Thin Pinstriped Line

Summary: The announcement of a Type 23 being permanently based in the Gulf should be cautiously welcomed, but there are many unanswered questions about how the risks to the UKs standing with allies, defence engagement goals and support to the defence industry more widely will be met, and most importantly, how can the RN deliver this without extra people, hulls and cash? The Secretary of State for Defence, Gavin Williamson announced at the RUSI Seapower conference on 24 May that the Royal Navy would be permanently basing a Type 23 frigate in the Gulf from 2019. In a wide ranging speech which can be found HERE he focused on the current flexibility and value of the Royal Navy, looked to its global presence and reach, and used the curious phrase ‘Tier 1 Navy’ (whatever that means) to describe the Royal Navy and its current capabilities. It was an ambitious and thinly veiled sales pitch to the Chancellor for more money, but it also highlighted the reality that the RN is o...

One of the pleasures of social media is the ability to follow the reaction to Defence Questions by knowledgeable correspondents. Whenever questions are put to Ministers in the House of Commons, journalists like Jonathan Beale, Deborah Haynes and David Willets (all listed in alphabetical order!) are well worth following on twitter to capture both the questions and reactions and to identify new issues to write about for this blog. Today was a good example of spotting a question to Gavin Williamson that is worth commenting further on. Mark Francois asked the Secretary of State whether the Royal Navy should keep older Type 23 frigates in reserve as they pay off whilst the newer Type 26 / 31 class enter service. There was polite demurral from the Minister, with suggestions that perhaps ships were disposed of too quickly. The subject of ‘Reserve Fleets’ is something that often comes up across the internet whenever naval forces are discussed. To many casual observers there is an inn...

It has become fashionable in some quarters to write off the UK as a nation in terminal decline, a nation that does not matter and one that is an irrelevance in the modern world. It is also popular among some to sneer at the values, standards and traditions that make up the fabric of this curious nation. Finally, many commentators on defence matters like pushing the idea that ‘the UK no longer matters’ due to defence cuts. This comes together into a narrative of national decline, putting forward the notion that we may as well give up as we don’t matter anymore. The marriage of His Royal Highness Prince Henry (Harry) to Ms Meghan Markle is perhaps a timely reminder that despite this narrative, the UK somehow possesses an innate ability to hold events that for a few short hours bring the world together. If the employment of soft power is seen as how you influence other nations and people to pay attention and consider you, then the Royal Wedding must have been one of the most e...

The competition to build the next generation of three new Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) support ships (known as the Fleet Solid Support / FSS) has become increasingly politicised, with Jeremy Corbyn making a speech demanding that all three vessels be built in the UK. Why has this situation emerged, why would UK industry and MOD want to build overseas and what are the benefits for the UK in doing so? The FSS project has its roots in the early 2000s, when the MOD began to look at options to recapitalise its increasingly elderly RFA fleet into the 21 st Century. At the time the RFA operated four stores ships – two Fort I (AUSTIN & ROSALIE) and two Fort II (GEORGE & VICTORIA) class, with subtly different roles. This scheme was known as MARS and was intended to provide a widespread replacement for the RFA flotilla. The original Fort class entered service in the late 1970s carrying dry stores / ammunition to support either Carrier or Amphibious forces, while the Fort I...