Farewell Sir John Keegan
Humphrey was deeply saddened to read of the death of the esteemed author and military historian, Sir John Keegan. He was one of the greatest authors of military history of the late 20th century, and many of his books can be found on Humphreys bookcases.
Humphrey first discovered Keenan’s
work in his teens, and found the excellent analysis and writing style to be engrossing.
It was always a pleasure to read his books, and the world is a poorer place for
his passing. Similarly, his work on the Daily Telegraph provided first rate
analytical capability to that paper, enabling him to join many disparate facts
and events and turn them into a critical ‘so what’ assessment on the
implications of a situation. In many ways Keegan was an intelligence analyst in
all but name, and proponents of the value of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
could do worse than look at his media articles to show how well written work,
derived using the same information as everyone else had access to, could easily
be used to inform policy makers without being classified as ‘Top Secret Burn Before Reading’.
One of the most important roles
that Keegan played though was in his work at Sandhurst. Working alongside other
superb historians, such as the late Richard Holmes, he was able to educate an
entire generation of British Army Officers in the subtleties of the academic
study of the profession of war. The 1970s and 1980s saw almost a ‘golden
generation’ of academics emerge from Sandhurst, teaching and writing, and
making the move from being a lecturer through to being internationally renowned
historians. This was not a new move, for there has long been a strong academic
trend at all three service academies over many years, and where whole
generations of officers would have been brought into contact with their
theories and ideas. The academic studies teams would teach on strategy,
tactics, and history and try to bring the wider theoretical and conceptual understanding
of military conflict, and merge it with what the cadets were learning in their
basic training. This marked the start of a lifelong process of military education,
where throughout their careers, military officers returned to Staff College for
further updates on strategy, history and wider considerations.
What is perhaps most
interesting though is that although they were with the military, the majority
of these academic staff, including Keegan, do not appear to have served full
time in the military. This is perhaps the most significant aspect. By delinking
the military, and providing civilian tuition, these individuals were able to
look at developments in a different light – a step removed from the military;
they would not have the same emotional attachment to certain issues, and could
teach in a more objective manner.
The seeming diminution in
status of the academic staffs at the three academies is a real loss. Unlike in
previous years, Strategic Studies appears to be lower on the priority for training,
and the personalities coming into the role do not seem to enjoy the same
stature as their predecessors. In the RN the role appears to have been hived
off to a local university, while at Cranwell Airpower Theory is taught by
serving staff, who while experienced, perhaps are too closely linked to the
subject to be able to examine it in a truly objective manner. Only at Sandhurst
does a small academic team really remain, and even then it recruits relatively
junior civil service grades to carry out the role. A place on the Sandhurst
academic staff no longer seems to be the hugely important academic post that it
once was. Arguably it is less important, particularly as the majority of
officers join now with degrees – there is less need for the academies to act as
a finishing school, and better to dedicate resources at Shrivenham where a
truly world class academic package can be delivered.
Does this really matter
though? Some may feel that time in a training environment is best dedicated to
mastering the profession of arms, and not of learning about historical events
which are of limited relevance to an officer on their first appointment.
Humphrey though feels that this link between the military and academics is
crucial – they provide a uniquely independent and unbiased take, able to
discuss and educate on matters of concern without having a direct service bias.
They can train people to think and write, and initiate a lifelong love of
learning which underpins their ability to think and argue on behalf of their
service.
One only has to look at the
dearth of high quality military academics in recent years – while there have
been good ‘war diaries’ published, describing the experience of what it is to
command, usually by former soldiers, there is a lack of new faces on the block.
If one goes to academic conferences organised by the MOD, you usually encounter
the same old faces, well known in their day, but now gently edging towards
retirement. It feels as if there is a lack of new John Keenan’s or Richard
Holmes out there. The gap is being filled by so-called ‘defence commentators’
but these are usually single issue individuals obsessed with one dogma, theory
or belief, and unable to view other arguments against in a truly objective
manner, for fear it will threaten their own religion. One only has to look at
the turgid, tired old diatribe from the Phoenix Think Tank, which seems to hold
that Sea Harriers and Naval Aviation is the one true form of flying, and
anything else should be cast asunder. Alternatively look at the disappointingly
poor ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ written by an individual who had arguably not
benefitted from sufficient staff training or defence academic studies, and the
end result was a document which felt akin to an internet bulletin board ‘wish
list of how to fix bad things’ rather than a serious credible argument in
favour of policy or defence reform. In both cases though these individuals have
got media coverage – there is a lack of credible individuals emerging from
periods at a service academy who can step up and speak publicly about the
challenges of warfare, about the challenges of defence, and educate not just
the military, but the public at large. The loss of this talent is keenly felt,
and it remains to be seen where the next generation of Keenan’s and Holmes will
emerge from.
Farewell Sir John, we will
miss your analysis and ability to put an argument across far more than we
perhaps realise.
Here-Here with your final large paragraph and wider points made.
ReplyDeleteThe issue is, is there funding for such positions? How can we turn these positions into a more desireable one?
Perhaps we're not seeing new faces because they've either been swallowed up by these groups or private industry, or those surviving are simply too overwhealmed by work to take up such a position.
Then again, in the 70's and 80's period, we did not have the resources we have now at our fingertips.
As with degrees, I'm not officer class but I have a degree... not an ologie (though those would work in certain trades)... something that is now prevalent in the S/NCO ranks (in the US, this has been standard for a while).
Again wishing this site had more traffic.
Good stuff.