSI Seapower conference on 24 May that the Royal Navy would be permanently basing a Type 23 frigate in the Gulf from 2019. In a wide ranging speech which can be found HERE he focused on the current flexibility and value of the Royal Navy, looked to its global presence and reach, and used the curious phrase ‘Tier 1 Navy’ (whatever that means) to describe the Royal Navy and its current capabilities.

It was an ambitious and thinly veiled sales pitch to the Chancellor for more money, but it also highlighted the reality that the RN is one of very few navies in the world that thinks and operates on a truly global basis. This year the RN has had ships operating in all the world’s oceans – something only one other navy (the USN)has done.

The announcement that the RN is to permanently base a Type 23 frigate in the Gulf at the RN Support facility in Bahrain is intriguing and one that offers both opportunities and risks to the wider fleet. The notion of forward basing ships is not new – for centuries the RN used a global network of dockyards and support facilities to keep its ships based globally. The permanent basing has been limited to smaller ships -such as OPVs and MCMV rather than the escort fleet, which has not had its ships permanently based overseas since the mid-1970s and the final withdrawal from Singapore.

There have been many studies over the years to look at whether it makes operational sense to forward deploy a vessel and swap crews over rather than deploy them on a 6 – 9 month operational cycle. This included the ‘sea swap’ trial where a pair of Type 42s swapped crews, and other studies. All of them seemed to result in inconclusive findings, which coupled with the lack of policy enthusiasm for a permanent basing presence seems to have repeatedly killed off the idea. It is likely that a keen FOI enthusiast could find many papers studying this concept over the last 20 years, all without results.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The announcement then is a significant policy shift for the RN and brings both benefits and significant risks too. The key opportunity for the forward deployment is the ability to keep a frigate platform permanently East of Suez in a vast complex operations area. The area of responsibility covered by the UK Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) in Bahrain covers over three million km2 – an enormous amount of space to operate in.

Keeping a vessel in Bahrain ensures that there is a continuous theoretical presence ‘East of Suez’ able to conduct high end military operations. This is an asset that can potentially shorten the time to respond to a crisis if required – but never forget that the JOA is a very large place and the steaming distances are enormous. Being based in Bahrain still makes it a week plus passage (at best effort) to most of the places that could require an RN intervention.

The message that the ship sends is that the UK is serious about its long-term commitment to the Gulf region, investing heavily in providing assets capable of providing regional security and helping show a genuine willingness to be there permanently. While the RN may have done repeated Gulf deployments since 1980 as part of the Armilla patrol, there was to the eyes of many local states a real difference between a short term deployer steaming in and out, and a long-term ship homeported in the region. It sent a message that the UK saw Gulf security as a short term operational task, not a long-term commitment to support friends.

Many Gulf nations will warmly welcome this news, seeing yet more evidence of the UK’s swing back to the Gulf region since 2010. It will also be welcomed by regional navies, keen to see a permanent RN frigate presence in a region that is seeing ever fewer Western warships operating in it.

What about the risks?

The challenge is that this sort of deployment presents significant risks, for diplomatic policy, for the operational commander, and for force generation and support too. It is not as simple as just parking a ship in the Gulf and leaving it there.

From a diplomatic perspective, the deployment of a ship to Bahrain permanently has effectively created a ‘tethered goat’ for the Gulf. In a region where all the nations know each other’s business, there will be an expectation that the ship is going to stay in the region. It has become ‘their’ ship.

There will be significant local pressure to see the ship kept and used in the Gulf, after all she is permanently based there isn’t she? If the decision is taken to move her out of the Gulf regularly for other duties, it will cause some challenging conversations in explaining that where the RN sends its warships is a matter for the UK.

It will be increasingly difficult for fleet planners to rely on using this ship to move significantly further afield or rely on it as a wider East of Suez deployer because she will be expected to return to Bahrain and show support to the Gulf. While it will not completely constrain freedom of manoeuvre, it is difficult to see a situation where the RN can let the vessel roam freely in the region and beyond.

Essentially permanently basing a ship in the Middle East means committing it to the region for the long haul – which in turn means the RN will need to find other vessels to send to the Pacific and beyond.

From an operational perspective, there are some questions about the value of the asset assigned to the region. One of the benefits of the flexible deployment model is that it allows programmers to flex assets and respond to regional changes – for instance deploying a Type 45 into the region to support a USN CVBG deployment, or if there is a sense of an increased threat from submarines, considering deploying a T23 with a ‘tail’ (towed array sonar). This allows some flexibility in tailoring the right asset for the job at hand, rather than trying to rely on the specific capabilities of one platform.

UK operations in the region are closely aligned to those of 5^th Fleet (indeed the UK 1* has his office right next to Commander 5^th Fleets) and there is a very close link between the two navies in the region. The USN genuinely values the RN deployers, particularly the Type 45 and MCMV force, and has always been keen to make best use of them.

If the RN chooses to deploy an elderly ‘general purpose’ Type 23 then some of this influence is lost. While the USN will be glad to see RN vessels in the region, knowing that a nearly 30-year-old GP escort without deep ASW or AAW capabilities is all that the RN can offer will erode RN standing in the eyes of the USN. This will further diminish if the RN no longer sends Type 45s or ASW T23s into the Gulf in addition to the permanent deployer. The challenge for the RN is going to be to work out how it continues to offer real lasting value to the USN in the Gulf.

In a region that is incredibly operationally challenging, and where tensions are high with conflict possible at very short notice, the USN is looking for peer navies to operate with. The RN MCMV force buys a lot of influence and access, as does deployment of the Type 45 force – particularly if it can burden share and work as part of a CVBG.

What the USN does not want to see is the RN ‘freeloading’ by sending an older less capable platform permanently to the region, while not continuing to top this up with regular deployments of other ships too, yet still expecting to benefit from the significant support extended locally in theatre. When coupled with the significant reduction in RN presence locally (in the last 5 years the force has gone to 1 escort and 4 MCMVs supported by an LSD(A) with the repair ship, stores ship and RFA, plus occasional survey deployments all being gapped or finished), it is hard to escape the view that for all the PR hype, this deployment masks significant reductions in the UK commitment locally.

From a wider perspective, other European navies are increasingly vying for attention in the region, and they continue to deploy their most modern vessels – able to operate as part of an integrated CVBG – for instance last year a key part of the GEORGE BUSH deployments battlegroup was a Danish escort ship.

The RN though has a difficult balancing act to strike. On the one hand there are plenty of regions which would welcome a regular Type 45 deployment, but in a world where the RN is only ever going to see a maximum of four at sea on a sustained basis, it is simply not feasible to do this. Similarly, as the ASW threat grows locally, is it more important to deploy a Type 23 with Towed Array to the Gulf, where the submarine is, currently, relatively low, or keep them closer to home to protect SSBN and SSN operations from the resurgent Russian fleet?

As the RN moves towards the deployment of QUEEN ELIZABETH and the establishment of the Carrier Strike capability, there will be a mindset shift in how it deploys as an organisation. It seems likely that the old model of 6-9-month fixed deployments will go, with instead the high end force being built around supporting a carrier group, deploying into a region to conduct operations and then returning.

In this model, the presence of an older Type 23, plus MCMV force in the Gulf to be then augmented every 18 months or so by a proper carrier battle group to fill the gap of the US CVBG (the USN is experiencing real challenges in keeping a carrier in the Gulf year round now) will almost certainly allay US fears, and reassure them that under the new operating model, the RN is more than pulling its weight.

Force Generation

One challenge facing RN planners is going to be working out how to keep the vessel permanently manned and deployable during a multi-year deployment. There seem to be two options open to do this – either a full crew swap, or rotating people out through the deployment to keep a constant trickle of people joining and leaving the ship.

The former option is how the MCMV force rotates, with crews working on platforms back in the UK and then rotating out to take over one of the hulls on a regular 6-month basis. This has worked exceptionally well, and the force is now very used to deploying en-masse and taking over a ship and quickly getting it operational.

Partly this is because of the ships being smaller and less complex than a frigate, but also because the MCMV force has effectively made support to the Gulf operations its ‘main effort’ and built its crews, deployments and means of operation around keeping the Gulf ships operational at all times.

For the escort fleet this move would pose real challenges. For starters keeping a ship deployed requires a 3:1 ratio (1 deployed, 1 working up, 1 returning / refit) to ensure a ship is on operational tasks permanently. Keeping a ship based in the Gulf will not alter this equation – the RN will still need a hull back in the UK to train the deploying crew on.

This means a significant shift in the way that the RN operates its escort fleet – it will need to build a ships company up, work them up and get them ready to fight in a very complex operational environment, and then take them off the ship and put them onto an entirely new ship somewhere else and go from scratch.

This requires the RN to have a Type 23 GP frigate available with the right level of equipment that mirrors the Bahrain frigates equipment (so called ‘Theatre Entry Standard) kit, so the crew are used to operating it in home waters. When you consider the length of time required to get a crew worked up for operational deployment through OST and beyond, essentially you will need a GP Type 23 on permanent FOST duties in the UK to act as the training vessel to get crews to the right standard to deploy out to Bahrain.

From a force of 5 hulls, this will place a lot more pressure on the RN than if you were just deploying a platform operationally. It requires two hulls to be at sea constantly (one in Bahrain, one in FOST) and places a lot more burden on the manpower side to stand up ships companies and move them around en masse to go from training to taking over the deployed vessel. In an escort force of 17 active ships, that is worryingly short of trained manpower, sustaining this deployment as well as regenerating carrier strike is going to be really hard work.

Loss of Defence Engagement and support to NATO

One of the unexpected side casualties of a permanently based ship will be the intangible loss of defence engagement opportunities and support to NATO operations. As ships deploy out to, or return from, the Gulf now, they usually undertake a hectic programme of activity involving visits to various ports, joint exercises with different navies and usually some support to NATO missions in the Med or Black Sea.

This allows an excellent chance to deepen defence relationships, promote joint operations and work with NATO partners. It also allows for opportunities to promote defence exports and help push the case for ‘Global Britain’. Putting a British warship into a foreign port can help the FCO achieve a great deal of local diplomacy and help benefit the UK more widely.

The risk is that if you no longer have a constant stream of deployers moving to and from the Gulf, the RN presence in the Med, Black Sea and beyond is going to vanish. There will be a huge loss of opportunities to work with and influence our friends in the region. For instance, there have been multiple ship visits to Israel by returning Gulf deployers in recent years – something that has helped make a real difference to a critical bilateral relationship. This will now not happen in the same way, or regularity.

It also impacts on the UK’s ability to support NATO – many returning deployers such as HMS DARING spent time working in the Black Sea to reassure the UK’s valued allies in the region of our commitment to their security. Not having the hull in the region to deploy and participate will be

Similarly, the opportunity to promote British exports will be diminished or lost as the chance to hold defence industry days onboard will fall by the wayside. An unexpected consequence of this move could be real damage to supporting major UK defence export campaigns.

The RN is going to have to consider carefully how it fills this gap, does it change its operating model to put smaller ships into the Med on such visits, or does it look to change how it deploys ships more widely to ensure there is no loss of defence engagement opportunities? The risk as it currently stands is that the well-intentioned idea of keeping a ship in the Gulf could damage Britain’s wider defence relationship with many other countries.

The Support Factor – How do we keep the ship at sea?

One of the factors that hasn’t really been explained by the MOD yet is how the RN will keep the T23 supported in the long term in the region and how much will it cost to do this versus just deploying a ship under the old system.

Ships deployed generate a lot of maintenance and support requirements that need attention. Some of these can be handled locally during a port visit, others during the longer stand down of a 9-month deployment, while some defects require fixing on return to the UK (such as last year when a T45 had to return early for an urgent repair).

That this work can be done locally usually is testament to the investment by the UK in an exceptionally capable logistics tail, involving the ability to move spare parts quickly by air or sea, and use relationships with Defence Attaches to unblock problems to bring them into the country. One of the reasons the UK is so effective as a global power is because it uses this network to keep ships operational far more effectively than other countries can. Based on Humphreys personal experience, even the USN is deeply impressed at the ability of the RAF and defence logistics to quickly repair and keep ships at sea when USN ones are alongside waiting for spare parts.

Permanent basing of a frigate though opens up a lot of questions about the support model that will be used. It is easy to keep the MCMVs in the region, as they can use local shipyards for light refits and then return home every 2-3 years as needed, while the mass of 4 hulls means there are still ships available for sea.

The advantage of an operational deployment is that it guarantees the RN will have a ship pretty much constantly available for sea (stand fast the mid deployment stand down period) whilst in the JOA. This is reassuring to operational commanders and the USN who want to know that the RN is there and ‘ready to fight tonight’.

But, keeping a ship in the region for three years will significantly reduce availability overall as it will inevitably need docking for routine maintenance and updating equipment to keep it at Theatre Entry Standard – presumably at Duqm in the new RN logistics hub and dry dock facility. This means there will be long periods when there is no RN escort at sea, and more importantly post refit worked up ready to commit to operations.

Either the RN has to deploy another ship into the region (drawn from either the CVBG force if in the Gulf or from the existing escort fleet), or it has to admit that it will fail to meet the requirements to keep ships available for sea. This will not sit well with allies and will increase the risk – particularly if there is a crisis going on in the Bab-Al-Mendab or Straits of Hormuz that requires ships to be escorted – if the RN is unable to provide a vessel due to its own local ship being in refit, then this will be highly damaging to UK’s interests and reputation locally.

Ensuring that cover is kept and that there is as much availability for sea under this model as with the 9 month deployers is going to present significant planning challenges for the RN – particularly if the fleet is moving to a model of supporting Carrier Strike as its ‘main effort’.

There are also wider practical considerations too – how much extra will it cost to fly lots of parts out for refits compared to now? How much time will be spent sending the right support and training personnel out to ensure the ship is ready for sea and able to operate effectively. In the current model ships deploy worked up and ready to go – in this new environment there will need to be significant reach back to home to ensure that the ship can be brought back up to readiness quickly.

In an RN that has personnel limitations, is focusing resources and effort to send people out to the Gulf regularly to keep an elderly Type 23 ready for sea the right use of resources or is it better to keep them at home working on all the ships that need attention. There is a risk that the focus on keeping the ship out there will distract people and resources from other duties back at home, and potentially impact on RN overall readiness.

Similarly, what happens to the ammunition onboard? Modern missiles are complicated and require regular care and maintenance to ensure they are able to be used if required. This means access to specialist facilities for loading and unloading munitions and appropriate storage facilities too (e.g you cannot do a RAS to load a new VLS Seawolf cannister or dispose of an old one).

Understanding how the RN intends to ensure that the ship can be operational and armed with the right equipment for the job is also key. There are no RN facilities beyond Gibraltar and possibly Singapore to do this sort of work (Jufair is not equipped in this manner), meaning again either the RN has to gap the Gulf ship, or it has to send another deployer out to cover for it.

While this sort of issue may sound ‘down in the weeds’ it highlights the significant range of challenges that will need to be overcome, and the possible risks/trade offs that have to be considered to keep a ship permanently in the region.

The question that isn’t clear is whether this deployment will actually save any money or keep ships at sea for longer in the Gulf region than if they were transiting out every 6-9 months. Keeping a ship forward deployed sounds impressive but poses a lot of logistics and support challenges that need to be overcome – and this comes at a cost.

Conclusions

Humphrey is very aware that there are certain extremely senior Officers and civil servants in the MOD who dismiss this, and other, blogs because they are both off message and not in full possession of the facts.

This article is a good example of this occurring – there are very substantial gaps that are not public knowledge yet that need to be set out to explain the benefits of this move, and the reasons why it makes more sense to do this than continue with the long established and highly successful deployment model.  Given the impact on wider UK defence engagement, bilateral relationships and how the UK intends to support the RN in future, it is worth asking the sort of questions posed here to see how such a deployment will change the way the RN operates.

Reading between the lines, it appears that this move is part of a wider RN move to substantially alter its operational structure and model to be far more ‘French’ in approach, built around a ‘hi/lo’ mix of lower capability ships on station, augmented by a far more capable force over the horizon. This marks an extremely major change in philosophy by the RN compared to its approach since the end of WW2.

Permanent basing does provide some opportunities, but it also comes at a very considerable cost too. It would be helpful to understand from the MOD its perspective – perhaps some of the many papers on this subject could be released  (or subjected to an FOI request?) to help explain to the public the rationale for this move.

Overall it is too soon to say that this is uniformly a good thing – until the wider picture is known about how the RN will do things differently, and how it operates in the future. Humphrey is reserving judgement on the merits of this announcement. There are simply too many risks, potentially too many additional costs and too many unanswered questions to be able to say that this is unequivocally a good thing for the RN or for Britain as a whole.