The UK & the Middle East - why do they matter to each other?

The recent news that Qatar has signed for the purchase of 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from the UK is a welcome piece of good news. It represents a significant defence contract in Qatar, and is a tangible symbol of the UK reaping the reward for its sustained re-engagement in the Gulf since 2010.

Following the UK withdrawal in 1973, official policy was to have a non-permanent military presence in the region, and no bases or other long-term infrastructure were formally sanctioned. This led to the mildly odd position that while the region was one of the busiest for the UK operationally, these tasks were funded and looked at as discrete operations, and funded accordingly, and not as part of a coherent longer-term presence.

There was a clear perception by many Gulf states that the UK was losing interest in the region, and that it saw its interests as lying closer to home -a relationship that reached its nadir under the Brown government, where hardly any Ministers visited or engaged with their Gulf counterparts. During the same time the US, France and other nations were quietly ramping up their visits and presence, while UK officials and industry reported back in terms of ever greater frustration the sense of bewilderment felt by Gulf nations and leaders whose instinct was to turn to the UK, but felt abandoned by them.

Since 2010 there has been a step change in engagement with the region, with a vast increase in visits by Ministers, bilateral talks and a regular through flow of senior officials and Parliamentarians into all the countries to re-engage, rebuild strained relationships and seek to open the door to future UK opportunities.

The historial presence - Mespotamia

Today the UK finds itself in a significantly stronger position in the region, with military forces permanently based in every Gulf state, albeit in varying levels, a significantly stronger trading and investment relationship and a sense that to the rulers in the region, the UK is ‘back’. We are now starting to see the dividends of this sustained investment in relationships, and the hope must be that this is the start of a new era for the UK in the region.

Why Does the Gulf Matter to the UK?

To Humphrey, in very broad terms the Gulf matters to the UK for three key strategic reasons:

a.       The presence of three of the worlds great maritime Chokepoints.

b.       The presence of regional security challenges that if left unchecked threaten UK and allied security.

c.        The opportunity to invest in, and work with growing economies for mutual benefit

The three great maritime chokepoints are the Suez Canal, the Bab-Al-Mendab straits and the Straits of Hormuz. It is essential for long term UK security that these are kept open and secure for mercantile traffic – a sustained closure would wreak enormous damage to the UK economy.

Simply put an enormous amount of goods shipped to the UK, plus almost all of its Liquid Natural Gas and other energy supplies must transit at least two, often three, of those chokepoints in order to reach the UK. The ships, be they LNG carriers or major container ships work to tight deadlines to support the global markets. A failure to get a series of shipments carrying electronic goods and toys into Southampton could reduce supplies for local shops, potentially ruining their Christmas trading periods and doing economic damage. A failure to keep the flow of LNG tankers sailing would lead to the energy supply in the UK being threatened, to the extent that the lights may go out. The ability to have a warm happy Christmas in the Midlands depends on merchant ships being able to sail without hindrance through the Southern Red Sea.

There are an enormous number of regional security challenges, not just in the Gulf but more widely that have the impact to destabilise UK security. There remain enormous tensions in the relationship with Iran, whose activities threaten regional stability – particularly in civil wars in the Yemen and Syria, and whose activities at sea in the Gulf pose a credible risk to shipping. A misjudged Iranian response could do real harm to securing UK energy supplies were the Straits of Hormuz to be even temporarily closed.

More widely the Gulf sits adjacent to the Horn of Africa – currently the scene of untold suffering and devastation as a combination of civil wars, famine and natural disaster is leading to population migration on an enormous scale. Instability in the Horn leads to people movements into Yemen, resource depletion as fishing increases and piracy as desperate people seek any way possible to find money for food. The impact on the UK economy is felt when insurance prices rise to cover risks from piracy and organised crime, which helps rise product costs. The wider instability is felt in terms of states teetering on the brink of collapse, and the need to prevent vacuums emerging which can be exploited by terrorist organisations as a safe space to prepare for attacks on the UK or its allies.

Finally, the Gulf matters because it has enormous cash resources to invest, and a workforce that is growing in size. There are tremendous opportunities for UK industries to invest and build long term partnerships with many countries locally – who in turn are seeking means to generate jobs for a growing population of angry, and often increasingly radicalised youth. Investing in opportunities, bringing jobs to those who need them and working together to secure a positive future helps build chances for UK industry, stabilises nations from risk of insurrection and helps keep the region open for opportunity.

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How does the UK matter to the Gulf?

To the Gulf nations the UK represents a credible long-term partner whose support matters. This is borne out in three key ways:

a.       Providing military advice, support and defence

b.       Acting as a voice to represent their interests with third parties

c.        Providing access to investment opportunities.

The UK is seen as a nation who can deploy credible military capability to act as a guarantor of security in a crisis. Most Gulf nations recognise that in isolation they cannot defend themselves against an external threat (usually Iran), and rely on the presence of allies to serve as a visible deterrent. The message is clear – invade us, attack us and you run the risk of war with the UK (and other allies).

The visible presence of UK assets on either a permanent or high profile temporary basis is keenly sought after. For many years after the 1973 withdrawal the Gulf states sought a return to a permanent presence, not for a specific operation, but as a more general deterrent. The ability of the UK to bring a highly capable force in to theatre, sustain it and employ it effectively is also crucial. The Gulf nations know that the UK is prepared to employ force if required – the same cannot be said of every nation, so they are keen to work with the ones that matter.

Similarly, the UK is seen as having a moderating influence and ability to positively message Gulf interests with third parties. The level of access enjoyed in Washington DC or with EU partners is noted and seen as having real value. Being able to represent your interests to Washington, while getting other partners like the UK who are listened to in order to make the same case is crucial. The UK matters to the Gulf because it has access, influence and an ability to persuade others to deliver.

The UK is also valued because it is far more conciliatory and respectful than some larger countries. The UK approach of discretely raising issues of concern, not publicly ‘naming and shaming’ goes down well too. There is also a sense that when dealing with London, it is as an equal and not a supplicant.

Finally, the UK matters because it represents a safe haven for investing capital to make greater profits, and has a range of industries that can equally invest in the Gulf. To that end it is worth viewing major arms deals, such as the Qatari Typhoon deal, through the prism of being an economic investment to upskill the workforce and get high tech investment into the region. What Gulf Nations want is the means to build up employment for their people in order to reduce long term tensions, and make their nations credible in the post oil industry world. Look for instance at the Saudi Arabian vision 2030 – a keynote document setting out how the Kingdom proposes to develop further. The UK matters in this because of the industrial potential to invest and develop these countries.

What is the Defence Relationship like?

Today the UK has a permanent military presence in every Gulf Nation. This in broad terms breaks down as follows:

Country	Presence
Bahrain	UKMCC 1* HQ, 4 x MCMV and 1 x LSD(A),
Kuwait	British Military Advisory Training Team (1* lead, approx. 40 staff)
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Training Teams (tri-service), exchange officers (at up to 1* level) in Saudi National Guard, support to delivery of Air Force projects (at up to 3* level)
Oman	Duqm – small logistics presence, plans to establish Regional Land Training Hub (Army training centre), large group of loan service personnel (approx 100 at up to 2* level),
Qatar	UKACC 1* HQ, use of Al Udeid airbase for aircraft operations (83 EAG), exchange officers
United Arab Emirates	Substantial RAF Presence at Al Minhad to support wider UK middle east operations, exchange personnel and loan service officers.

Underpinning this physical presence is a regular and varied series of exercises in the region ranging from low level training, such as between the Royal Marines and the Bahrainis, up to the large scale – like operating with the Saudis in the Red Sea, or Exercise Saif Sarea which is held with Oman. There are also a wide number of units passing through, or operating in the region which make use of these facilities.

In practical terms the UK has the single greatest foreign military presence in the region after the USA. It is dispersed and often not widely promoted, but the breadth of places where UK personnel will be found is quite astonishing. It sends a clear message to the region that the UK is committed to their defence.

Having a permanent presence, even in the form of low level attaches and exchange officers helps facilitate door opening in a crisis. Anyone who has worked in the region for a while is familiar with the need to cultivate relationships and know whose mobile phone number really matters, and when wasta is needed. Maintaining personnel across the region helps build networks, access and influence with senior decision makers, whose approval can be critical when overflights are needed, or a ship is required to dock urgently. There is enormous intangible benefits accrued from having people who know the system, know who to call and know who to call in a favour with in a crisis.

More widely the UK benefits by being able to build longer term relationships that make the case for defence and security exports. Letting nations work with equipment, see how good the UK set up is and help them understand the potential offered by airframes such as Typhoon is a great way to build the case for sales. It is a slow business and not one rewarded by an instant response, but a steady level of engagement by military personnel helps support UK economic security.

On a practical level, having good close interaction and working together means it is possible to have difficult conversations. The ongoing civil war in Yemen is an example where the UK has been able to speak candidly and provide advice to steer things to an appropriate solution, but in a manner which respects the host nation. Understanding the Middle Eastern culture is important – it is better to work to solve problems together, than taking a moral high ground stand, being isolated and then not getting the meetings or access needed to lobby for change. The UK can have these conversations, rather than being isolated and unable to influence change for the better. To walk away from these export opportunities for the sake of the moral high ground merely means that instead Russia or China will fill the void.

What are the future challenges?

As the UK looks to the future, the challenge is to not get complacent. Seven years of sustained engagement is now starting to bear fruit, but this is the beginning and not the end of the process. The challenge in Qatar will be to continue to engage with, and work alongside the Qataris for the medium term and not walk away now that the deal is signed.

Developing the relationship in a manner which meets the dual Gulf requirements of buying security by economically tying the UK into the nation, but also upskills the workforce will be challenging. As the UK defence industry evolves into offering more multi-national solutions for aerospace products, the opportunity for big deals like the Saudi Project of the 1980s diminishes. The future offer may have to rely on a mix of UK defence engagement to win major contracts for the private sector in areas like construction, cyber security or health. The UK will have to work effectively, leveraging its capabilities across government to win business.

The Gulf Nations will be looking for commitment and presence to support their long-term development goals – if the UK adopts a series of silos, whereby defence plays no involvement in efforts to win a health contract, then the opportunities for the UK diminish. Ensuring planners in Main Building understand that scrapping an exercise could impact on a UK education sector bid losing and causing jobs to be lost is essential – the future must be a coherent cross government approach to the region.

For the UK the challenge is to ensure continued access and stability. On a practical level the current generation of rulers are aging and while well disposed of to the UK, the views of their (many) potential successors are perhaps less well understood. The next generation will not have the same view of the UK – it will be positive, but different. There will be no sense of a ‘blood debt’, and access will be granted by our current actions, not past deeds.

The growing presence of foreign nations in the region also poses a challenge. For the UK ensuring the security of the three chokepoints is essential to our long term strategic interests. Yet in the Red Sea, the potential already exists to see Russian, Chinese and Iranian naval bases established between Suez and the BAM. There is a real threat that the long term assured access of the Royal Navy, allies and merchant traffic to the Red Sea can no longer be taken for granted in future. It may be the case that to get to the Gulf, we must be prepared to fight our way in.

The Gulf is the region where the UK is most likely to deploy a full formed military package in future – for all the aspiration of doing more in the Far East, the Middle East and Indian Ocean will represent the main area of commitments.  The USA seems to be shifting its force posture ever more East, meaning that the UK will be expected to use QUEEN ELIZABETH as the carrier for the region – one reason the USA was so supportive during the ‘carrier gap’ was the quid pro quo that QEC would ease the pressure on their own carrier deployment cycles.

The next 10-20 years pose an enormous set of challenges and opportunities for the UK in the region. There are huge security challenges that must be overcome – just dealing with the legacy of Yemen will take years to rebuild and recreate a broadly functional society. The potential for full on state collapse and human catastrophe in East Africa and the ensuing impact on the Gulf cannot be forgotten either. This is without considering what may happen in the relationship with Iran and how this evolves over time.

Added to this is the complexity that new players are emerging in the region. The UK has a privileged position now, but Russia is increasingly present as an arms dealer (Bahrain declared 2017 to be the year of Russia) and as western human rights lobbying reduces arms exports, will likely step up its physical sale of equipment and presence – although this is unlikely to result in permanent bases.

China too is far more present in the area, with their counter piracy task force based near Yemen now entering the Gulf more regularly, and slowly expanding relationships which in turn may see increased efforts to win influence from the West. Chinese interests align with the UK in some ways – with both nations needing the three chokepoints to remain open, but China will be keen to win export business (particularly for drones and advanced fighters) where possible.

This is a complex challenging region where small actions by tactical players, like a suicide bomber in a boat, an angry fisherman waving an AK47 to scare away a ship, or presence of mines in coastal waters can have massive strategic repercussions. The UK needs to be present to advise our allies, provide niche capabilities where required to support and be ready to take action to ensure our long term strategic interests are protected.

Without doubt the Middle East is on the cusp of major changes, and the UK needs to be able to respond to them, using both traditional and new methods to ensure its three core strategic goals are protected, while reassuring our long-standing friends and allies of our enduring commitment to protecting them. This requires a truly strategic approach over decades, not years, and a willingness to invest and not take short term ‘in year savings measures’ to save thousands at the cost of millions in lost business. The Middle East more than anywhere else shows the need for truly joined up Government.