Crossing the Thin Line in the Sand - Strikes in Syria assessment

On the evening of Friday 13^th and early hours of Saturday 14^th April, British, French and US armed forces conducted strikes on regime targets in Syria in response to the use of chemical weapons a week previously on civilians. The reaction to the strikes has been mixed, from broad political support across the West, to condemnation or opposition from regimes opposed to the West, particularly Russia and Iran and the leadership of the UK Labour Party.

It is still early in the post-strike assessment and hard to tell what damage has, or has not, been inflicted. But it is already possible to consider some of the immediate implications and impact of this situation for the UK.

From the outset it would have been impossible to deliver a proportionate response to these operations through a UN mandate. Russia has consistently used her position on the UN Security Council for several years now to protect the Syrian regime (in marked contrast to the UK and France, neither of which have used their veto for nearly 30 years). This means that any attempt to conduct strikes through the auspices of the UN would have failed.

The last few years have seen a long series of negotiations, talks agreements to try to get Syria to abandon their CBW capability. Despite claiming to have done so, the Syrian regime lied to the world and refused to do so. Efforts to resolve the issue by peaceful means have failed, and innocent men, women and children have died unimaginably awful deaths through the continued deployment of weaponry rightly outlawed.

To those who seem to think that more talks were the answer, the simple question would be ‘why, given all the previous talks have failed due to intentional deception by the Syrian regime?’ There have been many years of talks – they have all failed and dozens of Chemical Weapon attacks have occurred in the same time.

In a world where it is ever easier to develop and acquire Chemical Weapons, not acting in response to overt provocation would send a message to regimes across the world that the West was unwilling to stand up for the rules based international system, or to hold nations to account for their actions. Once the genie is out of the bottle, it would be extremely difficult to act in future – how can you justify air strikes in another country if you were unwilling to act in Syria when confronted with clear evidence of such atrocities?

A failure to act now and hold others to account would have resulted in further suffering and potentially normalised the use of Chemical Weapons without fear of consequences by others. At some point a line in the sand must be drawn, and action taken where appropriate.

One key lesson emerging is that the West is prepared to tackle this sort of behaviour, even in client states of hostile powers like Russia. This will send a clear message to all that the use of Chemical or Biological Weapons will not be tolerated.

Parliamentary Questions

Much of the debate in the UK has focused on whether Parliament should have been recalled to debate and approve this operation. To Humphrey the view is simple – Prime Ministers are entrusted to lead the Government and take difficult decisions which often result in the taking of human life.

Sometimes in a time of crisis it is possible to have the time and space to debate issues and seek the view of the House, and set out the case to the nation as to why the UK should conduct military operations. At other times this is not the case – particularly when working in coalition with allied nations who all have different timetables, and when dealing with an opponent who may use any pause to move assets out of harms way.

A debate would achieve little beyond disrupting the timetable for activity and providing a means for cynical political opportunists to disrupt the UK’s standing on the world stage. While this may appeal to the lunatic fringe who are increasingly visible and influential in some UK political parties, it would not do the UK’s standing, reputation or credibility good.

To Humphrey, this was an occasion where the need to act at speed overtook the need to consult and listen to views. Where limited strikes are predicted, as part of a one-off operation, then provided they are deemed legal by the Attorney General, and assuming Cabinet agrees, then the Prime Minister of the day needs the freedom to act at speed if required to commit the nations armed forces to military operations.

Is the UK ‘irrelevant’?

Sadly, even as the fires were likely still burning in Syria from the strikes, twitter was filling up with ill informed commentators suggesting that somehow the contribution of four Tornados, escorted by four Typhoons meant that the UK didn’t matter and that we were somehow less of a nation as a result.

The first thing to note is that possessing the capability to conduct an offensive air mission into one of the worlds most potent (albeit on paper) Integrated Air Defence Systems is not something many air forces can do. To successfully deploy a cruise missile strike onto multiple targets and return without loss is a significant statement of capability.

While the images of French surface ships firing SCALP missiles (essentially a navalised Storm Shadow) are impressive, and perhaps more ‘cool’ than air launched storm shadow strikes, this does not mean France is somehow magically a more potent power than the UK.

Operating in a coalition means sharing the burden and bringing capabilities that are of value to the overall campaign goal. The UK possesses two specific capabilities that are keenly sought after – Storm Shadow and Brimstone, both of which are world leading ‘best in class’ capability for the roles they are employed in.

The Storm Shadow is a long range cruise missile optimised for striking command bunkers, using a dual warhead which punches through the reinforced outer layer, before detonating inside to cause significant internal damage. It excels at destroying command and control and other hardened facilities and is very much a key enabler for the RAF. The US in particular value it as a capability and are always keen to see it employed during coalition operations.

The question then becomes ‘what else could the UK contribute’? If you are operating in a coalition where the other partners can provide wider cruise missile capability, then your requirement for a TLAM strike diminishes. If you’re not targeting vehicles or IADs sites then you don’t need many of the weapons that are used regularly by Typhoon and Tornado aircraft in Iraq as part of OP SHADER. So, in a limited one off strike designed to target a very specific range of sites and not a general war situation, what else should the UK have done?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

It is likely that the UK provided a wide range of other capabilities and assets, which could (and Humphrey is merely speculating here) have included ISTAR platforms, maritime air defence capability through a Type 45 (in this case HMS DUNCAN), basing facilities for air platforms and the JPR capability at RAF AKROTIRI and assorted tanking and other duties as appropriate. All of this is not necessarily hugely glamorous but would have played a vital and unsung role in the operation.

For the UK what matters is the ability to project specific capability as part of a coalition. TLAM is not always the answer, and the suggestions that somehow the UK is irrelevant because it ‘only’ deployed 4 Tornados to conduct the strike are way off the mark. If you can deliver the desired effect with 8 missiles, then why unnecessarily put more aircrew at risk just to somehow feel good about airstrikes? Coalition military operations are about working together to achieve a common goal, not having some ridiculous contest to determine who is the ‘best’ power.

The final point to note is that for all the constant whining about how the UK isn’t a military power anymore, the reality is that in a very short period of time the British Armed Forces were able to deploy a highly advanced strike capability against a challenging target while operating over 3000km from the home base, and as part of an international coalition.

This is something that takes a lot of time, practise and experience to deliver – it is not something that most nations can do. A quick look at the NATO partners suggests that few of them would be in a position to do similar in the same timeframe. This is a real testament to the work done by the MOD to ensure that the armed forces are ‘ready to fight tonight’.

What Next?

As we look ahead it is difficult to see the Wests relationship with Russia improve soon. The conflation of both the Salisbury attack and their response, and their support for the Syrian regime means that in addition to being an international pariah, Russia  has little chance of being treated as a responsible nation. Instead there is likely to be a pattern of worsening international relations returning the West to a new Cold War with Russia, who will find bed fellows, not with other ideologues, but pariah states that seem intent on acting outside the normal rules of civilised behaviour. The Russian response to this will be challenging and likely to come where we least expect to see it happen.

There will be keen interest in the amount of damage caused by these strikes and whether the much vaunted Syrian IADS network, supported by the Russians was effective in shooting down incoming missiles. Other than random claims (which are impossible to verify) that missiles were shot down, it is not yet clear whether the IADS network was effective or not. The lessons from this will help planners assess their assumptions for future operations against similar networks and consider whether they pose as much of a threat as feared.

For the UK this incident is a good chance to highlight its continued value as a global leader and influencer. The chance to repay the USA and France for their support for Salisbury and continue to champion a core set of values is helpful. It is also from a messaging perspective vital that the UK and France show they can work together in alliance with the US to project force against a competent and credible foe, rather than leave the US to do all the work in isolation. President Macron and Prime Minister May have again highlighted the importance of the UK/French defence relationship in Europe.

There may be a case emerging for the UK to consider whether to put land attack capability on surface ships such as the Type 45 and 26. Both designs have the space and ‘plumbing’ necessary for such a purchase, which would be helpful in increasing the ability to contribute to international operations. While they would not have been needed last night, adding further land attack capability would be a useful enhancement to the force. The forthcoming defence review does provide an opportunity to review this again, and it is likely that the MOD will consider it further as a result of this operation.

We live in difficult and challenging times where the commonly accepted norms of the last century against the use of CBW are falling apart, and the West finds itself engaged in opposition to a series of powers determined to murder their own children in the most vile way possible. A failure to act, to hold nations to account for the standards we as civilised countries accept and to say ‘enough is enough’ would embolden those nations determined to walk a path of darkness, and which would be to our own shame.

It is easy to say ‘we need robust dialogue’ but when you have tried this for years without effect, and the killings continue, sometimes sending a strong clear and blunt message is the only solution left. We must hope that common sense prevails and this act brings the war closer to an end, and sends a message to other nations that the use of these vile weapons will never be tolerated.