tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post4985614259701841094..comments2024-03-20T12:03:26.126+00:00Comments on Thin Pinstriped Line: Jumping into the unknown - the future of 16 Air Assault BrigadeSir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comBlogger31125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-79739935861433438592014-09-06T11:38:39.765+01:002014-09-06T11:38:39.765+01:00You have shared a great information about Marine S...You have shared a great information about <a href="http://www.omis.uk.com/index.php/insurances/all-risks" rel="nofollow">Marine Subsea Equipment</a> and <a href="http://www.omis.uk.com/index.php/insurances/business-travel" rel="nofollow">Business Travel</a>. <br />Which are very informative for us.ThanksAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00746003141049272497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-82261596962584666882014-06-08T15:59:32.326+01:002014-06-08T15:59:32.326+01:00If we really need to, can we not just move regular...If we really need to, can we not just move regular infantry companies into the deploying battalions until such time as the reserve infantry battalions reach full strength? JWHhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01637785437909299947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-67830186629515086172014-06-01T22:27:27.314+01:002014-06-01T22:27:27.314+01:0016 Air Assault Bde has always been a bit of an odd...16 Air Assault Bde has always been a bit of an odd duck - I suspect that when the decision was made to do away with 5 Airborne Bde and 24 AIRMOBILE Bde, the larger-than-average 16 Air Asslt Bde was a compromise to avoid removing a complete brigade. The changes now arguably finish what happened in the late 90s - two specialised brigades drop down to just one. 16 Air Asslt Bde's biggest strength has been that it's a formation held and trained at higher readiness on average than others. Some of the more specialised kit - Land Rover WMIKs, for example - have been proliferating out into the light infantry and the commandos since the deployment to Sierra Leone, and I suspect some of the activities 16 Air Asslt Bde have been doing will be swept up into the new Light Cav formations.<br /><br />There's no escaping the fact that the political decision has been made - the Army will reduce in scope and size, and manpower in the regulars will go as a result. Only a change in the political decision will change that - assuming that the money can be found to fund it - and I don't see much appetite to cut money from other departments to fund the MOD. I can only imagine how much worse the screaming would've been if the MOD hadn't been protected from the higher level of cuts other departments have taken.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-20565588649006088882014-05-31T12:56:30.738+01:002014-05-31T12:56:30.738+01:00UOR's are fine but add more to the woes of the...UOR's are fine but add more to the woes of the Treasury-Defence battle over the budget. Simply accepting all cuts is not the way to go.<br /><br />How about a balance of nuclear-conventional firepower/strength.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-76513205975312465122014-05-29T23:26:05.182+01:002014-05-29T23:26:05.182+01:00Hi anonymous - I'm wondering if you are the sa...Hi anonymous - I'm wondering if you are the same 'chap who runs a twitter page that you've blocked me from following despite slagging me off on it, and also a webblog that attacks this site too. The constant sniping, poor language and desire to attack seems pretty standard for that poster. Sir Humphreyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-68010239857197183722014-05-29T23:17:10.355+01:002014-05-29T23:17:10.355+01:00Hi anonymous
Thanks for your comment - while I ap...Hi anonymous<br /><br />Thanks for your comment - while I appreciate your point about 5 rapid reaction forces being deployed, lets look again at the SDSR assumptions. They clearly work to a 30,000 'best effort' across all three services. Thats the reality of our maximum deployment nowadays and can only be done if we stop all other deployments, and is done at significant risk to regeneration. <br /><br />The UK took a concious decision to reduce what it could sustainably deploy for major efforts after the SDSR, continuing a process begun in the SDR. So, in reality the chances of the UK being able to support more than 5 forces immediately is close to zero - but then again this still represents a more potent deployable force than any other nation outside the US. <br />So, its easy to say 'what if we need more' but I'd argue that we have no ability to deploy more anyway - this is in essence a reality measure. <br /><br />Also, don't forget the wider supporting elements are going to be stretched by a major deployment - sticking an ARG or airlift into a theatre is going to be a major drag on regeneration for other efforts - so even if the troops existed, the other equipment and assets may not. <br /><br />Finally, lets be realistic about when the UK has had to do back to back force generation at such levels in the last 50 years or so - arguably this hasn't been an issue and while we should never be cocky, we should plan on assumption its highly unlikely to occur without wider global situation changing significantly too. Sir Humphreyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-75199651690392138562014-05-29T23:10:29.603+01:002014-05-29T23:10:29.603+01:00Hi Derek,
Thanks for your comment.
The Admiral Lis...Hi Derek,<br />Thanks for your comment.<br />The Admiral Lister article is interesting - my sense was that it was a wider article on challenges of support for a professional publication, not a cheap shot at Govt policy, but I'd need to look at it in more depth before I could comment. Sir Humphreyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-53624573279491900432014-05-29T23:09:09.470+01:002014-05-29T23:09:09.470+01:00Hi Anonymous
The problem with saying 'sack peo...Hi Anonymous<br />The problem with saying 'sack people' is that it doesnt really solve the root problem that an army of 100,000 on current salary scales and planned defence budgets is simply not affordable. <br />The UK military is very well paid, but that comes at an enormous price, and arguably results in choices being made between equipment force structure, or unit structure - do you keep sufficient personnel to equip a Ship, or do you equip an Armoured Regiment? <br />Both the RN and the RAF are lean organisations, but the Army has managed to avoid the worst of the cuts for many years due to TELIC and HERRICK. The reality now though is that with a clear political decision taken that a force of roughly 8000 troops overseas is the most likely enduring effort, the affordability of more troops and equipment than required is called into question. <br /><br />Finally, on the issue of 'incompetent senior staffs' - its a classic 'blame game, but the challenges associated with it owe much to an overheated equipment programme filled with a lack of realism, the need to bring together multiple programmes at the same time and the reluctance to make cuts to actually cancel projects at a political level. The truth was that there was a £38bn black hole, that the EP was unaffordable and that when combined with the likely salary costs, something had to give.<br /><br />As for the 16AA example of 'borrowed kit', I could equally point to the emergence of a UOR system which was incredibly responsive to the needs of the units deployed - it was very rare to see requests being rejected unless they were clearly not urgent or operationally specific.<br /> Sir Humphreyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-22006375766090408092014-05-29T07:47:44.842+01:002014-05-29T07:47:44.842+01:00I hear what you are saying Sir H, but the reaction...I hear what you are saying Sir H, but the reaction forces you are talking about are heavy weight formations which have a very different role from the Para's and Marines. What happens if you need more than 5 rapid reaction battalions immediately - you aren't going to get 12 months to generate your force. <br /><br />I actually can't think of another army that uses the reactive/adaptive model - maybe the Germans in the Cold War but that's it. Every other force I can think of; US, French, Italians, Spanish, Dutch, Canadians, Australians, Germans etc prefer to have fewer units at full strength. We don't necessarily have to do what everyone else does of course, but it is easy to see that other armies don't have the issues we will have if coherent, trained units are immediately required.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-27120620874921721042014-05-29T00:15:30.210+01:002014-05-29T00:15:30.210+01:00@Sir H,
The tabloids of course and even the so-cal...@Sir H,<br />The tabloids of course and even the so-called quality press are probably a waste of time.<br />However some aviation or navy mags are just as bad with their bias towards one service or the other.<br />(Just to be clear I am the Anonymous who posted on the 25th 21:22, not the above comment)<br /><br />WaylanderAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-62403138544714533272014-05-28T19:50:42.779+01:002014-05-28T19:50:42.779+01:00Exactly. How much less is enough to face the uncer...Exactly. How much less is enough to face the uncertain? We keep enough nuclear weapons for the uncertain but not enough conventional forces for the uncertain? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-89701427721668854282014-05-28T16:42:13.794+01:002014-05-28T16:42:13.794+01:00The days when the UK had sufficient C130s availabl...<em>The days when the UK had sufficient C130s available to do brigade sized lift are gone forever – there is relatively little point keeping a full brigades worth of supporting airborne elements if you are unable to move them by air. The future air transport fleet size is going to struggle to sustain more than a battalion sized lift anyway, given availability of airframes in future. </em><br /><br />That isn't "less but more capable". That's just "less". Also, if we've managed to go from (50-odd * 4) old turboprop engines to (20-odd * 4) modern ones and get lower serviceability, we may as well give up. Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-614619232896759602014-05-28T14:07:11.894+01:002014-05-28T14:07:11.894+01:00It is sometime accurate unlike your rumours.It is sometime accurate unlike your rumours.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-61524407697405120122014-05-28T13:58:51.675+01:002014-05-28T13:58:51.675+01:00It is still an empty force.
Exactly which defence...It is still an empty force.<br /><br />Exactly which defence reform dont you agree with?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-63903801631030881002014-05-28T13:57:49.085+01:002014-05-28T13:57:49.085+01:001 PARA is the closest to UKSF so they match perfec...1 PARA is the closest to UKSF so they match perfectly well for the SFSG role.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-36513555991845838672014-05-28T12:37:48.939+01:002014-05-28T12:37:48.939+01:00This is just the usual magical thinking. Sacking a...This is just the usual magical thinking. Sacking a few politicians, senior officers and civil servants isn’t going to bring a single pound of that that £4-5 billion back. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-27859477326839857362014-05-27T17:28:58.098+01:002014-05-27T17:28:58.098+01:00Why can't another infantry battalion be made i...Why can't another infantry battalion be made into the SFSG so that 1 PARA can be reformed as the 3rd 16 AA formation?<br /><br />The adaptable force will have plenty of battalions under it's command, any one of which could be used for the role. It can be done, it just won't be through a combination of service politics and a lack of commitment when it comes to putting our money where our mouth is in terms of matching intent with the money and manpower needed to implement it.<br /><br />The post Herrick armed forces are supposed to be all about conducting small, sharp engagements with a light footprint and an emphasis on expeditionary 'strategic raiding' capabilities. So surely from the Army's point of view 16 AA should be at the top of it's list of priorities? Challengernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-42944665354600937362014-05-27T16:27:19.267+01:002014-05-27T16:27:19.267+01:00"but the reality is that an Army of 100,000 i..."but the reality is that an Army of 100,000 is unaffordable given current personnel costs and something has to give."<br /><br /><br />I'm afraid much of your argument here, and elsewhere, is diluted because, like MoD, you refuse to address the huge waste that continues to be the norm. For example, Nimrod MRA4. That one example was around £4-5 Billion. Why should Army, RN or RAF numbers "have to give" because of the incompetence of Ministers and senior staffs? I'd rather get rid of those who wasted the money, promote those who don't; and then consider what the real budget looks like before making deeper cuts. The cuts we see now are a knee-jerk reaction whose main aim is to conceal failures. <br /><br />As for "cap badge mafia", there is no doubt it exists and, in my experience, 16AAB has actually suffered more directly than many. In late 2003 a key element was deployed with essential kit loaned from one company, and other kit gifted by another. The GOC later called the former "the system of choice in AFG" at a press briefing, only to be pulled to one side by an aide and told, err, we haven't actually bought it boss, some Arty staff officers refused to sanction it for 16AAB, so some civvy did the business and begged it off the company on long term (free) loan". <br /><br />Always two sides the story. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-65287827377719661772014-05-27T09:50:17.256+01:002014-05-27T09:50:17.256+01:00Hi there,
I agree there is a natural concern that...Hi there, <br />I agree there is a natural concern that the adaptive force has less in the ORBAT than the reaction force. But, if we accept that Falklands style contingencies are exceptionally unlikely, and the premise that there is only a finite force level that can be supported (roughly brigade level), then we look to time as the main driver. The time required to rustle up reinforcements to the adaptive force is going to sit nicely in line with the roulement time - e.g. force goes in early, you spend 6-12 months using reaction force, then rely on adaptive force at 12 months plus to go in as follow on. This is plenty of time to generate and work up a force, when in reality there is little likelihood of any Brigade sized deployments of this nature for many years to come - the desire to do so just isn't there any more.Sir Humphreyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-60600147593638626392014-05-27T09:47:06.432+01:002014-05-27T09:47:06.432+01:00HI Anonymous, I've long realised that the idea...HI Anonymous, I've long realised that the idea of accuracy in Defence Reporting is unlikely to happen. Too many editors have clear ideas about how to spin a story in favour of a wider agenda, and the story 'routine reorganisation of British Army' is unlikely to get column space. Unless its doom and gloom it won't be published - remonstrating is a complete waste of time! Sir Humphreyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-14744523259752971322014-05-27T06:02:55.292+01:002014-05-27T06:02:55.292+01:00As a former soldier (Italian Army), I cannot help ...As a former soldier (Italian Army), I cannot help but be concerned about the adaptable force infantry battalions. Common cap badges between active and reserve components can and do help, but true unit cohesion takes much time and shared effort. Forget about shipping a random light infantry battalion to a war zone or peacekeeping operation overnight. Which is fine if you have a crystall ball to foresee the future with. Who could've foreseen the Fslklands war in late 1981, oroperatoons in Afghanistan in early 2001?<br /><br />This leads us to another issue:lack of building blocks will make it far harder to organize the "Brigade ++" deployments seen in Afghanistan. The British Army will have less ability to organize a Brigade + deployment, sustain it for a while and later on replace it with a Brigade or Brigade- unit. There will be too few assets to go around. Still, the UK will still own more deployable assets than any other European country, which is worrying. The West is not done with contingency operations, or worse.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-12166224431705865512014-05-26T14:57:36.139+01:002014-05-26T14:57:36.139+01:001 PARA is unfortunately needed for the SFSG. I wou...1 PARA is unfortunately needed for the SFSG. I wouln't trust the RAF Regiment to handle that role.<br /><br />Yes 16 AA is puny compared to the Royal Marines (which may have seen cuts too). 3 Commando boasts 3 Battalions, another intel/support unit, Engineer battalion, artillery and assault units.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-21931296304405577652014-05-26T14:54:51.425+01:002014-05-26T14:54:51.425+01:00They will be apparently backed up by the Reserve u...They will be apparently backed up by the Reserve units they are paired up with.<br /><br />The Adaptable Force is a broken force with no clear indication which two units are multi-role. Those in 7 are rotated to Cyprus most of the time and there are non Scottish units in 51 and Scottish unit in 38 Irish!<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-52130006780251072582014-05-26T12:23:15.657+01:002014-05-26T12:23:15.657+01:00Whilst i agree Army 2020 has little need or room f...Whilst i agree Army 2020 has little need or room for an over-sized 16th Air Assault Brigade of 8,000 people with all the bells and whistles it has up until now enjoyed i still worry about such a drastic reduction in size and capability. The rule of 3 for generating a cycle of high-readiness-training-recovery is one that most other formations still seem to follow, so how can only 2 parachute battalions deliver the same levels of availability?<br /><br />Id be far happier with the overall plan if it included bringing 1 Para back into the fold to provide 3 maneuver formations.<br /><br />I think their is a future for the Parachute Regiment but it's one that has to increasingly shed itself of the airborne image and instead focus on what it has actually become which is essentially a high-quality, highly reactive 'kick in the door' capability. Challengernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-8704244455660765202014-05-26T11:47:43.371+01:002014-05-26T11:47:43.371+01:00As we remember the advent of the First World war, ...As we remember the advent of the First World war, we should reflect that the glorious military success of the 19th century was no match for the new realities of the 20th century and we had to adapt very quickly. Likewise the new revised and flexible forces which saw success in the Second World War proved less appropriate for the problems of Afghanistan.<br />It's not just the money, it's the colour of the enemy and trying to retaliate against the unknown is fruitless by definition. The only constant is opposition to change. Any change, and it is a safe bet to assert that change is bad. There's a lot of mileage in that, but no sales of newspapers occur because of good news. Those successes will be small, but frequent, and ultimately accomplish the sort of change which is beneficial.<br />The other newspaper article which caught my eye the other day (Daily Mail 24th May!!), concerned an Admiral Lister complaining about lack of money causing the Navy to fail on operations. I don't know whether he went on to describe how the Navy was going to tackle these problems or was just bemoaning his lot. If the latter, he shouldn't be an Admiral.<br />He was an Engineer too, which saddened me in particular.Derek McBridenoreply@blogger.com