Looking East - the growing defence relationship with the Asia Pacific region
With the announcement that the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea (DPRK) has conducted its 6th nuclear test this
weekend, the world once again has its attention drawn to the far east and its
potential for nuclear stalemate. Last week the UK Prime Minister Teresa May
visited Japan, and made announcements on the deepening of bilateral defence
links, while senior UK military officers once again visited the Republic of
Korea (ROK).
The UK finds itself engaged in this region, but also more
widely in collaborating with both Japan and the ROK. The purpose of this
article is consider these links and try to understand why the UK is deepening
its engagement with nations thousands of miles away and what do we bring to the
table?
The UK’s engagement with ROK goes back to the 1950s and
the Korean War, when over 1000 UK personnel were killed over three years
operating as part of UN Forces. This bloody, often forgotten war saw brutal
fighting occur and served as a wakeup call for rearmament to commence across
many NATO nations. Following the Ceasefire the UK removed its ground forces,
although some articles maintain that for many years there was a practise of
sending a platoon out from Hong Kong to man part of the De Militarized Zone
(DMZ) – but Humphrey can find no reference of when this ended.
To this day the UK Defence Attache remains a 1* posting,
and the UK plays an active part in the UN presence on the peninsula. There is a
growing depth of engagement between UK and ROK forces, with a number of
exercises occurring in the last few years involving both Army and RAF assets,
coupled with a high level of defence engagement (including multiple 4* visits).
In the UK system, being able to secure multiple 4* officer visits to a single
country in a short space of time indicates just how important that nation is to
your wider security policy, and its clear that the ROK is increasing in
importance. At the same time, there is a growing two way industrial engagement
between the two countries, with the ROK operating both Lynx and Lynx Wildcat,
whilst the UK has chosen the ROK to build the 4 ‘Tide’ class tankers currently
entering service for the RFA.
The Anglo-Japanese relationship has blossomed in recent
years, again following a period of relative decline. While there is only a
small number of UK military in the country, based primarily in the Embassy, the
UK continues to enjoy port access as part of the UN mandate in Korea (hence one
reason why Tides are visiting Japan) and there is a growing collaborative
relationship. The Typhoon was a serious contender for the recent Japanese
fighter competition, while the Japanese P1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft was
reportedly in contention (and rumoured to have been the favourite of some RAF staff)
for the recent UK MPA contract. There have also been a lot more visits and exercises
between the UK and Japan recently – for instance a deployment by RAF Typhoons
and support aircraft.
It is clear then that the UK maintains a close military relationship, and aspires to make it even closer in some
areas with both of these nations, but why and what value does the UK bring to
this relationship?
Both Japan and the ROK rely on the USA as their primary security
partner of choice, and have tens of thousands of US personnel based in their
respective territories. There is no doubt that both countries would always look
to Washington first for support, assistance and security in the event of a
major external threat. But, there is also a desire in both countries to look
beyond the prism of the US to find other partners who can perhaps relate more
easily to their situation.
The challenge Japan and ROK face in working so closely
with the US is simply that they are very small players in the relationship. For
all the lip service paid, it is not a relationship of equals, and the US will
bring an overwhelming level of military capability to any exercise or
operation, that neither Japan or the ROK can hope to emulate. By contrast the
UK is very much a ‘peer partner’ – technologically on a par with the US, but
also able to relate to the challenges of possessing smaller forces and
deploying on a similar scale. One comment candidly made to Humphrey is that one
reason both ROK and Japan like working with the UK is that they are treated as
genuine partners, not merely token participants.
The UK has a globally focused security policy and is
willing to look beyond its home waters. It recognises that some threats need to
be countered ‘downstream’ involving deployments outside of traditional areas,
and it recognises that working as a player in a coalition, and not in isolation
is the way to achieve this. These views chime with policy makers in Seoul and
Tokyo, who see the UK as facing similar challenges and issues to themselves,
and recognise genuine opportunities to work together as equals.
This is perhaps most vividly demonstrated in the Middle
East where the UK, Japan and ROK all operate a permanent military presence
built mainly around naval capability. All three nations contribute to the
Combined Maritime Forces, a 31-nation organisation led by a US 3* (Cdr 5th
Fleet) but whose deputy for the CMF role is an RN 1* (the UK Maritime Component
Commander). Both Japan and the ROK provide escorts for their own shipping and
to tackle wider counter piracy duties in the region. Japan has also invested
heavily in sending Minesweepers too, which have worked closely with the RN and
USN force based in Bahrain to help keep the Gulf free from the mine threat.
On a daily basis the Middle East sees UK and both
ROK& Japanese ships, aircraft and personnel working together operationally
to support international security. The benefits to all three countries are
clear – it is vital that the three great chokepoints in their area (the Suez
Canal, Bab-Al-Mendeb and Straits of Hormuz) remain open for merchant shipping –
closure due to piracy, terrorism or conflict would do enormous damage to all
three economies.
The UK and Japan have built a particularly close
relationship in this area, and earlier this year when the Japanese commanded
one of the CMF Task Forces with a 2* Admiral, an RN OF5 was the Chief of Staff
and a number of RN personnel were embedded across the TF HQ in a truly joint
Japanese led, UK supported effort. This reflects the high demand from Japan to
work closely with the UK on operations in future. Building closer links to
Japan and the ROK therefore helps protect our own national security in the
Middle East. As both countries take on a more confident role globally, the UK
will be well placed to advise, assist and hopefully export capability to them
to help improve their operational capability.
In the Asia Pacific region the UK remains an influential
player on issues such as North Korea, in part due to its wider diplomatic
presence. It is often forgotten that the UK has an embassy in Pyongyang,
allowing HMG to see the country daily and provide observations on what is going
on in the ‘hermit kingdom’. This presence alone is seen as being of real value
to many of the UKs allies, who genuinely place real value on the UKs ability to
deliver messages directly to the DPRK regime.
This diplomatic presence (which few other nations have),
coupled with the legacy of UK military engagement on the peninsula and the
enduring reach of UK military to deploy to the region means that while it is
not a massive player, the UK continues to exert more influence than some may
realise. For example the RAF has routinely deployed aircraft to conduct nuclear
‘sniffer’ missions in the aftermath of tests in the region. As a P5 member of
the UNSC, the UKs diplomatic influence is valued, as is particularly is the
perception of its means to influence a diverse group of allies, including
Washington. Many nations value their access to the UK as a means of shaping and
influencing thoughts elsewhere – there is a view that the UK gets taken
seriously by some nations in a way some other nations do not. Working with the
UK helps those nations get their message across indirectly.
What does the
future hold?
The future of UK engagement in the Asia Pacific region looks
brighter now than it has done for many years. The significant growth in
bilateral engagement between Japan and also ROK in region, coupled with growing
experience of operating together in the Middle East has gone a long way to
strengthen these ties.
The UK will never supplant itself as the primary partner
of choice to either country, nor will an unlikely version of NATO emerge due to
the ongoing simmering tensions between both ROK and Japan over the difficult
historical relationship. But the UK can offer itself as a partner of choice, a
partner who understands the challenges of being a smaller player with a larger
coalition partner and help to be a bilateral partner who is a genuinely trusted
friend.
Moving forward, the UK has an excellent opportunity to
develop and thicken its relationships with both countries, and take defence and
security co-operation to the next level. This doesn’t mean we’ll see permanent
RN detachments in the Asia Pacific region, but it does mean we’ll likely see
things like more regular joint exercises, more regular deployments by aircraft
and occasional ship visits. The Middle East, being a convenient ‘half way house’
represents the location where the bulk of co-operation will probably occur. Its
realistic to expect to see more joint staffing of CMF Task Forces, and regular
exercises between vessels in the region.
The fact that the UK will have access to excellent basing
facilities in Bahrain, coupled with more limited facilities in Duqm, Oman is
also likely to be of real interest to both Japan and the ROK as a means of
sustaining their own vessels. The UK’s long experience of deployed operations
and sustaining forces at distance will be valued – particularly as neither ROK
or Japans navys have a recent tradition of long distance task force deployments
like the RN does – as they grow, the UK is well positioned to advise and
assist.
Overall then regardless of the situation in DPRK, the UK
currently has a fantastic opportunity to work with Japan and ROK to deepen our
mutual relationships and to help become a preferred partner of choice for
international security issues. The benefits and rewards of this are potentially
enormous, providing they are grasped and handled properly. Exciting times
ahead, but hopefully not interesting ones!
You missed the potential for closer defence industrial links but other than that this is a good piece.
ReplyDeleteA news report on the Japanese TBS TV station made similar points this weekend. They also counterpointed the fact that whilst they could do noting to help with the integral operations of a US CVN, it was possible they could do so on a QE CV.
ReplyDeleteStarviking