tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-62543625044959803772024-03-19T08:47:45.204+00:00Thin Pinstriped LineObjective analysis of defence and global security issues. Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comBlogger662125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-77202932599585057052024-03-16T16:36:00.005+00:002024-03-16T16:36:38.838+00:00The Price of 'Global Britain' .<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The MOD is apparently the “Ministry of Debauchery” with
overpaid and underworked ‘woke’ officials and senior officers gallivanting around
the world to luxury hotels, spending hundreds of millions of pounds of taxpayers
money on jollies, while our brave boys suffer at home. That’s the latest
diatribe from the Telegraph, whose ongoing crusade to fight the deep state forces
of waste & woke, wherever they may lurk is now firmly fixed on that bastion
of leftwing hippy nirvana that is (checks notes), the British Armed Forces… Alternatively
there is perhaps more here than meets the eye?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">According to FOI releases seen by the Telegraph, but which
don’t appear to have been hosted on the MOD website yet, the MOD has spent over
£300m on hotels and £350m on rail and air travel since 2018 (£650m). This works
out at roughly £2.5m per week, covering the approximately 140,000 regular,
30,000 reserve and 60,000 civil servants who make up the MOD. Broken down, each
person in defence is spending about £500 per year on travel – although of course
it doesn’t really work like this. Does it represent value for money though?</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJj1_tPL9VnhycfbQ-4zsFBVTKnta8RukxaxU5dQmmeLRyMeAY4CZBjHMD87-QjLqzj7rpnRlUdHCXaQWhZx2cjtjW_ryH0PntNXBzbeYN0YwDrXMjMCc8TaHKeW_wC9YEmQX8xbtRUGznNLmuVJoqQnLWFcK5mH3xwQICo6DmmP7kQVVmGCbBde1YZ_X9/s1200/SCA-20220716-797-MFFP%20Vespina%20RIAT-215.jpg.iCfL_qTgMWATAA.qDSPQDjG2U.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJj1_tPL9VnhycfbQ-4zsFBVTKnta8RukxaxU5dQmmeLRyMeAY4CZBjHMD87-QjLqzj7rpnRlUdHCXaQWhZx2cjtjW_ryH0PntNXBzbeYN0YwDrXMjMCc8TaHKeW_wC9YEmQX8xbtRUGznNLmuVJoqQnLWFcK5mH3xwQICo6DmmP7kQVVmGCbBde1YZ_X9/s320/SCA-20220716-797-MFFP%20Vespina%20RIAT-215.jpg.iCfL_qTgMWATAA.qDSPQDjG2U.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2022</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">There are lots of good reasons why the MOD would spend money
on T&S to support its goals. Most practically, its an operational
department with people based and working across the entire globe. There are
British personnel deployed in scores of countries, ranging from singleton defence
attaches through to thousands of troops on operations. On any given day there
will be UK MOD (e.g military and civilian) working in dozens of nations on all
manner of jobs from engaging in defence staff talks, providing training to local
militaries, helping prepare exercises or operations, supporting defence export competitions
for UK industry, attending major conferences where the UK is a leading player
or simply carrying out the routine business of Defence.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">You cannot be a globally deployed military power and not run
up a large bill for travel and subsistence. To give a few vignettes of the sort
of travel that is going on daily across the MOD, you only need to look at the roulement
of personnel to Las Vegas to support the wider RAF Predator operations at
Creech AFB or participation in Red Flag at Nellis. There are regular crew rotations
for the Batch 2 RIVER class OPVs involving flying crews around the world to
join their ships, be it in the West Indies or the Far East. The Army has
personnel based in Nepal and Brunei who may need to return to the UK for
different reasons too. All of these require long haul air travel and accommodation
on the way. In the US the huge presence of hundreds of exchange and liaison
staff across the nation means regular travel to different locations for meetings,
while in Europe there will be a constant flow of staff moving to talks in NATO HQs
across the continent or supporting bilateral diplomatic talks. The war in
Ukraine will have seen a significant increase in people needing to travel to Eastern
Europe for essential activities to support Ukraines ongoing fight for freedom
against the evil that is the Putin regime. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The point is that the global nature of the activity and the
sheer scale and diversity of it means you need to travel. Some will argue that you
should use military transport to do this – a great idea with just one major
flaw, which is that as a result of defence cuts which in the last few years
have reduced RAF aircraft strength by over 30%, the withdrawal of the C130 and
BAE146 fleets means that there is no spare capacity to fly people around – the A400M
force size is not sufficient for the jobs it has, let alone trying to reduce
the T&S bill of the MOD. There is no ‘communications fleet’ really
available anymore for local flying – look at any guides to the Cold War armed
forces and most major Commands usually had a couple of aircraft that could fly
people around as needed for shuttle missions. These have long been scrapped on cost
grounds, so there is no capacity to do the job ‘in house’. Finally even when
Govt does go ‘in house’ using the Titan Airways charted Airbus or the VIP Voyager,
they come under fire from papers like the Telegraph for using a private
solution and not using corporate travel. Plus ca change…<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Given there is a need for travel, is it really luxury cocktails
at the Ritz on the public account? Anyone with any experience of trying to book
travel with the MOD will laugh out loud at the idea that they can live it up in
luxury hotels. Like all major companies and government departments, the MOD has
highly stringent policies on approval of travel, usually needing senior approval
to get permission to do so – which during times of particularly tight budgets
can lead to situations where very senior officers time is spent not leading
their organisation, but instead approving travel requests. Such policies may
sound good, but lead to odd situations. The author vividly recalls some years
ago watching a 3* military officer wince as he was told he’d need to get
approval from CDS to travel abroad on a £60 Easyjet flight for a particularly important
visit. Watching very senior staff who early in their careers were trusted to
fire nuclear weapons suddenly being told they could not even think of using their
own budget to travel speaks volumes about the chances of a ‘culture of empowerment’
being successfully implemented in the MOD. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If approval to travel is given then there are established budget
rates for accommodation bookings. The precise rate isn’t publicly available,
but it was described online as being ‘about enough to afford a Travelodge or a
premier inn on a good day’. The reality is that staff are required to book at the
cheapest hotel for their trip, and cannot book a luxury one outside of the ‘cap
rate’. On the occasions when the booking is above the authorised limit as no
cheaper accommodation is available, staff need special permission to exceed the
rate, and which is recorded and monitored. Woe betide anyone thinking they can
sneak into the Ritz when accommodation was available elsewhere. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Much of the argument in the Telegraph article
was based on quoting room rates outright, and assuming that the MOD was paying the
same rate. Its worth noting that like any major organisation, the MOD will
almost certainly benefit from corporate rates that are significantly below the ‘rack
rate’ they’d charge a walk up guest. To get an idea of the scale of discounts
hotel chains may offer, look at how much cheaper the ‘US Government’ rate is
for US hotels when booking there – often the saving can be 20-30% lower – and its
likely that the MOD enjoys similar priced discounts. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Similarly with airline travel, there is a push for cheaper is
better at any price. There are plenty of MOD staff with horror stories to tell
of travel cells booking a hugely complex itinerary of international travel with
multiple stops en route to save £50 and fly economy, when flying business
directly may only have cost £200 more and saved 18hrs of travel each way. The
policies on flying are economy, with business travel only approved in the most
exceptional cases and usually on the clear understanding that the people are
going straight to work on arrival and return. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg9zUrpQUfU5wfkrOu9HEa6xpjfa1YGqsrKZ7TeQ3zJIU7TiKnFaiS8uvXpdJzTkX53vkBgrzAfwhCTwTxwa0YiV0o9R2e_KK_x4hAWkOSLKEA4uBL0W6ihDAuFHZ98cR4ST8qbPJvn_BqKyQbPG5b7QitUvco1L4E1_jWW-xvOFdoCzPLVYk4SlTNEvgzg/s1200/LAND-2009-068%20032.jpg.iCfIsqLgMWATAA.wo9w05hv1F.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="760" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg9zUrpQUfU5wfkrOu9HEa6xpjfa1YGqsrKZ7TeQ3zJIU7TiKnFaiS8uvXpdJzTkX53vkBgrzAfwhCTwTxwa0YiV0o9R2e_KK_x4hAWkOSLKEA4uBL0W6ihDAuFHZ98cR4ST8qbPJvn_BqKyQbPG5b7QitUvco1L4E1_jWW-xvOFdoCzPLVYk4SlTNEvgzg/s320/LAND-2009-068%20032.jpg.iCfIsqLgMWATAA.wo9w05hv1F.jpg" width="203" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright </span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Travelling abroad is more complex as depending on where you
go, hotels may vary in both price and safety standards. The FCDO usually conduct
inspections of all hotels at their Posts to know where is safe to stay - e.g.
meets fire regulations, has fire exits, meets food hygiene standards and is not a brothel in disguise (which has
happened to at least one traveller the author knows), and where the terrorist
threat is higher, has good security measures in place. In more challenging
locations it may be the case that Western visitors will stand out, so for their
own safety they may need to stay in certain hotels. This naturally can cost
more -anyone familiar with the Middle East will know there is a vast gap
between the local 3* hotel and one intended for Western visitors – this in turn
means that staff will often stay in what sound like nicer hotels but do so for
their own safety standards. It is not unreasonable to expect that when asking
staff to travel, you pay to put them up in hotels that meet these basic
standards.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One line of attack in the Telegraph was that the MOD was staying
in Las Vegas. The reason the MOD looks like it is staying in places like Las
Vegas is simple – there is a large RAF presence in the Nevada area, often in remote
locations where on base accommodation is not possible and where the nearest hotels
are in Las Vegas itself. The Civil Service is not flying out to Vegas to put it
all on black and solve the ‘black hole’ in the EP – rather they are going for
essential activity linked to exercises and operations with our closest ally. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In London the MOD was attacked for not booking into the
Victory Services Club or the Union Jack Club which are apparently ‘cheaper’. Both
sites are private members clubs, so not open to MOD booking. Also, the MOD bill
may well cover hosting inbound VIP visits by senior delegations for talks and
activities – in those cases, it may be more appropriate to host very senior
delegations in local luxury hotels next to MOD, such as the Horseguards hotel,
rather than sending 4* visitors to the less salubrious locations of facilities
that are essentially a Junior Ranks and NCO’s mess. Defence diplomacy sometimes
comes with a bit of a price tag attached to it, but the long-term benefits in
terms of access and economic benefits of orders for UK industry would surely
justify spending a few hundred pounds extra per night on a decent hotel versus
ideological puritanism. If the UK won’t look after our guests on an official
level, plenty of European partner nations will happily wine, dine and win their
business instead… This report also doesn’t seem to take into account is that
much of the travel will also be domestic – the cost of sending staff to
meetings around the UK or visiting industry or other locations. There is a shortage
of military accommodation to put people up in, so staying in the local mess isn’t
always practical as there are no beds to sleep in. If you want to reduce the estate,
you reduce the places where people can sleep if needed.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Its also worth comparing the MOD spend to industry – while it
is hard to get detailed figures for corporate T&S budgets, there are
indications online that in 2023 in the USA alone, Amazon spent $483m just on
air travel, while Deloitte spent $284m. This just covers travel for US staff,
but highlights that in one year Amazon spent roughly the same on airfare for US
staff as the MOD did in 5 years – highlighting that the travel figure represents
surprisingly reasonable value for money. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Ultimately its hard to work out what the Telegraph is angry
about here beyond the fact that the world is changing in a way that it seems to
be scared of. For years the paper has demanded a ‘Global Britain’ with a
presence of British troops and engagement across the world to support wider
British interests. It has also angrily railed against what it sees as laziness
on the part of the Civil Service for not coming to work and instead working
remotely most days. It is therefore a bit odd to see the Telegraph angry at the
MOD pushing a global Britain agenda and incurring the costs associated with it,
while it is also angry that Civil Servants are travelling and therefore ‘in the
office’. What exactly that they want because their entire argument makes no logical
sense. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br />Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-70675337189559621682024-03-08T22:02:00.002+00:002024-03-08T22:02:21.315+00:00Is The MOD Budget Really Growing? Arguably No.<p> </p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Here is a simple question with a very complicated answer. How
big is the MOD defence budget for 2024/2025? Depending on which official HMG
source you look at, it could be £48.6bn, £52.8bn, £55.6bn or £70bn. It’s a bit confusing
to say the least, but its also important due to the growing row over whether defence
spending will rise because of the latest budget in the UK. The MOD has stated
that the budget is rising (although as noted its unclear by how much) while
many commentators believe that it is falling. What on earth is going on? The author has spent many hours going through budget
documents, policy statements and looking at row upon row of excel spreadsheet
data to try to understand what is happening. He is not a financial expert, and
this blog represents his strictly personal analysis of the situation – but it’s
based on a reasonable amount of reading around the subject.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQJ_9WFsc0WaSlpuRNXAxLNDoJ53p_cPP5EUR5vsqjSrw7NTSt6VKZKV6p4xtO9dG-d2KN7LxeXyFtxN7yKMfXDT0xnwmk0AzJ8ejEMlQvh7FiCNy8iSh8AZP07omFl96GqCg2m37uO6WeflwLiFrzRHSMkbB7Y7lcXLMGJln_MwdS3xNz9akntnDGgJJD/s1200/MRM-20240303-0101-PWLS26-0148.jpg.iCf8yvbfMcvts79jYBMA.MgK7xEekMS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQJ_9WFsc0WaSlpuRNXAxLNDoJ53p_cPP5EUR5vsqjSrw7NTSt6VKZKV6p4xtO9dG-d2KN7LxeXyFtxN7yKMfXDT0xnwmk0AzJ8ejEMlQvh7FiCNy8iSh8AZP07omFl96GqCg2m37uO6WeflwLiFrzRHSMkbB7Y7lcXLMGJln_MwdS3xNz9akntnDGgJJD/s320/MRM-20240303-0101-PWLS26-0148.jpg.iCf8yvbfMcvts79jYBMA.MgK7xEekMS.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2024</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Spending in the UK is usually done through a multi-year
spending review settlement which agrees spending for (usually) a five-year cycle.
This is done on the assumption that beyond this horizon timings are into a new Parliament,
and the Government may change, with different spending priorities. At present
the Government plans for spending will expire at the end of FY24/25 (31 Mar),
when either a temporary roll over will occur, or a full spending round may have
happened. Therefore no formal spending decisions have been taken on the size of
the budget beyond next March.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Spending in the UK on an annual basis is run through a
series of votes in Parliament, that occur at different points in the year. For
a good primer on this process, read this <a href="https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/publications/guides/what-is-the-estimates-cycle">Hansard
Society link</a>. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unlike in the US where
it’s possible for this to become a huge battleground, the annual process in the
UK is a parliamentary formality, whereby the House votes approval for the
Government to spend money as requested. There are two main steps that matter –
the main estimates, which set out the spending plans for the year, and the
supplementary estimates where the Government seeks additional funding for
specific reasons. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Spending within the UK defence budget is split into several
different categories. For a good link to these categories, this <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-understand-public-sector-spending/how-to-understand-public-sector-spending">Government
link</a> is a good start point. Broadly this breaks down into three main areas –
RDEL (Resources), CDEL (Capital) and AME (Annually Managed Expenditure). RDEL is
the money used for day-to-day spending on people, consumables, utilities and so
on, as well as wider running costs associated with deprecation of equipment–
essentially it is the money used to make things happen on a practical basis.
CDEL is the money used to purchase new infrastructure and equipment that has a
life of over one financial year (e.g. buying new IT, buildings or warships
would all be examples of CDEL expenditure). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In simple terms when a new tank is being purchased,
and going through procurement process, it is managed under CDEL funding. At
some point as it enters service the day to day running costs of the tank and
the crew to run it and the consumables used to support it come from RDEL. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">AME is money that is not anticipated in advance as part of
the annual estimates process but needs to be spent in year on specific hard to
predict items. The <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/commons/Scrutiny/22072015-KEY-FINANCE-TERMS.pdf">UK
Parliament definition</a> of AME is: –<i> “largely difficult to forecast public
expenditure such as demand-led benefits and tax credits; non-cash costs; and
bank holdings and loan repayments. Spending in AME is separate to DEL”. </i>Trying
to find examples of what the MOD spends on AME is challenging, although in this
financial year (23-24) it is likely to be around £1.9bn in total – although historically
this has never been counted as part of the UK defence budget for calculating
spending. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2luxBd5uF2OytDDaXOeAr3jBeKnMq3kN_qISHB2YGBxES8kF8H6EczbFt9MBaUK21OFvwNRtUI6dmyohnE3i993ndSn1kK3ZcKLNvFVTTVBM1KmXlyCsT_45MfHxArCmeXimwjXGbwpPyXCAz6pEzMUujvdNsfFSu6ZehizP0xcGUErfCqjQKT5pQ1TRq/s563/Budget%20breakdown.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="277" data-original-width="563" height="157" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2luxBd5uF2OytDDaXOeAr3jBeKnMq3kN_qISHB2YGBxES8kF8H6EczbFt9MBaUK21OFvwNRtUI6dmyohnE3i993ndSn1kK3ZcKLNvFVTTVBM1KmXlyCsT_45MfHxArCmeXimwjXGbwpPyXCAz6pEzMUujvdNsfFSu6ZehizP0xcGUErfCqjQKT5pQ1TRq/s320/Budget%20breakdown.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">© Crown copyright 2024</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">A good way of understanding how all of this comes together
is to read this <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/defence-departmental-resources-2023/mod-departmental-resources-2023">UK
Government statistics</a> piece, which explains the difference between the
Defence Budget and Defence spending, and visually shows how the Defence budget
does not include the cost of operations.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In 2023/2024 the MOD sought and was granted approval to
spend £41bn on RDEL related activities, of which £8.8bn was covered by deprecation
(essentially an accounting sleight of hand). This left about £32bn available
for normal RDEL operations throughout the year. Additionally, the MOD intended
to spend about £18.3bn on CDEL, split into general procurement, military equipment
procurement and R&D. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The official MOD
charts below breaks down how RDEL & CDEL was going to be spent. In total,
minus deprecation the original net MOD budget for the year was around £50bn. The
visual breakdown from Government Stats below shows how the MOD plans to spend
its RDEL/CDEL split in 2023/24.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjLRkRWJ-2D27d4p_xzvJaLZ4Um7sYp8qGqCDN58XtCO5et4ihhZd-Yz-HInGyDWnbbm8h5N4VcASG-5xPESQc6-FBsWAQ8jo9IbIQAjoSAiQx7SN5k8_Od_gOlIfPtNLo74ixQQz36gnL6A_PPsozKGi2c6S3NxSoC8oMv4l7hLORYrHunGe1_ZESGh4Lv/s535/Capture.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="383" data-original-width="535" height="229" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjLRkRWJ-2D27d4p_xzvJaLZ4Um7sYp8qGqCDN58XtCO5et4ihhZd-Yz-HInGyDWnbbm8h5N4VcASG-5xPESQc6-FBsWAQ8jo9IbIQAjoSAiQx7SN5k8_Od_gOlIfPtNLo74ixQQz36gnL6A_PPsozKGi2c6S3NxSoC8oMv4l7hLORYrHunGe1_ZESGh4Lv/s320/Capture.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">© Crown copyright 2024</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">During the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65df0b24cf7eb1e5f4f57f67/E03059123_CG_Supp_Estimates_2023-24_Web_Accessible.pdf">Supplementary
Estimate</a> process the MOD requested a further approximately £3.5bn, divided
into around £2.7bn RDEL and £800m for CDEL. The Supplementary Estimates are a
fascinating insight into what the MOD is up to during the year and how its financial
position is changing. For example, they show how internal government budget transfers
occur, when Departments reimburse each other for services and activities, or
the transfer of service provision. For example, the MOD sent £34.5million to
the UK Intelligence Community for “HQS” and £6.5m for “Gold” – over £41m of
funding sent to UKIC for services or activities (or purchasing gold?), while at
the same time it made claims on the Treasury reserve for funding linked to
Ukraine, Dreadnought and munitions. This is where things get even more complicated!
For a good analysis of spending in the Estimates and how they break down by
Department, this is a <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9805/CBP-9805.pdf">good
read by Parliament</a>, analysing the 23/24 estimates.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The MOD has been able to draw on ‘reserve’ funding, which is
centrally held by the Treasury and can be doled out to departments as needed.
Over the years the tradition has emerged that the Treasury will cover the
additional cost of military operations -so while the MOD pays the salary of
service personnel deployed, it can reclaim the costs of the operation itself
beyond what it would normally expect to incur. This ensures that actually conducting
operations comes out of Central Government and not the MODs day to day budget.
Historically the Reserve has never been considered part of the MOD budget, nor
has it counted as the overall defence spending figure – its essentially a bonus
figure to cover costs incurred. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The MOD has agreed with the Treasury that it can have access
to some additional funding from the Reserve for munitions to rebuild munitions
stockpiles, currently valued at £280m. It also has access to a Treasury
contingency fund to draw on for the cost of DREADNOUGHT (the replacement SSBN
project) to help fund cost growth in year or unexpected contingencies. In this
financial year the MOD has claimed about £1.2bn from the Reserve for activity
linked to Ukraine, £45m for Afghan resettlement operations, £800m for
DREADNOUGHT and £280m for munitions – among other things. So, roughly £2.3bn of
central funding has been provided in addition to the £50.5bn originally
approved. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When you look at the way that
the estimates are calculated, its also possible to see those certain other
parts of defence funding, including elements of war pensions and a few other assorted
liabilities are included. This means that the total budget request for the MOD
in 2023/24 was £55.3bn. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Is this a budget that is going up or down though? If you
believe public statements by the MOD, the budget is increasing, but by how much
is less clear. Some figures indicate that RDEL is going up by £300m, while CDEL
is falling by £300m – so it would indicate its roughly cost neutral. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you look at the spending plans its hard to
work out what is happening. In part this is due to various accountancy tricks
being played – for example there was an, on paper, significant increase in CDEL
last year to the tune of £6bn, but in reality, much of that was a temporary
allocation from the Reserve to cover the costs of leasehold issues linked to Defence
Housing estate (approximately £3bn). None of this cash went on new equipment.
This year and next year there is a roughly £4bn increase in CDEL, but it’s unclear
what is driving this – it is likely to be linked to DREADNOUGHT expenditure as
that project ramps up, and is not so much ‘new’ money, as the Treasury
providing previously agreed funding for specific projects. It’s worth
remembering that you don’t pay 100% in full at the start or end of defence
procurement, and that the costs are spread out over time. As the SSBN programme
accelerates, more costs will be accrued, hence the need for a higher CDEL budget. There were hints in previous budget documents that the MOD
was getting additional funding for munitions, although this seems to be coming
from the Reserve and hasn’t been allocated to the core budget. Its not clear
how much is coming through next financial year though or if this is a major
increase. Again, this funding is not ‘new’ but rather some additional
pre-agreed funds in the same way as DREADNOUGHT.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3u1cTKyja2wuYSTf0yZUg3TjA4f2BJ7w45qod8drBj-hWwbVqS9zKox24jyzlxqZy8uR6QW7hyphenhyphenGlQFR1_0dM0K15W1aM-bPc9LFIqgighK0lcIrvRxEHS7Mnb21qpc0RDMPQ3OWqf6VEReh7tUJaSvy8I32kPAqwWg1T9vVyBeZLBPOQlkknrbCZjh9kI/s653/RDEL.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="442" data-original-width="653" height="217" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3u1cTKyja2wuYSTf0yZUg3TjA4f2BJ7w45qod8drBj-hWwbVqS9zKox24jyzlxqZy8uR6QW7hyphenhyphenGlQFR1_0dM0K15W1aM-bPc9LFIqgighK0lcIrvRxEHS7Mnb21qpc0RDMPQ3OWqf6VEReh7tUJaSvy8I32kPAqwWg1T9vVyBeZLBPOQlkknrbCZjh9kI/s320/RDEL.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">2023-24 Planned MOD RDEL Spend</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">What we can say is that overall MOD spending remains remarkably
static. Strip out the access to Ukraine funding and the Reserve and the agreed
plans are almost unchanged from 2021. Parliament itself believes RDEL is going
up by £300m. CDEL appears to have jumped from the planned FY24/25 settlement of
£16.8bn in 2021 to £18.3bn now, although this includes around £2bn of Ukraine reserve
funding. Strip out the Ukraine funding and in fact the MOD is spending pretty
much the same as before on Defence (£16.8bn), with a tiny amount extra for munitions.
At best, you could state that thanks to adding
the cost of Ukraine onto the Defence budget, the UK can make a case that its
spending more on Defence. The problem is that it isn’t spending more on British
defence, its spending roughly the same as was planned back in 2021 without any
significant injection of real new money into the spending plans. In real terms
UK defence spending is not meaningfully rising - £300m of additional RDEL and a
reduction of £300m of CDEL equates to zero growth overall, and a less than 1%
rise in RDEL spending. </p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghtk9iVHGabJBxOaJQB32U9ddW4dDANwNAQJGIpVpPrucoYkeVOekAeONO4CKCtJbcKlhcGY-BtkYgyj0wDWW5Wa_-m1XAmZ77iDqcGOR1SNm0zj2HAISbQWina0xh7jhyphenhyphenG5zzKaVYBb-ZRdYjs3N2915eIf1Jnso9Z2xoLX07tZxNQuElOteMaQzbTIW_/s633/CDEL.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="337" data-original-width="633" height="170" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghtk9iVHGabJBxOaJQB32U9ddW4dDANwNAQJGIpVpPrucoYkeVOekAeONO4CKCtJbcKlhcGY-BtkYgyj0wDWW5Wa_-m1XAmZ77iDqcGOR1SNm0zj2HAISbQWina0xh7jhyphenhyphenG5zzKaVYBb-ZRdYjs3N2915eIf1Jnso9Z2xoLX07tZxNQuElOteMaQzbTIW_/s320/CDEL.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">2023-24 Planned MOD CDEL Spend</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">This does not compare well to NATO allies. According to Ed
Arnold at the RUSI (@EdArnold_RUSI), a comparison of NATO allies’ expenditure
between 2014 and 2023 shows that defence spending in the UK has risen in real
terms by 6% in this period. This means that defence spending has risen by the
lowest amount of any NATO member state and has fallen from 2.14% of GDP to just
2.07% of GDP in that time. By contrast France has increased spending by 15% and
Germany 44$% in the same time frame, even Canada, long lambasted by some as being
a low spender has raised its defence budget by 57% in real terms in the same
period. Arguments can be made that the UK has long spent ‘above its weight’ on
Defence matters, and that this is other nations catching up and meeting their obligations,
but equally the fact is that these countries are spending heavily on new
equipment, expanding their armed force, and taking on additional responsibilities.
The UK response is to issue tweets arguing about the semantics of its annual
budgetary process to try to claim spending is rising.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3Q-f9zBTVqakxhrGHOiU4CbyKpbxgcWObnVlQu05ueXTqpUpN3U43I2OYMKHRubVqOaiOuEoX8U-7DqHk3ugCt8-1D8H0ss-GPYQXh-sIA0576-P_xYyNG8iiMI_OnQODZM9cs4aGzxS4e_sRl4CP2TI6-rgpHvaneckQEbetK_Sj_xf3K99dw6M1XqnL/s1170/GIJtR1XXcAAavma.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1170" data-original-width="1080" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3Q-f9zBTVqakxhrGHOiU4CbyKpbxgcWObnVlQu05ueXTqpUpN3U43I2OYMKHRubVqOaiOuEoX8U-7DqHk3ugCt8-1D8H0ss-GPYQXh-sIA0576-P_xYyNG8iiMI_OnQODZM9cs4aGzxS4e_sRl4CP2TI6-rgpHvaneckQEbetK_Sj_xf3K99dw6M1XqnL/s320/GIJtR1XXcAAavma.jpg" width="295" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The levels of defence funding is a matter for the Government
of the day, but there are alarm bells ringing all over the place. In a report
by the <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmpubacc/451/report.html">Public
Accounts Committee</a> issued on Mar 08, it made clear that the MOD had a £16.9bn
gap in its finances for the 10 year equipment plan – this is essentially an entire
missing year of CDEL funding. It gets even worse when you realise that only
about £10bn of the CDEL budget is committed each year to equipment, so in
reality, there is a nearly 20% shortfall already in the budget.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In fact the Equipment Plan is in even worst state. The Royal
Navy has identified that it is £15.3bn short of the funding required to deliver
everything expected of it. The British Army has identified its only got a £1.2bn
shortfall - but this is because it only reported on the projects it can afford,
but in reality if it was to try to fund everything Defence expected of it, its
shortfall would grow to £12bn. This means between these two services alone,
there is a £27bn spending shortfall between what is needed to meet agreed
defence outputs, and what funding exists to deliver them. There is also a shortfall
in the ability to fund industrial regeneration – there is apparently an almost
£6bn shortfall in the shipbuilding programme against current budgets, while the
MOD has got to find billions to commit to rebuilding defence industrial capacity
– money that it does not currently have programmed. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Meanwhile the MOD is, in the eyes of the
Public Accounts Committee being naïve on the scale of the challenges. All MOD
assumptions for funding of the Equipment Plan are being done on the basis that
its affordable if spending rises to 2.5% of GDP, which is a long-term
government plan. The MOD has noted that if this changes, then the programme
becomes even less affordable and significant cuts will need to be made.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What does all this mean then? For the MOD its clear that
major decisions loom in the next Spending Round and 2025 Defence Review. The funding
shortfall without a major new injection of cash means that there will be
significant capability reductions made next year. There is not enough money
programmed to afford them, which means short of an enormous uplift to the budget
(which the MOD estimates would be about £7bn per year to reach 2.5%) then the
next the Defence Review will force hardnosed choices on what to keep and what
to delete. This places the UK in a unique position – alone among NATO partners
it is both the slowest to increase overall defence spending and the one most
likely to make deep rooted cuts to solve the massive financial challenges at
its centre. Without a major injection of cash in the forthcoming spending
review, the UK’s claim to being a leading NATO power faces being critically, if
not fatally, undermined for the long term. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In terms of answering the question as to whether the budget
is rising or not, it feels as if the answer can vary depending on how you ask
the question. There is clearly a small increase in defence expenditure to cover
Ukraine, on top of previously agreed budgetary plans, worth several billion per
year. The challenge is whether you consider money spent on Ukraine (which is
absolutely worth it) to be something that is part of the MOD defence budget or
foreign assistance and aid. The MOD has strongly denied that the budget is dropping,
stating that it requires Parliament to approve the reserve estimates to enable
support to Ukraine, which would then show a budget increase. If you need to
rely on tortuous reasoning and dubious twitter images to suggest that when you
add central funding from the Treasury intended for the additional cost of
military operations, and which is being spent on a foreign partner nation and
not British defence directly to prove that the UK defence budget is increasing,
then respectfully, your argument is not strong. What is clear is that the only
way that the Defence budget can be claimed to be increasing is by relying on
funding for Ukraine, and not significant additional funding for the UK armed
forces. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><br /><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br />Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-80310472953690091752024-03-04T21:47:00.004+00:002024-03-04T21:47:36.205+00:00Analysis of Proposals For Defence In An Independent Scotland. <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The Scottish Government has published its <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/building-new-scotland-independent-scotlands-place-world/pages/7/">policy
paper</a> on Defence and Security in an independent Scotland. This author very
rarely makes comment on political announcements or policies. This blog is, and always
has been, politically neutral. It has never advocated for, or attacked,
policies of a specific political party. It analyses policies and announcements,
but from an objective perspective, and not through the lens of political
allegiance. It will never endorse a political policy or attack politicians as
individuals. The authors voting preferences are strictly between himself and
the ballot box, and the only encouragement that he provides in the run up to
election day is to remind everyone that they should, if possible, exercise their
democratic right to vote. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhL3Hqj8GlZagEqJ3wE690OIU5QSs3dTe7ZrqF4_s9xKOKUYAUsNYBUw14AcW5dGbS8kHx3kFHca_YJDjE5FStA3ImkMWDa3dS7SWRsezNgdHYgqIOYgZkZkcsAUeNj0YCAkfJB199Vi8tehswhwOIEFXdbyqiu9Z4Jv-qoMUgwaGH47A-rbSnnL4gqhoX-/s1200/RED-20240219-137-Lossiemouth%20transit%20-029.jpg.iCfskeXfMWATAA.gi9k_OUqmn.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhL3Hqj8GlZagEqJ3wE690OIU5QSs3dTe7ZrqF4_s9xKOKUYAUsNYBUw14AcW5dGbS8kHx3kFHca_YJDjE5FStA3ImkMWDa3dS7SWRsezNgdHYgqIOYgZkZkcsAUeNj0YCAkfJB199Vi8tehswhwOIEFXdbyqiu9Z4Jv-qoMUgwaGH47A-rbSnnL4gqhoX-/s320/RED-20240219-137-Lossiemouth%20transit%20-029.jpg.iCfskeXfMWATAA.gi9k_OUqmn.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">What follows is a strictly personal private perspective on
one of the most challenging debates in UK politics but viewed strictly from the
perspective of analysing the policy. The author will be clear, his strictly
personal view is that the issue of Scottish independence is for the people of Scotland
to decide should the time come for another referendum. He personally believes that
the UK is stronger together, and that separation of well-founded unions causes
nothing but harm and damage. As the ongoing impact of Brexit has all too vividly
shown, by pursuing an ideologically driven breakup at any price, puts up barriers
to integration, harms bilateral relationships and weakens the UK’s standing and
influence in the world as a result, it is clear leaving strong political unions
harms the party leaving, not those remaining behind.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Again, from a strictly private and personal perspective,
there is something deeply discomforting about seeing Scottish Government Civil
Servants employed to force through an agenda that makes the case to break up
the wider nation they serve, particularly when producing documents on areas that
the Scottish Government does not enjoy devolved responsibility for feels wrong,
for they are not experts able to offer this advice. This feels uncomfortable as
telling the Scottish population about a defence policy that no one in their civil
service is professionally employed to advise on feels potentially misleading.
There is no day to day subject matter experts employed to offer this advice
from a professional perspective, and the resulting document reads as more of a
nakedly political aspirational wish list than a credible statement of government
defence policy for an independent Scotland The challenges in the document are
many, and the purpose of this blog is to highlight the specific gaps that have
not been addressed or assumptions that have been taken for granted, without
being subject to real professional scrutiny by genuine experts in the field. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Personnel<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The document seems to assume that at the outset of
independence, people will be transferred en masse to the Scottish Defence
Force. This is a very dangerous assumption to make, for it assumes that people
will want to serve in an independent Scottish military rather than the British
Armed Forces. There is mention made of the UK being able to work jointly with
the SDF during a transition period, but this is incredibly naïve. Firstly, it
assumes that the UK would want to work with a Government that has chosen to
break away in providing it with national defence. Secondly it assumes that this
will be a relationship of equals – it will not. The UK will likely want to
withdraw in a realistic timeframe and will not be willing or able to provide
military cooperation due to the challenges of information sharing (more on this
below).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For starters, it is not clear whether the Scottish expect to
see people based in Scotland transferred over to Scottish command, or if they want
specialists assigned with platform expertise in the sites and capabilities they
want to operate. If the former, the risk is that they will find mass resignations/
departures as British soldiers choose to remain in the service of the UK. They
will also find that those remaining personnel may not be professionally skilled
or trained to operate and maintain the equipment that the SDF will inherit. If
the latter, and the Scottish Government requests transfer of (for example) a
small number of Type 31 frigates, then the Royal Navy may be asked to transfer
crews to support this. Can you imagine the outrage and anger from crews, many
of whom will be English nationals living in England, that they will be transferred
to the SDF as part of this independence negotiation. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The only way out of this would be a general offer of
employment in the SDF to those in the British military that want it, and then
see who comes over to join. This will mean that at independence, the SDF will comprise
many poorly crewed units derived from a random collection of transferee’s, rather
than a coherent military force. It will mean that the equipment they inherit
will probably not be usable due to shortages of trained personnel, and result
in many years of delay to acquiring a credible military capability while
suitably trained people are recruited and trained. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is not realistic to assume that on independence that
Scotland will have a genuinely functional defence force. It will have a random
assortment of people and equipment that it is unlikely to be able to operate,
maintain and support, let alone deploy. It will have major gaps in rank
structures, with experienced people (particularly at NCO level) likely to be in
short supply. The delays to creating a truly functional and credible SDF means
that, realistically, it will take 20 -40 years to recruit, train, and sustain a
credible cadre of personnel drawn from home population and operating at all ranks
and rates. Prior to this point, an independent Scotland would be essentially
defenceless in any meaningful sense of the word. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZ4EA-diIAFhRhxFyhb9kE6WgdhZhkxycOQ-UPrQveAx_kOBen-XggTBuhyJ5mbGC6Q0of4DeJRqRrmDw_QPIT_g2tZcIXrkAywDfV9IoU-BVmq_rpITzjvC1RcTaAIhWqL3MJ1b21rcqXqfGUxh_zq7y51k6uvovuFXlEz0AXPeXhX8XR0K0a63NjfD_B/s1200/FRPUN-20220314-AN0004-003.jpg.iCf1uOTfMWATAA.5ebG6ogmDf.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="858" data-original-width="1200" height="229" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZ4EA-diIAFhRhxFyhb9kE6WgdhZhkxycOQ-UPrQveAx_kOBen-XggTBuhyJ5mbGC6Q0of4DeJRqRrmDw_QPIT_g2tZcIXrkAywDfV9IoU-BVmq_rpITzjvC1RcTaAIhWqL3MJ1b21rcqXqfGUxh_zq7y51k6uvovuFXlEz0AXPeXhX8XR0K0a63NjfD_B/s320/FRPUN-20220314-AN0004-003.jpg.iCf1uOTfMWATAA.5ebG6ogmDf.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Training Pipeline<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The document is long on talking about building an ambitious force
structure comprising ships, aircraft, land battlegroups etc. This is where the
policy paper feels more like some of the party-political documents made, which
are long on focusing on ‘capabilities that go bang’ and short on asking about
how this will be supported in reality. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There seems to be no genuine understanding of the difficulties
an independent Scotland would face in producing a training pipeline for every
part of its military. It would need to establish a recruitment system, open training
depots for basic training and officer training, develop training schools for
the equipment, likely to range from fast jets to major warships, and be able to
produce trainees able to operate and maintain every part of the equipment.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To create this in the UK has taken, quite literally,
centuries and it is extremely expensive. If you look at the costs that the MOD was
being quoted for establishing a modern training outcome that would have seen
consolidation of training sites like HMS SULTAN and moves to Wales for others,
the cost was well into the multiple billions – and this was for consolidation,
not creation of a training pipeline. Scotland will need to establish all of this
from scratch, which will be eye wateringly expensive and take years to do. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There will also be issues with how to train things like pilots,
for example the fast jets, airlift and maritime patrol aircraft that are hinted
at. There is no flying training base present in Scotland, so it would need to
establish from scratch an entirely new flying training system, and put in place
the maintenance, support, and instructors to crew it. Given the challenges the
UK is facing in delivery of the MFTS training contract, it is hard to see this
being either cheap or quick – again leaving Scotland short of pilots and
potentially facing a many year gap before new ones become available. If you are
a pilot in the SDF, you’ll be a strategic asset due to your scarcity and the
fact that they won’t be able to replace you for many years. The cost of retaining
these pilots will be eyewatering.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Even mundane things like training in combat systems or
marine engineering will require enormous sums spent on training schools to
replace access at places like HMS SULTAN and COLLINGWOOD. The new Scottish Navy
won’t have any usable engineering or warfare sites, simulators or training pipelines,
so it will need to establish it from scratch. Trying to work out how to set up
training on the Type 31 frigates (for example) will probably involve a commercial
solution that will cost tens of millions to deliver and take many years to do. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The point here is not to say that it can’t be done – almost anything
is possible with time and money, but practically no thought has gone into how
it will be done. Its going to cost the taxpayers a fortune to replicate
facilities that already exist and which the SDF will either have no access to,
or limited access as foreign national trainees and they will pay through the
nose for those places. If you want to plan a defence force, you need to plan
from the outset on where the next generation are coming from, how you’ll train
them and how you’ll manage them – only then when you understand the costs and
capacity constraints can you ask difficult questions about force structure. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Access to Information and Intelligence<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One thing that comes through the document is a naïve understanding
of how access to information works. It talks about how the SDF and wider intelligence
services will apparently share information with the UK government and allies.
It has given no thought to just how much this would actually cost. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On independence the Scots will find themselves locked out of
the UKs military information sharing platforms and IT portals because they are no
longer in the UK. You can’t have your cake and eat it – much as the UK lost
access to EU IT at the stroke of midnight when it left the EU, so too will the
Scottish Government. At this point it will discover just how difficult and
complex it is to run a secure military IT network. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It will need to establish from scratch a “McMODNET” that can
handle traffic for routine, secret and top-secret communications and ensure
this is suitably encrypted and protected. It will need to ensure it is able to
properly store information and protect it from hackers and cyber-attack,
particularly pertinent if it wants to successfully join EU/NATO where the
standards of IT protection will be critical if it is to be trusted handling
their intelligence and sensitively marked material. One thing they will soon
learn is that EU/NATO cyber accreditors have no sense of humour, no willingness
to take risks with their information and will say no if they are not 100% happy.
This will come with a very large bill and a need for many specialists both cyber
and information security people, all of whom will have large salary
expectations. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They will need to do this
before they can even think about operating with the UK and sharing intelligence
– the British Government will be treating Scotland as a third party and will
only share intelligence if its own standards for information assurance are met.
It is incredibly dangerous to assume that the UK will automatically do this,
and that it will compromise its own security protocols to meet an unrealistic
policy paper aspiration. The Edinburgh Government will find itself forced to either
accept significant investment to meet UK information sharing standards or
accept it will not be getting information shared. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">More widely, Scotland needs to understand that once it
leaves the UK, it is a third party, and this means it can’t have much of the
equipment its used to operating with in the current UK military. Like all major
nations, the UK buys in specialist equipment from the US and NATO allies and
integrates it into its own military platforms. There is absolutely no certainty
that the UK can, or is legally able to, authorise the transfer of highly sensitive
military equipment that is integral to how many of the platforms that Scotland
may seek to acquire ownership of. This will be dependent on attitudes in Congress
and beyond and may not be forthcoming until Scotland has shown that it is a
trusted international partner. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is
not being flippant – the US guards its military secrets jealously and only
shares them under exacting conditions to highly valued partners. Lacking a
credible military infrastructure, and potentially pursuing policies that would
harm US national security interests (more on this below), it is doubtful that
the US would willingly see sensitive electronic, or software components transferred
until Scotland joined NATO. This will take many years to do as other nations
have found out – you can have a good bilateral relationship, but when it comes
to international security, the US will not compromise just because they like
your accents and have family hailing from way back. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s also worth noting that Scotland will no
longer be in Five-Eyes, which means that the sort of information able to be
shared will be reduced. The UK will prioritise its relationships with those
partners, and Scotland will have no chance of being admitted to this club,
which has been built up over 80 years of hard-earned trust. Once you leave, you
are not getting back in. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUoBys0WFI6oBETLhxyrFgCofRCSnjOkMCNAbjhjMVK5NcjbfKfd_Z3LjH0W5m8NYsFnUUQUspjCpTnekxILiqzjGP6mWVacitmHystD4iolObQFt2FIbDUiyLliVuJbCfEnskA_3Q3tzqMTZ2gicGsof-5bxO3ym7BWZJR0p9Rq4pTTEy7wSLVM0Lc2KT/s1200/RS71481_RS71462_BAE_HMSGLASGOW_LOAD_OUT0001.jpg.iCfWkuTfMWATAA.s7_uyjxbOz.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="676" data-original-width="1200" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUoBys0WFI6oBETLhxyrFgCofRCSnjOkMCNAbjhjMVK5NcjbfKfd_Z3LjH0W5m8NYsFnUUQUspjCpTnekxILiqzjGP6mWVacitmHystD4iolObQFt2FIbDUiyLliVuJbCfEnskA_3Q3tzqMTZ2gicGsof-5bxO3ym7BWZJR0p9Rq4pTTEy7wSLVM0Lc2KT/s320/RS71481_RS71462_BAE_HMSGLASGOW_LOAD_OUT0001.jpg.iCfWkuTfMWATAA.s7_uyjxbOz.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Infrastructure & Support Contracts<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A key point which is ignored is that the transfer of equipment
will be complex because there will be no supply or support contracts in place.
Due to the role of industry in the MOD defence establishment, many services and
support are provided by contractors, ranging from contracted flying training to
delivery of routine depth maintenance and refit support. All these contracts
will become null and void once the equipment goes to Scotland, meaning that
from Day 1, the Scottish Government will need to negotiate a vast range of
diverse support contracts with the UK defence industry for support. This
assumes the defence industry can legally support them, as they may not be
allowed to under the tech transfer terms agreed, particularly for third party state
derived equipment. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It sounds dull, but what a newly independent Scotland will
need is a lot of contract specialists able to put in place and monitor all manner
of contracts covering every part of the defence supply chain. They’ll need to
negotiate how maintenance will be done, who will be paying to support the
buildings and infrastructure, how is catering being provided. This is achievable
but will take lots of time and bandwidth, and most importantly money. No matter
what the aspirations are for a Scottish military presence, by the time you put
all the critical enabling services, training and IT in place, there is unlikely
to be much left for actual military equipment. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For example, look at the suggestion that the Scottish Air
Force would operate a transport capability – likely to be the A400M. Who is
maintaining this, and what will the costs be? Will Scotland be able to put in
place support contracts for this sort of capability, as well as setting up
ongoing purchases of spares and consumables? Who is responsible for the
airworthiness of the design and ensuring that any modifications to it undergo a
proper release to service, as the UK currently does? How will the governance be
put in place to ensure that if Scotland becomes an A400M user, it is able to
safely maintain, operate and support this fleet using accepted aviation safety
regulations? All of this is unglamorous, not remotely exciting and involves skilled
highly trained people who are in scarce supply – where is the money coming from
to pay for this all?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Alternatively look at the Typhoon fighter jet, which
presumably Scotland would look to deploy as part of its inheritance. Where is
the training pipeline coming from to support not just the pilots, but also all
the ground crew required to keep the airframe safe and airworthy? What
arrangements need to be put in place with the other Typhoon nations to ensure
they are content to see the technology transfer required of highly sensitive
material to a third-party nation and will they be supportive of this occurring?
Where will the next generation come from and who is selecting, recruiting, and
training them (at a cost of roughly £4.5m per pilot for the RAF, this is not a
cheap process). What is the arrangement for the ongoing support and spares
procurement which may need to be done from the USA – will an FMS case be
required and could this cause immense disruption to Scottish operations if spare
parts cannot be ordered due to bureaucracy on the Hill in getting it through? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There are thousands upon thousands of issues that will need
to be resolved here, all of which indicates that the Scottish Government will
need a large civil service capable of administering this, with a lot of both
procurement and support officials able to run defence contracts. Given there is
no major Scottish DE&S location, all these people would need to be
recruited from across the UK, given that this is the preserve of the Civil
Service and not the armed forces. It will require establishing, from scratch, the
capability to manage and maintain a deeply complex set of contracts from Day 1 –
a stretch for a skilled workforce, let alone a brand new one.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The other question not considered is what happens to all the
munitions stockpiles – lets assume Scotland acquires three Type 31 Frigates as part
of the settlement. Firstly, will the US permit them to operate the Mk41 missile
launcher or not, given that the FMS case was for it to be sold to the UK and
not Scotland as an independent country. Secondly, where are the munitions being
stored and maintained? In the medium term, how will Scotland keep missiles and
EW capabilities up to date given it will no longer have access to the UK EYES
ONLY material and databases necessary to keep them safe, functional, and able
to overcome potential attack? Just consider the challenge of maintaining and safely
arming a ship with a surface to air missile battery and ensuring these are safe
for the long haul – it requires industrial support, trained munitions staff and
access to a properly instrumented test range to conduct firings as necessary.
All of this may be available, but it will be jolly expensive to do and require
a lot of people to do it – all of whom will be very hard to replace.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Defence Industry<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also worth briefly noting that the Defence Industry
that Scotland currently enjoys may well not remain in its current form. The UK
has been clear that major warships will be built in UK yards, and the infrastructure
to do so will be constructed. This is partly for reasons of national sovereignty,
but also due to the above-mentioned challenges of integrating foreign military
equipment onboard. The UK will be unlikely to get support from the US or others
to permit hugely sensitive electronic equipment to be built in a now third-party
nation for front line warships. Given the choice between accepting a pause, and
building new yards, or annoying the US, the UK government is going to build
inside the UK. To suggest otherwise is exceptionally misleading. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Similarly, the defence industry based in Scotland will find
itself torn between supporting the nascent Scottish industry or relocating to
the UK to comply with wider international treaties, legal obligations and the
challenges of being a third-party country trying to sell into the UK and wider
NATO market. It is likely that there will be an exodus of defence companies
back into the UK because that is their primary market, along with NATO allies.
They will want to minimise disruption to their activities, and that means
ditching Scotland. Given the integrated supply chain and need to incorporate components
and sub systems onto delicate and sensitive equipment, it won’t be possible to
ship it to Scotland for integration as this will not meet wider obligations. At
best Scotland may have a future manufacturing low grade defence product, but
the days of a genuinely capable defence industry will be a distant memory, as
it will have moved to the UK to stay in business. <o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgl9WcP2W5bbPvnRk7iQH-lhWK8xEYdnVHoDOc-pOcr8VQz-ODoDPnfDqfXIfExl7sguNja8v3qnLiQyua3_cWhQuUDd0a-feBiLhNNch7jUt2Wzn2MS8NlDstDnvVIg3pNwBLcVzW3s-QKtEgOTqCT8Ce6k8rAya6VU4v8l6qJyECGEkypdoy_mmHVgpOR/s1200/2DEK3867.jpg.iCeel9_fMWATAA.3N5R9Md4fo.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgl9WcP2W5bbPvnRk7iQH-lhWK8xEYdnVHoDOc-pOcr8VQz-ODoDPnfDqfXIfExl7sguNja8v3qnLiQyua3_cWhQuUDd0a-feBiLhNNch7jUt2Wzn2MS8NlDstDnvVIg3pNwBLcVzW3s-QKtEgOTqCT8Ce6k8rAya6VU4v8l6qJyECGEkypdoy_mmHVgpOR/s320/2DEK3867.jpg.iCeel9_fMWATAA.3N5R9Md4fo.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><b>NATO and Nuclear</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Saving the most contentious issue till last, the real challenge
is the assumption that Scotland can have its cake and eat it by both closing
Faslane to UK nuclear weapons and also being part of the NATO alliance. This is
simply not a credible policy position to take.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">NATO relies heavily on the UK for provision of an independent
strategic nuclear deterrent which is (and always has been) declared to SACEUR
for NATO targeting purposes. It has been clear since the inception of the SSBN
force that it would only ever be in the most extreme of circumstances that a
British Prime Minister would authorise a nuclear strike outside of NATO. Today
the importance of this deterrent is more critical than ever, providing one of two
European nuclear powers committed to European security and helping provide
reassurance to the non-nuclear powers in NATO that in extremis, a nuclear
response is available to protect them. This is at the very heart of NATOs deterrence
mission. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Were an independent Scotland to close Faslane as a nuclear
facility, then it would lead to vastly expensive relocation of the SSBN force
as well as the Coulport depot (where operationally available warheads are
stored) and a massive multi-year construction of a new facility elsewhere in
the UK. This would realistically be either Milford Haven or Plymouth (based on
prior Polaris era studies) and the cost would be tens of billions – forcing the
UK to either exit the nuclear game or reduce funding more widely for Defence to
pay for it. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is inconceivable that many NATO nations will look kindly
on admitting a new member state that has managed to either end the UK nuclear mission
or has caused immense disruption to the wider UK commitment to NATO for purely
ideological reasons. Why would the US or other nations support admit a country
that was actively undermining the very purpose of NATO as a nuclear alliance,
given its track record of doing genuine damage to the nuclear mission? It is exceptionally
dangerous to assume that NATO member states would want a nation in the club
which has proven itself so willing to materially harm the Alliance it wishes to
join. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">More widely Faslane and the wider Scottish waters are of
critical importance to NATO for many other missions. You routinely see French
and US SSNs (and the odd SSBN) visiting the port for breaks from their missions
trying to listen to ‘magma displacement’ out at sea. The port is a vital source
of supplies and support for nuclear submarines of all NATO nations, and closing
the nuclear mission down would make it much harder to operate. Again, this
would be replaceable in time, but would be costly and burn goodwill that would
reduce the chances of NATO being willing to admit Scotland. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If you look at the facilities that may be impacted by Scottish
independence, then there would be ramifications more widely for so much of the
UK and NATO defence, for example the QinetiQ trials locations off the West
Coast that are vital for maritime operations, or the exercise areas used for
Joint Warrior. Look too at the NATO fuel installations at Loch Ewe, Garelochhead
and Campbeltown as well as the NATO munitions facilities it can call on – removal
of these, even for a short while will have huge implications for NATO
operations in the region, even before you work out a long-term solution to how
a non-NATO member can provide fuel to NATO members in the medium term. (It’s
doable and has been done, but adds yet more officialdom into the mix to fix!).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Then look at the UK air defence radars operated from
Scottish sites like Buchan and Saxa Vord which feed into the wider NATO air
defence picture, as well as the likely disruption to QRA provision, and you
realise that an independent Scotland would do huge damage to NATO defences by forcing
closure of sites that play an irreplaceable part in the Alliances wider defence.
Even if over time some could be brough back online, all the issues raised
before around information sharing agreements and meeting standards for
information assurance means it would be many years before this could happen. It
would leave a gaping hole in surveillance and defence of one of the most critical
parts of the NATO alliance, which members will not take well.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Some may counter with the suggestion that Scotland could
just share the information with them from the radar stations it inherits –
sadly it isn’t as simple as that. The UK air defence network has been carefully
built up and integrated into NATO over many decades. It is a truly integrated
network monitoring aircraft movements across the Alliance areas of interest – Russian
aircraft leaving Murmansk can be tracked, handed off and monitored through an
integrated air defence network all the way to the Med, or across to North
American airspace. An independent Scotland would not be part of this network,
meaning the information could not be shared as it currently is, as Scotland was
not a NATO member. Also sharing information from a Scottish radar that could
result in aircraft being scrambled elsewhere raises serious questions about
legality and permissions, particularly the rules of engagement under which the
QRA aircraft get scrambled – would it be legally permissible for Scotland to
provide radar data essential to vector in an RAF Typhoon which then may need to
shot a hijacked civilian aircraft or a hostile foreign aircraft in breach of
ROE down? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The alternative of course would be to keep sites like the
radar stations as ‘UK Sovereign Base Areas’ leading to the curious position
that Scotland would not have any air defence and be reliant on the UK providing
information to it – likely to be a costly and expensive venture to put it
mildly. That’s even before you unpick the huge complications of how to support a
UK national radar base ‘abroad’ that will require staff, support, and maintenance-
this points to a horrendously complex State of Forces Agreement between the UK
and Scotland that will again need years of negotiations to sign off. SOFAs
matter because without them, there is no legal basis for troops operating on friendly
soil – they’re a vital tool setting out what people can or cannot do on the
others territory and with what equipment and operations and which government is
responsible for taking action to resolve the issue. Trying to resolve how an
RAF team carrying equipment north of the border to an RAF base to conduct routine
maintenance, and which is involved in a road traffic fatality is key here – who
handles this? Equally, how do you resolve the issue of bringing staff into the
posts, all the current Scottish based employees will no longer be eligible to
see UK EYES ONLY material, meaning they’ll lose their jobs and be replaced by
UK contractors or staff. A rise in local unemployment due to locals being
turfed out of their jobs as they can no longer see material of a foreign
government is unlikely to be politically popular. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">These small vignettes may sound deeply in the weeds, but
that is the whole point here – so much of what the policy paper blithely takes
as writ is actually a deep morass of legal complexity and challenges that will
take many years to unpick. You can say ‘oh we’ll take care of that in negotiations,
but the sheer scale of effort needed to do this is enormous and likely to tax
an inexperienced nascent Scottish Government to the limit given it has no prior
experience in this field. The potential for both problems and festering grievances
because of a poor deal is high. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZGLt39vm1rk2CWaWo38YfN1Ql4NwC3zw3IhaQvETV3E8u98RgSFHueWF7437c5iYUGVHX_t7M3Ll2qm_DvCKBgYPup-QEIH3NLMm45_sllSlt3euNuuPIejZLd-gCs26pD0c3s47Sqsa3IiPQQjC6pxuNZ7NdbCJT8M5oQfRJgbxsA97gkQ4STvejx-yL/s1200/LOS-OFFICAL-0250-20180522-0168.jpg.iCensurfMWATAA.02Ct5cfDNI.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZGLt39vm1rk2CWaWo38YfN1Ql4NwC3zw3IhaQvETV3E8u98RgSFHueWF7437c5iYUGVHX_t7M3Ll2qm_DvCKBgYPup-QEIH3NLMm45_sllSlt3euNuuPIejZLd-gCs26pD0c3s47Sqsa3IiPQQjC6pxuNZ7NdbCJT8M5oQfRJgbxsA97gkQ4STvejx-yL/s320/LOS-OFFICAL-0250-20180522-0168.jpg.iCensurfMWATAA.02Ct5cfDNI.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>People<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Perhaps the biggest question of all is where are the people
coming from to staff and recruit the SDF? Even if they inherit several thousand
personnel at the beginning of their time (assuming that all the challenges of
transferring pay, pension obligations etc are resolved), where does the next
generation come from? The operating model proposed seems to assume that
Scotland can operate a balanced force akin to well established militaries like
Sweden or Denmark operating a diverse range of capabilities. This may be a long
term (40 year plus) aspiration, but getting recruits with the right skills, aptitude,
and training to take on a very complex range of roles will be difficult. It
takes many years to recruit and train a Typhoon pilot – even if they started on
Day 1, it would still take nearly a decade before a fully trained Scottish Air
Force Typhoon squadron had solely Scottish pilots. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The reality is that the Baltic militaries rely on a combination
of national and NATO training courses, schools, and career management to produce
the people they need at the right time and in the right numbers. There are
carefully established training pipelines for all career specialities, involving
courses and training that is expensive to run, requires investment in infrastructure
and retaining instructors. The SDF will be in the unique position of starting
from scratch with an inheritance of advanced military equipment and practically
no domestic infrastructure to operate and support it. This means either equipment
won’t be used for its intended purpose, or it will fall into disuse as skills
fade away – the Irish Naval Service is a very good example of this, which has
slowly deskilled in recent years due to lack of trained people, starting with
the removal of an ASW capability due to the lack of sonar crews, and in more recent
years tying the fleet up alongside due to the lack of deck crew to operate the
ships. Its likely Scotland would see the same – phasing out expensive older kit
and having to introduce less capable and simpler to operate equipment in due course
but struggling to strike the balance between investing in new kit and
maintaining in service equipment for a bit longer. However you look at it, its
hard to see a future where Scotland will be able to afford to remain a credible
military power with its inheritance, which in turn will make it harder to
recruit people in the medium term. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is a danger of writing ORBATs, which often sound like
fantasy fleets / air forces, and this is something best steered clear of. But
proposals to operate a fleet of escort ships and fighter jets are simply unfeasible
in terms of the long-term crew requirements. It would be better to aim aspirations
very low, keep them at the simplest and cheapest state possible and then over
time grow as recruiting and resources permitted, rather than being forced into
a state of managed decline within a generation. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyp1whst_Nen0Zkhk7VXvSG4FsmeG-Koo2CLGQqDWL3eXScjcI8eNNVdOX9CF7BiaXYtiexoQ4xT6cZBK9wpOHOcAs-yIeRI-t07iG0cxDUe7nRy1s-JlMos1CQGwriyxbhks8mirTGZ10j7Jc8eCmHMI41Fg2P1yWOmr6IZzYz9RIYHi8MM7lZpCsQJdg/s1200/45159140.jpg.iCfVuubfMWATAA.ZxIgvLeASp.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="1200" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyp1whst_Nen0Zkhk7VXvSG4FsmeG-Koo2CLGQqDWL3eXScjcI8eNNVdOX9CF7BiaXYtiexoQ4xT6cZBK9wpOHOcAs-yIeRI-t07iG0cxDUe7nRy1s-JlMos1CQGwriyxbhks8mirTGZ10j7Jc8eCmHMI41Fg2P1yWOmr6IZzYz9RIYHi8MM7lZpCsQJdg/s320/45159140.jpg.iCfVuubfMWATAA.ZxIgvLeASp.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Conclusion</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Is it technically feasible for Scotland to inherit a pile of
defence assets, infrastructure, and equipment in the aftermath of an
independence vote? Yes, absolutely. Would the process of taking military equipment
designed for global operations and supported by a well-developed training, infrastructure,
and supply chain of tens of thousands of people as well as industry, civil
service and NATO allies be prohibitively expensive to do for a small nation on
a small defence budget – yes almost certainly.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The costs involved in setting up the defence force envisaged
are significant. The policy paper makes no allowance for the practical
realities involved in not just owning military equipment from a theoretical
ORBAT strength (e.g. ‘we think we’re entitled to X tanks, Y planes and Z ships).
There are huge costs and challenges associated with this from establishing a
training pipeline to putting support and logistics in place for the long-term
sustainment of the force. None of this seems to have been factored in or considered
in the Scottish Governments paper. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Similarly, no effort has been made to recognise the scale of
the challenge in overcoming information assurance and sharing, the challenges
of intelligence sharing and the blunt reality that Scotland will be very much a
‘third party status’ nation for many years to come. As the UK has found on
leaving the EU, once you leave, you are gone. It may be easy to say ‘oh but
they’ll be nice to us because we sort of used to be in NATO’ right up until the
point that you realise you are no longer in NATO, that the road to joining NATO
is long and tiring and that by pursuing a course of action that directly does
enormous damage to NATO nuclear security at a time when the Russian threat is
higher than it has been for decades, you will have seriously annoyed many nations
whose goodwill you need. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a document which feels as if it has been written by
people who do not really understand how militaries work. It’s had some research
on to spending by other countries, some comparative ORBAT analysis and vague
outlines of military roles set out, but it hasn’t even begun to think about the
enormous and very expensive challenges that an independent Scotland would face
in establishing its military. The reason this matters is that this document
reads a lot like some of the pro-Brexit material at the time of the referendum –
trying to reassure people that nothing will really change, all will be well and
frankly we’re better off without that lot anyway. What it hasn’t tried to do is
set out honestly the challenge, the costs and the fact that it cannot begin to
deliver a fraction of what is promised, and that it is relying on hope and
hypotheticals in place of facts and reality. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The problem is that there are likely to be many who respond
to this blog going “oh we’ll sort all that out in the negotiations” – that’s fine,
but there needs to be open transparency about how complex and challenging these
negotiations will be. You cannot promise people things that you cannot deliver
and then produce an entirely different outcome. The decision on whether Scotland
should be independent or not is one for the Scottish people – but they deserve
to be properly informed by rigorous analysis and the provision of impartial
information about the scale of what they are embarking on. This document is not
that product – it is a thinly disguised propaganda pamphlet that does a disservice
to the electorate by relying on hope, not facts. The Scottish people deserve
better than this when it comes to being asked to make a choice about their
future. <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-40213127272763898962024-02-27T20:47:00.001+00:002024-02-27T20:47:08.149+00:00An English Officers Home Is His Castle / Two Bedroom Flat...<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The MOD has been forced into an extremely high-profile policy
shift following extensive coverage of its ‘New Accommodation Offer’ (NAO), and significant
criticism from a variety of quarters. The only constant seems to have been that
just about everyone impacted by the proposed policy changes was unhappy with some
part of the proposed policy changes. Why has this become so toxic, and what is
it that is upsetting so many people?<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaTSjpd5cbrSgmEWhgwpMT5cIcnXj2-mLc4nTr9vjkZQdJ9eb_pNu1kiYroKb2cKKdWr4xnq_zOgAcf7PChYcp9RihnVONmq-qqL1UP8kuFoly0JLKBSWGc-CtqCMP-UJJN07PqYqVZEFhMYRhUCfAskep0bVmvO_6raLic1rqrRdqNGsURfiCy3YpZXMk/s1200/2DEK3576.jpg.iCfO9rzfMWATAA.NS_Pwuxvh0.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgaTSjpd5cbrSgmEWhgwpMT5cIcnXj2-mLc4nTr9vjkZQdJ9eb_pNu1kiYroKb2cKKdWr4xnq_zOgAcf7PChYcp9RihnVONmq-qqL1UP8kuFoly0JLKBSWGc-CtqCMP-UJJN07PqYqVZEFhMYRhUCfAskep0bVmvO_6raLic1rqrRdqNGsURfiCy3YpZXMk/s320/2DEK3576.jpg.iCfO9rzfMWATAA.NS_Pwuxvh0.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">© Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Accommodation provision is at the heart of the ‘offer’ made
to members of the armed forces, the guarantee that service personnel will be
provided with either single living accommodation (SLA) or service family accommodation
(SFA) for them and their families. The scale and quality of this accommodation offer
varies, ranging from extremely sparse and austere barrack blocks through to
modern new build housing estates that provide good accommodation standards. The
cost to the individual is usually significantly lower than comparable market
rates – for example the MOD estimates that to rent the highest quality 4 bed
house including energy and council tax bills, the cost to the individual is around
£1450 per month – a figure that is significantly lower than comparable civilian
equivalent properties. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The issue is that over the years a phenomenally complex
patchwork of allowances and policies has grown up over many years, leading to confusion
around entitlements and policies that are less reflective of the modern armed
forces people dynamic. For example, the rise in couples in long term relationships
who are not married or single parents with significant child caring
responsibilities. People also have different expectations of home ownership
now, with fewer people prepared to become permanent ‘livers in’ in a mess
without another home or expect to have a permanent location to return to weekly
that supports their wider family commitments, keeping children in the same
school for example. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At the same time the military has seen a very different set
of service experiences emerge – the Royal Navy has coalesced around two major surface
ship, one submarine and two naval air station home locations, meaning that most
personnel can settle down with reasonable security of being posted to similar
areas throughout their career. The RAF is similar, with the reduction in aircraft
fleets and operating bases meaning that people who specialise in certain roles
(e.g. Typhoon engineer maintainer) can be reasonably certain of postings to one
of two locations (Lossiemouth or Coningsby). The British Army by contrast
continues to be significantly more mobile, moving units’ home from Germany and
still moving them between locations in the UK in a way that makes it harder to
predict long-term posting plots and where best to invest in a house. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">These challenges are further exacerbated by the fact that the
MOD no longer owns its housing stock, due to what has widely been accepted to be
a strategic miscalculation in selling it off in the 1990s for short term gain.
This places the MOD in a difficult position where it knows it needs to provide
accommodation for tens of thousands of families around the UK as a central part
of its ‘offer’ to retain desperately needed talent at all levels, but it is
reliant on private companies to deliver it. This combination of factors has led
to a desire by the MOD to invest in a longer-term accommodation plan that reflects
the work force needs and tries to provide reasonable quality housing in the
numbers required at the locations where needed. This work has undergone a variety
of titles but is now referred to as the New Accommodation Offer. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On paper the package being proposed puts forward a lot of
reasonable ideas to help improve the quality-of-service life. For example, it expands
the entitlement to SFA to single personnel, expands the entitlement too for families
who are not ‘traditional’ married couples, and looks to provide access to
rental accommodation if required where service accommodation isn’t necessarily
available. The aim in theory is also to provide accommodation that provides
sufficient space to people with larger families, rather than tie it to rank.
For example, the new policy would mean that a private with 5 children is
automatically entitled to a house with sufficient bedrooms for them, rather
than the current smaller entitlement. When added to existing measures like help
to buy (enabling a service person to borrow up to £25000 on a low interest loan
for moving expenses), then there is clearly a commitment to trying to modernise
the accommodation offer and make it fit for purpose in the 21<sup>st</sup>
century. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhle-ZM3E6JdAvFwe4F9gL2hNAY78aQZW43CBe1r-c40X3C9jyZGzlVuvdr3lq5kcvJJVT570YUQAisIv7Zec7boQCpUJu8nPX3Tl05Z6NuMRm74tuxgluaR2lId5wVOQ0Wl-2UijAQWtjuQvT_q5_veUrisUarXA-qo3Oofg6Lf_Yk-S9K6yTXqQsxVMI7/s1200/45154168.jpg.iCegy8LfMWATAA.Gjr7f-t5Vi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="1200" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhle-ZM3E6JdAvFwe4F9gL2hNAY78aQZW43CBe1r-c40X3C9jyZGzlVuvdr3lq5kcvJJVT570YUQAisIv7Zec7boQCpUJu8nPX3Tl05Z6NuMRm74tuxgluaR2lId5wVOQ0Wl-2UijAQWtjuQvT_q5_veUrisUarXA-qo3Oofg6Lf_Yk-S9K6yTXqQsxVMI7/s320/45154168.jpg.iCegy8LfMWATAA.Gjr7f-t5Vi.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">© Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The problem is that it has landed very, very, badly with the
military community for a variety of reasons. The reasons for this are varied,
but broadly break down into several distinct groups. It is also a complex and fast-moving
situation, and the author freely acknowledges that his understanding may be
incorrect on current policy as it evolves.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Firstly the NAO looked to charge service personnel who were
on<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>detached duty away from their
existing SFA for the use of SLA elsewhere – so if you were (for example) living
in Marham, but on a temporary basis using a mess room in Northwood, you’d find
yourself being charged for the privilege of doing so, and expected to claim the
costs back (up to a ceiling each month). Previously this would have been free,
whereas under these proposals, personnel would have been expected to pay for
the privilege of detached duty – potentially costing them hundreds per year in
unnecessary additional expenses. This naturally went down like a lead balloon because
no other employer would insist on sending staff away from home, then expecting
them to pay twice for their accommodation in the process.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thankfully this particularly
unwelcome change has been paused but may yet come back. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the risk of stating the obvious, if during a
retention crisis of experienced personnel and during a cost of living crisis at
a time when salaries are in real terms 60-80% of what they were in previous decades,
you decide to start charging people a significant amount of their scarce salary
for the privilege of staying in temporary accommodation that you told them to
stay in, as well as adding in an enormous admin burden to claim some, but not
all of the costs back, don’t be surprised when your retention crisis worsens if
the MOD decides to revisit this ‘inspired’ idea. This was a problem that was
invented to solve an issue that didn’t exist and, in the process, managed to cause
a major crisis – what’s the emoji for ‘slow handclap’ again?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Next up is the genuine anger at the decision to draw down officers’
entitlement to housing standards. The opposition here is since people who have
gotten used to having larger houses, and accumulated stuff to go in them are
now being told that they can no longer have an equivalent sized house under the
future model. This may sound ‘first world problems’, but it can have a very real
impact – if you are reliant on service accommodation for your housing needs,
your possessions expand to fill the space available. You cannot seriously
expect to tell people in their mid-40s and 50s, whose children have left home,
but who still have their belongings at home, that the couple can now only have
a two bed, not a four bed (as has happened to some families). That is wholly unreasonable
and seems intended to drive people out of the military as they realise, they
can’t realistically store the goods acquired over decades of service. The wider
message it sends to many is that the ‘soft perks’ of the job, such as larger
housing for more senior and responsible roles will vanish. To some officers,
the trade off for lower pay is access to softer benefits like slightly larger
houses – if this is now linked not to the rank you hold, but the number of children
you have, it suddenly ceases to be a benefit, and instead penalises anyone whose
children have left home, or who through no fault of their own has been unable
to have children (or lost children). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The challenge of expanding entitlement out is that now it is
usually possible for units to ensure that junior people with larger families
are looked after, and don’t pay a premium to do so. So, a junior soldier with
five kids won’t pay the higher rate for a property they don’t have a technical entitlement
to. Under the new system, the same soldier will have to pay the going rate,
meaning real terms pay cut compared to what they are used to paying – which will
hurt if you are on a smaller salary and have large outgoings. Again, this could
lead to a retention crisis as people realise, they can’t afford to stay in the
accommodation on offer to them, and the cheaper accommodation isn’t suitable
for their family. What started as a genuinely good intention may in turn backfire
and hurt those who need it the most.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The media has picked up on opposition from ‘Officers Wives’,
which sounds a bit like a bawdy 1950s social group made up of terribly posh
ladies called Audrey and Celia who stay at home and drink tea, raise families,
and organise supper parties all day. In reality the modern military spouse can
be of either gender, and usually holds down a full-time career too. There is
something a bit Victorian about the way the media imply that this grouping is
shaping events and opposition to the new policy. It would have been better to
portray it as reasonable concerns from husbands and wives concerned about the
impact the changes would have had on their accommodation plans in future. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Army has strong concerns about the way the new policy
will reduce social cohesion ‘on the patch’ and could lead to mixed estates,
with senior officers and junior soldiers living together in close proximity.
This represents the unique perspective of the Army where the dynamic between
Soldier, NCO and Officer remains carefully balanced and split, reflecting three
very different types of career and responsibility – many in the Army are keen
to prevent the loosening of links informally, and to instead preserve the chain
of command and its rigid delineation to ensure that it doesn’t compromise the
ability to order soldiers to do things likely to result in their deaths on
operations. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Speaking as an outsider, the
author can see the point being made, but will never quite understand it, particularly
given that the RAF and Royal Navy are far more meritocratic in their housing allocation
arrangements. But there is a clear and genuine concern felt that if you want to
operate under enormous rigour in wartime, ensuring that the iron hierarchy of
the chain of command remains in place, and isn’t impacted by blurring is entirely
understandable. It is important that even if it is hard to understand, it is
respected as those people impacted by it are the ones, we expect to pay with
their lives on operations to keep us safe. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whether over time these changes because of
wider social demographic changes will be interesting to see though. Certainly,
there are plenty on social media who feel that this move is about officers
looking after their own, and not being prepared to welcome others to their
accommodation patches. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6chRkA2te4L7KzpGxNeBPt0Zwopwm6XKO9LqzgnsPx0sgSBah48Evo-_3RMBQpc5vmgmLXeL2Klk_FMLDs7b3mTBajUzuhyphenhyphenlDLGW0-l9ydGkmO6jlum0pe62zwUSVt0pUpJN8zUa22BppzLCaOqRkiI9X-1omGlPtYJ2cc0DFxSBwFXsWcJ-MzKvNAQSo/s1200/PJHQ-RMWD21-20210127-059.jpg.iCeqvcHfMWATAA.EgWOXqMoEf.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6chRkA2te4L7KzpGxNeBPt0Zwopwm6XKO9LqzgnsPx0sgSBah48Evo-_3RMBQpc5vmgmLXeL2Klk_FMLDs7b3mTBajUzuhyphenhyphenlDLGW0-l9ydGkmO6jlum0pe62zwUSVt0pUpJN8zUa22BppzLCaOqRkiI9X-1omGlPtYJ2cc0DFxSBwFXsWcJ-MzKvNAQSo/s320/PJHQ-RMWD21-20210127-059.jpg.iCeqvcHfMWATAA.EgWOXqMoEf.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">© Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">That there has been such strong pushback here speaks to the
lack of effective consultation on the changes being proposed. Reportedly fewer
than 70 service people were consulted on the plans prior to them going live –
this is far too small a sample group to give a genuinely representative view.
In addition, the lack of clarity has meant that many personnel have no idea how
much money will be in their March pay-packet when these changes begin to kick
in, causing significant financial stress and concern. These concerns seem to
have exploded on social media where there was a genuine sense of anger and
outrage at the way that many of the most fundamental tenants of UK military housing
policy had been thrown away overnight and undermined the offer and peoples bank
balances in the process. Many highly experienced personnel saw this as the
straw that broke the camels back, and it is telling how many social media
accounts, often with very experienced and loyal people behind them are united
in their anger at the new policy. A
cynic may argue that if you were Russian intelligence and wanted to wipe out
long term UK military capability, then you couldn’t have done a better job than
implement an accommodation model seemingly designed to make people quit. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Looking to the future, what does all this mean for the wider
future of the military career and accommodation model? For starters its
reasonable to ask if part of the problem here is the way that the career system
is designed on the assumption that you must move every 18-24 months, building a
pool of generalists, not deep specialists. Not everyone will promote, and
moving people around on an endless merry go round of postings seems a good way
to burn people out, particularly later in their career. Has the time come to
think differently about career postings and movements, perhaps getting people to
accept they will not promote, but locking them into roles for 4-5 years at at a
time later in their career, providing stability for home life and a pool of genuine
deep experts in specialist areas. This already exists in some very niche parts
of the military, perhaps the time has come to roll it out more widely.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is the thorny question too of what these changes mean
for the future of the ‘zig zag’ career model that was central in the 2023 White
Paper. The chances that someone will leave, move to a private house for their
next job (and be paid enough to afford a 4-bedroom house) and then willingly re-enter
to be housed in a 2-bedroom flat in line with their entitlement is nonsense.
This move will kill the idea for many who would be keen to return but won’t
want to see a material decline in their standard of housing just to adhere to entitlement
policy. It’s likely that the more these changes bed in, the less likely it is
that rejoiners with skills and experience will return if they know just how
poor the accommodation offer is. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The last area to think about is how does the MOD engage with
policy in future now that the military have discovered that loud outbursts on social
media produce demonstrable policy action? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is a lot of talk on social media about a
fundamental breaching of the relationship between the MOD and the military. Its
not about the number of bedrooms people have, its about the fact that they’re
finding out their entire future lives are being thrown up in the air over a survey
that a pitifully small number of people filled in, that they are not seeing any
real improvements to their housing and that the only way to get the companies
involved to do their job seems to be to tag very senior officers on Twitter and
hope that this gets picked up. When the Chief of Defence People ends up functioning
as an online help desk to log complaints about the state of military accommodation,
you realise that the system is close to being broken, and with it people’s
goodwill. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This has been a watershed for many in the armed forces who
feel that there has been a fundamental betrayal of trust by their employer in the
offer they’re being given, and that the way it’s been set up stinks. It is notable
just how many serving personnel are openly attacking MOD policy on social
media, and how it is causing disruption and upset, as different camps form
(e.g. the ‘Officers Wives’ versus the ‘Other Ranks’ groupings). Coming on the
back of years of false promises, failure to deliver improvements and frankly a
truly appalling standard of domestic accommodation for too many people, many
personnel are tired and angry about the way their home life is being treated.
They don’t want much, simply a reasonable house with water, electricity, and
heating, and not damp on the walls, mould on the ceiling and walls that are
collapsing into the bedroom. Sadly, for the current estate providers, this
seems too much to hope for. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The truly
appalling state of the service accommodation plot in too many places means that
when people found out these changes, it was too much to bear. It genuinely feels
that this is a watershed moment for the military and that at a time when they
feel overworked, badly underpaid and fed up, then many people who the armed
forces cannot afford to lose will leave. There is a real risk that this will
only accelerate the loss to the point where the military is structurally
unsustainable in the near future due to the huge unexpected increases in voluntary
outflow rates. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">After days of poor news headlines and huge social media
anger the MOD has run up the white flag and surrendered – with much of the implementation
paused pending review. This outcome is genuinely significant, for it marks a
wholescale retreat in the face of military anger, but in the eyes of some, it
is too little, too late. This has arguably been a wholly avoidable crisis which
wider engagement and genuine outreach to get the views of service personnel
would have picked up and shown that while some of the ideas were genuinely
good, much of what was proposed was potentially awful. One has to hope that the
next round of changes is more widely circulated and engaged with, and that
people understand that people will vote with their feet. An Englishman’s home
is his castle, not a two-bedroom flat after all… <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-26139775829532200392024-02-21T09:55:00.004+00:002024-02-21T09:56:34.298+00:00Should We Worry About The Trident 'Failure'? No<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p>HMS VANGUARD has ‘failed’ to successfully launch a Trident
missile as part of her return to service trials in the USA. This marks the
second test in a row that has not been successful for the Royal Navy. Is this a
cause for alarm and should we worry? In a word, no.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiw0xBv-Up54KUD4k_DQSD_eH-tfHw4GcDiY8iHaiZ4OVhx09rAGJMJbW6H4ZYopFndOeivkD6O8gCg3X8xd0eeBxb_fLt5u4KcBGAX9Qn5ChFmIm7PewU8MKrp_RVlWtnveb9LHer4AvgJUZ71smgW_e_Y7iwIMz8bed8Gp144Nvm5EDxy-_0ulSbmIdR_/s1200/45152118.jpg.iCfhv5vfMWATAA.2X3mzP2iL-.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="844" data-original-width="1200" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiw0xBv-Up54KUD4k_DQSD_eH-tfHw4GcDiY8iHaiZ4OVhx09rAGJMJbW6H4ZYopFndOeivkD6O8gCg3X8xd0eeBxb_fLt5u4KcBGAX9Qn5ChFmIm7PewU8MKrp_RVlWtnveb9LHer4AvgJUZ71smgW_e_Y7iwIMz8bed8Gp144Nvm5EDxy-_0ulSbmIdR_/s320/45152118.jpg.iCfhv5vfMWATAA.2X3mzP2iL-.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">Crown Copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><b>What do we know has happened?</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Royal Navy and US Navy share a pool of Trident missiles,
which the UK can draw on 58 to load its SSBN force and conduct tests. As part
of the shared agreement on Trident operations, the missile compartment on the
VANGUARD class is essentially a scaled down US Navy missile compartment and the
launch process follows US procedures. The policy in place is that when a UK or
US SSBN completes refuelling, which is a multi-year process of refitting a
vessel, the final stage before the submarine takes its place in the deterrent
patrol cycle is a test firing of a missile to ensure it works as planned. This is
known as a DASO (Demonstration and Shakedown Operation) to confirm the submarine
is fit for operations. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">During the 2024 test, HMS VANGUARD successfully launched the
missile as required, but for reasons not being made public, the missile did not
ignite as expected and instead sank. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Is this a wider problem?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In a word, no. The UK and US have collaborated together on dozens
of tests over the last 56 years – the Royal Navy did 32 Polaris test firings, and
this was the 12<sup>th</sup> Trident firing. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These are not done in isolation, they are part
of a much wider cycle of US testing, which is utterly identical. Some US tests
have also failed, although not for systemic reasons. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is a shared pool of data to draw on based on these
tests that will identify if there is a common fault in the missile stockpile,
or if this was an isolated incident. All indications from the MOD are that this
was isolated. If it was a wider fault then the US would be equally concerned because
it could have serious ramifications for their own nuclear deterrence
capability. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Why did the last test fail?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The last test (2016) is seen as a failure in the eyes of the
public because the missile was destroyed while under way. The very important
distinction here is that the missile was launched successfully – the command,
control and communication chain held up to deliver an authorised firing message,
the submarines systems worked internally to ensure that the boat could fire as
intended, and the missile was launched successfully, ensuring that the
submarine met the required standards.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">After the launch, for reasons that have not been made public,
the decision was taken by the range safety team to destroy it while in flight –
this was nothing to do with the Royal Navy. It is common for Range Safety
Officers to do this if they perceive even the slightest hint of risk – read accounts
of astronaut training and they will recount how all US launches, including crewed
ones, will have an RSO present who will destroy their spacecraft, killing them
all, if the telemetry indicates a risk. There is a zero risk tolerance here, which
would not apply in real launches, and which the UK is not in any way at fault over.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Again, if a wider issue had been detected, there would have
been ramifications for the whole UK and US SSBN force. This indicates it was an
isolated event, not a systemic reason for concern.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Does the UK have a credible nuclear deterrent?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In a word, yes. The test proved that VANGUARD, like
VENGEANCE in 2016 has the ability to successfully demonstrate she can fire a
nuclear missile if ordered. The test met its goal, and the submarine is now
back in the patrol cycle, ensuring that the RN can sustain Continuous At Sea
Deterrent (CASD) patrols.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The UK remains able to fire a credible nuclear strike at all
times, regardless of this test. Nothing has changed.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Why do tests fail?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Sometimes firing highly complex missiles highlights things
don’t work as planned. Sadly missiles do not have a 100% reliability rate – every
nation on earth has that experience as the Russians with their 50% failure rate
on recent tests can confirm. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Tests are highly controlled and subject to stringent safety
measures not in place in peacetime which can impact on operations to a point
(e.g. the RSO), and also draw on older missiles approaching life expiry rather
than brand new ones. Anyone who has served in HM Forces and done live firings
will have experienced things going wrong. This does not mean the missiles will
not work when required, as wartime experience indicates over many years. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is a danger of drawing too much from one situation,
but in turn it highlights the value of tests. It is likely that the ‘lessons
identified’ washup will find more valuable data from this experience than a successful
shoot, which can in turn be used to help increase confidence in the deterrents ability
to be used when required. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Why don’t we fire again to prove it works?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is no need to do so – the system has been proven to
work for the goal of the tests. VANGUARD has shown she can fire a missile if
needed. To fire again would cause significant disruption to her patrol cycle,
potentially risking longer term CASD capability and would send the message to
the wider world that the UK and US had doubts about the credibility of Trident
and needed to conduct further reassurance trials. Paradoxically, more tests
would call the sense of our confidence in the deterrence into question in a way
not testing does not. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Things go wrong, it does not mean that there is a systemic
problem.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Time for the RAF to take over?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is no requirement for the RAF to pick up the nuclear
mission. There are no nuclear capable jets in the front line force, or nuclear air
launched bombs in our inventory and nuclear strike missions require significant
amounts of people, aircraft and support to be credible. It would require expensive
integration of the US tactical nuclear weapons onto either Typhoon or F35,
disrupting the front line force, reducing available aircraft and not really adding
much in terms of day to day capability that cannot already be done by Trident. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Why was it kept secret?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The MOD chose not to publicise this event, in keeping with
its long history of silence on nuclear matters. The USN is significantly more
open about DASO tests, while the MOD does not, as a rule comment. Sadly the
rise of open source intelligence makes it hard to keep anything secret – AIS transponders
and imagery before and after the test, and publication of the test range
closure dates meant that it was obvious it had occurred. The author spotted
images of RN participating vessels on their way home some time after it had
happened and was beginning to wonder if the silence meant things had gone wrong.
The lesson here is that everything will leak – trying to cover it up rarely
works. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The bottom line though is that this is not the drama, let
alone crisis some want it to be. Tests happen, the desired result was achieved
and operations continue without impact. The deterrence remains assured and there
is not an issue to worry about – that the RN and USN remain publicly relaxed on
the issue and are not recalling their SSBN for urgent refits tells us that this
is not a wider problem. It is also worth remembering that this could equally
have been a US SSBN firing the same missile, and this is not a uniquely British
problem. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Overall, remember the words of the Hitchhikers Guide To The
Galaxy – Don’t Panic!<o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-30545311389860312422024-02-20T19:35:00.004+00:002024-02-20T19:35:24.501+00:00A Tale of Two Royal Navy's - Ambitious Expansion Vs Strategic Decline.<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">You could forgive supporters of the British Royal Navy for feeling
incredibly jealous this morning as <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/australia-to-double-fleet-size-with-small-warships/">news broke</a> of the plans to drastically
increase the size of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) surface fleet. To a
cynic, it would represent a sea change from the British tradition of years of barely
managed decline, cuts to force levels, stockpiles, infrastructure and shore
support and an attitude that somehow less is more if you insert “world class” in
front of the ship title. To see a ‘Royal’ Navy set out a clear plan for growth
that will, if implemented in full result in the RAN possessing a significantly
larger escort force than the RN is both exciting and depressing that the UK lacks
a similar sense of aspiration and ambition. But will this really come to pass,
or will this fade into a future of recriminations and half delivered goals? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The RAN commissioned a <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/independent-analysis-navy-surface-combatant-fleet">review in 2023</a> into the size of the surface
fleet, and the response was formally published on 20 Feb 2024. In broad terms
the future RAN will comprise 9 ‘tier one’ escorts made up of the Hobart class
AAW destroyers and the Hunter class (Type 26) ASW frigates. These will be
supported by up to 11 frigates of a lighter patrol variant for general
constabulary duties, supported by up to 6 ‘optionally crewed vessels’ that will
help bridge the gap as the RAN moves towards a future of more uncrewed ships at
sea. This will give the RAN an escort fleet of 20 crewed major surface
combatants, and 6 potentially crewed vessels. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi58t_RdK5Z-W3py0K04k_4g7UW4pMYQKJJ3SKX5Zyt0s4U4UP0rIedR9atE57X3dO9P8NxSxaAn3w-2sMV5Z-1-mzaLniJgp-DsIEDO-I8ITAHGZAih2zbZ_2jOU9cAkBnnOX7Wvym5CpxPDO4jYkZt4b_gk1Oncjpafpn9FIGi-zRrQ9xvxF3tingrhij/s1200/45154685.jpg.iCfNw6PfMWATAA.WSMRNI15sx.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi58t_RdK5Z-W3py0K04k_4g7UW4pMYQKJJ3SKX5Zyt0s4U4UP0rIedR9atE57X3dO9P8NxSxaAn3w-2sMV5Z-1-mzaLniJgp-DsIEDO-I8ITAHGZAih2zbZ_2jOU9cAkBnnOX7Wvym5CpxPDO4jYkZt4b_gk1Oncjpafpn9FIGi-zRrQ9xvxF3tingrhij/s320/45154685.jpg.iCfNw6PfMWATAA.WSMRNI15sx.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Coupled to this ambitious growth plan for the surface escort
fleet, the RAN will continue to acquire a significant number of nuclear attack
submarines, with the first nuclear engineers coming off training courses in the
UK now, and it will operate the US VIRGINIA class in the short term, and the future
SSN designed with the UK. In addition, plans have been put in place to produce
new support ships to replace HMAS CHOULES (the BAY class LSD(A)), while work is
in place to expand the capability of the existing elderly ANZAC class frigates
with more strike missiles.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On paper these plans represent a stunningly ambitious goal
to reinvigorate the RAN, taking it in force size terms to levels not seen in
over 40 years, and except for the fixed wing carrier and SSBN component, making
it arguably a larger and more capable force than t the Royal Navy. Even with 20
ships, this will still give Australia a significantly larger surface force than
the Royal Navy, which is continuing to decline in size and capability, and
seems set to drop to just 6 AAW destroyers and 8-10 frigates for most of the
2020s and early 2030s. It is not until the mid-2030s that (in theory) the RN
will have 19 escort ships in service.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If realised in full then over the next 15-20 years the RAN
will quickly move to become one of the most potent navies in the Indo-Pacific
region, combining a wide range of highly capable warships, coupled with first
rate personnel and access to strong support and intelligence. When you add this
to the existing acquisitions for the Australian Army and RAAF, one is left with
the sense that here is a nation that, unlike the UK, is not prepared institutionally
to accept strategic decline as an inevitability, and which is prepared to
invest and spend for the long haul in both sustaining and expanding defence
capabilities. It is no exaggeration to say that on the current course and trajectory,
that given the currently rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the willingness
of Australia to invest in defence properly and their credible capable military,
that Canberra may soon be seen in Washington as a defence partner of equal, if
not greater importance and credibility than London.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">But this vision depends greatly on it being delivered in
full, and like all good visions there is a price to be paid ahead of time. For
starters two ANZAC frigates will be decommissioned early over the next two years,
leaving the force with just 9 escort ships, while the Hobart class will reportedly
need to undergo significant refits in the next few years, further reducing surface
fleet numbers in the short term. At the same time work on other projects has
been reduced, with home-built patrol ship numbers being slashed (the ARAFURA class),
while the HUNTER class has been reduced from 9 – 6 hulls. This means in the
short term the RAN will get markedly smaller while it waits for replacement
hulls to arrive, and it will need to do so with ever older frigates. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The real challenges to delivery are threefold – money, industry,
and people. Firstly, there needs to be certainty that the long-term funding is
in place to deliver this vision not just now, but for at least 15-20 years to
come. This will require apolitical commitment to sustaining these plans, and
being ready to bear the costs when they inevitably rise. The one certainty of
defence projects is that they never get cheaper, with the HUNTER class rising
significantly in cost terms being the root cause of deleting three hulls from
the project. Add this large shipbuilding bill to the huge costs of the nuclear submarine
programme and you realise that a lot of taxpayer’s money is committed to
maritime defence investment for decades to come – will this remain politically
popular and palatable for many electoral cycles ahead?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Being certain that the money is there will be vital for industry,
which will need to deliver significant investments to make this credible. The
Australian shipbuilding industry is reportedly struggling to make good the people
and skills needed to build ships at home, hence the cancellation of the ARAFURA
class project. Ensuring that there is sufficient expertise at home to build the
HUNTER class and the new light frigate class, potentially at the same time, as
well as aspects of the SSN programme will stretch Australian industry to the
limits to deliver. Even if the political will remains, being able to find
enough people and resources to construct these ships will be hard and may lead
to increased reliance on foreign construction. Already the RAN is clear it will
build the first batch of light frigates abroad, which may also land poorly if taxpayer
dollars are spent building Australian warships in foreign yards.<o:p></o:p></p><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Most importantly of all, this plan calls for the RAN to have
enough people to crew these ships as well as put in place the wider support
services needed to offer a meaningful career. There is a danger of assuming
that you only need ‘X’ extra people to add as ships company, assuming the basic
crew complement, multiplying it by the hulls being purchased and recruiting
that many people. You need more than this to provide a margin for training, natural
wastage, to staff the various support services needed (e.g. dockyards, HQs etc)
and to ensure that people don’t spend their career going from sea job to sea
job. Even if more modern ships need fewer crew, you still need to recruit and
retain enough people to provide meaningful career paths for the many
specialisations present. This means you need a path to recruit and train
sufficient officers to provide 11 command qualified CO’s and XO’s, which in
turn means many more officers of the watch and warfare officers. You may only need
half the number of people to crew twice as many ships, but you still need to find
twice as many CO’s, XO’s, MEO’s etc than you had before, and this in turn means
major impacts on career management.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh45UKn5jjTMS1B8gIQH4HjiZH1kb7ZNs4eoV-9YkTzHBSNC-0VQNCyvlGEZc91jBEQ261-FBLRU1D_-msjPwwrPH8jF1PHF_-jCPZUZlgVj_VD_-Fy2tQ-rGMLeYmM1ZYtxTuARywlPoOlhQTA2fqgQ0c1cm8lS0WG7uw37rww_foa4fLSWeAK87Do4vNk/s1200/CH170015241.jpg.iCfch6PfMWATAA.46SRCHxtpm.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh45UKn5jjTMS1B8gIQH4HjiZH1kb7ZNs4eoV-9YkTzHBSNC-0VQNCyvlGEZc91jBEQ261-FBLRU1D_-msjPwwrPH8jF1PHF_-jCPZUZlgVj_VD_-Fy2tQ-rGMLeYmM1ZYtxTuARywlPoOlhQTA2fqgQ0c1cm8lS0WG7uw37rww_foa4fLSWeAK87Do4vNk/s320/CH170015241.jpg.iCfch6PfMWATAA.46SRCHxtpm.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright<br /><br /></span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The risk is that the RAN is <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/slim-pickings-for-navy-as-it-struggles-to-recruit-20240105-p5evdx">shrinking year on year</a>, and voluntary
outflow rates are increasing, particularly of technical personnel. Those who
are left are going to have to work harder than ever to fill gaps caused by
others leaving, increasing pressure on their own careers, and they will need to
both run on increasingly elderly platforms while introducing multiple new hull
types into service. This is going to present an enormous challenge for a force
of barely 15,000 people and may not be achievable without major changes to
recruitment. Interestingly Australia seems to be suffering the same recruitment
woes that the UK has, with the average recruiting time for soldiers being 300
days, meaning good people are being lost as they get other jobs elsewhere. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is possible that the Australians will resort to their time-honoured
tactic of ‘encouraging’ other 5-Eyes naval personnel to join up. For many years
its been common to see the RAN and RNZN place recruiting adverts in Navy News
(Canada less so – perhaps, come to Canada, see moose, drink moose milk’ is a
less appealing recruiting pitch?). There are plenty of RN personnel who have
gone ‘down under’ usually on a package of pay, allowance and pension that
usually leads to residency in 3 years. The general feedback from Brits seems to
be that you’ll be utterly thrashed and work hard, but you’ll be generously
rewarded and treated in a way that makes you wonder why you didn’t do it years
ago. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>you look at the plummeting morale in the
British military, particularly over increasingly uncompetitive pay that doesn’t
compensate you adequately for being thrashed from posting to posting, with a
new accommodation model that seems to have landed very badly in some quarters,
as well as the opportunity to live in houses that are so poorly maintained by
supremely disinterested contractors that your 2 year old child ends up in hospital,
is it any wonder that many people will be likely looking with interest at their
options down under? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The risk though is that this could be seen as ‘poaching’ and
doesn’t solve the wider allied problem of crew shortfalls, it merely transfers
a finite number of people around the various navies, rather than really expanding
them. This may be a particular issue as the RAN SSN force comes online, when nuclear
engineers will be in huge demand and many RN submariners may be sorely tempted
to jump ship. Trying to prevent a mass exodus from one navy to another could test
international relations to the limit. One has to idly wonder why, given how
much better the Australian offer appears to be on paper to many British
personnel that the UK doesn’t just attempt to emulate it outright and make a real
effort to keep people in as it does seem to be a very attractive package. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Given all of this, while the long-term vision is impressive,
it remains to be seen if the Australians can deliver it in the timescale or
numbers envisioned. The worst-case scenario is that the RAN takes pain now to
deliver on a long-term future that produces promises of a growing fleet of escort
ships that never quite delivers what was promised in either timelines or hull
numbers. This may sound eerily familiar to supporters of the Royal Navy, burned
over the last few years of increasingly hollow statements about ‘growing the RN
for the first time in a generation’ which have proven to be utterly worthless. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is hard not to see significant parallels to
the RN in this scenario. A commitment to a growing surface fleet, investment in
new ships and plans to bring a two-tier navy into being of both heavy and light
ships really sums up every defence review since 2010, yet nearly 15 years
later, the force is smaller than ever and struggling to recruit and retain people.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also interesting to see that the RAN is resorting to
the same methods that the RN has tried to solve its crew shortages of choosing
to pay hulls off (e.g. two ANZAC class) to free people up to fill billets on other
ships. Given the RN has been trying this method for almost 80 years of scrapping
ships when it routinely runs out of people, only to find that it hasn’t worked
and it needs to scrap even more ships, one wonders when this inspired idea will
work – presumably when there are no ships left to scrap, at which point there
are no gaps to fill? Less cynically the challenge is going to be delivering
both the current fleet and the future fleet in a way that doesn’t break people
and disrupt operations and doesn’t result in the nightmare scenario of a magnificent
future fleet unable to put to sea due to lack of people. This is not as far
from reality as some may think – just look at the<a href="https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-41109211.html"> Irish Navy</a> and its
current personnel challenges.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJPVdos8MR-fz1bubBRsKu5t4UPLz7-qxwps9vHLaHIGhZ7ErbCpFtyqUhrhwyiWRjoIlBhy8-CCibs5kNx5qY8tngT18igJobcVMBtLLGo2HNt0AEZN1ewEHhNRr9zVySrnw0XDz_D5uICMThwh4Yr2-9IThyphenhyphenim14CBliqMCCY3uTo9DZj8j0JXLbkPrL/s1200/FH090085020.jpg.iCeyr57fMWATAA._e-QwMzw6G.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJPVdos8MR-fz1bubBRsKu5t4UPLz7-qxwps9vHLaHIGhZ7ErbCpFtyqUhrhwyiWRjoIlBhy8-CCibs5kNx5qY8tngT18igJobcVMBtLLGo2HNt0AEZN1ewEHhNRr9zVySrnw0XDz_D5uICMThwh4Yr2-9IThyphenhyphenim14CBliqMCCY3uTo9DZj8j0JXLbkPrL/s320/FH090085020.jpg.iCeyr57fMWATAA._e-QwMzw6G.jpg" width="213" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">As a loyal supporter of the Royal Navy and eternal optimist,
watching the RAN set this vision out for the future has left the author feeling
rather depressed. There is no chance at all that a comparable announcement
would be made in the UK for the Royal Navy. One only has to look back over the
last 10-15 years of shrinking force numbers, the increasingly challenging
materiel state of the force, the growing unplanned outflow of people without direct
replacement and an operational plot that grows ever busier. There is no funding
ever likely to be available to double the RN escort force, nor the people to
crew it. The harsh reality is that the UK defence budget isn’t sufficient to
meet the demands placed on it year in year out, yet further spending seems increasingly
unlikely.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Looking ahead to the two nations naval future, one gets the
sense that this is a defining moment in the relationship between the two Royal
Navies. On the one hand Australia has set out a clear and funded path to significant
expansion and capability growth that if met will result in its nearly doubling
in size and capability in the coming years. On the other hand, in the UK, the
MOD has refused for some years now to even publicly state its plans for the
total planned size of the RN escort fleet on the desperately pathetic justification
of ‘national security’, something noted by the<a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/work/7654/armed-forces-readiness/"> Parliamentary Defence Select Committee</a>
as being wholly unacceptable. Australia is telling the world it is doubling its
fleet size, while the MOD refuses to tell the taxpayer how many ships they plan
to operate, despite such information readily being available on social media. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The future is likely to be one where both navies operate as
peer forces, a situation brought about by strategic investment in the
Australian Navy and strategic decline in the Royal Navy. Both will operate an
ageing frigate force, a more modern AAW force and be trying to introduce two
new classes of frigate and an SSN into service in similar time frames. Both
navies will see a moment in coming years when they embrace autonomous technology
to shape their future force structures. Both navies will struggle with budgetary
situations, industrial capability and recruiting and retaining people. In time
the RAN is likely to be one of the leading naval powers in the Indo-Pacific
with a clearly defined mission of maritime security to deter China and predominantly
operate in its home area and friendly territories, giving it a huge area of
responsibility to protect. The Royal Navy will aspire to global operations but
not be resourced to deliver this and will instead continue its decline to being
a regional navy with carriers and SSBNs, focusing predominantly on NATO operations
rather than being the global force it used to be. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Overall the future for the RAN is considerably
brighter than the RN, and if this plan is delivered, it will only be a matter
of years before the RAN is bigger, and arguably more capable and operationally
credible than the Royal Navy, in turn shaping Australia’s emerging position as
Americas most important, and credible ally. <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-67898259483802234972024-02-14T19:09:00.001+00:002024-02-14T19:09:07.578+00:00Why Training The Military In Climate Change Makes Sense<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The Daily Telegraph has continued its campaign of encouraging
its readership to be scared about things that don’t impact them in the
slightest this week by reporting the outrageous ‘news’ that the Royal Navy is looking
at giving training in climate change. Apparently this a bad thing. Cue lots of
angry commentators moaning about wokery and demanding that the military is used
to defend the UK and not act as a tool of social engineering. Is this the case,
or in fact is there more to this than meets the eye?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The more complex reality is that whether the armed forces like
it or not, climate change is something that will need to be factored into practically
every aspect of military life in the years to come. This will range from
tactical issues around kit through to strategic trends that will shape how the
UK as a nation engages on the global stage. It is not something that can be
ignored or dismissed as ‘Whitehall woke nonsense’. Indeed the <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmdfence/32/report.html">Defence
Select Committee</a> has written extensively on this, issuing a report in 2023
about this subject that is well worth a read. Similarly, most other major armed
forces have conducted similar studies or assessments to understand the risks to
them and their operations. <o:p></o:p><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11pt;">The
MOD climate change roadmap, eloquently setting out the risks and challenges can
be found </span><a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973707/20210326_Climate_Change_Sust_Strategy_v1.pdf" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11pt;">HERE</a></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhxZwVOg0FQVTomLNSJSkb_vi3zPEsXrBL2qPAgUYc3MYiPvsULfTFceSRvJLzqJpt4lQyAdNV1B1L6fxBKX_SPhMjmtZWjYvhuPFhWeLTHEqfAVS_UCCK7P2g_yOWQIFu2Xio6hNNPpGL_KRm8laClX88xP2wUhntp9I_End7xK515JBt8vNjZOErnAyIX/s1200/FLEET-20240206-XD0071-014.jpg.iCeAmYHfMWATAA.kSd4CyEBJs.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhxZwVOg0FQVTomLNSJSkb_vi3zPEsXrBL2qPAgUYc3MYiPvsULfTFceSRvJLzqJpt4lQyAdNV1B1L6fxBKX_SPhMjmtZWjYvhuPFhWeLTHEqfAVS_UCCK7P2g_yOWQIFu2Xio6hNNPpGL_KRm8laClX88xP2wUhntp9I_End7xK515JBt8vNjZOErnAyIX/s320/FLEET-20240206-XD0071-014.jpg.iCeAmYHfMWATAA.kSd4CyEBJs.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2024</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The changes wrought through an evolving climate can be felt
in a variety of different ways. At a practical level the UK has historically maintained
forces capable of operating in reasonably moderate climates of Europe – predominantly
mild, wet, and not subject to extremes of temperature. While it has maintained
some equipment and stockpiles for other regions, this has been more limited in number
and required specialist training – for example, arctic warfare training in the
Norwegian winter (currently underway as part of NATO EX COLD RESPONSE), jungle
training in Belize and Brunei and desert training with allies in locations like
Jordan. Equipment is intended for use, in the main, for the NATO theatre and is
not always well adapted to climatic shifts or deployments to other climatic
extremes.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At a strategic level this matters because changes in climate
will impact on wider international stability. For example, rising sea levels
will put some islands under water, forcing mass population displacement.
Changes to weather patterns have led to droughts, for example in Africa droughts
have led to the collapse of the farming patterns pursued by migratory
populations, and in turn led to their moving to new locations, for example in
Somalia. Desperate to find income and with resource pressure growing, the resulting
outcome is a rise in<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>piracy as people
take to the water to find a way to gain money to buy food that is skyrocketing
in price and fishery stocks collapse. The Royal Navy has found itself deployed
for years in the region handling counter piracy duties as a result, in part due
to climate change elsewhere in Africa. More widely melting sea ice could lead
to the opening up of year round sea routes across the arctic, increasing the
potential for maritime trade, but also increasing the opportunity for conflict over
territory and resources. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Operationally changes to climate are already impacting on
how the military trains and operates globally. The constant rise in
temperatures in Cyprus means that now training in this strategically critical
location is impossible for parts of the year due to heat, while the rise in freak
weather events may lead to an increase in demands for humanitarian assistance
both in<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the UK and globally. Shifts in human
population may lead to mass migration of people, requiring interventions, such
as the ongoing operations in the Med to assist where migrants are found sailing
in desperately unsafe vessels – drawn there by a collapse in the economies in
their home regions due to climate change leading to inflation, unemployment and
loss of food. Shifts in winter patterns means that the UK may now need to
consider carefully how it deploys to the high north, as part of its wider
arctic strategy, potentially needing to be ready to deploy more equipment more often
to monitor and support deterrence operations to prevent mischief making by
others, enabled as better weather increases opportunities for operations. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Tactically climate change will force real choices on the
military around investment in equipment. Over 1000 new armoured vehicles are
due to enter service over the next decade – will they be able to operate in the
climatic extremes likely to be encountered in some crisis scenarios, or will
they be unfit for purpose? Does this mean more money has to be spent future
proofing them against contingencies, possibly meaning less can be purchased,
and what is the impact on the design – what are you trading off capability wise
to integrate these climate measures in? This isn’t a hypothetical ‘what if’ – the
Royal Navy is already seeing the impact of rising sea water temperatures in the
Gulf, beyond what it reasonably expected to encounter, and impacting on ships
habitability and performance. Trying to send elderly mine hunters to sea in the
height of a Gulf summer may push them beyond the limits of habitability, impairing
their operational value and reducing our national ability to contribute
strategically to a campaign. It may sound minor, but these decisions can, and will,
impact on the UK’s ability as a nation to deploy globally and play a leading
role in international security. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is why it is so important to understand these risks
because every member of the armed forces is likely to find their service
careers directly impacted by the effects of climate change, be it dealing with
uncomfortable to use uniforms, or seeing their houses not being fit for occupation
due to temperature extremes. They may find themselves deployed far from home to
bring help to others in an emergency, or have their leave cancelled to assist
with flood recovery here in the UK. To that end reminding people of it, why it
is so important and so central to everything the military does matters a great
deal. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The problem is that this has been seized on as ‘proof’ of
some kind of agenda of ‘wokeism’ (presumably by these mysterious ultra left Britain
hating civil servants that apparently run the MOD despite no one ever having
knowingly met one in a position of power). There is outrage that the Royal Navy
is now looking at this as an outcome, even though the proposals are just that,
proposals. As best as can be seen, given it comes from a leaked document, the
RN is possibly adding a short online training session to add to its wider
training (also delivered online) to remind personnel of the importance of understanding
climate change and how it can impact the military.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It may be helpful to remember that lots of military training
is delivered online these days covering everything from safe use of desks to cold
weather / hot weather environmental training or reminders about operational
security. Personnel are expected to take this on a varying basis from a ‘one
off’ to annual refreshers. Adding a short training course that may only need to
be taken once does not seem a particularly onerous problem. Of course to those
opposed to what they see as social engineering in the military, this is more
proof that the ‘woke’ are taking over. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
problem with this ‘war on woke’ is that when you look at the opposition to it
online, the people opposed to it usually end up demonstrating exactly why so
much of this training is needed in the way that they manage to casually insult
and offend anyone who has the audacity to not be a white male member of the
military. This is usually accompanied by demands that they have no problem with
equal treatment on merit, but they don’t see the point of all this nonsensical
training, and who is likely to join up anyway given all the ‘Britain hating
brainwashing going on’?<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtB8ol2RnrVpRdYGIjUCdwGSuNJ1AtZv1UeVEH4dec7ExyWBB8c7z6MEVr3UaHqL9TNfVZBmLu3bgI6o1ceqsynDaW9pOuk6H3fpExP6m3DDOs4sZIsHTNQ5nr6J6dVnn2ieC5P1kt38f41nNhWAJpCCkjxsx1XVZi-Y4JrdQ3DvQQZKCorog6o2dAtKCo/s1000/6460968023_c05e6c49e5_b.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="666" data-original-width="1000" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtB8ol2RnrVpRdYGIjUCdwGSuNJ1AtZv1UeVEH4dec7ExyWBB8c7z6MEVr3UaHqL9TNfVZBmLu3bgI6o1ceqsynDaW9pOuk6H3fpExP6m3DDOs4sZIsHTNQ5nr6J6dVnn2ieC5P1kt38f41nNhWAJpCCkjxsx1XVZi-Y4JrdQ3DvQQZKCorog6o2dAtKCo/s320/6460968023_c05e6c49e5_b.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2024</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Sadly, if you look at the many reports which exist and graphically
illustrate the scale of the problems faced by non-white male members of the
military, you see that it is very necessary. Equal treatment on merit is fine
if everyone is genuinely treated equally – unfortunately there are still huge
biases in the system, and far too many incidents where people are treated
appallingly. The <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/343/defence-subcommittee/news/156892/report-protecting-those-who-protect-us-women-in-the-armed-forces-from-recruitment-to-civilian-life/">Atherton
report</a> details the systematic abuse, assaults and sexual violence inflicted
on female service personnel over many years. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/nov/16/sixty-women-at-mod-complain-of-widespread-toxic-and-hostile-behaviour">recent
letter</a> leaked to the Guardian signed by female service and civil service personnel,
detailing a horrific catalogue of attacks, sexual molestation, inappropriate conduct
and treatment of women as second class citizens in MOD head office is not only
deeply worrying, but also a sign that the problems are deep rooted. There is no
point saying ‘I believe in equal treatment’ if the culture you actively
support, sustain and believe in results in its members being treated as second
class compared to their male colleagues.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Some will see this as yet more ‘snowflakery’ because it wasn’t
like that in their day. In fact that’s a very good thing because a lot of the conduct
in the past would be wholly unacceptable today, and potentially result in criminal
charges. If you want to moan about ‘back in my day it was okay’ ask yourself
honestly if you’d be happy for your son or daughter (or grandchild) to experience
the exact same treatment as you went through. The answer is likely to be no,
which is why challenging and changing is so important. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Others moan that the current generation won’t
join and won’t fight. This too is nonsense, applications are high, and when the
Army launched its fantastic ‘<a href="https://www.marketingweek.com/british-army-snowflake-campaign/">snowflakes’
advertising campaign</a>, it led to one of the highest levels of expressions of
interest ever seen in an Army recruiting campaign (and a 71% increase in applications).
Strangely if you target the audience you want to attract with messages that resonate
to them, they’ll respond in kind. Recruiting has changed and needs to work hard
to bring in new recruits who are far more digitally savvy, conscious of their environment
and care about issues that are different to their predecessors. They’re still
joining up and fighting like lions, or doing their nation proud – just look at how
in the last month the Royal Navy has seen its ships in action with the crews operating
under huge threats and doing their job to perfection. They’ve always had what
it takes, they just communicate and think differently to the previous
generation, as has been the way since time immemorial.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There are also moans about how time shouldn’t be spent trying
to attract people that won’t join anyway – which seems an attempt to say ‘I’m
not a racist but’. The fact is that many minority ethnic communities don’t
currently have a tradition of service in the military in the UK, but that can change
over time. But it takes a long time to build the culture and community where
people feel that a career in the armed forces is for them – if you look at the
accounts of racism in the military people experienced in the 1940s and 50s, is
it any wonder that some will tell their children and grandchildren ‘don’t join
up as the armed forces are racist’,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and
too often that message was heard. The reason training and culture shift matters
is that this is a generational long mission to shift attitudes and help people
of all backgrounds and beliefs realise that they have a place in the military –
over time as people go through, and experience fair and genuinely equal treatment,
they’ll tell their children and grandchildren to join the military, rather than
avoid it. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This matters because if you look at the birthrate of the UK,
it is slowing down and new births are increasingly coming from ethnic minority groups
or families who migrated here from elsewhere in recent years. If you create the
conditions where the armed forces are seen as hostile to people who are not
white males, you have slammed the door in the face to anyone interested in
joining but realises they are not wanted or welcome. Culture shifts take
decades, and this is about ensuring that through small changes now, the
recruiting pool in the 2050s – 2100s are keen to join up and serve, rather than
relying on an ever smaller group of angry white men to join the infantry. If
you want to recruit engineers, cyber security experts, pilots and others, you
need to look at the whole of the recruitment demographic, understand that it is
slowly but inexorably changing and take appropriate steps to target it. If not
then gapping will only increase, and the finest minds of the next generation
will be lost to us. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This author makes no apology for coming across as ‘woke’
because we are in a battle for talent now and in the future. The author passionately
cares about the military, the armed forces and ensuring they are fit to serve
not just today, but for the decades ahead. It is clear that this will only
happen if real change happens, and that means embracing ideas, culture shifts
and behavioural changes that some people will find uncomfortable. But if this
isn’t done, the alternative is even worse, and we find ourselves as a nation
without the people we need to keep us safe in future. The stakes could not be higher,
we need to do everything possible to recruit and retain everyone. This will make
people uncomfortable at times, but something has to be done to break the cycle
of decline, to ensure that people have a service experience where they want to
stay for as long as possible, not leave due to racist bullying, sexual violence
or being career fouled for the audacity of having children. The small amount of
training being done, the investment in new career policies and strategies and
trying to ensure that there is an honest conversation is vital here. It
deserves more support than being dismissed as ‘hard left Britain hating wokery’
because that is utter nonsense. It is being delivered by people who serve their
nation, love their country and are trying to do everything in their power to
secure its long-term future – they deserve support, not insults from on high. <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-9184625619315478172024-02-11T13:22:00.009+00:002024-02-11T14:24:24.075+00:00Standing Up for D&I <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">In what is undoubtedly an utterly remarkable coincidence,
the Daily Telegraph has managed to secure documentation suggesting the British
Army wants to review security clearance requirements for Commonwealth recruits,
that the Armed Forces are being told to reduce mention of overtly religious acts
at Remembrance and a letter from that body of truly marginalised societal group
of former military, now middle aged, middle class, white males has written to the Telegraph attacking ‘wokeism’ just in time for the Secretary of State for Defence to
boldly leap in and save the day. Promising a review on MOD D&I policies,
SofS<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>has managed to save the military
from those “<i>leftist ideas that have leaked into the Civil Service… poisoning
the discussion</i>” Rule Britannia and lets all go kick a shifty looking foreigner
to celebrate taking our country back from (checks notes) the Civil Service…<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjs5fsWfvsoJXi_pdCzN0KTCh0ZaQEupe9HH5Krbxky5nhiyZ-sVfywTp9VH5vn3MYXagVjaRQ_qb5c6DUJqXMyevGVG1is8bSfXu-lz71U4ONaMLwS_VIYRAivhNVq-TS8ZSxys9IGr0-PPIwviL9QO__4ACaFjISu5SL8CPsobBiZgAES7gfGDg4SbWFc/s1200/APOSE-2017-042%203CS%20RLC%20Guard%20Mount-0218.jpg.iCelv_PeMWATAA.DHeK9KxaQc.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="871" data-original-width="1200" height="232" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjs5fsWfvsoJXi_pdCzN0KTCh0ZaQEupe9HH5Krbxky5nhiyZ-sVfywTp9VH5vn3MYXagVjaRQ_qb5c6DUJqXMyevGVG1is8bSfXu-lz71U4ONaMLwS_VIYRAivhNVq-TS8ZSxys9IGr0-PPIwviL9QO__4ACaFjISu5SL8CPsobBiZgAES7gfGDg4SbWFc/s320/APOSE-2017-042%203CS%20RLC%20Guard%20Mount-0218.jpg.iCelv_PeMWATAA.DHeK9KxaQc.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br />UK MOD © Crown copyright </td></tr></tbody></table>
<p class="MsoNormal">The British Armed Forces allow applicants from Commonwealth
nations (countries that are, in the main, former members of the British Empire)
to apply to join up. This is not a guaranteed right, nor does it necessarily become
a straightforward process. Navigating the hugely complex legal morass that is
the visa process is the first hurdle (you cannot come to the UK and say you
wish to join up and stay while this is going on). There are many different ways
that the system can identify challenges, ranging from residency concerns to medical
matters. In recent years, for example, the RAF has rejected hundreds of
commonwealth applicants on grounds ranging from medical, prior convictions, tattoos,
age and even failing to turn up to continue the process. It is not as simple as
saying anyone can join and leaving it at that.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One of the biggest challenges is <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>security clearances and the need to provide a level
of vetting for applicants, particularly to more sensitive roles. Each of the three
Services and their respective branches/trades/capbadges has a different attitude
to vetting. Some posts require little more than a basic check of address
details and prior family, while others require a detailed examination of ones personal
and private life. The DV process (developed vetting) is intentionally intrusive
and designed to spot potential spies or subversives who should note be given
access to top secret material. It can at times be a little intense – the author
still recalls being asked many years ago in a DV interview, by a terribly nice
middle class lady who looked like she shopped in Waitrose, how many men and
women he’d slept with, including prostitutes… <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The biggest challenge in securing the higher clearances (SC
and DV) is the residency requirements that calls for sustained periods of UK
residency. This is to demonstrate both a traceable history for checks, and be
able to run wider credit checks and other financial analysis that underpins
these clearance processes. Without the residency its much harder to build up
the information needed to provide information to enable decision makers to take
a risk based assessment on whether an individual can, or cannot, be granted an
SC/DV. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is a particular challenge
for commonwealth recruits who haven’t lived in the UK for a long time (you can
join without 5 years residency) as it makes it much harder to complete these
checks. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The result is that there are far fewer commonwealth officers
commissioning in the Army than perhaps should be the case on pure numbers grounds
alone. According to Hansard, less than 3% of British Army Officers come from
BAME or Commonwealth backgrounds. This is being particularly felt in areas
where a higher level of clearance is needed – for example the Intelligence
Corps and Royal Signals, which handle particularly sensitive material. The end
result is a diminished pool of recruits, leading to significant personnel
shortfalls at all levels, and a lack of ethnic representation. The latter
matters, particularly in intelligence because if you want to get a viewpoint on
what the enemy may do, doing so from a non white European male background is
often invaluable – only by looking at other ways of thinking than our own group
think can we consider every possible outcome. If we’re only culturally capable
of assuming the opposition will act in a way we consider rational, then we’re going
to get our metaphorical arses kicked when they don’t (does anyone remember
Singapore in 1941/42?). <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh5ISd_A5Y94matUvjAcjaLFPnt0lqwJ9OtHeRDfGPuLLMTZtkElOzKCdXJ4d9rUiJdKRcuYnAnw9vcmoedVeMcAW2OoVwmRLSf43j5eYuB345ZgCMb7emYidv0cyJi7PPTug8znMTqYsmrO5iJkeb1g3ejo0A_nKLypxuyLXj3eTvhdY2_IQhy5c0Qr8pa/s1200/APONEC-OFFICIAL-20211030-060-232.jpg.iCeEr_DeMWATAA.pUGwIWZ8Va.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh5ISd_A5Y94matUvjAcjaLFPnt0lqwJ9OtHeRDfGPuLLMTZtkElOzKCdXJ4d9rUiJdKRcuYnAnw9vcmoedVeMcAW2OoVwmRLSf43j5eYuB345ZgCMb7emYidv0cyJi7PPTug8znMTqYsmrO5iJkeb1g3ejo0A_nKLypxuyLXj3eTvhdY2_IQhy5c0Qr8pa/s320/APONEC-OFFICIAL-20211030-060-232.jpg.iCeEr_DeMWATAA.pUGwIWZ8Va.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br />UK MOD © Crown copyright </td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What the Army group looking at this appears to have
correctly noted is that until you look at the issue of residency for clearance,
you will continue to struggle to get sufficient numbers commissioning. The question
is what to do about it, which is far more complex than is being reported. For
example, the Army could consider the issue and decide that national security constraints
mean no waiver is possible, and continue as planned, but note the wider risks that
this results in. Or it may look at security vetting risk appetites and decide
that some risk could be taken in other ways (are there mitigating factors like
reducing access to some secret information or could wider checks be done?) There
are checks and balances in the system that could be employed in a way that
reduces the residency risk, while still providing an overall analysis of the
risk presented by the individual. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vetting
is about risk management, and understanding what risks an individual may, or may
not present and putting in place appropriate mitigations to deal with this.
What the Army seems to have noted is that to raise numbers, you may want to
look at different ways of vetting to raise wider numbers and diversity of the workforce.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The problem is that it is impossible these days to have a
sensible conversation about diversity and inclusion without deeply toxic people
screaming ‘WOKE’ at the top of their voices as a pavlovian response. There is a
particularly curious attitude in parts of the right wing media that sees any
hint of looking at bringing people together as wrong. They seize on tiny
snippets of much wider carefully considered reports and analysis to present a
wholly misleading approach that seems intended to scare the comfortably well
off retired white middle classes and foster a generation of hatred to anyone who
isn’t a heterosexual white Christian. This is usually done against the backdrop
of false concern, suggesting that this group are usually being persecuted in
some way for their beliefs. In the case of the armed forces, when you look at
the recruiting and retention challenges they are experiencing, and continue to
experience, it is necessary to consider every possible way to make people feel
welcome and part of the team. Recruiting adverts often play on a sense of belonging,
but if you are made to feel a 2<sup>nd</sup> class citizen because of your gender,
ethnicity or faith, then why should you put your life on the line to defend a
nation who sees you as not part of the team?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Why would many young BAME recruits want to join an organisation
that seems to idolise dead white men, has a societal structure in place that to
an exterior appears to sustain and maintain societal and class divides, and
which at its heart seems a bit ‘holy war’ in its adherence to Christian faith? If
you maintain and reinforce this, you create an organisation that is less
representative of the society it defends, and which will struggle to recruit
and retain people.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is entirely sensible to reflect on how faith, for example,
plays a part in military life. The UK is not a Christian country in any meaningful
sense anymore. The vast majority do not go to any form of religious service,
and while many may have some fleeting adherence to faith, the majority do not. To
focus too heavily on the Christian faith at services where we are commemorating
those of all faiths and no faith who died feels wrong. There is absolutely a
time and place for faith in military life, and the author is an enormous fan of
the military chaplaincy and wider faith based support that is offered – it is a
wonderful body of people who bring great comfort to those who need them, often
at times of deep strain. But there is a difference between a brief memorial
service that recognises effort, and being a ‘forced church parade’ for non believers
of that faith. '. In todays agnostic and secular society, looking for ways to
engage that is respectful of all, not just some seems appropriate and recognises
that while society and our act of remembrance has changed, the fact that we
remember has not. <o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Another minor issue, not really picked up on is that this guidance dates to 2022, so its almost two years old and it appears that in reality, not much has changed. Its incredible how despite the seeming power of the forces of woke, they are unable to affect that much change in two years, but are seen by the media as powerful forces of wokeism. That seems to ascribe a level of capability that in reality doesn't seem to have materialised. The 2022 guidance is a reminder to ensure that there is not a wholly religious element to an event that is likely to be attended by people of all faiths and backgrounds - hardly a 'woke agenda</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg7jAedc8Gen3gIa_OEjeHcZtPaeikMdiDXDba0JqyP9Cf0px4UdQdWnuQthhMwfYA1EZbEdNs05Pq2u7SJjaTG4Br6NBje4ky8j2AEWFwcxsSAbzK1YdS9GSjuWUEOM_nVSA7xkaZxP2QGFY8XLfqbcY1o7Wm88ijbdxZDyvV-IzF-okEMLvX8LR991tTG/s1200/45169545.jpg.iCeF0ufeMWATAA.9pvJRf651k.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg7jAedc8Gen3gIa_OEjeHcZtPaeikMdiDXDba0JqyP9Cf0px4UdQdWnuQthhMwfYA1EZbEdNs05Pq2u7SJjaTG4Br6NBje4ky8j2AEWFwcxsSAbzK1YdS9GSjuWUEOM_nVSA7xkaZxP2QGFY8XLfqbcY1o7Wm88ijbdxZDyvV-IzF-okEMLvX8LR991tTG/s320/45169545.jpg.iCeF0ufeMWATAA.9pvJRf651k.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br />UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021</td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">You cannot have newspaper editorials demanding the growth of
the armed forces and sustainment of a strong military if you then attack the
armed forces for trying to take steps to retain people. This sort of manufactured
media outrage seems intended to make things harder for the armed forces to
deliver their core mission of recruiting and retaining enough people to serve
the nation across a diverse range of roles and responsibilities. There is
nothing ‘woke’ about looking objectively at what could be done differently. There
is nothing ‘woke’ about trying to find ways to make 100% of the workforce feel they
belong. There is nothing ‘woke’ about trying to ensure everyone has the best
possible chances of success, and where it can’t be done for good reasons,
understanding why, rather than taking it for granted. This is why this work is
so important, because if the military continues to be constrained by media
outrage and political opportunism, then it will find itself unable to tackle issues
like those so terrifyingly revealed in the Atherton report which showcased
awful instances of discrimination and sexual assaults on women. It will find itself
unable to deal with the issue of racism and racist behaviour that sees far more
bullying, harassment and discrimination service complaints from BAME staff than
white staff, and it will continue to fail to make the most of its people.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Its quite ironic writing this article to be talking about
the perceived problem with the D&I agenda, having just watched three BAME members
of staff in the local supermarket bravely tackle an aggressive white male shoplifter,
who while trying to hurt them was screaming at them ‘why don’t you go back to
where you came from’ (thankfully the Met Police TSG van that was flagged down
assisted resolving this case). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this experience
highlights that there are real issues in society that are deep rooted and need
addressing. This isn’t some kind of ‘wokeist’ left wing civil service plot, its
about the armed forces trying to look out for their people and make up for all
their people, not just the straight white males. This may come as shock to some
people who read those papers and whose values still seem stuck in the 19<sup>th</sup>
century, but unlike them, the rest of the UK and the armed forces have moved on
– its time they did too.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-67906109633276003022024-02-05T15:51:00.001+00:002024-02-05T15:51:01.732+00:00Don't Panic! Reasons For Royal Navy Carrier Optimism <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">If you believe some of the more hysterical defence reports
recently, HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH has returned to port with propellor issues for
emergency repairs, prompting the Royal Navy to send ‘plastic warships’ (P2000s)
to sea in her place to take part in Exercise Cold Response, alongside the
carrier HMS PRINCE OF WALES. By any reasonable measure the RN has plummeted to
yet another nadir after years of relentless cuts. But is this a reasonable
assessment of the situation?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What has happened is far less dramatic, despite Daily Mail reporting
suggesting that the ship returned to port, which was an outright lie, as she
had never left port in the first place, engineers have reportedly identified
issues with the propellor shaft on the QE. A decision was taken late in the day
to delay sailing and have the potential fault looked at and fixed rather than
let the ship sail and potentially experience issues while deployed. This is not
an easy call to make – to cancel the sailing of your fleet flagship after
announcing her departure is always going to make for uncomfortable coverage. This
is magnified in the social media age when every departure and arrival get huge
attention online and news spreads globally in seconds. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEio2DE07iOpaX5nB11u-B0J0g04tXOzFkdkSvGTIVUJu0EclgOwedek8oMWjpdUf_Dy9BQd-Qe_SAs8FEMJWUhrXXxpNeMHB0_JETl_MSRPu-W2-65ImAegfCKf7E_3wHrpCyzZgMG2RJpDpk1AbGeEH7r4PKwjcTKivBVaMtkWYnsVPOt2f1HP2sKJ7t1p/s1200/FLEET-20210519-AP0001-046.jpg.iCfa5NPeMWATAA.5-lFxhU6yY.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEio2DE07iOpaX5nB11u-B0J0g04tXOzFkdkSvGTIVUJu0EclgOwedek8oMWjpdUf_Dy9BQd-Qe_SAs8FEMJWUhrXXxpNeMHB0_JETl_MSRPu-W2-65ImAegfCKf7E_3wHrpCyzZgMG2RJpDpk1AbGeEH7r4PKwjcTKivBVaMtkWYnsVPOt2f1HP2sKJ7t1p/s320/FLEET-20210519-AP0001-046.jpg.iCfa5NPeMWATAA.5-lFxhU6yY.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is a truth not universally acknowledged that warships are
phenomenally complex and rely on advanced technology and equipment to work properly.
This equipment can, and does, go wrong on a surprisingly regular basis for many
different reasons. It could be due a repair, or a refit for new parts to be
fitted. It could be that a fitting has come loose that needs to be fixed, or that
something totally unforeseen has happened that requires attention. Every navy
in the world has experienced these problems, with ships developing problems
that require attention before sailing. If you look back through history there
will be hundreds, if not thousands of incidents that have occurred in the Royal
Navy alone, just since WW2, when sailing was delayed due to the discovery of a fault
that needed fixing. The inevitable reality of being a sea going navy is that things
break down if you use them, and the easiest way to avoid this is not to go to
sea. As noted, every navy on the planet has been in this position. This is not
unique to the Royal Navy. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The people that made this decision will have done so based
on balancing off risk, noting what could go wrong if the ship was at sea and
the impact on the wider programme if things went wrong, versus the short-term
cost of doing local repair work and fixing the problem. This isn’t an easy call
to make because it could be entirely possible that the risk would never manifest
while deployed, but equally if it went wrong at a crucial stage (for example
during flying ops), then the impact could be disastrous. The people making this
judgement call have had to look at a tactical issue and make a decision that has
both operational and strategic ramifications (e.g. replacement on the exercise and
the reduced likelihood that a UK CV will be able to relieve USS EISENHOWER in
the Red Sea). This is a genuinely tough call to make. On balance it was almost
certainly the right one. Can you imagine the impact if the decision was taken
to accept the risk, sail on and then it went wrong in the middle of the Red
Sea, while under attack from Houthi missiles? That would be a less than optimal
time for the MEO to discuss the risk register with the CO… <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In terms of the impact on the exercise, its limited. There will
be a short delay while HMS PRINCE OF WALES prepares for sea, and then it will
continue as before. There will, of course, be an impact on the programme for PWLS,
which hasn’t been publicly shared yet, but it will not impact on the UK
involvement in the exercise. This serves as a reminder of several things –
firstly the value of having more than one carrier in service at a time – as the
French have often found out, crises seem to happen when their carrier is in dry
dock.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Its also questionable if a similar
situation had occurred 20 years ago whether the RN would have been able to
cope, as with the different maintenance routines and use of the three INVINCIBLE
class, it’s entirely possible that there would not have been a carrier
available for sea in the same time frame.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Secondly, the value of having two carriers able to go to sea
in the fixed wing role, and swap at short notice. The real positive news story
here is the testament to the training and flexibility of Royal Navy and RAF
personnel who will quickly be able to adapt to a new plan and find themselves
operating the most advanced fast jet in the world, at sea and without prior
notice, and do so seamlessly. This is a good news story in demonstrating the
flexibility of both the carrier force and the people who support it. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If you look at the wider plan for the carriers this year,
its unlikely to have a major operational impact. QE was due to hand over at some
point to PWLS as the fleet flagship and prepare for planned maintenance. In
this case, she may be at sea less, but there is unlikely to be a significant
disruption to her medium-term programme. Its likely that for some time the QE
will be less active anyway – this situation merely brings that forward by a few
weeks, so there is no major impact on operations. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgAfLUj4hjPLUVsJl3KTMnbsc9lSYK7Ossb1TJcOKghks3mdufrmbCoyrRnSFMPZ6XQrRaztrRSz5OumaZ0_6D7r9yCBc7Hmsk1Ddr0EOSj0HgdAxWHJ3pC33Zy9Ui-86taVzTChnK4Obrgv12tYZCnQKDg1-tQcbM71y_0fmigVrcpUQfJIAK4HxVYnvh8/s1200/FLEET-20210519-AP0001-141.jpg.iCeh6s_eMWATAA.ik5hOtPe4L.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgAfLUj4hjPLUVsJl3KTMnbsc9lSYK7Ossb1TJcOKghks3mdufrmbCoyrRnSFMPZ6XQrRaztrRSz5OumaZ0_6D7r9yCBc7Hmsk1Ddr0EOSj0HgdAxWHJ3pC33Zy9Ui-86taVzTChnK4Obrgv12tYZCnQKDg1-tQcbM71y_0fmigVrcpUQfJIAK4HxVYnvh8/s320/FLEET-20210519-AP0001-141.jpg.iCeh6s_eMWATAA.ik5hOtPe4L.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">This case is interesting as it highlights the growing void between
routine naval operations and social media expectations. Speak to anyone in the
RN and the general sense is ‘meh, ships break’ – this is very much a business-as-usual
situation where something has gone wrong, it will be fixed, and the RN has successfully
come up with a Plan B. It is very much a ‘nothing burger’. But in the eyes of
the social media commentary, you’d think the RN had been humiliated in the eyes
of the world, that this is a legacy of a lack of defence spending and also that
no other navy has ever had any technical problems, ever. In their eyes this is
a very British debacle. It poses an interesting question about how to manage
expectations – the RN and MOD are rightly proud of talking up a ships
capability and do a good job of communicating how and when she will sail. When
things go wrong, the public, who do not necessarily understand the complexities
of ensuring that an aircraft carrier is safe to go to sea, and who don’t understand
why an issue has (in their eyes) only just been spotted after months alongside,
feel that this isn’t good enough.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal">There is a challenge too in the public perception of how
these ships operate. People wrongly assume they have spent long periods
alongside doing nothing, when in reality both vessels have been engaged in busy
deployments and exercises – last year for instance both ships globally deployed
on trials and operations in the Baltic and USA. Just because they do not go to
sea in an operational way that previous carriers did doesn’t make them ‘harbour
queens’. In fact, an analysis of time alongside versus at sea of previous carriers
would probably show similar levels of operational activity. That perception is
hard to challenge though because the constant stream of social media imagery of
the ships alongside and tracking of every harbour entry/exit makes it hard to
see the bigger picture of their operational programme. Perhaps the challenge is to work out how to communicate to
the public that things do break, that this is normal, but that the RN isn’t
failing when this happens. Trying to get the MOD to agree to a social media campaign
about the armed forces which doesn’t sound like it contains nothing but the
lyrics to the song ‘Everything Is Awesome’ may be hard to do. This incident
perhaps proves the need to communicate both uplifting messages, but also candid
honesty about the state of the armed forces too.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">More widely its also interesting to see how twisted the
reporting has become of the exercise. As noted, the Mail implied that the ship
had gone to sea and returned – putting out an article which was factually wrong
and utterly misleading to the public. If you look at the <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13046803/royal-navy-small-ships-p2000-hms-queen-elizabeth-norway.html">Mail</a>
and <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/royal-navys-four-smallest-plastic-ships-to-take-part-in-biggest-nato-exercise-since-cold-war-13064729">Sky
News,</a> they’re reporting that the RN is sending a ‘plastic warship’ to the
exercise as the P2000 force sorties north to Norway. Its being implicitly tied
to the carrier situation, implying that this is somehow linked – but in reality,
it is not. In fact the RN put out a <a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2024/january/11/20240111-big-mission-for-navys-smallest-ships-as-patrol-boats-prepare-for-four-months-in-norway">press
release on 11 January</a> talking about this planned deployment, which got very
little news coverage. Its only chance that the ships sailed today, giving the
perfect chance to fuse verbatim the words of a near month old press release
with the suggestion that these ships are the replacement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The P2000 deployment to Norway is a key part
of the work being done by the Coastal Forces squadron to practise littoral
operations and carry out missions done by their predecessors in WW2. Its an
exciting opportunity for the ships and crews to take a vessel into the Arctic Circle
– from the authors perspective, having fond memories of time onboard one of the
participating ships from his URNU days, the idea of sailing into an arctic
winter on one is a very ‘brave and courageous’ decision in Whitehall parlance! <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Overall, this is a situation which has become newsworthy for
all the wrong reasons. There are many things to be concerned about with the
state of the modern British military, as the recent <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/43178/documents/214880/default/">House
of Commons Defence Committee report</a> in to resilience highlighted. This
small technical issue is not one of them. People see this as evidence of the
woes of the Royal Navy, not an advert for its strengths. Yet in being able to
reassign participation from QUEEN ELIZABETH to PRINCE OF WALES, the RN is reminding
the world that it is one of a tiny number of nations that operates multiple
carriers, that it has people with the training and flexibility to shift focus
at short notice and that resilience and redundancy means the show can, and
will, go on. <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-71631950504875728072024-02-03T10:25:00.002+00:002024-02-03T10:25:26.349+00:00Ground Hog Day - The Royal Navy And the Falkland Islands<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">February 2<sup>nd</sup> is sometimes referred to as ‘groundhog
day’ referring to both a curious tradition in the US around an animal selecting
a weather prediction scroll, or the movie involving Bill Murray. It has come to
mean, in popular consciousness, living the same thing on endless repeat.
Frankly, ground hog day was the phrase that came to mind reading the latest ‘the
sky is falling’ article from the Daily Telegraph, published on 2<sup>nd</sup>
Feb 2024 about the Royal Navy and the Falkland Islands. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Unusually written by their US Editor, rather than their excellent
Defence team, the article focused on the fact that the Royal Navy hasn’t sent a
major escort ship to the Falkland Islands since 2017 and this is apparently a
bad thing. Cue complaints about defence cuts, the threat from Argentina, the
obligatory visit from everyone’s favourite rent-a-quote Admiral Lord Alan ‘I
Used To Be First Sea Lord Doncha Know’ West and you have the makings of a
classic defence ground hog day story – long on hyperbole, short on factual
analysis or context. So lets try and set some context shall we?<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhI0ql-MwTbweX5n53weWdpVkc412qH7QvD7lj0ZHeFzaX07yImpIqvR2XBfXQ-oCTNv0Giwcqdq3VuSiq8RUiHy7ykDSi3ZnHnT0S3gWa4pkBqu-DmpyrCnvOHOTdussh-HCHbLKuO6601YmfV3j3A4C3WbrMrWcc31s1vCwOsS1i71bqDBNQqSckngud/s1200/CAT%20D_Inaugurate%20Austral%20Endurance_Cpl%20Fletche.jpg.iCe87L_eMWATAA.CkyCAkJ1hf.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="681" data-original-width="1200" height="182" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhI0ql-MwTbweX5n53weWdpVkc412qH7QvD7lj0ZHeFzaX07yImpIqvR2XBfXQ-oCTNv0Giwcqdq3VuSiq8RUiHy7ykDSi3ZnHnT0S3gWa4pkBqu-DmpyrCnvOHOTdussh-HCHbLKuO6601YmfV3j3A4C3WbrMrWcc31s1vCwOsS1i71bqDBNQqSckngud/s320/CAT%20D_Inaugurate%20Austral%20Endurance_Cpl%20Fletche.jpg.iCe87L_eMWATAA.CkyCAkJ1hf.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright - RAF A400M at South Georgia</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Firstly, what is the Royal Navy presence in the South
Atlantic? After the 1982 war, the RN deployed forces of varying size in the
region for many years, ranging from local inshore patrol ships (such as HMS
SENTINEL) to occasional visits by nuclear submarines. By the early 1990s the
permanent naval presence had stabilised on a permanently deployed ‘CASTLE’
class OPV, a ROVER class tanker, rotating visits from an escort ship, usually
but not exclusively a Type 42 to provide air defence if needed, and the
semi-permanent presence of the Antarctic patrol ship, HMS ENDURANCE. This was supported
through the military port facilities at the Mount Pleasant complex, designed to
ensure a credible maritime presence. In more recent years this presence has
evolved, with fewer visits by deploying escorts (Type 23 and 42) and the withdrawal
of the ROVER class tanker. In its place has come a new permanent presence of
the RIVER class, of which one is permanently based in the islands to conduct
sovereignty patrols and provide support to the garrison as needed.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">How much of an impact has this really had on the islands security?
Firstly, the RIVER class is a significant step up from the CASTLE class in
terms of range, capability and habitability – they make for an excellent
platform to monitor the islands and conduct the 99.9% of maritime operations
that are not throwing missiles at each other. Their long legs (over 5,000 miles
range at normal steaming) means they do not require an RFA tanker for ‘top ups’,
removing the need for an RFA presence in the region. They are the ideal ships
to handle the sovereignty protection role and patrol challenging waters where
the biggest threat is the treacherous high seas and bad weather. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The move to no longer routinely deploy an escort to the
islands has its roots in the significant changes to operational deployment
patterns by the RN in recent years. Historically escorts were sent on singleton
deployments for 6-9 months out to various locations – for example the Gulf,
West Indies and South Atlantic, usually relieving another vessel in the region.
Their purpose was to ‘fly the flag’, provide a measure of military capability if
needed and conduct sovereignty protection where required. The missions varied
depending on the location, but it was normal for a ship going to the South
Atlantic to visit ports in both South America and southern Africa, and roam
across the region more widely. While in theatre the ship provided additional
defence capabilities – usually a helicopter and heavier 4.5” gun for gunfire
support and anti-ship missions, and potentially some limited ASW capability too
depending on the platform. This would make them a useful capability to deter a
surface attack or air attack – for example a Type 42 could sit west of the Islands
and identify/intercept incoming aerial attacks as part of the wider air defence
network on the islands.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj1QYYAMTERSb4RzbKIqeJvkdIOaxllOMaX8zLtOaj7rxL6R8daOzWliBjevW-pU-xQNcXPosYQXMzbyOCjFVko43V8kV16-JR5A7JA8AFH5RVJB2gk0qFOx8Me1QAXSasZ2EtSahgR8Mjgg1Emqh_0ZQbmwjKL-Ae6oJTK_hbkH3yVZZLwtKDPqbYgqoQG/s1200/MPC-OFFICIAL-20201216-471-1321.jpg.iCe08L_eMWATAA.H-nImml_y8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="716" data-original-width="1200" height="191" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj1QYYAMTERSb4RzbKIqeJvkdIOaxllOMaX8zLtOaj7rxL6R8daOzWliBjevW-pU-xQNcXPosYQXMzbyOCjFVko43V8kV16-JR5A7JA8AFH5RVJB2gk0qFOx8Me1QAXSasZ2EtSahgR8Mjgg1Emqh_0ZQbmwjKL-Ae6oJTK_hbkH3yVZZLwtKDPqbYgqoQG/s320/MPC-OFFICIAL-20201216-471-1321.jpg.iCe08L_eMWATAA.H-nImml_y8.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright = Grenadier Guards exercise</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">What has changed is that the RN has moved away from this operational
model. It is now exceedingly rare for a major escort to conduct a singleton deployment
like this on a 6 – 9 month basis. If you look at the last 18 months the only
one that springs to mind is HMS DAUNTLESS on her deployment to the West Indies
to act as guardship during the hurricane season. Instead the RN escort force is
now focused on providing support to NATO operations (e.g. HMS DUNCAN spent
about 9 months in the Med last year with
various NATO forces) or in support of ASW operations – for example HMS
NORTHUMBERLAND has spent much of the last 12 months in remote seas listening
for ‘interesting’ acoustic noises. In the Gulf HMS LANCASTER is permanently based
in Bahrain conducting similar operations with allies in the Middle East region
and will be there for several years.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The main bulk of the force now deploys as part of the ‘Carrier
Strike Group’ concept, sending out larger task groups with the Carrier or other
major platforms as a formed group to conduct operations and tasks. For example
in 2023 the QUEEN ELIZABETH group operated in the Baltic, before detaching HMS
DIAMOND to the Red Sea in late 2023 to support British shipping. The plan now
is that the RN will only very rarely deploy surface ships out in isolation,
instead using them collectively as part of national or allied task groups. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In place of the isolated deployments, the Royal Navy has forward
deployed five Batch 2 RIVER class OPVS to Gibraltar, West Indies, Pacific Ocean
and the Falkland Islands. These ships undertake the defence diplomacy work and
routine patrolling previously done by isolated deployers, and ‘fly the flag’ on
a year round basis across these regions. The result is that there is now a
permanent Royal Navy presence in regions which for decades had not seen one,
and the size of the ships means they can visit ports and nations which had rarely
previously seen an RN platform (for example repeated visits have now been made to
Pitcairn, the most isolated British Overseas Territory in the world in the
Pacific Ocean) – this followed years of no visits at all. The presence of these
ships eases the burden on the main escort fleet, enabling it to prepare for higher
end warfighting operations, while enabling a continuous defence engagement
presence around the world at very low cost. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The other thing that has changed is the threat posed by Argentina
to the Islands. In 1982 the Argentine forces consisted of a reasonably modern
and balanced military force capable of posing a credible threat to British forces,
including dozens of fast jets, modern warships, submarines and an aircraft
carrier. This threat remained reasonably high in the years after the war, but
over time has diminished significantly. Today the Argentine military is a fraction
of the size that it was in 1982. It does not possess any fast jets, it does not
have a credible operational submarine force and its escort ship force is
decades old and has undergone no meaningful modernisation in this time. The
defence budget has been slashed and very little money is available for basic day
to day operations, let alone planning an amphibious attack on the islands.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Argentine Air Force has been trying and failing to acquire
supersonic fighter jets since the 1990s, while the Navy has made clear its procurement
plans focus on OPVs and Antarctic operations, not amphibious assault. There are
technical studies underway to provide a replacement submarine, but this is
likely to be years, if not decades away before it can provide a meaningful
seagoing capability – assuming it is ever ordered. No matter how you look at it,
the Argentine Armed Forces are a shadow of their former self, and do not pose a
meaningful threat to the Falkland Islands. Any change to this situation would
take many years to evolve, given the time needed to buy, build, deliver, train
and operate new equipment. One would hope that the UK would notice such developments
and react accordingly. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">More widely the political landscape is changing, with the
new President Milei adopting a more policy based approach to the ongoing
sovereignty dispute with the UK, with both sides agreeing to disagree.
Hopefully this is where such a debate will stay, polite disagreement and no
ungentlemanly acts. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcTaHHGXZbJ4-FjfdMXA0S1JBIBkb44Ozp9lrx2i2Jnf5tusefXpc2K-3Y3IwcDLWpgRc9RA0a4WNx76lFVagMTgJoBYt6ROIguctKthgJRsJf-weGazPmLyGcP7M6o3yJSpN8QJCjKIMgpuWJ7WCzJyF2cBK_isPbkT4cEbBxgm4CrKomx7vZ1JsNKNak/s1200/45164210.jpg.iCentcbeMWATAA.VWl-Z8wqcZ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="715" data-original-width="1200" height="191" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcTaHHGXZbJ4-FjfdMXA0S1JBIBkb44Ozp9lrx2i2Jnf5tusefXpc2K-3Y3IwcDLWpgRc9RA0a4WNx76lFVagMTgJoBYt6ROIguctKthgJRsJf-weGazPmLyGcP7M6o3yJSpN8QJCjKIMgpuWJ7WCzJyF2cBK_isPbkT4cEbBxgm4CrKomx7vZ1JsNKNak/s320/45164210.jpg.iCentcbeMWATAA.VWl-Z8wqcZ.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright =RAF Typhoons in Falkland Islands</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Meanwhile the Falkland Islands remain well defended, with a
large operating base designed for rapid reinforcement if required. Huge barrack
facilities, extensive airfield operating facilities and significant defensive
preparations are in place for the ever less likely day that Argentina attempts
to return. The fact is that they are operating on a timescale of decades, while
the UK can respond and reinforce the islands in days, if not hours if really
needed. Short of the penguin population revolting against their colonial oppressors,
it is hard to see any credible situation where there is a military risk to the
Falklands directly.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Given all this, it is hard to see what the Telegraph is upset
about precisely. The Royal Navy still maintains a credible permanent presence with
both a RIVER class and the semi-permanent deployment of the Antarctic patrol
ship HMS PROTECTOR. The lower level tasks carried out by the old South Atlantic
Guardship are still carried out by the new one, while there is no military threat
requiring a high end anti-air/surface/submarine escort for thousands of miles
in any direction. Sending a hugely capable Type 45 to the Falkland Islands for
a routine deployment would be a complete waste of both a scarce asset and
public money to defend against a problem that doesn’t exist. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This isn’t about lack of ships, because the RN
escort force is still roughly the same size as it was in 2017 or 2012. It has
more modern ships like the Type 31 due to enter service soon too, which in turn
could (but in reality are highly unlikely to) deploy to the region. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Once again it feels like media ground hog day – complaints
that the RN isn’t doing something it doesn’t need to do in an article which
doesn’t make any effort to understand why things are done the way they are. There
just isn’t the military need for escort ships in the South Atlantic at the
moment, and frankly, that’s a good thing. The world is in enough of a security
mess as it is at the moment – we don’t need to add ‘proactively defending the
Falklands from new credible invasion threat’ to the lengthy MOD to do list. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-27381660517748943582024-01-31T19:31:00.002+00:002024-01-31T19:31:14.888+00:00"National Service Guarantees Citizenship" - The Case For Very Limited Conscription In the UK<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">It is a rather remarkable state of affairs to be in when No10
Downing Street feels the need to confirm that it is not HM Government policy to
bring back conscription to the UK. This previously unthinkable interjection occurred
after remarks from the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Sir Patrick
Sanders, on the wider context of how the UK needs to shift its thinking towards
the move to conflict. In his view, there is a need for a national debate around
how the UK population need to mentally prepare for the changes that society
would experience were the Russian threat to become outright war. These remarks
have in turn spurred a wider debate about conscription and national service in
the UK and what more can be done to boost the mass of the armed forces in
peacetime.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The UK has not had any form of conscription since the last
national servicemen were called up in 1960. Since that point it has been
reliant on an entirely volunteer force made up of three core parts. The regular
armed forces, the volunteer reserves (spare time members who serve for varying
periods) and the regular reserve. The latter was of key importance during the
Cold War as a source of personnel who would retain some equipment, documents
and limited contact with the military after leaving in the expectation of being
called up in the event of general war. The regular reserve was quietly left to
languish after 1991 and to all intents and purposes became little more than a paperwork
exercise – there was no practical way it could be used or drawn on for people
in an emergency. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It now appears that MOD
thinking is shifting towards re-establishing a ‘whole force’ which increases the
mass of people who can be drawn on to both augment the regular force and
provide mass to regenerate parts of the military in wartime. Such a move would
represent a very significant policy shift and provide several challenges to put
in place, but it is definitely a move that needs to be considered. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhe7pNcO59U9ywTCpueqqneHSutZDh_tU8oM-48f1SK6Qw94vmn3KCcJ2zj38D31vJ21Rv1X93ueBWs1D6sCRZrP36qwSTUp1EqRVV-h6ackx1zo-LHiVUE9hR1xA9tYMHVHx1-TiNQ-xvn6H4R5eS6Mzuc43lQ8uRmH_5Ch_QXK4ARmgNgzG4pVu4mFFj1/s1200/AHQCPL11-OFFICIAL-20231002-038-203%20copy.jpg.iCf5tLzeMWATAA.hYz7Yz6jrQ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhe7pNcO59U9ywTCpueqqneHSutZDh_tU8oM-48f1SK6Qw94vmn3KCcJ2zj38D31vJ21Rv1X93ueBWs1D6sCRZrP36qwSTUp1EqRVV-h6ackx1zo-LHiVUE9hR1xA9tYMHVHx1-TiNQ-xvn6H4R5eS6Mzuc43lQ8uRmH_5Ch_QXK4ARmgNgzG4pVu4mFFj1/s320/AHQCPL11-OFFICIAL-20231002-038-203%20copy.jpg.iCf5tLzeMWATAA.hYz7Yz6jrQ.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The first question to ask is ‘what is the MOD requirement likely
to be for’? There seems to be a few different requirements here. Firstly providing
mass, to have a pool of partially trained people able to serve if called upon,
with less training needed. Secondly it is a way to close gaps in the existing regular
structure, providing people with some experience already to augment into a unit
to help thicken its operational capability. Finally it seems to be about
finding specialists with highly niche skills that do not usually exist in the
military, but which would be needed in wartime (e.g. specialist engineers, cyber
tech sector etc). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There would be a few ways of doing this short of bringing
back conscription. The first would be to expand the opportunities for people to
conduct condensed training ahead of university then go onto study and be a
reservist. There is a long tradition of this in the armed forces, offering ‘gap
year commissions’ for people to serve for a year then leave. More recently the
Army experimented during OP HERRICK by recruiting people to serve in 4 PARA
with the promise of completing training and deploying on an Op Tour as part of
an FTRS contract -a move that, anecdotally, was popular to young men seeking a
bit of adventure before doing a ‘real job’. Finally the RNR offers a summer
commissioning programme for both Ratings and Officers, who do 6-12 weeks full
time training at RALEIGH and BRNC before passing out and becoming reservists.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The benefits of programmes like this is that they offer people
paid work, a chance to do something very different with their time and some
good adventure at a point in their life when they are (relatively) commitment
free. The challenge is working out the return of service and benefit to the
military. Anecdotally many of the RNR personnel who joined the accelerated
training programme have quickly gone onto Regular careers, meaning the Reserves
did not benefit in creating a new cadre of personnel. People may also not want
to retain links to the military after uni, meaning that for all the good Gap Year
commissions offer, they do not bring long term benefits to the Service. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Relying on people with ‘muscle memory’ is of arguably finite
benefit. Having done a short amount of reservist training a few years ago doesn’t
mean you will be of value to the modern military if called on. If anything
there is nothing more dangerous than ex-reservists with ‘bad habits’ going back
through training again – far easier to shape and mould recruits from scratch
for the sake of a few weeks additional training. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A similar argument applies to the Regular Reserve, where
suggestions have been made that service leavers should attend an annual weekend
each year to ‘stay in touch’ and pass their fitness test and weapons handling
test. Such a move is likely to be challenging to deliver – many people leave
the military for good reasons and don’t want to re-engage. Is putting grumpy ex-soldiers
in for a weekend of ‘mandatory fun’ involving live ammunition really a sensible
idea? This move would require a very fundamental mindset shift on the part of
the British public to a point where a ‘whole force’ approach is central to how joiners
think – they join because they reasonably expect a long-term commitment to the
military as a lifelong calling, not a finite short term job. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The optics of making the Regular Reserve a far
more central part of the military experience will need careful handling, lest
people perceive it as a ‘Hotel California’ experience that you can join, but
never leave.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Perhaps the solution is instead to think far more literally
about the concept of ‘whole force’ and be prepared to pay for it? By this the
author means that rather than just extend service benefits to regular
personnel, look at extending ‘the offer’ more widely to people to give them a
reason to stay in, or at least stay in touch. For example, part of the
challenge recruiting younger reservists is that ‘real life’ tends to get in the
way and after they settle down, get a career, have kids etc many of them have
less time and interest in <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>their military
life. To keep people in the system, particularly experienced people with skills
that are needed, versus new joiners, then the offer needs to be compelling to
make staying for the long term make sense. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2BPzEJHN9a1-bB379YK9OfZxxH8jYpFGnQWb_NQiRy-dXDIfgQPJUAdAkCODXUHIyt7XV50lozdt8BItj5rykxm5L5F0tNLRBNDX-qVeN5ZxAid09bXj9of-eNguRGdzXXqO3K0rhOx0MFC_IfT1_XfJOyc7YdOmyn-XARXmSSL8R2tVqn1g8v8UvMRfG/s1200/AHQCPL11-OFFICIAL-20230718-033-055.jpg.iCeB-bfeMWATAA.z8eDKB7SyV.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2BPzEJHN9a1-bB379YK9OfZxxH8jYpFGnQWb_NQiRy-dXDIfgQPJUAdAkCODXUHIyt7XV50lozdt8BItj5rykxm5L5F0tNLRBNDX-qVeN5ZxAid09bXj9of-eNguRGdzXXqO3K0rhOx0MFC_IfT1_XfJOyc7YdOmyn-XARXmSSL8R2tVqn1g8v8UvMRfG/s320/AHQCPL11-OFFICIAL-20230718-033-055.jpg.iCeB-bfeMWATAA.z8eDKB7SyV.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">A simple win would be to resort to old-fashioned bribery and
financial inducements. For example in the UK right now the average expected student
loan debt is around £45,000 per student. This will be subject to a phenomenally
complicated repayment schedule, but in broad terms requires paying 9% of your
salary each month over a certain earning threshold for many years. This means,
for example, that a British Army Captain on appointment is paying £150 a month
student repayments (£1824 per year) – it will take over 20 years to repay this debt.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One easy ‘quick win’ could be for the Government to commit
to paying off a percentage of your outstanding student loan for each year you
serve, reducing the balance and interest payments. For example it could scale
up, maybe 5% for the first five years (paying off a quarter of your debt), then
increasing to 10% for the next five years (75% paid off) and 12.5% for the next
4 years (100%) paid off. This would mean that the average service person
(regular or reserve) would be student debt free if they served for 10-15 years,
and would be thousands of pounds better off each year – money that could pay
for mortgage. Suddenly staying in, even as a reservist, makes a lot more sense given
the financial impact of leaving. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A similar approach could be taken to housing. If a truly whole
force perspective was taken, then why not build single living accommodation
(SLA) for reservists across the UK? The offer could be simple, for as long as
you are an active reservist, you are entitled to live at military rates in SLA,
until such point as you buy your own property. Suddenly membership of the
reserve becomes incredibly appealing as it means younger people at the start of
their careers don’t need to find over £1000 per month to rent a room in London.
It would be challenging to administer, but why not give it a go? If you could
offer a reservist junior officer 5-10 years of very cheap accommodation and
student loan repayment in return for regular commitment and call up when needed,
retention would be far less difficult to manage. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This may sound obvious but saying ‘whole force’ means
applying benefits to the ‘whole force’ – offering very cheap accommodation to
reservists gives you a pool of people to draw on when needed. If you need a reserve
force to provide mass when required, you need to set the conditions to retain
it, not just rely on the offer of ‘world class leadership training’ (which, to
be frank it really isn’t) and some vague promises of AT at some far-off date. Such
a move would significantly increase costs, but at a price likely to be far less
than expanding salaries or recruiting lots more regular personnel. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There are challenges to delivering this sort of move though.
Not least that of medicals – if you want to recruit a force for ‘gap year
commissions’ or specialists then you need to massively reduce the medical
standards. Setting the bar high for an infanteer who needs to be intensely physical
makes a lot of sense, but equally if medical standards stand in the way of good
people joining, then they need to be re-evaluated. Thinking ‘whole force’ means
accepting that you will bring people into service as a reservist whose medical
card may be marked ‘only to be deployed in the event of general war’ and accepting
they may struggle with some aspects of training. But equally if that risk in
turn gives you access to linguists, software engineers and others with highly
sought after skills then its probably a risk worth taking. We need to accept that
the vast majority of the military won’t do front line close quarters combat – e.g
Admin clerks, engineers and the RAF Regiment (<span style="font-family: "Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif; mso-ascii-font-family: Georgia; mso-char-type: symbol-ext; mso-hansi-font-family: Georgia; mso-symbol-font-family: "Segoe UI Emoji";">😉</span>), but that they can still
do their bit. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If you insist on trying to make every recruit meet high
standards you’ll end up running out of people (as happened in WW1 and WW2).
Also it makes for an awkward conversation when it comes to what to do about the
Regular Reserve when they arrive for call up – the vast majority of them have
little chance as 30-50 somethings of meeting the medical standard of an 18 year
old. At this point we’re either accepting them on risk or rejecting them
outright. If the latter, then what is the point of a regular reserve, and if
the former, why not take similar risks on new joiners?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The other question to ask is to generate this ‘whole force’,
does the MOD need conscription to find people or can it rely on other approaches?
There is a good argument that investment in the Cadet Force movement (one of
the finest bodies of volunteers in the UK who have done untold good for their
charges) and the University Units would help create a pool of interested
applicants for regular and reserve service. Similarly looking to make more
intelligent use of service leavers could also keep mass and skills in the
system – for example, it could be set up so that every service leaver automatically
transferred on leaving to the volunteer reserve, enabling them to keep a link
to the military while they set up their new life. This seamless transfer would keep
ties to the Service intact, while also keeping them available and credible on
their equipment and training. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The risk of skills fade though is high and perhaps not
considered enough. There is little point having a reserve to call on if all you
get is middle aged veterans who haven’t used the equipment currently in service,
are years out of date on tactics, procedures and equipment and who add little of
direct value to a modern military. How much use (for example) would an RN
regular reservist be if the last missile system they supported was the Sea Dart
(which left service over a decade ago). The risk of relying on a regular
reserve is that it gives the illusion of mass, but no certainties of skill or credible
value to the current armed forces. This is where the volunteer reserve which at
least trains regularly would add far more value to the force.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBKI3m3ia1yG9w3Spi4p-97w19vNHMk5eMkzdMpl9lbrIFEFl3tV6s2jK2D4kw5gbKI2de2tDR9znuEsnRFDWozIcOAzJ3iC7xAsnpfrJs-urKNDE3GZKxCaAWGzujJtSxU9sJD5vnFP1qhpZiCS2DItd-4m206L6pVF5IGjcXuPuz6r4Fh82gJ2kwKLS5/s1200/APOLOND-OFFICIAL-20230603-057-155.jpg.iCfB_LfeMWATAA.8UTSwEnQys.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBKI3m3ia1yG9w3Spi4p-97w19vNHMk5eMkzdMpl9lbrIFEFl3tV6s2jK2D4kw5gbKI2de2tDR9znuEsnRFDWozIcOAzJ3iC7xAsnpfrJs-urKNDE3GZKxCaAWGzujJtSxU9sJD5vnFP1qhpZiCS2DItd-4m206L6pVF5IGjcXuPuz6r4Fh82gJ2kwKLS5/s320/APOLOND-OFFICIAL-20230603-057-155.jpg.iCfB_LfeMWATAA.8UTSwEnQys.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The wider question is whether this whole force needs some
kind of ‘national service’ to find enough people to staff it. This is a complex
question to ask because arguably the military don’t hugely need lots of unwilling
conscripts who have been forced into a role they don’t want to do for 2 years.
They won’t gain enough experience or skills to be useful and many of them will
begrudge the experience. Equally though the armed forces do need people with
very specialist skills that can take many years to acquire, and where the military
struggle to compete with civilian recruiters. Take the Tech sector for instance,
where employers are fighting with each other to attract highly skilled talent
with very niche skills. Or look at the engineering sector where people with
good engineering skills, particularly at supervisory levels, are needed in the military,
but prove increasingly hard to retain.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Perhaps paradoxically some kind of national service is
needed, but not for conscripts to serve at the start of their career, when they
could in theory form some division many years later in a crisis using obsolete weapons
and equipment. Instead what is needed is selective conscription of skilled
people, at all stages in their career to fix the skills gaps inside the armed
forces in peace and war. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A genuinely
bold move maybe to offer extremely tempting incentives to volunteer (as
discussed above) but for areas where needs are high and people are low, perhaps
‘conscription as a sponsored reservist’ may be considered. In this case,
selecting people to be nominated to be a sponsored reservist and attend
mandatory training, and then be called on when required for operations. Such a
model may work well for the tech sector where the combination of military recruiting
requirements almost automatically ruling many applicants out, plus the general
sense of many in the sector that the military lifestyle is the last thing they
want, means that conscription may be the best answer. Such a move would need
significant flexibility on medical standards, and an acceptance that it existed
as a last resort, but it could be a way to consider staffing gaps in a crisis
where you need people with real world experience to be employed in a military
environment.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Any move to do this would be politically deeply contentious in
the UK but may prove to be the ultimate fallback for the delivery of a ‘whole
force’ that can be called on at short notice. It would send a powerful
deterrence message too, that the UK is embarking on deep societal change to
respond to the threats posed by Russia and is willing to consider previously
unthinkable steps to meet this. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Ultimately delivering the ‘whole force’ will require a lot
of money, a lot of political willingness to do things very differently and a
military willingness to fundamentally change how they recruit and operate. But
it may be a price worth paying to ensure that ‘National Service guarantees citizenship’.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-19634822712086448682024-01-28T19:14:00.006+00:002024-01-28T19:14:29.472+00:00' Why The Answer Isn't Always Royal Navy Carriers' <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">Even as the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force continue to acquit
themselves with distinction in the Middle East, there are loud murmurings from the
home front that the UK has wasted time and money on the carrier fleet, and that
a failure to send a carrier to strike the Houthi sites means that apparently carriers
are useless white elephants. No matter what the crisis or relevance, we seem
destined to live in a world where armchair ‘experts’ decry any decision to not
use the carrier operationally. What is it they know that the MOD does not?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The UK has spent many years and a lot of money acquiring a
Carrier Strike capability, built around a pair of aircraft carriers, designed
from the outset to operate the F35 (both UK and allied), every major military
helicopter in the UK inventory, including Merlin, Chinook, Apache and Lynx
Wildcat as well as a range of uncrewed UAVs. Supported by air defence and anti-submarine
warfare escorts as well as RFA stores support (currently theoretically given
the desperate state of the RFA at the moment), the force represents a highly
credible capability able to operate globally in support of British and allied
interests. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Both carriers had a busy 2023,
with concurrent deployments undertaken in the Baltic and Western Atlantic,
while there is likely to be a similarly busy 2024, with the MOD confirming
further NATO deployments are likely during this time. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Given the opportunities that they offer and
the inherent flexibility of the design, it is easy to understand why people are
asking why these ships haven’t been deployed to the Southern Red Sea to support
ongoing operations against Iranian backed Houthi militants. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtsxY0MitqUlmr_2Pxb-SJuynL3YJ94UBPRIijxwS6YtjGP-BM3BjiNMGt4MKmQ9izj3c5x3UIvU1dTk0Tnlvv908yLKQJ_bnvCYFHxmMy57z_O_O7_qohEao474W6TVp7DPqDGnLhWsIpSTrcUQgFm13FKeR7FV2IRdSEdDDnLaoSMePUviOhc41uHwac/s1200/FLEET-20230929-XN0149-039.jpg.iCfpgqHeMWATAA.7sMBbt3mgI.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtsxY0MitqUlmr_2Pxb-SJuynL3YJ94UBPRIijxwS6YtjGP-BM3BjiNMGt4MKmQ9izj3c5x3UIvU1dTk0Tnlvv908yLKQJ_bnvCYFHxmMy57z_O_O7_qohEao474W6TVp7DPqDGnLhWsIpSTrcUQgFm13FKeR7FV2IRdSEdDDnLaoSMePUviOhc41uHwac/s320/FLEET-20230929-XN0149-039.jpg.iCfpgqHeMWATAA.7sMBbt3mgI.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The first point to note is that the decision to deploy a
carrier is a political one. Ministers, not Admirals, make the decision on matters
like this. They will do so based on advice from the MOD, which will provide a
range of options setting out how to meet overall strategic ministerial ambition.
For example, if Ministers have said (and this is entirely hypothetical), that
they wish the UK to play a leading role in taking action against the Houthi,
then MOD planners would note what could be potentially done, be it airpower
from Cyprus, maritime operations in the Red Sea, possible Special Forces or
other Army assets on land and so on. This advice would set out the benefits and
how the force packages could meet this ambition, but also the costs of doing so
– both financially as well as longer term on the planned operational programme.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Nothing can be done without an impact – sending a carrier to
the Gulf on an unscheduled deployment means taking it off its planned programme.
Such a move may impact on training, integration work, planned joint exercises,
refit and maintenance plans across not just the carrier, but also the escort
group and airwing. This doesn’t mean that it should not be done, but that the cost
of doing something may be greater with some options than others. The decision
on what should be done rightly falls to Ministers to accept the option that
most suits their political and policy goals. They can be advised, but Ministers
decide. In this case it seems that, for now, the decision made by Ministers is
that it isn’t the right time to send a carrier group.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In conducting these strikes there is a balancing act that must
be struck. At the current stage of the operations, the UK requirement appears
to be for air defence (provided by HMS DIAMOND), escort of UK vessels (which
may also be provided by HMS RICHMOND) and a limited air strike capability on
specific targets, delivered by Typhoon. This is likely underpinned by
intelligence collection, logistics and other enablers. While some have wrongly
focused on the perceived foolishness of sending Typhoons on a 3000 mile trip
from Cyprus, this rather misses the point. Sending a carrier strike group to
the Southern Red Sea is an approximately 8500 mile round trip, costing significantly
more in fuel costs than sending four Typhoons and a Voyager. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Given the importance of RAF Akrotiri to UK operations
across the Middle East and the near permanent presence of Typhoons and Voyagers
at the base, this is a strike that can be carried out among other operations. When
the current requirement is for just two sets of air strikes, this represents a
far more effective use of defence assets to use pre-existing assets already in
the region over a bespoke deployment. At the current strike rate, there is
little need for a carrier, and the disruption to programmes, and tying up of
the F35 force and wider assets for some months is likely to be a far greater cost
than just using the Typhoon force.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2Mns7yS_6R4KLpTi0K6S8h5IjWtZTF5ciVgmfg58SztMbuhqZKj6Ou0-Wdp80MyhXV3x6eLRMpGKip6epad9sFt-EoqPybv-e7I74tuw_IJnhgjXffUjVso-8iVwxGPN0ESf-iNYNddCDPLB0ce4EhCrp_jr4acOmMhEbhhfuQry0CRrlqo7tyW6-YHwe/s1200/FLEET-20231005-XE0079-021.jpg.iCfVl6veMWATAA.BELHu-vIXT.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2Mns7yS_6R4KLpTi0K6S8h5IjWtZTF5ciVgmfg58SztMbuhqZKj6Ou0-Wdp80MyhXV3x6eLRMpGKip6epad9sFt-EoqPybv-e7I74tuw_IJnhgjXffUjVso-8iVwxGPN0ESf-iNYNddCDPLB0ce4EhCrp_jr4acOmMhEbhhfuQry0CRrlqo7tyW6-YHwe/s320/FLEET-20231005-XE0079-021.jpg.iCfVl6veMWATAA.BELHu-vIXT.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">It is possible that the equation may quickly change – if for
example the need became to deliver regular strikes on Houthi targets, then the
presence of a Royal Navy carrier would be advantageous. A shorter flying time
and quicker response means that if the rate of strikes had to step up, then an
RN carrier would potentially, for a finite time, be a better option than using Cyprus.
The limitations are, of course, the number of munitions in the magazines, and
the fact that without an operational RFA solid store ship, the carrier would periodically
need to put into a friendly port to rearm and restore. Finding a friendly port
in this region with a host nation willing to allow munitions loading via its
airports may be challenging – although Duqm is a potential host port, Oman may
not want UK operations conducted there given the impact on its own borders.
There are no other ports easily accessible from the Red Sea that the Royal Navy
could use without either disruption with time off station, or repeated Suez Canal
transits. The RN may need to use a US supply ship to stay on station for a longer
period or reduce coverage.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Another case could be made for the carrier to follow in due
course to relieve other ships in the region. At some point US carriers will
need to return home for microwaved tea and more cookies (noting that the
current CO of EISENHOWER exceptional <a href="https://twitter.com/ChowdahHill?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">social
media account</a>!) The RN could, if the desire was there, be a strong
contender to replace the Ike, particularly noting the exceptional interoperability
of the QE design with US military assets, particularly the Osprey and USMC F35.
In these circumstances, having an RN carrier able to take on this role would ease
pressure on the US carrier battle force, which would definitely be welcomed by
the USN. This is, of course, entirely speculation on the authors part, but it
does highlight that one of the advantages of the QE design is its ability to integrate
with US peers and support them in a way no other allied carrier design can.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The biggest danger in times like this is the way that loud commentators
shout at length at what they see as a clear failure by the MOD to ‘do something’.
They fail to grasp that defence is about delivering a golf bag of different ‘capability
clubs’ which are right at different times. The RN carrier force is a fantastic asset,
it brings enormous capability and if needed, would be extremely valuable in the
region. But the question is ‘is it needed now’? Rather than answer this
question, people have assumed that just because something is going on,
everything is needed NOW and anything not needed is by definition defunct. This
sort of nonsense if applied would mean that after the Falklands War, we’d have
offloaded all of our main battle tanks as they weren’t deployed, or after the 1991
Gulf War we’d have scrapped our carrier force as, again, it wasn’t used. Not
everything needs to be used on every occasion, and what is telling is that people
will not take a strategic perspective in all this. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is frustrating to see articles in the press implying that
somehow the RN has ‘failed’ here for failing to deploy an asset which, at this point,
does not need to be deployed and where better, cheaper and more efficient means
of delivering the intended effect exist. It’s the same nonsensical logic that infers
that because 5 of 6 Type 45s are not deployed now, the design is a failure.
Lets ignore that for most of last year at least half the force completed
multi-month deployments and have only recently returned home, or that right now
HMS DIAMOND is in harms way and serving in the finest traditions of the
Service. Instead these people shout angrily at clouds because they don’t understand
and can’t be bothered to understand how these things really work. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Strategically we are at the start of the Carrier Strike journey,
and it is very early days in the projected 50-year lifespan of these vessels.
There will be many times in years to come when sending a carrier is absolutely
the right thing to do, but this may not always happen for very good reasons. The
question is ‘what is the right tool for the job for the UK now’, not ‘the
answer is the carrier, whats the question?’ <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-62561006509336706452024-01-24T22:42:00.005+00:002024-01-24T22:42:56.600+00:00Playing The Numbers Game - Does the MOD Need People Or Technology?<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">Saying ‘technology means we need fewer people’ (or words to
that effect) is one of the default phrases of practically every British Defence
Review since the end of WW2. The simple fact that people are our finest, but most
expensive asset, and they are often in short supply means that successive
governments of all political hues have tried to reduce overall personnel numbers
while relying on the mantra that ‘technology means we can do more with less’. Grant
Shapps MP, the newly appointed Secretary of State for Defence has reemphasised
this line with comments in late January that the UK can safely make reductions
in Army strength because technology permits the MOD to do so. Is this credible
or do these plans not really add up?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is a strong argument that technology reduces the need
for mass – a good example is airpower, where the increasingly accurate
munitions used reduce the need for airframes. For example, the modern Typhoon
fighter-bomber jet is able to drop bombs on multiple targets, achieving a level
of precision unimagined 50 years ago, before deploying brimstone missiles
to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>destroy individual tanks or armoured
vehicles. In WW2 such accuracy would have been impossible, instead requiring hundreds
of planes with large bombloads to disrupt and destroy an area, while in Vietnam
dozens of jets were used, unsuccessfully, in 873 attempts destroy the Thanh Hoa
bridge in 1965 for the loss of at least 11 US jets. It was not destroyed until
1972 through the use of laser guided bombs. In circumstances like this, you can
see why fewer jets can quickly have the effect that previously required hundreds
of aircraft and missions to deliver. In turn this reduces the need for jets, munitions
and can reduce the ‘tail’ of groundcrew, support functions and logistical
chains needed for operations. If you can achieve the effect with a fraction of
the previous need, why wouldn’t you do this?<o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQv8SRN9_X8NoKnFJwKmssnuleQ9ByCJmwEOekOI1zWy2P-Q3bF8Zwbdb5JuHv6e3D_InW_jen1X8tM2ufDijoQ0rtAy3R_4eLzOdjNUJt9SHSXHpKywVYYHpe59lXnsllM4Zb189bBSI-zqj6kP5VkxP3EsGCMBRKoK7P0VbPErmi943URhEMWum45_FG/s1200/APOSEC-OFFICIAL-20231118-035-142.jpg.iCfzoYneMWATAA.DJvdckJg8d.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQv8SRN9_X8NoKnFJwKmssnuleQ9ByCJmwEOekOI1zWy2P-Q3bF8Zwbdb5JuHv6e3D_InW_jen1X8tM2ufDijoQ0rtAy3R_4eLzOdjNUJt9SHSXHpKywVYYHpe59lXnsllM4Zb189bBSI-zqj6kP5VkxP3EsGCMBRKoK7P0VbPErmi943URhEMWum45_FG/s320/APOSEC-OFFICIAL-20231118-035-142.jpg.iCfzoYneMWATAA.DJvdckJg8d.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a story that all three services will be familiar
with to a point. The Royal Navy for example deploys warships today like the
Type 45 with around 190 crew, doing a job that previous County Class destroyers
in the 1960s required over 450 crew to do, and arguably with a far higher level
of accuracy in their weapon systems. As ships modernise and technology
improves, the need for sheer numbers decreases thanks to automation and improved
ways of working. This trend continues today, with uncrewed and autonomous
vessels likely to become the bulwark of the future Royal Navy, able to do jobs previously
carried out by vessels with dozens of people onboard (for example mine warfare
or surveying). It is clear that there is likely to be a significantly reduced
overall headcount need in coming decades for both the RAF and Royal Navy as
these services embrace modern technology that needs fewer people. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">But these changes come at a price, and it is important to be
clear that reduced headcount does not mean reduced risk. For starters the
assumption that technology gives the UK a battle winning edge relies on us
assuming that our likely foes are not investing in similar technology
themselves (and in larger numbers). While during the 1990s – late 2010s it was possible
to say that the UK could realistically plan on military technical advantage
over likely opponents for intervention operations – particularly in the Africa
and Gulf regions, the same cannot be said today. The rapid proliferation of
cheap and highly capable equipment sold by China means it is easy for countries
to acquire a capable and credible military ‘on the cheap’ that poses a
meaningful threat if properly trained and employed.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is also a strong argument that an opponent doesn’t
need advanced technology to cause disruption and achieve an operational and strategic
effect. Look for instance at both Iraq and Afghanistan, where Iranian backed militia
groups used IEDs and rockets supplied by the Iranian regime to disrupt
coalition forces, causing significant casualties and sapping political will in
the process. Meanwhile in Yemen the Houthi militia use of not particularly
modern ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles and ‘one way attack drones’ is
having a strategic effect, drawing the UK and USA into conflict in the region and
forcing the commitment of advanced jets, warships and other technology to
reduce the risk from an obsolescent but effective missile force. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Another challenge is that reducing headcount places an
increased focus on the need for specialists with specific technical training.
Modern weapons, communications, sensors and other military equipment is often
not simple, requiring extensive training and experience to properly operate and
maintain.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This in turn means military
personnel need extensive training, often for years, to become masters of their
craft. If they leave, you are left with a gap that will take time to fill.
These personnel will have highly in demand transferable skills by industry,
often able to pay more and offer a life with better work/life balance. A
smaller military will mean that with reduced mass compared to the past (for
example having multiple air defence squadrons in 1980s and far fewer today), there
are less people around to share the operational burden. If you only ‘need’ two
air defence squadrons, compared to say seven or twenty in the past, then the workload
will fall disproportionately on those units. Mass provides a level of
redundancy and resilience that enables people to take a break and recover – one
only has to look at the level of commitment on the F35 force and some of the publicly
stated facts on personnel availability to realise that no matter how great the
equipment, your ability to operate comes down to having enough people in the
first place.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3uEEh6qtOwaZHXb8mDF2EgFdcUCaaXQ_ekrigGcLZikiTo0_DEGoPRsdisFgJ1MlMOEfjtUUbKKXL6hxmOD660f8Na1YwXTwKbWJA9vSQ9_jghJ8jpAO1lHHOBFKWzw0MGSZ9tzjbGx2RDKjz7DxvsVtULSsC6fs0oFivXkAXXfrVc2u35Pte1tdv8qJg/s1200/FLEET-20231201-SPE031-2974.jpg.iCee-JbeMWATAA.38SfGTgkfD.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="676" data-original-width="1200" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3uEEh6qtOwaZHXb8mDF2EgFdcUCaaXQ_ekrigGcLZikiTo0_DEGoPRsdisFgJ1MlMOEfjtUUbKKXL6hxmOD660f8Na1YwXTwKbWJA9vSQ9_jghJ8jpAO1lHHOBFKWzw0MGSZ9tzjbGx2RDKjz7DxvsVtULSsC6fs0oFivXkAXXfrVc2u35Pte1tdv8qJg/w320-h180/FLEET-20231201-SPE031-2974.jpg.iCee-JbeMWATAA.38SfGTgkfD.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">This is particularly true for the British Army which is undergoing
a significant downsizing from 82,000 to 73,000 to better reflect modern
strategic realities. The Army has reduced by roughly 25% in the last 15 years,
despite the rapidly worsening international security situation, a move driven
by a combination of unaffordability of equipment, the high cost of people and
being able to invest in modern equipment able to operate on the battlefield. As
Ukraine is reminding us daily, success in
operations in the modern land environment calls for very advanced and survivable
equipment able to survive, overcome a complex operating environment and fight
against potentially large numbers of older but still lethal Soviet era vehicles.
The British Army view is that it cannot afford to equip more than a deployable division
to meet this operational challenge – the sheer cost of vehicles, equipment and
people is so great that it is unrealistic to go for more. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The realistic view is that it is better to have a smaller
army, but equipped to operate at the highest levels of conflict and take on
peer rivals like the Russians, and of more value to key NATO allies like the US
and Poland, by being able to fight as a truly integrated colleague, not kept on
the margins due to the inability to integrate properly. There is little point
keeping people on strength, drawing wages and rations for whom there is no
money to properly equip, otherwise you are essentially creating a two tier army
of the deployable versus the unemployable. Not everyone would agree with this
view that smaller means better – certainly the UK is being rather brave in being
the only major NATO member to be downsizing its army at a time when European
security is at greater risk than any time since the darkest days of the Cold
War. No matter how compelling the argument is that smaller means better, it looks
rather hypocritical of the UK to encourage others to spend more on Defence
while allowing itself the luxury of cutting its Army by nearly 15%. Such a move
damages UK credibility with allies, and may lead to key partners openly asking
whether the UK is still a credible partner in the land environment.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The wider issue is the uncomfortable reality that no matter
how much technology wins wars, you still need to recruit women and men to defend,
attack, seize and hold ground against others. This is a dirty dangerous job and
as Ukraine has shown, can result in huge casualties, both killed and wounded. You
cannot magic away the need to capture or occupy terrain through drones or “cyberzz”
– you need people prepared mentally and physically to use extreme force to
close to bayonet range and murder their enemies eyeball to eyeball. The
challenge is finding the mass of people to do this – by all accounts Army
recruitment figures are in trouble, with a notable decline of numbers being
recruited, despite expressions of interest being high. Some argue that it is ‘Capita’,
while others point to onerous Army rules and regulations on medical standards
and tattoos that can be a blocker. Whatever the delay may be, it is reducing numbers
when more are desperately needed to top up understrength units.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGlMexodLy1sQ-zeZQVoA1eLkg9CLrxBWc3ZtqNw9TJmE7Em9uHAZ-xpQos9GJYVleNDnN-oklfOfeX-Ec0SdDpa4FlJQxKA6HuQ7OG4dCTMzye_kSU20XaMVl_t3L6dnbbz77iq5L7geY4xvO6DnaSDGelsgLZUJQlcIO04Hwd0GmEkiaLCoIPyTlQtCn/s1200/CAMS-OFFICIAL-20231120-017-026.jpg.iCfo3Y3eMWATAA.AcjU4vvifT.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGlMexodLy1sQ-zeZQVoA1eLkg9CLrxBWc3ZtqNw9TJmE7Em9uHAZ-xpQos9GJYVleNDnN-oklfOfeX-Ec0SdDpa4FlJQxKA6HuQ7OG4dCTMzye_kSU20XaMVl_t3L6dnbbz77iq5L7geY4xvO6DnaSDGelsgLZUJQlcIO04Hwd0GmEkiaLCoIPyTlQtCn/s320/CAMS-OFFICIAL-20231120-017-026.jpg.iCfo3Y3eMWATAA.AcjU4vvifT.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table>
<p class="MsoNormal">The harsh reality is that in wartime the UK will urgently
need more women and men to augment existing units, and form new ones. Much like
in WW1, the Regular Army was the initial roadblock that was then reinforced by
the TA, that lasted long enough for the citizen volunteer and conscript army to
come online by 1916, there will need to be more troops required in wartime as replacements.
The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Patrick Sanders has raised eyebrows by hinting
that the UK will need to draw on a spirit of national service and get volunteers
or others to step up at times of conflict. Other media articles have suggested
that the MOD is looking at plans for a ‘whole force’ of around 500,000 people,
regular, reservist, and this new wider body. That No10 has been forced to deny suggestions
that conscription is looming suggests how this idea landed in the corridors of
power. CGS has not though said anything that his peers in other NATO nations
are not saying, with several senior defence officials in other countries
warning of the need to prepare for war within the next few years. There is a sense
that a mindset change is needed across NATO to be ready for whatever Russia tries
to do next.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiYCbDbaVATk3nmZStBNf7RYleHf6eW45By-ipEn9hlBtMHE7dfq1xojuP5aPlX_tglFE-dxOwaujhGyXVwHgX1KjAezqLIfcNS9KHhSQBJlNbGSvdiZ6VftCL8dc67cPSaTAYjWZeGks0CEqZBhsOQaSLFHRGj6Zk4HVTxPIdTZEG2Vf5zarDPQdOdLg1F/s1200/FLEET-20230224-XN0066-020.jpg.iCelyI3eMWATAA.6tEA8-WeiO.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiYCbDbaVATk3nmZStBNf7RYleHf6eW45By-ipEn9hlBtMHE7dfq1xojuP5aPlX_tglFE-dxOwaujhGyXVwHgX1KjAezqLIfcNS9KHhSQBJlNbGSvdiZ6VftCL8dc67cPSaTAYjWZeGks0CEqZBhsOQaSLFHRGj6Zk4HVTxPIdTZEG2Vf5zarDPQdOdLg1F/s320/FLEET-20230224-XN0066-020.jpg.iCelyI3eMWATAA.6tEA8-WeiO.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table>
<p class="MsoNormal">The suggestion that the UK could raise a force of
volunteers, several hundred thousand strong to augment the armed forces seems ‘courageous’
to put it mildly. The simple fact is that the stores, infrastructure, industrial
base and equipment to give them does not exist. The UK has spent over 30 years
reducing the size of the Defence Estate, reducing barrack holdings, training
land and relying on smaller and concentrated ‘super garrisons’ over a legacy
estate acquired mostly during WW1 and WW2. The mass stockpiles of wartime equipment
held in warehouses ready to be issued during a general mobilisation have long
been disposed of, a legacy of the ‘Resource Accounting Budgeting’ saga of the
2000s when the MOD was forced to offload huge chunks of stores after it was
financially penalised for holding on to them. The lunacy of penalising an
organisation like Defence, which needs stockpiles for wartime not peacetime was
pointed out then, but ignored. Instead the MOD has been forced to rely on smaller
stocks and hope and pray for ‘just in time logistics’ to work when required. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There are no warehouses full of WW2 era battledress and
puttees waiting to be given to newly arrived ‘volunteers’. There are enough
weapons for the military we have now, not the military may need to expand to.
This marks a change from as late as 1991, when the British Armed Forces on full
war mobilisation had the plans, and stores, to nearly double in size (on paper
at least) in about 7-14 days bringing back ex-regulars and volunteer reservists
to form up units to full war strength. Files even exist in the National
Archives showing plans to issue tens of thousands of cadet force .303 rifles and
Webley Revolvers to the police at this time too. The plans, infrastructure,
stores and munitions existed and were tested and the chances are that, come the
day, it would have worked reasonably well. Today none of this exists, all sold off
or disposed of as unnecessary in<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the
peace dividend era.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What good would these ‘volunteers’ do anyway – at best the
MOD may be able to get details of regular reservists or hope to bring people in
in a hurry, but we then hit the reality of technology and warfare. Anyone
rejoining is likely to be long out of date and unfamiliar with current
equipment and tactics and need a lengthy retraining period. Any civilians will
need realistically a lot of time to train and be useful on equipment that takes
months to learn and understand. The same equipment that hasn’t been bought in
large numbers because its so expensive not much of it can be afforded, and the
chances are its been destroyed anyway and there aren’t any attrition reserves
available. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This sounds downbeat, but if
the UK wants a serious conversation around what a national call to arms looks
like, it needs to ask what the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>expectations
are of these people. Is it to be trained as basic troops to carry out basic
infantry functions, or is it to provide specialists and others as required? Does
the MOD want a pool of volunteers it can draw on in an emergency who have
pre-existing training – like the RNXS, UKWMO or Home Service Force – all of
which could mobilise thousands of keen and experienced volunteers and all were disposed
of in the name of financial expediency in the 1990s. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2YtdWxsWSi6ptTHhgGw8Sfqtmnc4unKTP4nbWOtLdE1RXIQL9ZkOrCvr15HI8T-YyYbusMfPm8FNUV7CyJnTVJKATPxDrZaayeceDzBkTA4vTib_VY-RSbNiDSeTgp3KPd_TAaGzwaKCP034GQx5FP6O6p9ENM_m7dvotjNSRDS7wPBVhCAaDiZDU3OSj/s1200/DDC-OFFICIAL-20230914-342-023.jpg.iCeB9ZLeMWATAA.MjZLtewiOY.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="901" data-original-width="1200" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2YtdWxsWSi6ptTHhgGw8Sfqtmnc4unKTP4nbWOtLdE1RXIQL9ZkOrCvr15HI8T-YyYbusMfPm8FNUV7CyJnTVJKATPxDrZaayeceDzBkTA4vTib_VY-RSbNiDSeTgp3KPd_TAaGzwaKCP034GQx5FP6O6p9ENM_m7dvotjNSRDS7wPBVhCAaDiZDU3OSj/s320/DDC-OFFICIAL-20230914-342-023.jpg.iCeB9ZLeMWATAA.MjZLtewiOY.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">There is a case to try to step numbers up slightly through
different means – for example increasing recruitment into University Units to
get a pool of partially trained people available. Another idea may be to incentivise
people to volunteer and serve their skills in a different way – for example
offering to pay off a significant percentage each year of outstanding student
loans, or providing larger financial contributions to a house deposit (similar
to a Lifetime ISA) may be a great way to get people in their 20s to volunteer to
support the military as a volunteer in their spare time without joining up, on
the understanding they could be available in a crisis. The First Aid Nursing Yeomanry
(FANY) is an excellent example of this sort of body of people, and it has a
long and proud history of supporting civil emergencies and state functions with
equal credibility.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The MOD and armed forces would need to think carefully about
what they wanted these volunteers to be and what standards they should meet.
Part of the challenge of recruitment is a zero risk attitude to any form of
medical ailment, which is both sensible but can at times (at least according to
multiple accounts on Twitter) be taken too far.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A serious discussion is needed about whether to relax significantly
medical standards to open the military up to all, and accept them on the basis
of possession of pulse alone. This would expand the pool of people who could
join, and potentially find those with the skills and aptitude to meet the
technical needs of the modern military. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This whole situation presents the very different dilemmas facing
the MOD. On the one hand it wants to recruit hugely technically skilled staff
able to operate advanced equipment, but cannot afford to do so in large
numbers. It has to come up with a credible offer to attract people who will be
tempted by large salaries in the tech industry and persuade them to stay in for
decades, as the military refuse to countenance sideways entry. The continued application
of this personnel model has in recent years shown itself woefully unable to retain
talent, thus creating much of the current personnel challenges the armed forces
face. But at the same time the military need to create a pool of people who can
be drawn on as the next generation of attrition replacements, who exist to be
sent forward to replace those who have been killed or wounded. It requires
people willing to step up in tension and wartime to serve their nation, but in
a way that places an utterly different training and logistical burden on the
armed forces. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is no easy answer to these challenges. It is clear
that defence reviews will continue to cite technology as a reason for headcount
reduction, but in turn there must be an irreducible minimum number that the
military cannot slip below. Even if the need for service personnel reduces,
there will always be others required to deliver services – just look at the way
privatisation of MOD services and functions has not reduced headcount, merely
transferred it into someone else’s budget line or company. The answer is not
zero, but even as technology improves, there will always be a need for people both
as skilled technicians and infantry soldiers. The challenge for MOD is how to
do both for right now it is caught between diametrically opposing needs and has
neither the people, nor the money to solve both challenges. <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-29898073727049375892024-01-16T20:51:00.001+00:002024-01-16T20:51:46.407+00:00Is 'The Company' a Going Concern? <p> </p><p>One of the most important pieces of news in the UK this week was the announcement that a major Model Railway exhibition that had run for decades had been cancelled due to the lack of young blood entering the model railway hobby. Now, with the demographics looking increasingly bleak, the show was deemed beyond the point of salvage. This is not just sad news, but also a surprisingly apt analogy for the state of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), or ‘The Company’ as it is sometimes called by its members.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj38e-tCZoCkrq4kJ8ZojqwF04pznYEYadhWP9Q9ZT_2hm1-nbbwS2MniX7uGzn8yiUjnpmFpQMOvQyC1-og916DvBtSmKeBxqp53LiozZgM6eBGFAhMK4FwZkY9EIi7qCoRHFzx1inYE6XbR8Ddtf6ZMt8slbv-32sUpdgYRqaNhRM9NsvVwt8K7ykH7jD/s1200/FLEET-20210706-BG088-1794.jpg.iCfTr-PdMWATAA.CaaO7melze.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj38e-tCZoCkrq4kJ8ZojqwF04pznYEYadhWP9Q9ZT_2hm1-nbbwS2MniX7uGzn8yiUjnpmFpQMOvQyC1-og916DvBtSmKeBxqp53LiozZgM6eBGFAhMK4FwZkY9EIi7qCoRHFzx1inYE6XbR8Ddtf6ZMt8slbv-32sUpdgYRqaNhRM9NsvVwt8K7ykH7jD/s320/FLEET-20210706-BG088-1794.jpg.iCfTr-PdMWATAA.CaaO7melze.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><p><br /></p><p>Operated by civilian seafarers, who are employed as MOD Civil Servants (and count towards the headcount of the MOD Civil Service), and who are also sponsored reservists, able to operate as members of the armed forces if required, the RFA is is a wonderfully British invention that provides a range of diverse maritime services to Royal Navy, wider defence and allies around the world. Historically it has operated tankers, stores ships, aviation training ships, repair ships, landing ships and all manner of platforms that are undoubtedly naval in nature, but do not need a commissioned warship to deliver. It is the single largest employer of civilian UK seafarers, and its vessels are technically merchant ships, not warships – a subtle but very important distinction.</p><p>Perhaps the most important RFA role is that of providing fuel and food to the fleet at sea – something that it has done for over a century. It helped pioneer the delivery of oil to ships steaming at sea, the so-called ‘Replenishment at Sea’ (RAS) and was central to supporting the British Pacific Fleet in 1945, where the fleet train of support ships vastly outnumbered fighting vessels, and enabled the UK to contribute to victory in the Pacific. Throughout the Cold War the RFA provided tankers and stores ships to most naval deployments, and the stories of withdrawal from Empire and lonely patrols deep in the Atlantic will all feature an RFA in one form or another. Perhaps its finest hour ever came in 1982 when, stretched to the limit, 8000 miles from home. RFA ships and crew were the ingredient without which the Falklands War could not have been attempted, let alone won. They may be civilians, but they are the sailors for whom the military cannot do without.</p><p>One of the key ship types operated by the RFA was the solid stores ships, designed to provide support to carrier and surface task groups during the Cold War. The UK designed and from the mid 1960s built several different classes, including the NESS, RESOURCE and FORT class of store ships. Although built to different designs, the essential philosophy was of a large floating warehouse and supermarket, fitted with spare parts, food, stores and munitions that could be provided to other ships by either jackstay transfer (sailing together and transferring via a line between two ships) or helicopter (so-called ‘vertical replenishment). The outcome was large ships, capable of carrying multiple helicopters (the FORT 1 class could carry and operate four sea kings), and also unusual stores (the FORT 1s stored nuclear depth bombs).</p><p>In the early 1980s plans emerged for the ‘FORT II’s, which were to trial a new concept of operations. Designed to operate with the then austere Type 23 design, intended as an ASW-lite frigate, the new design was intended to be a tanker, store ship, ASW aviation maintenance platform and contribute to task group defence. The result was a giant vessel, over 200m long, weighing over 30,000 tonnes (so as long as, and 30% more displacement than the INVINCIBLE class carrier), capable of operating up to five Sea King or Merlin helicopters and armed with VLS Seawolf. The idea made a lot of sense, essentially providing a hub for the T23 ASW groups that would attempt to stop Soviet submarines during a future Battle of the Atlantic, while being able to provide stores, fuel and maintenance to helicopters (remembering the T23 was originally a very austere design). 6 were planned, but due to cuts at the end of the Cold War, only 2 entered service, and VLS Seawolf was never fitted.</p><p>Throughout the 1990s and 2000s the RN relied heavily on the RFA’s four FORT 1 & 2 class ships to provide stores support to operations. This included global deployments, support to UK personnel ashore in the Balkans, the Gulf War, and other duties. These were hard worked ships that filled a variety of roles to support a globally deployed British military. The 2010 SDR took the decision to withdraw FORT GEORGE from service, scrapping her ahead of a refit to save short term cash. In a similar time frame the decision was taken to run on the FORT 1 vessels (ROSALIE and AUSTIN) until 2024, when they would be approximately 45 years old and replaced by the Future Support Ship (FSS). Due to delays bringing the FSS onto contract, caused by policy challenges, spending problems and the RFA not being seen as high enough priority to fund over other equally pressing issues, the FSS first of class entry to service date has slipped to 2031, while the FORT 1 class have been in reserve since around 2015 and were decommissioned in 2021, and later sold to Egypt.</p><p>RFA FORT VICTORIA on the other hand has been busy on global deployments throughout the 2010s, including extended periods in the Middle East. She was refitted to function as the lead Carrier Strike support ship, a task which involved removing her oil refuelling capability and using her purely as a solid stores ship. Despite plans to run her on till 2030 (when she will be 40 years old), she is now in reserve in Birkenhead with a skeleton crew and no plans to sail her until she begins preparation for the 2025 Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Far East. This means that at present the Royal Navy has no active stores ship capable of providing replenishment at sea. Is this an issue though, or is it something that can be managed and mitigated?</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmI0e-Jafxa-JC5e5Vjh7hZfqBzN3nhj5vmnCrVTA7-ElHQXfhzPCi8Seuw_ArWbqq0QRgcObzCgZu_2NM2EbZRmAv3AZjy3hVpR_Ou08LD4ALoB4FT42X2PV0uKknNm9OowKqxCTIh6cCaXp-LwPjnzBTlgTEYtpAPeghZFsC5samCU9Av2TqzDmXlP0H/s1200/FLEET-20211003-AA0144-074.jpg.iCfq497dMWATAA.hbPofL0Qwm.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmI0e-Jafxa-JC5e5Vjh7hZfqBzN3nhj5vmnCrVTA7-ElHQXfhzPCi8Seuw_ArWbqq0QRgcObzCgZu_2NM2EbZRmAv3AZjy3hVpR_Ou08LD4ALoB4FT42X2PV0uKknNm9OowKqxCTIh6cCaXp-LwPjnzBTlgTEYtpAPeghZFsC5samCU9Av2TqzDmXlP0H/s320/FLEET-20211003-AA0144-074.jpg.iCfq497dMWATAA.hbPofL0Qwm.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p><br /></p><p>A reasonable case can be made that this is not that big an issue operationally, even if presentationally it is challenging. The FORT 1 class were not compatible with the new QUEEN ELIZABETH class carrier, so they could not be used to support these ships at sea. They were also very old, reliant on hard to obtain spare parts and were reportedly in increasingly challenging state to operate and maintain. They were hulls on paper, but towards the end they perhaps lacked the operational capability of earlier in their career. Therefore their loss, while sad, is not going to impact directly on the RN Carrier Strike Group aspirations. At the same time, the smaller size of the Royal Navy, and the move away from keeping means to land a Commando Brigade at scale, as part of the ‘Future Commando Force’ plans, meant that there was less need for stores ships to carry ammunition and support material for Royal Marines afloat. Add reduced deployments to this as part of both a smaller navy, and the focus on operations in the Med and Gulf where shore support was easily available through either NATO allies, sovereign facilities like Gibraltar or generous support from allies like Bahrain for basing and maintenance, and the need for solid support ships reduced. If you look ahead for the next 5-7 years then the majority of RN deployments are likely to be in waters where there is a friendly port nearby. It seems reasonable to assume that with the rise of Russia as a credible threat, the majority of the fleet will be operating in the NATO area, standfast isolated deployers like the RIVER class. </p><p><br /></p><p>The challenge comes when you focus on what the RN cannot do without having a stores ship to hand. There is perhaps a danger that when using the phrase ‘blue water navy’ people assume RFA’s have holds the size of a TARDIS and can keep ships on station indefinitely. That is not true – an RFA is a vital way of keeping ships at sea for longer, but only as long as it has cargo in the holds to deliver. A better way of looking at it is to think of an RFA Stores Ship as an Ocado delivery van – it can stay with the main group, supporting as required, but when the need arises, can break off and put into a friendly port. As a merchant vessel it is much easier to put RFA’s into ports where warships may not always be able to enter. They can make use of both local stores and also airheads where RAF aircraft can provide logistical reach back to the UK for specific spare parts – never forget that sustained sea power can only be provided by either a very long chain of stores ships, or RAF strategic airlift.</p><p><br /></p><p>Without this ship able to provide stores and supplies, a carrier strike group is reliant on ports for restoring, significantly reducing endurance. In peacetime this may not be an issue, and indeed could be good for defence diplomacy and crew retention to offer ‘runs ashore’. The Royal Navy has access to a good network of facilities, both via NATO and national ones across the globe where supplies can be loaded onboard. The issue is when it comes to wartime – for example, were HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH operating a full airwing of 24 F35s and dropping live missiles and bombs on targets, then she would only have a finite time on station before needing to pull into a munitions facility to ‘bomb up’ again. Without an RFA on hand carrying additional weapons for top ups, or the ability to break away and reload at a friendly port, the UK will have a part time strike carrier capability – only good for use for as long as the spare parts and bombs last. This is why RFA FORT VICTORIA is so mission critical, as she is the glue that binds the CSG concept together and ensures the Carrier and escorts can stay at sea for longer and does not need to return to port regularly for resupply.</p><p>The issue now is that the RFA is rapidly running out of people, which in turn means it cannot get ships to sea. In 2010 there were (roughly) about 2300 RFA sailors, but today (Jan 24) there are 1,740, a reduction of approximately 25%, or a quarter, in just 15 years. At present the RFA is losing around 10% of its personnel per year, a figure that may increase significantly as long serving members hit retirement age, or others are tempted to go with better paying jobs elsewhere in the Merchant Navy. In 2022 an FOI stated that of the 221 deck officers in the RFA, only 24 (approx 10%) were under the age of 25, while 78 were aged over 40 (and at least 7 were aged over 60). This is an age demographic pyramid almost the reverse that of the Royal Navy. Additionally there is a challenge in recruiting and retaining new entrants, with another 2022 FOI suggesting that over the course of a 2 year apprenticeship, up to 30% of participants in some areas fail to complete their training – even before they hit the fleet as a trained rating.</p><p>Looking at social media, there are suggestions that pay is a key reason why people are leaving – what used to be a tax free income in the days of global deployments and huge time away from home waters is not keeping pace when on Civil Service payscales that are taxable in the UK. RFA personnel are definitely feeling the pain in their pockets, to the extent that strike action has been seriously considered. Add to this a sense (via social media at least) that ‘The Company’ is losing its identity and being subsumed into the Royal Navy, while being forgotten about as a unique body of mariners, and it is easy to see why retention is challenging. An urgent regain is needed to try to persuade people to both join, and stay.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiPGLYpBXjKMU04Sq1SrFIE2v-bShj2bZcYaZyP1n0JWmQm6658e16MuQikbAO6O441sDrYmG1iCMTB4Y_a_U4lPm6xDME4EYLCbli44AeW886vrJDCvvm0lwFBUK5oxjhP7KTB-cHp9mshFZNpCUJpuYhU6zpTtnyyn2fSNSY717lfZJIZUaTtcY31V3fj/s1200/45169261.jpg.iCf6-evdMWATAA.wW73IFNHOL.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiPGLYpBXjKMU04Sq1SrFIE2v-bShj2bZcYaZyP1n0JWmQm6658e16MuQikbAO6O441sDrYmG1iCMTB4Y_a_U4lPm6xDME4EYLCbli44AeW886vrJDCvvm0lwFBUK5oxjhP7KTB-cHp9mshFZNpCUJpuYhU6zpTtnyyn2fSNSY717lfZJIZUaTtcY31V3fj/s320/45169261.jpg.iCf6-evdMWATAA.wW73IFNHOL.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p><br /></p><p>The impact of this shortfall is being seen in the effective wiping out of vast swathes of RFA capability. Of the 6 RFA Tankers, two (the WAVE class) are in reserve and unlikely to ever sail again under the Blue Ensign. Of the four TIDE class, none are operating outside of UK waters, and it is telling that in 2023 the RFA was unable to provide a tanker to support either deployment of the QUEEN ELIZABETH and PRINCE OF WALES, to the extent that the US Navy had to provide a tanker for the latters WESTLANT deployment. The FORT VICTORIA is in reserve and unlikely to go to sea again before 2025, assuming crew can be found. The STIRLING CASTLE and PROTEUS have been alongside for months without going to sea, despite only being commissioned last year. The only active ships at present at ARGUS and LYME BAY, operating in the Eastern Med, while MOUNTS BAY is the MCMV mothership in Bahrain.</p><p>This is a stunning reduction in presence – even 10 years ago the RFA had tankers and support ships deployed globally that supported both RN and allied operations. While the reduction in some deployments is understandable – for instance the emergence of the RIVER class in the South Atlantic with more fuel efficient engines removes the need for a resident tanker, or the use of basing facilities in the Gulf makes it easier to use baseports for fuelling, the fact is that the RFA has withdrawn from global operations in a major way. This represents both a loss of capability and influence that is critically important for the UK.</p><p>The impact of this reduction can be felt in several ways. Firstly the RN is now far more reliant on shore bases for support than it was 10-15 years ago. The assumption now is not ‘when do we RAS’, but ‘where do we go into port for stores’. In peacetime this is easy, in wartime far less so – both for loss of fighting capability, but also the potential for ports to be denied access. It only takes an effective lobbying campaign diplomatically for RN vessels to be shut out of ports and then critically short on fuel and supplies and a long way from home.</p><p>Allied to this mindset shift is a loss of training and ‘muscle memory’. Without doing RAS and VERTREP regularly, the skills are quickly lost. One of the reasons the Falklands War was a success was because the Royal Navy, RFA and Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) were used to refuelling at sea in foul weather. The victory occurred because these ships could replenish each other and stay on station. While ‘risk’ can be taken when constructing a planning round option or Ministerial Submission without pain, the real risk is that the less the RN and RFA personnel do these evolutions, the faster the same organisations lose the mindset and experience on how to do them and learn from them. Once you are out of the habit of doing this sort of thing and instead planning to put a ship into port, then it’s a hard effort to get back into the blue water ocean going navy game. The longer these ship layups continue, the more skills fade occurs and the harder the regain becomes.</p><p>Is there a solution to this problem? One suggestion may be to look for the Royal Navy to take over the ships and augment the crews. The problem with this idea is that the RN also has no people and the RFA today represents over 10% of the seagoing (e.g. non FAA, Submarine or Royal Marine) Naval Service. The people to take on these ships and support them do not exist, so the RN can’t help. Another option may be to look to work more closely with allies and use their replenishment ships in deployments as part of the interoperability goal of the CSG – much like Dutch and US warships took part in the CSG21 deployment, could a foreign navy send their stores ship to help? The challenge here is that these ships are few and far between, and many navies may be reluctant to send their key support asset on a global deployment for the benefit of a foreign navy. Add to this the problem of the ship not carrying all the right spare parts for the Royal Navy, and the complexities of trying to maintain a logistics chain that involves RAF aircraft, third party ports and DIPCLEAR for foreign warships (remember most NATO auxiliaries are warships not merchant ships) to store on butter and bombs, and you make this a very challenging evolution.</p><p>Finally could the USN help – essentially trade a pair of tankers that the US badly need like the WAVE class for access to a USN supply ship to help with the fragility of FORT VICTORIA and bridge the FSS gap? There is a history of RFA’s serving proudly in the US, with the old NESS class serving longer under the US flag than the British, but transfer seems a step too far. The cost of changing the ship to meet UK standards and equipment, plus the thorny issue of accommodation changes (put politely, USN bunking standards resemble prison with the added bonus of drowning) and its hard to see many RFA wanting to sign up for this gig. When you add the timescale in that the FSS is ‘only’ 7 years away, and the cost and time of running such an operation for a short period doesn’t seem a good use of public money.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjswJNosi4a_vkBRkY5V9lCklxzDVLOhnuHjFsLj0g73wO2ZkczQiHAHiOXWMzAYTRiD7PeDGyANYjL9y_0zmhb8EvCKm5733S4-ENJPoxhwXFPjm_b9gmyjgzZ4FmpE2JHhPtbcn83npyH6lqwuLgXxy8kvhufNRXSNbONByDHvHmTgepaTxP2ORA_RcKh/s1200/FLEET-20211003-AA0144-083%20(2).jpg.iCfl2erdMWATAA.96j3MYQ5Tk.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjswJNosi4a_vkBRkY5V9lCklxzDVLOhnuHjFsLj0g73wO2ZkczQiHAHiOXWMzAYTRiD7PeDGyANYjL9y_0zmhb8EvCKm5733S4-ENJPoxhwXFPjm_b9gmyjgzZ4FmpE2JHhPtbcn83npyH6lqwuLgXxy8kvhufNRXSNbONByDHvHmTgepaTxP2ORA_RcKh/s320/FLEET-20211003-AA0144-083%20(2).jpg.iCfl2erdMWATAA.96j3MYQ5Tk.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p>Sadly the likely outcome instead is that the Royal Navy is going to have to accept a significant capability shortfall for some years to come. Operationally this impact will vary – if the RN continues to deploy mostly in NATO waters then the need for stores support and tankers will remain relatively low. The key pain will be felt in wider global deployments where the RN will lack the ability to properly support Carrier Strike on a near permanent basis until the FSS enters service. Until this point its single point of failure will be a nearly 40 year old store ship which is held in reserve and for whom regeneration out of reserve will be lengthy and costly and reliant on sailors who don’t currently exist to deliver.</p><p>The risk is that if Ministers want to continue to pursue a ‘Global Britain’ narrative and send large Royal Navy task forces globally then, for some years to come, the ships and support does not exist to do this properly. While the RN can send ships out on diplomatic deployments, there is a significant capability difference between a carrier strike group without tanker and/or store ship and one that arrives with this indigenous capability. Without this, the RN will struggle to deliver a global ability to project power without being wholly reliant on friendly ports in a storm.</p><p>To give a sense of how challenging this is and how calamitous the collapse of the RFA over the last 15 years has been for British maritime power, in the over 100 year history of the RFA, there has never been a time when the RFA could not provide at least one active store ship when needed to support Royal Navy operations. Right now, and until 2025, the RN is completely reliant on foreign navies for support at sea outside of home waters for fuel and stores, and could not deploy a carrier strike group beyond the NATO area without significant foreign assistance. This is the first time in the history of the Royal Navy in centuries that it will be reliant on the goodwill of others to enable it to be ‘ready to fight tonight’. The time has sadly come to ask ‘Is “the Company” a going concern'?</p><p><br /></p><p>(All images in article are MOD Crown Copyright)</p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-89941974719492968382024-01-12T19:29:00.004+00:002024-01-12T19:29:41.631+00:00Initial Thoughts on Yemen Airstrikes<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The Royal Air Force has conducted air strikes in Yemen as
part of wider international efforts to disrupt the Iranian backed Houthi rebels
from attacking international shipping. These strikes were a proportionate and
necessary response to needless provocation that threatened wider global economic
stability. Much will be written over the coming days on this, but it is worth noting
some immediate thoughts and reactions.<o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1px_BUl8uWqHp3dCfUe2uHp89r9YhpDoBkw7KT1fsE62lw4hyFlrSTrqt1RO0LL7Wv5y7G4xJluYgUy1E-sVnNOoNpUiBDaYHE5IQJZpj_bSc1QgKYkO5SZIPT9Sx2jdfZ1zJ4_OL0S1NE3Y-y_nOQrCfjtQgqzk-HG43KBCwTcKho9bB3m78eK2lyDNI/s1000/Typhoon.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="666" data-original-width="1000" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1px_BUl8uWqHp3dCfUe2uHp89r9YhpDoBkw7KT1fsE62lw4hyFlrSTrqt1RO0LL7Wv5y7G4xJluYgUy1E-sVnNOoNpUiBDaYHE5IQJZpj_bSc1QgKYkO5SZIPT9Sx2jdfZ1zJ4_OL0S1NE3Y-y_nOQrCfjtQgqzk-HG43KBCwTcKho9bB3m78eK2lyDNI/s320/Typhoon.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The first is that these strikes were necessary only because
the Houthis had failed to respond to international pressure to cease their
attacks. If anything the international community had demonstrated significant
restraint since Nov 19, when the first attacks were launched. Despite this, and
the increasing presence of western naval assets to defend their maritime and
trade interests, they have persisted in launching unwarranted attacks on both commercial
and military shipping. There is no excuse or justification for firing anti-ship
missiles, ballistic missiles and drones at merchant ships undertaking innocent passage.
Many innocent sailors’ lives have been put at risk as a result and it is lucky
that no ships have been lost. To continue to fire on Western warships protecting
these vessels is also an astonishingly foolish and aggressive act that was unnecessary.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Others will say that this attack has been pointless and that
the Yemenis can reequip from Iran. Yes, they probably can, and will, over time.
But the calculation has now changed. They can no longer fire with impunity, and
the West has laid down a marker that it will disrupt and deny their assets if
it deems appropriate. The Houthi and their Iranian allies will now be disrupted,
needing time to rearm, rebuild and prepare for new attacks. Their current sites
are compromised, and they will have to accept trade offs between using known
and targetable sites, and less capable new facilities that may also be found
and destroyed. They will need to decide if it is worth the cost and hassle of
disruption and destruction to continue firing, or if holding back may be a
better course of action.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Iranians will also have seen a clear message from the
West that there are lines and that if crossed, they will retaliate. Drawing boundaries
and policing them is a key part of deterrence, and the West has made clear it
will act. The Iranian regime will need to assess if the value of the Houthi
being provided with weapons and technology remains worth the price, they need
to pay to support them. Whatever they decide, they do so in the knowledge that
they cannot act with impunity. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For the military this response highlights several issues. Firstly,
the importance of building diplomatic alliances for airpower. These strikes
could not have occurred without diplomatic approval for overflight of airspace,
which points to a concerted diplomatic push and relationship building. In turn
this reminds us of the importance of diplomacy and the presence of embassies
and high-level engagement that helps persuade a nation to authorise overflights
of armed aircraft through their airspace.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The RAF have also demonstrated the importance of airpower in
its reach and impact, and the critical value of RAF Akrotiri as a base for
British and wider interests. This facility, long the home of operations more
widely in the Eastern Med remains a site of enormous strategic value, and along
with Gibraltar, one of the two sovereign British runways in the Med. The
continued value of Akrotiri as a hub for operations cannot be overstated, nor
its importance to both the UK and our allies. Providing a sovereign site that can
host aircraft, support logistics and munitions resupply and provide a flexible
response to a variety of operations is crucial. The strikes also remind us of
the importance of the RAF Typhoon fleet and its versatility in operating in the
region. Long deployed on Op SHADER from Cyprus, the Typhoon has shown itself an
agile and resilient platform that can support operations across the wider
Middle East. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Typhoon force has been
hard worked in recent years, often out of the wider limelight, but it is
proving itself a key asset.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There are some who will feel that a carrier group should
have been deployed instead. The author respectfully disagrees here – this is a
problem that was sorted by air power from a well-equipped location, and it is
hard to see what the F35 could have added that wasn’t already delivered by the
Typhoon. Sending a carrier may have made a political statement, but there are
serious questions as to whether you’d want yet another carrier operating in the
Red Sea, which is a cramped water space and deconflicting QE from her US Navy
cousins in air operations could have been challenging. If instead you operated
from the Eastern Med, the question becomes, why not just use Cyprus? Add in the
impact on wider programmes and delivering carrier airpower for the long haul
and the case, right now, for a Royal Navy carrier in the region becomes relatively
weak. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Finally, this operation reminds us of the importance of sea
power and maritime trade to British and American national policy. Iran has
attempted through proxies to deny freedom of passage to merchant shipping and
turn a key waterway that powers the global economy into a free fire zone. The
UK and US have taken significant steps to demonstrate that both air and sea
power will be used appropriately to ensure freedom of passage. Other nations
will probably draw reasonable conclusions as to the extent to which the West is
prepared to protect its interests in this space, and look at their own maritime
disputes accordingly.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Few people want to see violence inflicted on others, and
very few people actively want to send the military into action without good
cause. But it is hard to think of a better or more just cause here than
removing the ability of dangerous actors to threaten global trade and security.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There will be some who see the Wests
response as warmongering or pointless. It is not. You have to ask at what point
would they have supported military action – when the first sailor was killed,
the first ship sunk, the first warship damaged or sunk? How many innocent sailors
would they judge an acceptable price to avoid retaliation? The wider costs too
must be remembered – these attacks have been having a damaging effect on Egypt’s
economy, hurting countless people who rely on the Suez canal and its associated
incomes for their living. Closer to home we would (and may yet) see prices rise
as maritime insurance costs increase, fuel costs for longer passages bite and
disruption to supply chains. In a cost of living crisis, is it acceptable for
people in the UK to be poorer and out of work to avoid entanglements in Yemen? Had
the Houthis heeded the very clear demands of the West to halt attacking
innocent shipping then this could have been avoided, but instead they chose a
path of needless confrontation and escalation. This subtlety will be lost on
the usual crowds who will somehow see this as the fault entirely of the West, but
it is hard to think of a more clear cut and legitimate case for action than
exercising the right to self-defence against a hostile regime trying to kill innocent
sailors for its own political ends.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-40783705026402193012024-01-11T21:25:00.001+00:002024-01-11T21:25:04.454+00:00The Modern Press Gang - LinkedIn and the Royal Navy<p> </p><p>The Royal Navy has resorted to a new form of digital press gang to recruit Admirals, according to recent media reports. Rather than rely on the old fashioned system of appointing someone to a post, the RN has instead turned to LinkedIn to try to find a suitably qualified ex service person to become the next Director Submarines as a Rear Admiral. This is according to various commentators a bad thing or a ‘disgrace’ and even a boon to Russian intelligence. Is this something we should worry about, or is this a non-story?</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi01ehdSuhOzw0I98fTvYMw-bxdx0JcCk1kLQVt1luMPt-899NqGVbtEVWH-WOxG6SXQB4IwChHxqK095htXJsrzNtPBgvmY-Ltvm2rMbvNCNHoz6Cb2Gs20Wn1Od0P7cpXSwTI-6mfyjKBJEuXGs-azU6AEYydA497GlQyaalx1l51CQkWGCk9eHy0mj_4/s1021/astuteclassgeneric.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="580" data-original-width="1021" height="182" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi01ehdSuhOzw0I98fTvYMw-bxdx0JcCk1kLQVt1luMPt-899NqGVbtEVWH-WOxG6SXQB4IwChHxqK095htXJsrzNtPBgvmY-Ltvm2rMbvNCNHoz6Cb2Gs20Wn1Od0P7cpXSwTI-6mfyjKBJEuXGs-azU6AEYydA497GlQyaalx1l51CQkWGCk9eHy0mj_4/s320/astuteclassgeneric.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p><br /></p><p>There is some important context here that many reports have missed, which is around how the Royal Navy manages careers. Up until the rank of Commander, Officers are moved to different appointments, usually on a roughly two-yearly basis. They have their careers managed for them and work with their career manager to identify the best role to develop their skills and which meets the needs of their branch career stream and wider Service requirements – for example a junior warfare officer can expect to spend a lot of time at sea or on professional training courses like the PWO course, while a logistician will do a Charge Course then go to sea as head of logistics on a major warship. This is a pattern that has existed for centuries.</p><p>At the rank of Captain and above, it all gets a bit more confusing. In recent years Captains and Commodores have joined the system usually applied to Admirals of ensuring that after a certain period of time (6 years for a Captain), they must apply for a post, and if they don’t get one, then they leave the Service. This can result in situations arising where good officers run out of road as the Service has no posts to offer them, or candidates from another Service take it instead.</p><p>The result is a system which has benefits and disadvantages. It is a good idea to incentivise people to look to manage their careers and work out what roles they want to fill, as happens in wider government. The flip side is that it introduces a level of uncertainty in the mid-late senior career phase which can be unsettling – if you know you are only 2 years away from potentially losing your job, do you focus on the job you’re doing or look to get out into a role that pays the mortgage and school/university tuition fees? The system in theory produces a crop of ever more competitive and capable people as only the best promote and move up, and deadwood is ruthlessly culled, but how many good people leave early rather than put up with this?</p><p>In this case the media are reporting that no suitable candidates were found who met the pre-requisites for the job – which according to the press required someone with submarine command experience. The challenge the RN has faced is finding a suitably skilled and qualified individual who wants to apply for the role now, and who can see a credible pathway for their career beyond this point. It could be, hypothetically, that people didn’t apply because they didn’t want the job – or because it may be their dream job but they’re not ready to go for it now, and didn’t want to do a job that having taken it would result in their potentially leaving the RN at the end of their time. The downside of empowering officers to apply for roles to fill is that they have a vote, and if you can’t make a role attractive, and you apply stringent criteria for applicants to meet, then you’re in trouble if none of the pool of qualified applicants apply for it. </p><p>People are blaming the Royal Navy for failing to manage the officer talent pool appropriately and suggesting that the Service is at fault for failing to find a suitable 2*. The challenge with this is that unless you return to a much more directed series of career appointing, allowing people to see out their time (or at least offer a series of linked roles), you cannot force people to apply for a job they don’t want to do. If you push the issue, then they’ll probably leave anyway, leaving you with two vacancies to fill! So how has the RN chosen to handle this? By adopting a genuinely innovative (for the Royal Navy) move to open the role up to external applicants, and in turn recruiting via LinkedIn for the post. This makes sense for several reasons.</p><p>Firstly there are plenty of ex RN submariners out there who have passed Perisher, but who have left the Service. They left at different times and for different reasons, be it good or bad. There will be some who loved their time in the Service, but would never go back, while others may still have an itch that needs to be scratched. Most of them will have gone on to jobs where they will have excelled – anyone capable of commanding a nuclear attack submarine in cold waters, dodging ‘Icebergs’ and listening for ‘magma displacement’ is likely to be capable of achieving great things in whatever career field they choose. There will be some out there who have done well in business and acquired a range of skills and experience that would be well suited to taking on a 2* role. They would return to the Service and bring both the credibility of being part of the Submarine Service, and bring industry experience too. Bringing in someone like this is a great way to introduce fresh thinking and help ensure the system is fit for purpose.</p><p>It is important to realise that senior officers are required to demonstrate skills of wider strategic leadership and management. They need to show they can run a complex portfolio of programmes, support operations and manage budgets of hundreds of millions of pounds. They need to work at a strategic level, driving their many different business areas forward in pursuit of a shared goal, and being able to work across different strands, spotting the common threads and ensuring the organisation delivers. While ‘speaking matelot’ is helpful, it is not essential to be a full time sailor to do many of these jobs – what matters is the leadership skills you possess and the credibility to operate and run a major organisation. These are skills that can as easily be acquired outside in the private sector as in it.</p><p>Using LinkedIn also seems a very sensible idea. It is a valuable recruitment platform used by most large industries and companies to recruit staff in senior roles. The majority of professional job hunters will be on the site looking for roles and understanding the market. For example, the author found one of his most challenging and fascinating private sector roles by spotting a chance advert on LinkedIn that got his attention. There are also a lot of ex-military on LinkedIn who will see the advert and potentially forward it on, or apply themselves. It makes complete sense as a recruiter to target the sites where your audience is going to be, rather than placing an advert in the Times saying “Men Wanted for hazardous journey…” (or words to that effect).</p><p>If anything this appointment should be used to herald a far more routine use of LinkedIn to encourage the best talent to return to the fold later in their career. Recent Defence Reviews have been heavy on emphasising the rise of adaptable careers, seeing personnel move regular – reserve – industry and back again, and this is a good test of this. If you insist on running a career structure that is adamant that someone can only be in a senior role towards the end of their career because they’ve been in your organisation for 25-30 years, then all you do is promote the tiny number of talented people who you manage to retain for this time, and accept some more average / deadwood may need to be promoted as there is no one else left. This may sound harsh but if you won’t let fresh talent in at senior levels, you can only work with the materials you have to hand.</p><p>By opening to bringing externals in, this signals to those who leave that the door is open again later in their career. This doesn’t mean that any old person can do the job – they’ll need to have shown a similar level of career prowess and success as if they’d stayed in the Service. It also doesn’t mean that someone won’t be qualified to do the job compared to staying in – if you look at the typical career plot at the OF5/1* level, this is increasingly about taking on leadership and responsibility for delivery at a more strategic level, versus being on the bridge of a warship commanding a fight. Even then, the postholder will have a good team of experts around them whose job it is is to ensure that the boss knows what is going on and is properly briefed – because that’s what already happens with in service senior officers who find themselves with large portfolios and finite time.</p><p>Hopefully the RN will go one step further and join with the Civil Service in opening up all 1* and above jobs for open competition. You can set clear criteria that the post holder needs to meet to be considered for the role, but if you really want to bring the best possible talent in to lead UK defence, why not invite people to apply? The Danes did this in house for their CDS and ended up appointing a Lieutenant Colonel as a 4* officer. Why can’t the UK be open to fresh thinking and encourage open applications from people?</p><p>There will almost certainly be readers now choking with apoplexy at this idea, but its already happening – the RFA has advertised for its next Commodore via Civil Service jobs, which is a critical appointment to be filled. No one is suggesting that you’ll see totally inexperienced people fill the jobs either – you can set criteria like ‘prior command of submarines’ or ‘post PWO course’ as a useful filter to sift out timewasters. If this move was adopted more widely, it may lead to many people otherwise lost to Defence to genuinely think about coming back at different points in their career, dipping in and out as they see fit. It would make a massive difference to the military in terms of gapping if, for example, people could rejoin at a more senior level with their civvy qualifications recognised. This already happens to a degree with some junior ranks, but why not let an excellent Lieutenant Commander who left the RN because they wanted a change, rejoin as a full Captain in a specific role? The blood chit system means that they’re not bed blocking someone else from promotion, as if they don’t measure up, they’ll leave again soon enough when they can’t get a post.</p><p>There is a genuinely exciting opportunity here to embrace modern career patterns and see this as a chance to make people not see leaving as a binary choice. It could, if used sensibly, revolutionise staffing for the military. This is a chance to be seized, not dismissed because it doesn’t align with a 19th century career structure that insists that direct entry is the only way to go. The irony of course is that those who are adamant that rejoiners are a risk due to their lack of a career in the service ignore that resettlement training for the military is designed to land people with no prior sector experience into well paid private sector roles on the basis of their prior military skills and leadership experience. Surely its time this one way system evolved into a two way street?</p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-51970416734892215852024-01-05T22:15:00.004+00:002024-01-05T22:33:06.809+00:00Does It Make Sense to Pay Off Frigates and LPDs? Possibly... <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">In an ‘inspired’ leak that seems to fit the Yes Minister definition
of a ‘Confidential Security Briefing’, the <a href="https://t.co/NVMNgIhmso">Daily Telegraph</a> is reporting that
the Royal Navy is to pay off two Type 23 frigates, HMS ARGYLL and WESTMINSTER
early in order to find crew for the Type 26 frigates. Assuming this is true,
this means that since 2010 the Royal Navy escort fleet will have been cut by
40%. Meanwhile <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/4d0e2a23-8193-4d8c-9a69-8c68456b9b47?shareToken=9b87e0ba558525c8cc208f335ba47089">the Times</a> is reporting that the Royal Navy will mothball both LPD’s
and no longer have an active amphibious assault ship command platform. This
represents a 100% cut to the active assault ship force. The reasons given in
both cases seem to boil down to the line that this is about providing sailors
to crew the Type 26 frigate. It doesn’t seem to be linked to the rumoured huge
budgetary challenges facing the MOD this financial year, which could equally be
responsible for this decision. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There are different ways that this information can be
interpreted depending on how you look at it. For starters we need to ask the
question, why these two ships? The Type 23 force is elderly, with the ships
intended for an original 18-year life span, worked hard in the North Atlantic
and replaced quickly. They have all been extended in service for up to twice
their original design life, while repeated delays to order the Type 26 has
meant they are working far harder, and far longer than ever anticipated.<o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNIdu0PY7s3jLzP8oLROLgB3oG-leFFmBwM34cGinF6jBMSTiRFYnWGH9lNQ-rlmWpXzq2ItYzPs_Ghda7EPkdqlFOcdF30GMLP6NxQeO7O7yxBwu7cr79Caj1XVUdDaXH-8c39Q6DSowcNKWc8d7QE0va-_DteusEqJiGO86B0Tq3HRiMMJIvc8xRUQWR/s1200/45170520.jpg.iCfhgK7dMWATAA.sAglcG2hN3.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNIdu0PY7s3jLzP8oLROLgB3oG-leFFmBwM34cGinF6jBMSTiRFYnWGH9lNQ-rlmWpXzq2ItYzPs_Ghda7EPkdqlFOcdF30GMLP6NxQeO7O7yxBwu7cr79Caj1XVUdDaXH-8c39Q6DSowcNKWc8d7QE0va-_DteusEqJiGO86B0Tq3HRiMMJIvc8xRUQWR/s320/45170520.jpg.iCfhgK7dMWATAA.sAglcG2hN3.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">These are ships designed 40 years ago, with the original
Type 23 design dating back to the early 1980s. It is no exaggeration to say that
there is almost certainly no one left in active regular service who was serving
when the Type 23 design was first conceived. This means the design reflects the
1980s equipment and capabilities and standards – be it in the structure of the
messes (large mess decks for junior sailors) or the internal wiring and machinery.
While still capable, be in no doubt that these are elderly ships with all the
many challenges that this brings. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To
make up for the many and varied delays to the Type 26, the RN has funded life
extension work to the force for some years, fitting new missiles, guns and sonar
equipment over time. The modern Type 23 is a far cry from its original design
in equipment and capability, but it is still at its heart a 1980s warship.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">WESTMINSTER had gone into refit in 2022 to begin the process
of extending her life out to the late 2020s. The refit for WESTMINSTER would
have cost around £100m to provide a further 4-5 years of service. while HMS
ARGYLL had undergone the life extension process which would have seen a planned
decommissioning in the late 2020s (the precise dates are not clear anymore due
to the ‘odd’ MOD decision to currently no longer provide this information on
the grounds of operational security). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The LPD force by contrast is in a different position. The
two ships ALBION and BULWARK were built to replace the venerable FEARLESS class
in the mid 2000s. For most of their career one has been in reserve while the
other has been active, the same pattern as occurred with FEARLESS and INTREPID,
where the latter spent years in increasingly poor state in reserve. The timing
for this decision makes sense operationally as ALBION has come to the end of
her commission and was due to pay off into reserve, while BULWARK is still being
regenerated in refit and hasn’t yet gone to sea. It would be possible to put
both ships in reserve and free up a reasonable amount of sailors in the
process. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The question is what is the impact on the fleet itself?
Currently the RN probably has a requirement for 19 escort ships – ‘probably’ is
used as the MOD has refused to provide a statement on target force numbers in
the two most recent Defence Reviews, so this is an assessment based on the 2015
Defence Review. That we have to rely on a near decade old defence review to
guess how many escorts the RN plans to have speaks volumes for the manner in
which the MOD engages with the taxpayer. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Of those 19 ships, currently there are only 17 in service –
11 Type 23 frigates and 6 Type 45 destroyers. Two Type 23 frigates were paid
off early as a savings measure under the 2021 Defence Review. There is a stated
desire to grow the force, with 8 Type 26 and 5 Type 31 frigates under construction
or on contract at present, which if delivered in full would leave to an RN of
19 escorts again in about 7-9 years’ time. Beyond this there is an assumption
that the so-called ‘Type 32’ would be built to grow the escort fleet into the
early 20s, although nothing formal has ever been stated or committed to. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In the short term the loss of both ships is unlikely to
cause significant pain to the fleet. ARGYLL is the general patrol version of
the Type 23, with scaled back capabilities and used for more generic patrol duties
in usually lower risk areas. WESTMINSTER is an ASW hull, but will not have been programmed for any
activity until at least the mid-2020s anyway due to her refit, so in terms of
operational ships at sea, this loss won’t be felt until then. ARGYLLs loss will
depend on her programme, but it will be felt in terms of one less hull able to
carry out general purpose patrol work in areas where a RIVER class is not
sufficient. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The bigger risk is likely to be for HMS LANCASTER and IRON DUKE, as they will be the last of the ‘GP’ Type 23 frigates and an orphan sub type. The RN
historically rarely keeps orphan units running for long due to the higher costs
of keeping them going, much like HMS SHEFFIELD and COVENTRY were quickly
disposed of in the early 2000s when the other Batch 2 Type 22s were paid off under
the 1998 SDR. It would seem a safe bet that if these two go, LANCASTER will be
paid off when she returns home from the Gulf in the next year or two. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The real risk to this decision is not in the next couple of
years, but in the mid-late 2020s. The loss of these hulls now, materially
fragile as they may be and elderly as they are reducing the mass of ships that
can be relied on if the Type 31 is late. At the moment the theory is that these
ships will be replaced by the Type 31, while the Type 26 will replace the 7 ASW
variants. If this happens as planned, and Type 31 delivers then we can breathe
a sigh of relief as highly capable new ships start to enter the water, complete
trials and can be programmed for fleet time within the next 3-4 years. If there
is a delay though then the RN has run out of road and will find itself covering
a period of gaps for several years where there is neither a T23 or a T31 able
to meet the tasking requirement. This is where the pain will be felt – fewer hulls
meaning fewer chances either to operationally use ships or do trips that may be
good for morale (e.g. West Indies Guardship).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The impact of the LPDs going into reserve is harder to judge.
Both ships are command platforms first, optimised to fill a role of landing a
Brigade sized force as part of a wider amphibious group, reflecting the
doctrine of the mid 2000s which saw the UK acquire both these ships and four LSDs
for use in the amphibious space as well as an LPH. For a brief period in the
mid – late 2000s the UK had the worlds second most capable amphibious force
after the USA. Today though changing views on the feasibility of amphibious
operations and the reality that the UK (and allies) do not see a future in which
throwing marines over a beach from a landing ship is a likely outcome means the
LPDs were increasingly in search of a relevant role that justified their crew
and costs. The RN has long seen them as less relevant to the sort of amphibious
operations that it sees the Royal Marines doing (small raiding forces versus D-Day
style landings). In paying them both off into reserve, the RN loses one ship at
sea, but in terms of operational impact, it will be fairly limited. But when
added to the wider pattern of loss of the LPH without replacement, and the fact
that only one, potentially two BAY class will be available for amphibious
roles, it will leave the UK with less amphibious capability than Australia,
France or the Netherlands. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgreXrHysmUdyZTBUqEU71NFV_t2vYfQar_EfEppBT6Ylxb2zGYo2qENhZGMQR3x5cC-MDSoZDgL5LrI_5q0mKlZbaSyKSomYdMMOY-dYYkMZUjZNrgDDpd_IbVvGjCcmcxhM6zG_JWoUm39dKsVXu6ydKnZz5ygFsOBpwW81_myDR9GbunmKDxhtmBEibt/s1200/MU180001131.jpg.iCfi56fdMWATAA.R5Zna-SGih.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgreXrHysmUdyZTBUqEU71NFV_t2vYfQar_EfEppBT6Ylxb2zGYo2qENhZGMQR3x5cC-MDSoZDgL5LrI_5q0mKlZbaSyKSomYdMMOY-dYYkMZUjZNrgDDpd_IbVvGjCcmcxhM6zG_JWoUm39dKsVXu6ydKnZz5ygFsOBpwW81_myDR9GbunmKDxhtmBEibt/s320/MU180001131.jpg.iCfi56fdMWATAA.R5Zna-SGih.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span face=""Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">People will ask why these ships cannot be put into mothballs
and held in reserve if needed. That’s a reasonable question, but sadly the
answer is that it makes no sense to do so. Putting ships into reserve properly
is an expensive and time-consuming process involving refits, regular
maintenance and assigning of crews to make sure the ships can be brought out
when needed. There is an excellent file in the National Archives as part of the
Options for Change collection which showed that the RN seriously looked at this
as an option in the early 1990s to maintain escort numbers, but the detailed
analysis proved that it was an extremely costly option that would save very
little money and would be a real challenge to deliver properly working ships in
a crisis – the file looked at a report analysing reactivating the Type 81s in
the Falklands War which highlighted how inefficient it would be. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The challenge is that these ships need a lot of work to keep
them safe for use at sea. WESTMINSTER will not be in any state to go into reserve
without a major refit to put back all the equipment that was ripped off her in
preparation for a refit. Spending money on a ship refit only for the ship never
to go to sea again isn’t ideal during a public spending squeeze. If you look at
the images regularly posted of MONMOUTH and MONTROSE rotting out on the trots
in Portsmouth, you’ll see how quickly material decay sets in, and how ships
left out without regular TLC decay. Just look at the appalling material state
of HMS BRISTOL, now awaiting the scrapyard, and how quickly she has decayed far
beyond the point of no return. The painful truth is that putting these ships
into mothballs would save little and would be a false economy, for they would
quickly become little more than floating piles of scrap. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For the LPD’s both are likely to be maintained in reserve
requiring both crew and support. This means in theory they could be pulled out
of mothballs, but as the efforts to bring BULWARK out and regenerate her have
shown, this is a lengthy process that will take months if not years to do. In
reality even if maintained in reserve, it will essentially be for show only as
it is impossible to envisage any circumstances where these ships sail under the
White Ensign again – this is to all intents the end of the road for the LPD in
Royal Navy service. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One aspect of the story that caused Humphrey to raise his eyebrows
quizzically was the confident assertion from the source that the crews would be
diverted onto the Type 26. This is, to put it politely, an exercise in spinning
the truth akin to suggesting the Norman invasion was merely a setback for the
Anglo-Saxons… There is no doubt that the RN has a clear plan on how to migrate
crews off each paying off ship and then redistribute people across the fleet to
generate a crew for the new ships. It’s been in the business of doing this sort
of resource management for centuries. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">But HMS GLASGOW is unlikely to enter sea trials or fleet
service for several years yet, meaning that she doesn’t need a full ships
company now. Also, HMS WESTMINSTER is to all intents a ‘dead ship’ having not
been to sea since 2022 and is effectively a hulk. There is no real ships
company to disband and more pertinently, there would have been no need to generate
a ships company for a couple of years till she started to emerge from refit. The
only crew being freed up immediately would be those from ARGYLL while drafters
and appointers would be freed of worrying about how to find a crew in due
course for WESTMINSTER. To put it politely, it is a work of fiction by the source
to suggest that paying these ships off is essential for the Royal Navy to crew
Type 26 now, because the Type 26 isn’t yet ready for a crew. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is no doubt that the RN is in deeply challenging
waters when it comes to people numbers. <a href="https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2023/11/too-few-people-for-too-many-ships.html">Recent reports </a>indicating both recruitment
challenges and an increase in unplanned outflow point to the fact that the
workforce is struggling to meet the demands placed on it. Its not possible to quickly
fix this issue either, for no matter how many people join, it will still take
10-15 years to get the right numbers of properly trained, qualified and
experienced senior rates and officers into the roles where shortfalls are occurring.
This is a problem that will take decades to properly fix. The challenge is that
this shortfall of people seems to sum up the RN experience since WW2 – namely an
inability to properly manage the workforce strategically, a failure to retain
skilled people and a shortfall of crews leading to too many ships being paid
off early due to lack of people to sail them.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This may sound harsh but at times the author does question
whether the RN really should use the strapline about ‘world class people
management’ that it throws around a lot. A cynic would argue that the story of
the RN since 1945 is one of avoidable decline due to a failure of the Admiralty
to properly manage the workforce or consider genuinely radical changes to doing
business. When you look at the way that so much of the career plot, management
and approach to doing business is often so unchanged, one wonders whether people
are banging their heads on the desk and shouting ‘why does this keep happening
to us if we keep doing what we’ve always done’. Given we’re likely about to see
paying off of roughly 10% of the surface escort fleet due in part to a failure to
recruit and retain the right people, has the time not come to actually be
radical and try new things given that the current system has, in the eyes of
some, been systematically destroying the RN from the inside for almost 80
years? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This may sound blunt and harsh but there is an element of
truth to the fact that if the RN recognises it has a people retention problem,
particularly for highly skilled technical trades, (as has been the case since
the 1940s) then perhaps the problem is not the people, but the system and how
it employs them? Has the time come to actually think outside the box and try
something new, rather than keep doing what they’ve always done and wonder if
eventually the workforce will stop leaving? There is a risk that in the public
eye the responsibility for the decline of the Royal Navy in pure numbers terms
owes much to anyone but the Royal Navy. The usual answer on social media is to
blame the politicians, or the contractors or the Treasury – but there is a
reluctance to ask if the problem lies closer to home. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Speaking to friends serving in the regular RN at a variety
of ranks and rates, the author is struck by the growing sense of despondency
that so many of them feel at the moment. Many people who would be described as ‘lifers’
in a previous generation are now actively applying for jobs outside – they’ve had
enough. Their sense at the mid level is that they’re in an organisation that feels
in terminal decline and that there is no chance of their being able to arrest
this change or be empowered to deliver it. As one serving friend bluntly put it,
‘<i>we’ve spent our entire careers being told about this bright future ahead of
us in the RN, if we get past this temporary blip. The problem is the bright
future has never materialised’</i>. There is both sadness and resignation in
this statement, a sense that they no longer believe the statements issued about
the great future ahead when all around them they see ships being scrapped and
financial pressures biting. It must be hard to stay positive when throughout
your career you’ve been told by seniors that the Royal Navy is a growing navy,
only to see it get smaller year on year. Why stay when the organisation seems
set to collapse? Learning through the media that the RN sees paying off two
escorts and two capital ships as the only way to secure crew for ships that
have been in the build programme for, literally, decades, indicates just how
badly things are going.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1f7vp3u-ICfzN6kjpMD_pgqbKirlEDxZk-vmDEpfYQDBypeXQxGPfqNagrtij5NQB73c2pZKcpvRyeELASr48Wh0xfZvPqp7VG0ZzFqWoxrwZCpFfBDvVpGb3s1PCTrClu8xhlJCoQZtptfESZlKcMf-JXRUQPEMA38DUxnVPRfUAc3cPzrGNEph7Pgd_/s1200/FRPUW-20211014-BR0033-033.jpg.iCetwqndMWATAA.43iLeaP5rw.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="818" data-original-width="1200" height="218" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1f7vp3u-ICfzN6kjpMD_pgqbKirlEDxZk-vmDEpfYQDBypeXQxGPfqNagrtij5NQB73c2pZKcpvRyeELASr48Wh0xfZvPqp7VG0ZzFqWoxrwZCpFfBDvVpGb3s1PCTrClu8xhlJCoQZtptfESZlKcMf-JXRUQPEMA38DUxnVPRfUAc3cPzrGNEph7Pgd_/s320/FRPUW-20211014-BR0033-033.jpg.iCetwqndMWATAA.43iLeaP5rw.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span face=""Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Is it really as bad as it all seems to some? Its genuinely
hard to tell. There is an argument to be made that the RN is actually coming to
the end of a challenging period and that we’ll shortly see new escorts, support
ships, submarines and autonomous vessels enter service. There is also a good
case to be made that the nature of escort ships is changing and that we are on
the cusp of a move to a very different way of operating as autonomous vessels
take much greater prominence – the days of needing large, crewed ships at sea
may soon pass as robotic technology and drones take on many different roles.
Within 20—30 years the RN may well look a massively different force, where
crewed surface ships are few but the platforms, sensors, intelligence and firepower
provided by the autonomous force are far greater than we have now. Is it better
to embrace these changes and make the most of them, or hold back and cling to
the familiar? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also fair to say that the RN is not alone in having older
ships that are money pits. Look at the US Navy which is desperate to rid itself
of the legacy Aegis cruisers that are now very old and incredibly fragile. The
USN would dearly love to free up resources to spend on new technology and other
platforms, but politics have made this far harder than it should be. There will
be other NATO navies also looking on at the future and realising that significant
shifts are required, but lacking in the certainty of how and when to make this transition.
There is an opportunity here for the RN to be a genuine global leader, embracing
both the change and the opportunities for influence (and technology export opportunities)
that this provides. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If we look to the RN of the mid 2020s then objectively in
some quarters it is in good shape. The arrival of both carriers is to be welcomed,
while the new TIDE tankers are also hugely useful. The SSN force is slowly regenerating
and more A boats are coming on line while the return of VANGUARD will hopefully
ease pressure on the SSBN force. The Mine Warfare force is in transition and will
soon look radically different, but will also be far more effective than before
with new technology taking ‘the (wo)man out the minefield’. The escort fleet
too has a bright future with Type 26 and 31 having the potential to be game
changers. But<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the RN needs to get them
in service soon and ensure they work – the arrival of HMS VENTURER & GLASGOW
as sea going vessels will not, of itself, ease these challenges for she will
need to do extensive first of class trials and be ready for use. The remaining
escort fleet of likely 14 escorts (6 Type 45s and 7-8 Type 23s, assuming
LANCASTER and/or IRON DUKE pays off too) will be worked very hard, and the risk is that this
causes even more people to leave. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Some will probably suggest that the carrier should be paid
off to cover the crew shortfalls, but this is misleading. The carrier crew complement
is vastly different to the T23 and wouldn’t solve the problems of finding crew.
It is easy to forget that while on paper the RN is about 30,000 strong, only
half of these are general service personnel, the rest being submariners, Royal
Marines or Fleet Air Arm. The carrier is a vital part of the future force and
to lose this to keep a pair of elderly escort ships and an LPD at sea seems a poor
trade. But equally it is easy to understand why people feel concerned that the
RN seems to have bet the farm on getting two carriers and in the process shrunk
by a quarter in the same timeframe.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To understand the scale of the change the RN has seen in
recent years, it is worth comparing and contrasting the size of the active Royal
Navy today if these cuts are applied versus 15 years ago in 2009. This rough
figure does not include ships in build or on trials in either year. In very rough
numbers the Royal Navy and RFA of today is roughly a quarter smaller than it
was 15 years ago. This is very rough ‘wikipedia’ reporting so should be seen as
a broad headmark rather than highly detailed analysis. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTable15Grid5DarkAccent5" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-padding-alt: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-yfti-tbllook: 1184;">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-firstrow: yes; mso-yfti-irow: -1; mso-yfti-lastfirstrow: yes;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-right: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 5;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Ship Type<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 1;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">2009 Active<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 1;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">2024 Active <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-left: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 1;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Approx % Change<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 0;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">SSBN<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">4</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">4</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+0%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 1;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">SSN<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">8</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">5</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-30%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 2;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Carriers<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">2</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">2</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+0%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 3;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">LPD<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">2</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">0</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-100%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 4;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">LPH<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">0</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-100%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 5;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Destroyers<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">8</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">6</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-25%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 6;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Frigates<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">17</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">9</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-45%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 7;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">OPVs<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">3</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">8</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+150%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 8;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">MCMVs<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">16</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">9</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-45%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 9;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Survey Ships<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">6</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">3</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-50%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 10;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">Inshore Patrol Vessels<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">18</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">18</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+0%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 11;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA LSD(A)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">4</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">3</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-25%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 12;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA Store Ships<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">4</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-75%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 13;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA Tankers<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">9</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">6</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-30%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 14;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA Repair Ship<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">0</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-100%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 15;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA Aviation
Training<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+0</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 16;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA MCMV Support<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">0</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+100%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 17;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 4;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">RFA Cable Support<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">0</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">1</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(222, 234, 246); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 51; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">+100%</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 18; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;">
<td style="background: rgb(91, 155, 213); border-top: none; border: 1pt solid white; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 97.2pt;" valign="top" width="130">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 68;"><b><span style="color: white; mso-themecolor: background1;">TOTAL<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><b><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">104</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 90.25pt;" valign="top" width="120">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><b><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">77</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
</td>
<td style="background: rgb(189, 214, 238); border-bottom: 1pt solid white; border-left: none; border-right: 1pt solid white; border-top: none; mso-background-themecolor: accent5; mso-background-themetint: 102; mso-border-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-bottom-themecolor: background1; mso-border-left-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-left-themecolor: background1; mso-border-right-themecolor: background1; mso-border-themecolor: background1; mso-border-top-alt: solid white .5pt; mso-border-top-themecolor: background1; padding: 0cm 5.4pt; width: 92.2pt;" valign="top" width="123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-yfti-cnfc: 64;"><b><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">-23%</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">When you look at numbers like this, it is easy to understand
why many may feel concerned about the state and capability of the fleet –
particularly given that many of the ships listed in 2009 are still in service, without
replacement today, including all of the frigates. Also many of them are not
active – for example 2 of the RFA’s 6 tankers are in reserve and have no chance
of ever going to sea again. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhaDvLMwmj3uHarUE3e_SCno3nubHhmP4LpC_nNaIClNQhoRwVyIDk_un2_VL7Oguay7LpEamMNf3qnr_5SikxiU-DxK_yoFI8VVbttNTUTzrE_urlxXJUjwcyAL44nCLIFFjSG8CsTcP2149jKjdI5nOwJF8TfKMOCFRq2QwQu8O17A8f3ucWXho0fSXMY/s1082/GDGsb0JWEAATc9O.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="850" data-original-width="1082" height="251" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhaDvLMwmj3uHarUE3e_SCno3nubHhmP4LpC_nNaIClNQhoRwVyIDk_un2_VL7Oguay7LpEamMNf3qnr_5SikxiU-DxK_yoFI8VVbttNTUTzrE_urlxXJUjwcyAL44nCLIFFjSG8CsTcP2149jKjdI5nOwJF8TfKMOCFRq2QwQu8O17A8f3ucWXho0fSXMY/s320/GDGsb0JWEAATc9O.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">RN Task group 1977</td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In 1980 it is said that during the infamous (but surprisingly
pragmatic and sensible) Nott Review, when the RN was looking at cutting itself
from 65 to 50 escorts, at least one Admiral said that this would not be Navy he’d
want his son to serve in. Today the fleet is roughly 75% smaller than this, and
yet the RN continues to shrink in size and capability. It is genuinely hard to
decide whether to be optimistic or more pessimistic about what this news means
for the RN. Deleting a pair of elderly frigates in poor condition to save money
and free up crew in due course rather than throw good after bad is probably a
good thing, but it will not solve short term challenges. The risk is that if
the MOD’s parlous financial position continues to worsen while staffing
challenges worsen, then things could get even worse. If the personnel position
improves and recruiting delivers more staff to the front line while retention challenges
ease, then this could be a passing phase with light at the end of the tunnel. On
balance this set of decisions is probably the right ‘least painful’ decision
the RN could take but coming on the back of pressures across the fleet, one is
left with the sense that good news is desperately overdue to show when the RN
has finally turned the corner of decline to embrace a very different future
ahead. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">When you look at a photo of the Springtrain deployment of 1977-78 and realise that in one photo it shows more seagoing frigates, tankers and
store ships than the Royal Navy and RFA have available right now in just one photo,
you realise how grim things look. While it is easy for outsiders to blame the
Politicians for taking decisions, they can only act on the options presented to
them by the military. These options are drawn up by military officers and staffed
through the military chain of command. That the RN feels it needs to pay ships
off to solve people and financial issues should be seen, at its heart, as an
outcome caused by the Royal Navy and its failure to sort its people management
out and not a politically inspired choice of spite taken by Ministers. The
decline and fall of the Royal Navy was ultimately caused by the Royal Navy personnel
who developed and presented these options as credible. That we are in this
position is due to plenty of good people doing the best they could with a bad
hand, but we cannot evade the fact that this is self-inflicted harm caused by a
failure to recruit and retain people – a problem that has not changed since
1945. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-11635166623959396962023-12-31T15:21:00.001+00:002023-12-31T15:21:06.865+00:00A textbook example of small gun gunboat diplomacy - HMS TRENT in Guyana<p><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">The Royal Navy patrol ship HMS TRENT has arrived in Guyana
for a routine port visit. The ship, which has recently arrived in the West
Indies after sailing from Gibraltar has already called in at Barbados, and judging
by her twitter feed also managed to enjoy a good Christmas at sea (hands to
bathe in the Caribbean anyone?). She has now conducted a port visit that has
made headlines due to the wider international situation. This has aroused both
the ire of the Venezuelan Government and the ire of legions of ‘armchair
admirals’ who continue their ongoing obsession with the fact that the Royal
Navy has patrol ships that don’t carry the firepower of a Frigate, and that
somehow <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the ship is a ‘sitting duck’. In
reality this is a situation which perfectly demonstrates both the
proportionality of gunboat diplomacy and the importance of scaled escalation. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhApPK9q5ol9PvpH-w4eRwVdTkM4vGXqBfCqqcu_EeShGQw15LHDa7UMxRTeo5wG5VtRYYEMi_M3KquGsLvcx7H1XQr3dAwcn-ctLpm0p96DbInz0TLkcQcK23XwD0L_2r6Q3lkwTuMufAiXuXxgXkBz0h189CDsUUmcj5VWAIexhZ4M5p9Yss_4jbb1zOb/s1200/45169616.jpg.iCf4xY_dMWATAA.rM8md3dFhW.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="721" data-original-width="1200" height="192" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhApPK9q5ol9PvpH-w4eRwVdTkM4vGXqBfCqqcu_EeShGQw15LHDa7UMxRTeo5wG5VtRYYEMi_M3KquGsLvcx7H1XQr3dAwcn-ctLpm0p96DbInz0TLkcQcK23XwD0L_2r6Q3lkwTuMufAiXuXxgXkBz0h189CDsUUmcj5VWAIexhZ4M5p9Yss_4jbb1zOb/s320/45169616.jpg.iCf4xY_dMWATAA.rM8md3dFhW.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Following a recent ‘referendum’ (of a highly questionable
nature) the Venezuelan regime is now claiming a significant proportion of Guyana
for its own territory. Ignoring that these claims have no basis in
international law or that they conveniently seem to cover areas of the country
that are potentially oil rich, this seems a flagrant attempt by one of the
worlds more despotic governments to shift attention away from its catastrophic
handling of the economy in recent years. Guyana, a former British colony and
member of the Commonwealth, by contrast is a small and relatively poor state,
with limited military forces and no credible way to defend its territory alone
against determined attack.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Amid the sabre rattling by Venezuela, the UK has taken the decision
to engage in a port visit to Guyana by HMS TRENT. While the visit is not
formally to do with the dispute, it is remarkably useful timing to have it
occur as a very visible symbol of British support. Naturally the Venezuelan
regime has responded with anger to this news, condemning the visit outright. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Port visits are a very powerful diplomatic tool when used
well. The decision to send a ship to visit a friendly port helps reiterate to
others the ongoing links between two nations and the positive relationship that
exists. In this case the visit enabled the UK to host the Commander of the Guyana
Defence Forces for a demonstration of the ships capabilities, supported by the
British High Commissioner, and doubtless led to discussions about future
opportunities for further defence and security related collaboration. In
addition it is the perfect chance to foster good working relationships and engage
in bilateral training opportunities. The visit was the perfect chance for the
Royal Navy to return to waters it has <a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2016/april/12/160412-hms-mersey-historic-visit-to-guyana">rarely
visited</a> in recent decades and help bolster bilateral relations.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The reason that TRENT was the right ship for the job is
because of her size and capability. Send too big a ship on a port visit and it
will look visually impressive, but be of limited relevance to the host nation –
Guyana has a very small <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>coastguard, the
flagship was the former RN RIVER class MCMV HMS ORWELL, but she is now
reportedly unserviceable. If the RN sent a Type 45 to visit, the scale of the
vessel and her capabilities would be far beyond anything the GDF operates, making
joint training of limited value. By contrast, sending a smaller ship at the same
rough level of capability as the Guyanan Coast Guard is far more valuable –
training can be relevant and appropriate, for example joint manoeuvres or practising
coast guard style drills. There is far more value in working at the same level
than in leaving your hosts impressed but unable to take meaningful lessons from
the experience. By working in partnership, you set the stage for future visits
that will take the defence relationship to the next level. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Some social media commentators have suggested that the RN
presence is pretty pitiful and that if the UK is doing gunboat diplomacy, it
should send a message to Venezuela using ‘real warships’. This is utter
nonsense. The whole point about defence engagement is that it is scaleable – by
sending a vessel of a type that permanently operates in the region you’ve set
the baseline for the relationship. It’s a reminder of interest and presence but
implicit in it is the message that the UK is interested in, and cares about,
Guyana. If you want to scale the presence up there are other options – for example
increasing the frequency of port visits, conducting joint exercises, bringing
in more exercises with the RAF and the British Army, seeing other partner
nations also visit and so on. Over time, if Venezuela continues to threaten or
move to more overtly aggressive responses, then the toolbox of responses can
change – for example, sending a larger frigate / destroyer, or in extremis
arranging for the deployment of a Carrier Strike Group to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>send a strong signal of concern. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The trick is to get the balance right – if, for example,
Whitehall decided to send the CSG now to steam for Guyana at best speed, it
would look visually impressive, but has set a high bar for future support and
leaves no escalation messaging. How would Venezuela know in future that the UK
was increasingly concerned if each time they did something, a carrier popped up
– or paradoxically, if your future engagement revolves around OPVS, does it signal
lesser commitment as this time you’ve ‘not’ sent a carrier? Balancing this off
is key – it makes no sense to go to the top of the escalation ladder from the
outset, far better to be careful poker player and hold some cards back in your
hand for future use. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiHPP4r9NAG1ldEXB7W1VsNfAcgk_Mia5juptp8D3_cSlj7kQ9AyDuaeXCLiq2AzZ4YhQinH5fD6mdJwU6bp2TImceHUb2MVPAMW33nVKRjEvo-IULUv4jRK4b9HXzoT1CDcfx5fOpTfqnwTZIX1Ct0eg9iz9iF63fcMNkdUL3wdZIcplRdLM22veg0uUiF/s1200/45169603.jpg.iCfg1JPdMWATAA.dyP7JoTtlZ.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="721" data-original-width="1200" height="192" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiHPP4r9NAG1ldEXB7W1VsNfAcgk_Mia5juptp8D3_cSlj7kQ9AyDuaeXCLiq2AzZ4YhQinH5fD6mdJwU6bp2TImceHUb2MVPAMW33nVKRjEvo-IULUv4jRK4b9HXzoT1CDcfx5fOpTfqnwTZIX1Ct0eg9iz9iF63fcMNkdUL3wdZIcplRdLM22veg0uUiF/s320/45169603.jpg.iCfg1JPdMWATAA.dyP7JoTtlZ.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">TRENT conducting joint training off Africa - UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The Venezuelan response is telling of itself – to mobilise
6000 troops and scream condemnation for the routine visit of a sovereign
warship to another country indicates a deeply insecure regime. If an OPV can
generate this level of hysteria and paranoia, what could a destroyer or carrier
do? The more these visits go on, the more that Venezuela will find itself
having to react, calling up troops every time a foreign warship visits Guyana
will both reduce the impact of the action, as other nations tire of hearing
about it, and place strain on resources. If you also see US, French and Dutch
visits (for example) then this will place huge pressure on the Venezuelan
regime, leaving them with little to show for their anger. To that end then, a RIVER class OPV is the
perfect vessel for the job at hand – small, credible to the hosts and able to
do the maritime constabulary and coastguard work that Guyana does, she is the
ideal platform to build links to Guyana with. The fact that she carries a light
armament is utterly irrelevant as no one except the most febrile minded of
souls assumes that she will end up in a shooting war.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The UK naval presence in the West Indies has historically
always been low key and lower priority than other tasks. Even at the zenith of
British naval supremacy in 1914, there does not appear to have been any RN ships
permanently based in the West Indies. After WW2 the presence was built around a
small (usually two ships) detachment of frigates and destroyers used to patrol
and provide disaster relief when required in the hurricane season. As the emphasis
on counter narcotics grew, these ships were used to work in partnership with
the US Coast Guard to carry out missions to interdict narcotics traffickers at
sea. By the 1980s this commitment had reduced to a single escort, and by the
2010s had been replaced by the near permanent presence of a BAY class landing
ship as an ideal platform to conduct disaster relief from. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Today the RN has a presence that is built
around a permanently based RIVER class OPV rotating through with different
hulls as well as seasonal deployments of a larger vessel as needed – for
example this summer HMS DAUNTLESS was the guardship. An occasional visitor has
also been HMS PROTECTOR en route to refit in Charleston USA. There has often been
an RFA present too, with the WAVE class being particularly long-term visitors
and experienced at supporting US Coast Guard operations. It is not uncommon
therefore for 2 -3 RN and RFA vessels to be in the wider region and able to
support if needed. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The UK has a consistent and capable presence in the region
able to always protect our interests, and these are perfect waters for OPVs to
be based. The small harbours may prevent larger vessels from visiting, while
the scale of the OPV and her capability is ideally matched with local
coastguards and police forces. There is no meaningful naval threat in the
region that requires up arming ships. Yet if you listen to social media, you’d
think the RN had somehow ‘failed’. Some of the posts suggest that it is an
embarrassment that the UK can ‘only’ send an OPV, while others worry that the
weaponry is too limited and that in the event of war she will be sunk. Others
moan that the MOD has failed to give the ships the weapons they need to do the
job. All of this is nonsense.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For starters, if you look at the naval presence in the
region you’ll see that the RN is one of three foreign nations maintaining a
permanent presence in the West Indies. The others being the Netherlands and
French, who have a military presence designed to support their overseas
territories. In both of these cases their presence is built around a core of a
large OPV style vessel – the Dutch usually use a HOLLAND class OPV, a 3000-tonne
platform with a 57mm gun and hangar, while the French use a FLOREAL class ‘surveillance
frigate’ – essentially a 1990s era light frigate armed with a gun and hangar. In
both cases these are ships intended for maritime constabulary work and not high
intensity conflict. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">HMS TRENT is a very similar vessel in terms of size and
capability, the main difference being not having a hangar fitted, which
reflects the UK’s operational priorities. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What this means is that the core UK presence
in region is at the same level as our peer allies, all of whom are content that
gun armed OPVs are ample for the regional security threats. If you look back at
online forums for the last 15-20 years you’d see all manner of ‘experts’ suggesting
that the RN didn’t need to use a scarce frigate in the West Indies, so why not
send an OPV. That this has now been achieved should be music to these peoples
ears, but instead the same people are moaning that the OPV isn’t enough to meet
the threat and needs to be up gunned urgently. It is difficult to understand
what would make some of these people happy – they seem to spend their entire
lives moaning about the state of the RN and obsessing over why something isn’t ‘right’.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The constant obsession some of these people have is that the
ships should be up gunned to meet some unspecified threats. The problem with
this is that it is impossible to reason with these people to explain that life
is about more than just buying a gun or missile and bolting it onto a ship. Sites
like ‘warships1’ are full of fantastical posts by dreamers about how if you ‘only’
spend a few million you can buy a bunch of guns or missiles and then refit them
to a RIVER and every problem goes away apparently. Absolutely zero consideration
is ever given to the logistical and practical realities of refitting a ship with
new weapons – for example the impact on the design, changes inside the ship, how
to integrate the various different sensors and systems, the impact on storing spare
parts and consumables and its effect on other systems. The integration work
required to ensure that the weapon works as required and the installation of a
combat management system to successfully use the missiles as needed. This is before
you even think about where the people are coming from to operate and maintain
these systems, as despite the RN suffering a significant personnel crisis, it
can apparently magic up a whole cadre of SQEPed officers and ratings to operate
these weapons out of nowhere. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Meanwhile the same people seem obsessed with wanting to make
an OPV a frigate without giving any thought to the very different design philosophies
that these ship classes have. A frigate is designed to go to war and fight in a
very high intensity conflict and survive, with an extensive array of weapons
and sensors and sufficient crew to carry out damage control if hit. An OPV is a
grey hull, but has a far more austere fit of sensors and weapons and isn’t
designed or intended to go to war in a serious way – and before you assume this
is Treasury and MOD parsimony at play, in fact just about every nation that operates
frigates and OPV’s uses them in this way – cheap, expendable and not intended
to be in the way when missiles start getting thrown about. They are the ‘third
rate’ vessels of the Napoleonic navy in modern form – intended to fly a flag,
do the 99% of maritime work that doesn’t involve fighting in a war and doing it
cheaply and efficiently. The RIVER class are the latest in a long line of proud
RN units designed to be simple and highly effective – they may not have much in
weapons, but this is an irrelevance for they are perhaps the most high value
defence engagement platforms in the RN today. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The danger of turning these ships into mini frigates is that
you both increase their attractiveness as a target, without making them
particularly survivable in the process, while also not really asking what they
are meant to do in wartime. A lot of commentators seem to think that giving these
ships an anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile capability is a good thing to improve
their survivability. Yet in wartime, this would turn the platform into a higher
priority target for the enemy, and if you have 8 anti-aircraft missiles, what
happens when the 9<sup>th</sup> jet arrives? This is the problem, giving a
limited ability to stand and fight makes you more appealing to be taken out,
and increases the likelihood of it happening. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By contrast equipping ships with a gun and supporting
MGs gives enough ability to handle pirates or drugs traffickers if needed, without
giving the PWO delusions of grandeur about being the next HMS GLOWWORM…<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhj9rnXrqOlf3OsA2tU4ioGkMtDhrcpza2e7r6mzq3BxC4yoHEFNCYvwO1FEG7xXB8Q-PWjDX6wviy7Zxw_4KCV9Hm3MHguqsjepq_z9FCvitfBfJOUOwViK8m3sDXlOiW0hGKCyfAiW0cKyWgBRSgcG8fdBUhWgsirZ6fek0777KlVIUv33xE6jakPhB5r/s1200/FLEET-20211030-AF0027-052.jpg.iCeDuordMWATAA.OG_e9yl9eX.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="961" data-original-width="1200" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhj9rnXrqOlf3OsA2tU4ioGkMtDhrcpza2e7r6mzq3BxC4yoHEFNCYvwO1FEG7xXB8Q-PWjDX6wviy7Zxw_4KCV9Hm3MHguqsjepq_z9FCvitfBfJOUOwViK8m3sDXlOiW0hGKCyfAiW0cKyWgBRSgcG8fdBUhWgsirZ6fek0777KlVIUv33xE6jakPhB5r/s320/FLEET-20211030-AF0027-052.jpg.iCeDuordMWATAA.OG_e9yl9eX.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">TRENT joint training - UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">There is a curiously British need to feel angry or
despondent about anything the UK does which is a success. In the case of the
RIVER class visiting Guyana we’ve seen just about every box ticked in the ‘Armchair
Admirals reasons to feel cross’ list. We’ve seen the ideal use of a low key platform
armed with the right equipment turn up at the right time to have a real diplomatic
effect. This is a great use of maritime forces for diplomatic goals, and it
serves as a reminder of the value of having warships permanently based in the West
Indies. We’ve used a ship that is of a similar level of capability to our
allies in the region and we’ve done so peacefully and effectively. Naturally
the online crowds see this as a failure from the embarrassment of ‘only’
sending an OPV to the fact that the crew are apparently sitting ducks in
wartime (without for one moment asking whether it is remotely likely that the
Venezuelan regime would risk going to war with the UK and Guyana by launching
an air strike on an OPV).</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Perhaps most importantly all of this has been going on while
another RN vessel, HMS DIAMOND has been engaged in a far more active form of
gunboat diplomacy in the Red Sea, helping escort merchant shipping and engaging
drones. While she has gone to deliver this mission at very short notice, yet
more RN vessels including frigates, submarines and aircraft carriers are at
high readiness to deploy if needed on operations. The UK has sent gunboats in
December while also signalling many more are ready to sail if needed. This is
the hallmark of a globally facing navy, that it can scale up to deliver
multiple operations globally while still having enough forces at home to regenerate
and deploy the next set of ships as needed to continue to meet its missions. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One final thought is<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>about the future of gunboat diplomacy in a world where autonomous and/or
uncrewed vessels will become ever more prevalent. One of the advantages of sending
OPVs or MCMVs to visit ports is that they can have a very effective role to
play in human engagement, be it building links to local organisations, helping charities
or hosting a cocktail party to support British interests. This cannot be done
with an uncrewed platform, which raises the question about how will modern
navies do gunboat diplomacy in the future, in an age where they can send a gunboat,
but lack the human touch to be able to carry out the engagement which makes
these visits so successful. Does this mean as much effort needs to be made on
support ships for enabling these visits, or building more cheap OPVs to carry
out routine port visits in order to sustain a defence relationship that will
otherwise struggle if there are no port visits to speak of? <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-36916598646381541152023-12-29T11:21:00.003+00:002023-12-29T11:21:23.070+00:00The Pinstripedline 'Tweenmass' Book & Podcast Recommendations<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is the most wonderful time of the year, Christmas is
over, the relatives have been seen and seen off, and presents have been
provided. All that remains is to sit back, relax and digest the many delightful
meals you’ve enjoyed from trifle at breakfast to plate after plate of ‘beige
food’. It doesn’t matter what time of day it is, for time has no meaning. For
the author this is the ideal time of year to unwind, read and catch up on both Lego
assembly and the painting of model soldiers while the weather outside is frightful.
Enjoy this period while it lasts for January is just around the corner…<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One way to enjoy this time is to focus on pleasant activities
like reading or listening to podcasts and audiobooks. This short blog is an
attempt to capture some of Humphreys favourite books and podcasts of 2023 and
why they are worth engaging with. The author has finished all of the books
listened, but its important to note not all were published this year, nor are
they listed in any order of merit. All were excellent and thought provoking but
for often very different reasons. A link is provided to the book where
possible, but if you can, do support your local independent bookseller to purchase
the physical versions, for without these stores, the very life blood of our reading
world falls away. Now, without further ado, please enjoy the Pinstripedline
2023 reads of the year!<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivJQgoXwcakVBOgdmZfbWQof43GFcRTvPtMqw6FAzZYBFlS_NO6tUshyphenhyphen4gjju77KWQOqQqzsKvGXx6nPCNbIUK_A94WxH_kaAoo_vmhqA7TWuuXMa_Mcqd9HvLWqMXqzDgMqilyJk2P3Ajjmt2SXpGM8mwn80iRSD2MnTkAP7AiUPj2PIpvDm4krPvYoEf/s1200/CFL-OFFICIAL-20230821-013-24.jpg.iCezqITdMWATAA.3NRRi_9Dag.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="810" data-original-width="1200" height="216" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivJQgoXwcakVBOgdmZfbWQof43GFcRTvPtMqw6FAzZYBFlS_NO6tUshyphenhyphen4gjju77KWQOqQqzsKvGXx6nPCNbIUK_A94WxH_kaAoo_vmhqA7TWuuXMa_Mcqd9HvLWqMXqzDgMqilyJk2P3Ajjmt2SXpGM8mwn80iRSD2MnTkAP7AiUPj2PIpvDm4krPvYoEf/s320/CFL-OFFICIAL-20230821-013-24.jpg.iCezqITdMWATAA.3NRRi_9Dag.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Victory-Defeat-British-Army-1918-40-ebook/dp/B0BVVL3LLW/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1K96897YTQ71H&keywords=victory+into+defeat+danatt&qid=1703847923&s=digital-text&sprefix=victory+into%2Cdigital-text%2C71&sr=1-1">Victory into Defeat</a> – Robert Lyman & Richard Dannatt</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal">This excellent book helps remind us of the manner in which the British Army of 1918 had become a world leading army, relying on manoeuvre, technology and very capable artillery to attack a competent and capable foe. It then focuses on the way in which this force was comprehensively dismantled and planning for modern war abandoned, to be replaced by Imperial policing on small wars across the globe.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal">There is something strangely familiar of the tale of an Army that wanted to get back to ‘proper soldiering’ and a government keen to focus on peace intervention and peace enforcement in the colonies and not preparing for modern war against a peer rival. Arguably the British Army has gone through this process 3 times in the last century (1918, 1945 and 1991) and each time failed to learn the lessons of history in the process. This book should be required reading for anyone seeking to understand British military policy in the period.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/1914059964/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_asin_title_o09_s00?ie=UTF8&psc=1">Battlegroup
– The Lessons of the Unfought Cold War</a> – Jim Storr<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This book is a fascinating appraisal of the likely level of
readiness of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the Warsaw Pact to fight WW3 during
the Cold War. It examines in significant detail the planning, capabilities and
support afforded to the major armies during this period. It also relies on the
authors wargaming experiences with his late brother to test assumptions and
model the outcome.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a good read if you want to understand the levels of
readiness that existed across NATO and the extent to which as the Cold War
progressed, NATO became ever more capable at being ready to defend itself. We
sometimes assume that any attack on the Central Front would have resulted in a
nuclear conflict very quickly after the Soviets overwhelmed NATO defences –
this book forces a reappraisal of these views. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is definitely worth a read for the top
level understanding, but be warned that as it progresses, it goes into a lot of
tactical detail which may lose some readers. The other note of gentle criticism
would be that many of the footnotes seem to be references to the authors experiences
and recollections rather than formal documentation, which may not please all
readers.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/What-Happened-Battleship-1945-Present/dp/1399070088">What
Happened to the Battleship</a> – Chris Baker<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In the public imagination the story of the Battleship really
draws to a close in 1945 as these leviathans of the ocean were left behind by
naval aviation and nuclear weapons. Other than a short return to glory in the
Cold War for the IOWA class, they were (and are) regarded as dinosaurs. Chris Bakers
excellent book makes a good case for the argument that this was not necessarily
an automatic outcome in 1945 and that many navies still had plans and roles for
battleships. He traces the fate of all the known battleships in existence in
1945 ranging from the well known (IOWA and VANGUARD) through to the more obscure
(the Turkish Yavuz). There were over 100 of these vessels in existence, but
numbers quickly fell and by 1960 all but a handful had gone. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Where this book is helpful is in interpreting what the
battleship could do and how the UK and US felt its role would sit in the early
nuclear world. There is excellent research on discussions around the
practicality of operating these ships, from finding enough crew to outfitting
them with sufficient ammunition for their magazines. There is also a good account
of the surprisingly active lives they led from the mid 1940s until the late
1950s when it became clear that the nature of war had changed, and that the
hydrogen bomb meant any form of reserve fleet was to all intents and purposes
an economic drain and militarily useless for the wars envisaged to be fought. If
you are interested in both policy and history of battleships, you should definitely
read this book to understand how the nature of maritime warfare changed in this
period.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B001P9W9PY/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_d_asin_title_351_o05?ie=UTF8&psc=1">The
Unforgiving Minute</a> – Craig Mullaney <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a good read about the experiences of a US infantry
officer going through West Point, Oxford and then via service in the US Army to
Afghanistan, where he saw action. It is not a story of special forces selection
or any particularly dramatic battles. It is instead a good account of how a
perfectly normal officer tried to make himself ready for the privilege and
challenge of leading men into battle. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It’s a good read if you want to recall the mindset of the
late 1990s and early 2000s as the US (and UK) society and military moved from post-cold
war peace <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>to war on terrorism deployments.
If you enjoy seeing the evolution of a junior officer on their journey, along
with the burdens they faced, then this is a great read.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B0B1G4D3VW/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_d_asin_title_129_o03?ie=UTF8&psc=1">The
Accidental Detectorist</a> – Nigel Richardson<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A non-military book, but a beautiful wander through history
to understand the world of detectorists. It is well written, encompassing
history and the simple joy of discovering treasures (or rather ring pulls) <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>unseen for years, if not centuries. The author
writes of both the people and hobby in an affectionate respectful way and in
doing so helps shed a fair light on a fascinating area that can be very misunderstood.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Bone-Chests-Unlocking-Secrets-Anglo-Saxons-ebook/dp/B0BVVFF712/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">The
Bone Chests</a> – Cat Jarman<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a fantastic account of the chests in Winchester Cathedral
containing the many different remains of Kings (and at least one Queen) from many
different centuries. Written in a style that explores both the individual and
their reign, coupled with the work undertaken to determine the skeletons identity,
this is a great read about English history in a complex period of time. It sheds
light on dark ages and messy politics and is well worth reading to understand
how complex this period was. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Spies-epic-intelligence-between-East-ebook/dp/B0B37519PL/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">Spies</a>
– Calder Walton<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This magisterial account focuses on the complex and ceaseless
conflict between East and West via their intelligence services. It is a great way
of looking in an integrated manner at the way that Russian interference in the
West is not new, and how the 5-Eyes community had to be ready to defend against
highly aggressive intelligence operations from the Soviet Union. It focuses too
on the rise of China as a threat and asks about whether China is being handled
correctly or if we need to think again about the intelligence approach in this
space.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If you are interested in espionage and covert operations as
well as the policy underpinning this complex space, then this book really
should be on your ‘must read’ list. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Who-Can-Hold-Sea-1945-1960-ebook/dp/B09BTPF1PN/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">Who
Can Hold the Sea</a> – James Hornfischer<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is an excellent account of the policy and activities of
the postwar US Navy and how it degenerated from a global navy capable of conducting
massed carrier strikes on Japan to a barely seagoing force in a matter of
years, and then in turn its rapid regrowth into the worlds largest seapower. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Straddling policy, operations and human stories, this book is,
sadly, the final one written by the author who passed away while writing it. It
is a well written and very informative story around a period of naval history
often poorly understood, but in which we saw rapid change. Encompassing the end
of WW2, the early nuclear tests, Korea and the arrival of SSBNs, this book will
significantly increase your understanding of the US Navy and wider US national security
policy in the early Cold War. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Napoleonic-Wars-Global-History-ebook/dp/B082VCG483/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1EDVDWY195PZA&keywords=napoleonic+wars+alexander&qid=1703847706&s=digital-text&sprefix=napoloenic+wars+alexander%2Cdigital-text%2C68&sr=1-1">The
Napoleonic Wars – A Global History</a> – Alexander Mikaberdiz<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">With interest in the Napoleonic period on the rise following
the release of Ridley Scotts film, which may or may not be accurate as none of
us were there to confirm the details, this book helps remind us of the global
nature of these wars. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Looking at both European operations as well as lesser known
conflicts like the littoral raiding campaign by Denmark against the British,
the plans by the British Army to invade the Philippines (en route to Mexico!),
the lengthy and bloody fighting in the Middle East between France and Russia
and the wider collapse of Spanish rule in South America, this book helps us rethink
of the period not as a regional conflict, but as, arguably, a second world war
(the first being the Seven Years War). Long and at times hard going, it is
still an excellent read if you enjoy learning of history that challenges your
pre-existing conception.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://coldwarconversations.com/">Cold War Conversations</a>
– Podcast<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is my favourite podcast of all time. It is a series of
interviews with participants from the Cold War ranging from Vulcan bomber
pilots to nuclear submarine commanders and to intelligence officers. Many
different nationalities feature, providing perspectives on the Cold War from
East and West and how they experienced the conflict. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What makes it so good is that the interviewer Ian makes the
interview about the subject and not his ego. With a gentle but probing style, he
captures the memories of participants in a way that records oral history for
the ages. I cannot recommend this highly enough if you like Cold War history,
and with the episodes being an hour to 90 minutes long, it’s the perfect
companion for a commute or long run. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://www.militaryhistoryplus.com/">Military History
Plus Podcast</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a relatively new podcast launched by Dr Garry
Sheffield and Dr Spencer Jones focusing on understanding military history. Of particular
note is its excellent three part short series on the historiography of WW1
history, which really captures the complexity of telling the narrative of the
war and the wars fought by historians to produce their narrative. Highly
listenable and very informative, this should definitely be a ‘must follow’ for
anyone interested in military history. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is the last PSL blog for 2023 – it has now been running
for 0ver 12 years, with 650 articles and well over 4 million page ‘hits’ the
blog continues to plod quietly away. It remains an amateur labour of love, done
in my spare time and using only ‘google derived’ information for context. As
always if you have questions, comments or queries, please contact me via <a href="mailto:pinstripedline@gmail.com">pinstripedline@gmail.com</a> or @pinstripedline
on Twitter. I do try to respond to every message I get, although some end up in
spam filters and go unseen for many months!<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thank you for reading and engaging in 2023 and best wishes
for 2024!<o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-27364317138261705072023-12-21T22:59:00.003+00:002023-12-21T23:07:02.522+00:00Cold Weather Jackets and Red Buttons...<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The Christmas season is upon us and as organisations head
off on leave, those who are left holding the fort are already forced to dig ever
deeper for content beyond “what to do with Turkey leftovers”. There have been a
couple of articles in the news which can, at best, be described as scraping the
bottom of the journalistic barrel in terms of reporting. The first is the manufactured
outrage and anger in the Telegraph at the image of the Leader of the Opposition,
Sir Keir Starmer MP sporting a British military combat jacket while visiting British
troops in Estonia. Apparently, according to the author of the article, Sir Keir
is a “disgrace” who does not know one end of a bazooka from another. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Ignoring the minor problem that the Bazooka was a US Army
weapon that first saw action some 80 years ago, so is almost as old as the average
Telegraph reader, and which didn’t (to the authors knowledge) see widespread service
in the British Army, we have to try to understand what the issue actually is
here. In the eyes of the author Sir Keir shouldn’t be impersonating the military
while wearing a combat jacket – a valiant point, rather fatally undermined by
the fact that politicians of all parties have a long history of wearing military
jackets on occasions. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEix5IhYNCbDk2netMsIP429fsfcc9JmMEPQHLWvrfxR3hX2inEJg3OR3sROZiMWXDMayjXx2Ak9bWDw3YW4NgQrOucDTOQHehXZNaR2GHNrBa0DSLrkIAG9Yo-9u_uirYrrMjvkIG156LYccY-ZB_6EApNV0nJYCjCmhA3y1rkq5p0ZVLJw-AphWLwx1FmR/s1200/45152118.jpg.iCfhi9_cMWATAA.QO5rrOfSLj.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="844" data-original-width="1200" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEix5IhYNCbDk2netMsIP429fsfcc9JmMEPQHLWvrfxR3hX2inEJg3OR3sROZiMWXDMayjXx2Ak9bWDw3YW4NgQrOucDTOQHehXZNaR2GHNrBa0DSLrkIAG9Yo-9u_uirYrrMjvkIG156LYccY-ZB_6EApNV0nJYCjCmhA3y1rkq5p0ZVLJw-AphWLwx1FmR/s320/45152118.jpg.iCfhi9_cMWATAA.QO5rrOfSLj.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><p class="MsoNormal"><span face=""Helvetica",sans-serif" style="background: white; color: #212529; font-size: 10.5pt; line-height: 107%;">© Crown copyright</span><o:p></o:p></p></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Without wishing to stray into the realm of politics (and please remember this is an apolitical blog), a
simple google reveals two of the three previous Prime Ministers of the last 18
months wearing Royal Navy ‘foulie’ jackets with ‘Prime Minister’ on their name
tag. A certain former Secretary of State for Defence was well known for his
toting an MTP jacket regularly, while photos exist of Michael Heseltine wearing
DPM jackets while he was occupied the same job. As for Sir Winston Churchill,
he never saw a uniform he couldn’t try to wear in some way – indeed he seemed
to have spent most of WW2 wearing uniform. The bottom line is that there is a
long and honourable history of politicians donning jackets at times, without
long term negative impact.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To be honest its easy to have sympathy with politicians at
times like this. Visiting troops in extremely cold conditions means wearing a
wardrobe fit for keeping you warm. There is little point turning up in a thin fleece,
only to come down with frostbite and need emergency medical treatment – that way
lies a loss of credibility. Likewise, turn up with a high quality arctic jacket
bought commercially and you leave yourself open to attacks about being out of
touch with poorly paid squaddies, who are unable to afford similar jackets, and
also to the “did you pay for that jacket yourself Sir” question, which implies
either you’re overpaid or you’re sticking it on expenses so the public can pay
for your nice new skiing outfit. When you do turn up and its cold, the Unit you
are visiting is often terribly polite and provides warm clothing for you, just
in case, so you’d be causing offence by not wearing the jacket they went to
some effort to source for you. Pity the poor press officer trying to navigate
the minefield of climate appropriate sartorial wear – to be honest the best
thing to do is, if offered, don the warm jacket provided to you by the British
Army and use a simple line to take like “Its good to see this jacket does a
great job at keeping the magnificent women and men of our armed forces warm at
work – we intend to continue giving them all the support they need like this”
and hope this calms matters.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is nothing intrinsically wrong with politicians
donning what could be termed “Pirate Rig”– a mix of civilian and military
clothing, provided it is for practicality and comfort and not to make a political
point or gesture. After all wearing military surplus is very popular for many
people, so its not like a great taboo has been committed. As long as the
individual doesn’t stray into a nakedly political speech (e.g. standing in
front of troops while wearing parts of uniform and making a speech more at home
in Parliament or a Conference), then there really is no issue to see here.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The other story that gained traction involved that of
buttons, not in a fashion sense, but in whether in extremis Sir Keir would ‘push
the button’ and authorise the release of British nuclear weapons. In a now
deleted tweet involving interview he essentially gave no answer to the ‘yes /
no’ question of use of the nuclear deterrent. To some this decision was seen as
an outrage, implying that the UK was not safe under his leadership, yet this equivocation
marks a return to an approach undertaken by many former British politicians of
all parties who were involved in the nuclear game.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The British system of nuclear release is unique and fascinating.
Ignoring the minor constitutional trivia that His Majesty King Charles is the
only head of state of a major nuclear power to not have the ability to order a nuclear
strike himself, the British PM has a more intimate engagement with the process
than their peers in other nations. In the US, the President is aware of the
plans that exist to launch a nuclear strike but doesn’t have to make decisions
ahead of that point. Presumably similar arrangements exist in France, Russia,
and China in different ways, by which political leaders understand the
firepower at their disposal and how to authorise its release, but do not have
to meaningfully engage with the process in peacetime.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">By contrast the British Prime Minister has a far more direct
role – during the early Cold War the PM would have needed to authorise the
release of the V Force in person, or through authorised nuclear deputies. By
later in the Cold War, once the Royal Navy took over the deterrent, they had to
think of ways to ensure that the PM’s wishes got through – it was likely that
in the event of a nuclear strike, the War Cabinet would be wiped out before the
retaliatory strike could be ordered. Similarly, although arrangements were made
for the continuity of government through so-called ‘PYTHON’ (or other code word)
parties dispersed across the UK and at sea with a nucleus of central government
and Ministers embarked and ready to take charge of the nuclear forces if
needed, there was again no certainty they would survive or that contact could
be made to the SSBN force at sea (or the remaining RAF tactical nuclear air launched
force). To ensure that the deterrent remained credible and assured even after a
‘bolt from the blue’ took out London before they had time to react, alternative
plans were made. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Arrangements exist as part of the nuclear firing chain to
ensure that the Prime Ministers wishes can be met even after their demise. Early
in their time at No10 the new Prime Minister will be briefed on the process,
the deterrent and the capabilities they now control. They will understand the options
open to the SSBN CO at times like this and the potential courses of action that
could follow. They will then be left alone to write four letters, each
identical, setting out what it is that they want the submarine to do. It could
be to order that the submarine fires in response, or it could be to do nothing at
all. It is a daunting responsibility for the PM has to confront the reality that
with the stroke of a pen, they are writing words that will determine the fate
of <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>tens of millions of people and either
let them live (or at least not be killed by the PMs hand) or condemn them to a horrific
violent death. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal">The contents of these
letters have never been leaked or spoken of. Very little is known of the process around these ‘letters of
last resort’ beyond the fact that each submarine holds a safe containing a
sealed envelope containing a letter setting out what the Prime Minister wants
the CO of the submarine to do in the event of all contact being lost with
government. One imagines a Cold War scenario where multiple Royal Navy SSBNs
are trying to establish contact with a nuclear blasted UK only to find there is
no remaining central government to take direction from. In these darkest of
hours, the safe would likely be opened. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
specific circumstances though of when this would happen and how it would be
verified are doubtless some of the most tightly held secrets in the British
Government, for they set out when an SSBN can fire without there being a living
chain of command to authorise it.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What this means is that the Prime Minister has a unique connection to the nuclear release decision. They are alone in global leaders of
effectively ‘pre-ordering’ a nuclear attack and in having to confront so early
on the enormous responsibility they bear as leaders. Nothing can prepare
someone for the moment when they are told they must decide whether, in the event of their death in a nuclear conflict, they want
tens of millions of people to die, and then to write it down on paper. No other
nation publicly uses this method of posthumous nuclear command and control. We
do not know what the 13 Women and Men asked to write these letters decided to do.
None of the current or former occupants of the role have ever hinted what they
would do or why they chose that course of action. There are hints that some
would have authorised release but never forgiven themselves, but the contents
of the letters will remain the most secret of all parts of the British State.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Historically British PM’s have operated on a form of strategic
ambiguity around whether they would use the deterrent or not. While this sounds
odd, it makes a lot of sense – if your opponent doesn’t know how you’ll react,
they cannot plan with certainty on what the response would be. If you have
declared that you will use nuclear weapons, then your opponents know you have,
by implication, a red line that is the threshold for release. It then becomes a
matter of pushing the boundaries to determine where this line sits and what
they can get away with beneath it. By being ambiguous, you make it much harder
for opponents to work out what to do or the risks it may involve – by having a binary
answer, you paradoxically make your opponents lives a bit easier. The first Prime
Minister that the author is aware of saying they would use nuclear weapons is Theresa
May MP. Prior to this the author cannot recall any serving PM expressing a view
one way or the other precisely to preserve strategic ambiguity. This is why Sir
Keir in not answering the question has not acted in a way that calls the
deterrent into question. By avoiding a binary answer, an element of ambiguity is
restored to the deterrence process that makes hostile nations lives harder. To quote
the lyrics of a song “you say it best when you say nothing at all” …<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On that note it is time to move away from grim dark thoughts
of the huge burdens placed on politicians and the ultimate responsibility they
face and instead turn our attention to Christmas. This will be the last PSL
blog this side of the Christmas break, so as is tradition, the author would
like to say:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i>"I wonder if I might crave your momentary indulgence
in order to discharge a by no means disagreeable obligation which has, over the
years, become more or less established practice in government service as we
approach the terminal period of the year — calendar, of course, not financial —
in fact, not to put too fine a point on it, Week Fifty-One — and submit to you,
with all appropriate deference, for your consideration at a convenient
juncture, a sincere and sanguine expectation — indeed confidence — indeed one
might go so far as to say hope — that the aforementioned period may be, at the
end of the day, when all relevant factors have been taken into consideration,
susceptible to being deemed to be such as to merit a final verdict of having
been by no means unsatisfactory in its overall outcome and, in the final
analysis, to give grounds for being judged, on mature reflection, to have been
conducive to generating a degree of gratification which will be seen in
retrospect to have been significantly higher than the general average<o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i>Jim Hacker: Are you trying to say, "Happy
Christmas," Humphrey?<o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i>Sir Humphrey: Yes, Minister."<o:p></o:p></i></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-84490553624592423122023-12-17T18:40:00.004+00:002023-12-17T19:41:17.086+00:00"The Jewel in the Naval Crown" - Quick Thoughts on the HMS DIAMOND incident<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The Royal Navy has joined with international partners including
France and the USA in deploying warships to combat the growing threat of Houthi
led maritime terrorism in the Southern Red Sea. Over the weekend, HMS DIAMOND,
a Type 45 destroyer made history as being the first of her class to fire missiles
in anger, engaging and destroying a drone targeting merchant shipping. This engagement
has caused both interest and debate by both media and ‘armchair admirals’, who
have become overnight experts in missile engagements in conflict zones. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The facts of the case publicly known are limited – we know
that there has been a number of drones and missiles fired by Houthi militia at
merchant ships in the Bab-al-Mandab and wider Southern Red Sea, probably coming
from Yemen using Iranian provided technology. The Iranians have backed the
Houthi for about a decade, helping support them during the ongoing conflicts in
Yemens complex conflicts as well as wider conflict with Saudi Arabia. Over the
last decade the risks to shipping have increased as anti-ship missiles, mines
and drones have been deployed or used in this area, which has posed a real risk
to shipping. The Royal Navy, and other navies has previously deployed warships
to escort merchant vessel in the region, providing essential cover against the
possibility of incoming missiles. For example HMS DARING was awarded the GSM for
operations in the region a few years ago in a very high threat environment. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjNl2CXKpDIpf4s3qGztENV2EOzhjw3U8u7Xqsj7uf2eKMWnDkKUze_DXZCZeILyBchL5Bg-HFGyAIhMRmNcxxaigGbk1q8BFCb1R35BRUCBta8EHIoyFysB2LZCZleEtriABExAlLq5WD6i377WU4AEwRzNufmveYa6CIKbxzlq9He3_aDlAxZ9gF8C2Of/s1200/FLEET-20231109-XN0188-015.jpg.iCeey8jcMWATAA.W3RzK67wc1.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="802" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjNl2CXKpDIpf4s3qGztENV2EOzhjw3U8u7Xqsj7uf2eKMWnDkKUze_DXZCZeILyBchL5Bg-HFGyAIhMRmNcxxaigGbk1q8BFCb1R35BRUCBta8EHIoyFysB2LZCZleEtriABExAlLq5WD6i377WU4AEwRzNufmveYa6CIKbxzlq9He3_aDlAxZ9gF8C2Of/s320/FLEET-20231109-XN0188-015.jpg.iCeey8jcMWATAA.W3RzK67wc1.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">HMS DIAMOND - UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Tensions have increased in recent months as a result of the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, which in turn has seen Iran fight
a wider conflict by proxy through third parties. In this case using their links
in Yemen to both fire missiles at Israel and also hold the maritime straits at
risk through a combination of piracy, anti-ship missiles and drone attacks. These attacks are continuing as part of
efforts to force Israel to end its ongoing conflict in Gaza, essentially hoping
that global pressure and concern over disruption to shipping will force
international pressure on the Israelis to end the conflict.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The reason this matters is because in terms of global ‘critical
nodes’ the Southern Red Sea (SRS) and the Bab-al-Mendab Strait is a major waterway
for maritime shipping. All vessels using the Suez Canal as a shortcut on their
journey to/from Europe and Asia will sail these waters, which are barely 18
miles wide at their narrowest. In maritime terms, sending very large vessels with
limited ability to manoeuvre and no self-defences to speak of through this
space is very high risk. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The only alternative
to sailing this route is to instead sail via southern Africa, a voyage that
adds weeks onto any journey and while far lower risk, will cost more in terms
of fuel and disruption to global supply chains. Although over time this can be
adapted, the risk is that in the short term the global merchant shipping
industry will struggle to reposition ships and routes to avoid Suez. The impact
could be catastrophic on global economies, particularly Egypt, whose national
economy is highly dependent on revenues from the Canal. <span style="mso-tab-count: 8;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal">It is for this reason that western navies have been operating
in the region, trying to escort and defend merchant vessels from attack and
reassure companies and marine insurance providers that the risk is manageable. To
date the naval presence has been hard worked, managing multiple incidents and shooting
down drones and missiles aplenty. In the margins of the ongoing Gaza conflict there
has been relatively little attention paid to this area, but it has become the hub
of some of the most intense maritime conflict in decades, with allied warships
engaged on a near daily basis.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For the UK and Royal Navy there are several implications of the
going conflict. For starters, it is a good reminder of the value of maritime
power and the speed of response. HMS DIAMOND has spent much of this year engaged
as the AAW escort for HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, and deployed at short notice after a
return from operations in the Baltic. To go from defence diplomacy with NATO to
firing AA missiles in the Southern Red Sea in a matter of weeks is testament to
the agility of maritime power and the flexibility of the crew in adapting to a new
mission quickly – a reminder too of the importance of the training pipeline
like FOST that has helped produce crews able to take on this sort of mission. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Secondly it is a good reminder of the reassurance value of
warships in protecting merchant vessels – a function that is as old as navies
themselves. Wherever merchant ships find danger, they will look to navies to support
them. The Royal Navy plays a critical role, alongside friends of reassuring these
ships and helping them sail safely in riskier locations – a mission that is
crucial for both stability and global economic security. The sooner shipping
companies feel reassured that they can sail again in this space, the more
limited the disruption to the wider economy. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Many commentators have argued that using an expensive missile
like Sea Viper to shoot down a drone was a mistake, being both costly and when
other systems were available. These people are misguided fools. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This may sound blunt but it is
also true. Unless you were on the ship, privy to the full operations picture
and understanding what the threat was, how best to respond to it, the potential
impact if the drone hit the target and the lives that may be lost, then you do
not know enough to comment on whether it was the right course of action.
Ultimately the CO, and the crew, took the right decisions for the mission they were
involved in. There is something deeply unseemly about never served armchair
admirals whose sole exposure to salt water is opening cans of tinned vegetables
getting angry that missile X was used, not missile Y. Very few people are in
possession of the facts, and the only thing we can be certain of is that if
DIAMOND had not fired her Sea Viper and the merchant ship was hit, these same
people would be angry demanding why didn’t they do this (bonus points to be
awarded for any tweet or message which linked this lack of firing to ‘wokery’
and ‘snowflakes’). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Over the years the
author has been exposed to various naval weapon systems and has a relatively
basic understanding of them and their roles. This does not make him an expert in
their functional employment at sea. I have no intention of trying to second
guess how people in harms way a high threat situation decide what to do or why –
it’s a deeply inappropriate thing to do. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also mind-blowingly stupid on the part of others to
start openly questioning how many missiles the ship has left onboard, or when she
may need to replenish her stocks, and if so, where would she do it? This may
sound an innocuous question, but many nations use the internet for intelligence
gathering. It is a near 100% certainty that answers to questions like this,
coming from people who clearly know their stuff will find their way into hostile
intelligence teams hands and be used to plan future operations. The internet is
not a safe space for warship fans to talk at length about things that could jeopardise
the safety and even lives of Royal Navy (and allied) personnel in harms way.
Please, if you’re focused on debating how many missiles are left or other such
nonsense, try to remember that you are doing the enemy forces a favour in the
process. Please don’t put sailors lives and safety at risk just so you can ‘win’
the internet. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Some commentators argue that the RN should be involved in
retaliating ashore – that is again a risky option given that retaliation is complex
and would involve almost certain loss of Iranian life – assuming IRGC personnel
are assisting at various launch sites. Shooting down drones or missiles is one
thing, deploying special forces or firing land attack missiles at these sites
is quite different. The balance policy makers need to determine is whether its
easier to accept the incoming rounds but not take action against launch sites
for a variety of reasons that makes sense to those engaged in this great game,
or whether fighting a proxy war with Iran in Yemen is a better policy outcome. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2xFFejgWwEAkjGXLqUJTFn6E2EnxjjX_0yUAcJJuegjGO9dyje4wV2BT4UCJRX3upvYV1hx0s9vhXeCJ8Op_g2EHuK9h6JKf6m3d4ocw5QcWXVn4KzvXDPDLq2BALakyqICG13nfw4KT9pMnqxJZ6R-bGqiTE5WK7ycIG4LtHxgasH6tZxURQOQ_VRYgs/s1200/DDC-16122023-SV2-Crop.png.iCf54szcMcPlcbljYBMA.ntWMaClP_P.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="680" data-original-width="1200" height="181" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2xFFejgWwEAkjGXLqUJTFn6E2EnxjjX_0yUAcJJuegjGO9dyje4wV2BT4UCJRX3upvYV1hx0s9vhXeCJ8Op_g2EHuK9h6JKf6m3d4ocw5QcWXVn4KzvXDPDLq2BALakyqICG13nfw4KT9pMnqxJZ6R-bGqiTE5WK7ycIG4LtHxgasH6tZxURQOQ_VRYgs/s320/DDC-16122023-SV2-Crop.png.iCf54szcMcPlcbljYBMA.ntWMaClP_P.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Missile Away! UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The challenge facing policy makers is trying to determine
what makes the best overall sense. Push too hard on the Houthi and Iran can
respond via different means, for example looking at options in the Arabian
Gulf, or it could look to step up support it offers on different fronts, widening
the conflict. It may also lead to longer term risks if more missiles are fired
in the region at shipping, closing it down and causing significant economic disruption.
It is perhaps a strange irony that for a nation with a very limited and not
particularly capable navy, Iran exerts a significantly disproportionate
influence on three of the world’s maritime chokepoints. There is doubtless a
future ahead for a legion of students to assess whether you actually need a
navy to secure control of the sea-lanes, or if you can do so via some cheap drones
and willing third-party accomplices. We must be wary of charging headlong into
a conflict with Iran just because it feels ‘right’. Unless we have a clearly
defined end step and goal, escalating a proxy war is not automatically going to
resolve the issues we face and could make things far more complex than they
already are. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The last point to make at this time is that arguing over
cost of missile is pretty pointless. We know that missiles are expensive, but
so too are merchant shipping insurance premiums. It’s a lot cheaper to our
economy to fire a missile than it is to handle the impact of sunk ships. The
risk of assuming a ‘but why didn’t they fire CIWS which is cheaper’ argument is
that this is about more than just money. If ships are hit and start sinking and
crews die, then the western economy quickly takes a hit that will be far more
expensive. Quibbling over missile costs is pointless and unhealthy thinking –
what matters is employing the right weapon for the scenario at hand, not worrying
about the bill at the end of it – that’s for the Treasury to pick up… <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Finally amid all the online chatter and commentary, can we
please pause to remember what really matters here. Right now out at sea are a
group of British, French, Spanish and American sailors who are sailing in very
dangerous waters, facing off against an opponent who has demonstrated they have
the will to fire missiles at them. This is<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>a demanding, challenging and doubtless very scary place to be. It is
likely that many of the sailors, of all nations, in this space are both excited
and probably quietly a bit nervous too. What matters above all else is that they
and their families know they are supported throughout and that they all come
home safely from this deployment, both physically and mentally. Please remember
that there are many nervous families out there worried about loved ones, and
that criticism and speculation may be of interest to you, but can cause immense
stress and concern to them. We owe it to our people, and their families, to do
right by them – If in doubt, check your fire until this has become an item of
historic interest, not breaking news.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Above all else, let us reflect that HMS DIAMOND and her crew
appear to be acquitting themselves well and in line with their motto <i>“Honor
clarissima gemma”- ‘Honour is the brightest jewel’.</i><o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-68262521572466901732023-12-14T19:47:00.002+00:002023-12-14T19:47:43.224+00:00Troubling Times & Difficult Decisions - The 2023 CDS RUSI Speech<p><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">News broke this week that off the coast of Ireland the<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12855413/British-warship-helicopter-chased-Russian-submarine-Irish-coast-Putins-forces-probe-weaknesses-UKs-western-flank.html"> RoyalNavy</a> reportedly had to track and monitor the presence of a Russian submarine just
outside of Irish territorial waters. The combination of a (presumably) Type 23
frigate and Merlin was used to politely suggest to the Russians to go and play
in someone elses backyard. The Irish Navy was unable to send vessels to police
the incident themselves due to a decision taken years ago to pay off vessels
equipped with sonar and remove the capability from service. A risk that seemed
sensible and pragmatic at the time has proven to have long term consequences. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For Ireland the decision to not invest in sonar made perfect
sense, the submarine threat was negligible and the skills and cost needed to maintain
a truly effective ASW capability would have cost far in excess of anything the
Irish Republic either needed or could afford without making swingeing cuts
elsewhere. Maintaining a semblance of a capability would do little good either
as to go up against Russian nuclear submarines without a genuinely top tier ASW
force would<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>be pointless – like firing a
water pistol at a shooting range. The decision to scrap sonar is a genuinely
good example of bold risk taking -<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>accept
that it makes more sense to stop doing something and move on, than maintain a
figment of a capability that would in reality not achieve much. Perhaps there
is a lesson for the UK here?<o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicIYAcYVWSMCGk62EyVI3hJRCqxt3REtYCFWW-N-dUl1r7oQz1ZWQdZvLNz_jbsefUC70Wy6VsZ-7OWtLxFQV9dVHqCRCf09LTpGM3st62Ilt87fJxxLsEbkXOoG251_vae6A0RqXLT56gU-4OXRngXJGMtqkCBazf2pwvSO3mvQEzDqdJ6Ezs-nSczio8/s1021/astuteclassgeneric.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="580" data-original-width="1021" height="182" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicIYAcYVWSMCGk62EyVI3hJRCqxt3REtYCFWW-N-dUl1r7oQz1ZWQdZvLNz_jbsefUC70Wy6VsZ-7OWtLxFQV9dVHqCRCf09LTpGM3st62Ilt87fJxxLsEbkXOoG251_vae6A0RqXLT56gU-4OXRngXJGMtqkCBazf2pwvSO3mvQEzDqdJ6Ezs-nSczio8/s320/astuteclassgeneric.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In the same week the Chief of the Defence Staff (Admiral Sir
Tony Radakin) delivered his annual <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-of-the-defence-staff-admiral-sir-tony-radakin-rusi-lecture-2023#:~:text=Chief%20of%20the%20Defence%20Staff%20Admiral%20Sir%20Tony%20Radakin%20gave,Lecture%20on%2013%20December%202023.&text=Last%20year%20I%20spoke%20of,competition%20in%20the%20Indo%2DPacific.">lecture to the RUSI</a> on the state of the
world and how he saw global developments. Notable as one of the increasingly
rare occasions when British military personnel are allowed to make public ‘on
the record’ speeches, it is a good insight into where he sees the direction of global
travel. Throughout he portrayed a world in which statecraft is once again
coming to the fore and where alliances, engagement and presence are as
important to deterrence as possessing physical military force. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The speech is positive in many ways – for
example the emphasis on growing NATO defence budgets, the way that the
international community is using a variety of levers of statecraft to tackle Russia
and also in which wider challenges from conflict in the Middle East to the
tensions in the Indo-Pacific clash together to create a world of increasingly
unsettled violence. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Reading a senior officers speech is a fascinating business,
usually to see how the speechwriter has structured it to get both ‘killer facts’
and insight into thinking in a coherent way that will be interesting enough to
not send the audience to slumber, but bland enough to not wind up a SPAD. This
speech contains several interesting snippets worthy of further thought.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The first is that in terms of prioritisation the emphasis is
very clearly on the recapitalisation of the British Army and throwing resource
at that as an issue. The lessons of Ukraine have been heard, in that we are
seeing a clear mission to refit the Army to be able to deliver meaningful deterrence
effect within NATO. This is a positive view on where resource should land. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The second is the relative absence of emphasis on conventional
sea or airpower as an instrument of the state. Reference is made to a 6<sup>th</sup>
generation fighter jet (e.g. the joint British, Japanese and Italian project),
and to the idea of integrated air/missile defence, but little else. No mention is
made of conventional seapower in terms of presence and capability as a priority
– while reference is made to the carriers and commandos, the more conventional
presence like ASW frigates or air defence gets little attention. Instead focus
is on partnership in AUKUS and the long term renewal of the deterrent well into
the 2030s. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It also contains one claim that one must hope the speechwriter
has firmly checked and verified is in claiming that with the arrival of A400M,
the RAF has ‘greater lift capacity than at any time since the 2<sup>nd</sup>
World War’. Given that the C130J fleet has been scrapped as a defence cut,
reducing airframes only this year, it is hard to see how this claim stands up
to scrutiny, given the relative reduction in RAF air transport, particularly
compared to its arguable heyday of the 1960s and 70s. It would be very helpful
to understand how this metric was calculated as, to put it politely, given that
it is physically impossible for 100% of these airframes to all be airborne at
once, suggesting a theoretical lift capability as opposed to an actual one
given the swingeing cuts imposed on RAF strategic airlift over the last decade
or more, is perhaps stretching plausibility a little. It we took the actual
lift capability on a normal day, with normal availability rates, it would be
useful to know if this claim still adds up. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The speech also focused on the fact that the Service Chiefs
face difficult investment decisions ahead with further reviews looming. This seems
to indicate that all is not well in Whitehall and that the MOD budget faces
significant in year pressure and short term pressures. The recent NAO audit
report into the equipment plan found that it was £17bn short, due mainly to
inflationary pressure. There is no injection of cash on the horizon that will
fix this and unless inflation falls quickly, this pressure will remain in the
system to be solved. Reading the evidence (<a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/event/19896/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/">LINK</a>) to the House of Commons
Defence Committee from Tue 12 Dec, it was fascinating to see senior officials
and officers confirm how challenging the problem is right now. For example, it
was confirmed that the MOD had planned last year on inflation assumptions of
around 2.5%, whereas it is now at around 6.2%, injecting billions of extra
costs for the same projects into the Equipment Programme. Likewise, the collapse
of the GBP-USD exchange rate last year at the time of the Truss premiership has
increased costing significantly too, a particular issue for a Department which
spends heavily in dollars. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Listening to the evidence the depressing phrase “defer / delete”
was deployed in terms of re-equipping the British Army. In other words the Army
has got to work with the wider MOD to significantly change its procurement
plans, deleting wholesale capabilities or slipping other projects to help
afford its newly found priorities arising from Ukraine. This is a grim state of
affairs, to hear that at a time of unprecedented global turmoil, the MOD faces
making substantial defence cuts due to the lack of sufficient funding to meet
its requirements. The UK is practically alone in NATO in being in this
position, but it is hard to see what else can be done. The defence budget has
grown significantly in real terms and there is plenty of delegated authority in
Defence to find money or pockets of unspent money to do things differently. The
MOD is not alone in facing inflationary pressures and every pound committed to Defence
is a pound less for more voter friendly policy areas. Simply put, the MOD is going
to have to find ways to cut its aspirations to match its cloth.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The challenge is trying to do this when the policy headmark
remains that the UK should be a globally focused power interested in NATO and
the wider world and which is keen to do lots of good security work with lots of
nations. There is no doubt that there is a huge amount of optimism and aspiration
in the various national security strategies published in recent years – the problem
is delivering this. Perhaps the time has come to have a very serious analysis not
of procurement but of policy and aspirational vision. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For example, during the HCDC session, it was confirmed that
the MOD is in negotiations to buy 14 CH47 Special Forces Chinooks at
significant cost to meet a policy need to operate at the very hardest end of
the spectrum. The phrasing was subtle but essentially it was implied that the
MOD is buying these because Special Forces have a policy requirement to do very
complicated stuff – it was then admitted that if the policy need changed, the
MOD wouldn’t need to buy these helicopters after all. In other words, part of
the pressure on the defence budget comes from very high-end policy requirements
that could, if the will existed, be amended downwards to remove the need to buy
stuff. Such a move would upset the team in MOD A Block, and doubtless lead to
some choice inspired briefings to friendly media but would help make it easier
to find money for the ‘green Army’. This is a good example of where the UK faces
some binary decisions – so much of what Defence does is built around a desire
to operate at the highest end of the spectrum, and to be the ‘Day 1, Night 1’
partner of the US, operating at the outset of conflict in the highest threat
environments against peer rivals and overpowering them. This in turn drives
extremely expensive requirements for very capable equipment, be it SF Chinooks,
advanced fighter jets or high-end warships – the UK is driven by a need to work
at the very highest level of threat and be seen as credible. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Could one solution be to scale back the aspiration and do
less complex activity in some environments. For example, focus the high-end capability
in NATO while accepting that wider tasks rely on the 2<sup>nd</sup> tier of forces
– for example cutting back RN deployments outside of the NATO area to a minimum
except for OPVs or the occasional carrier task group? This would mark a return
to the UK military of the 70s and 80s, focused primarily on deterring the
Russians with only a very limited interest beyond this region. How such a move
would sit though with the aspiration to work with partners globally (for
example the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’) is less clear – having invested time and
effort in a globally focused military, particularly betting the RN ‘farm’ on
Carrier Strike, rowing back from that would be painful to put it mildly. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If the UK is serious about deterring Russia and strengthening
NATO, perhaps its time to ask if the QUEEN ELIZABETH class have a long-term
future in the Royal Navy, or if the Carrier Strike Group concept is laudable
but has been overtaken by events and is now no longer the priority. At its
hardest, has the time come to pay off both carriers into reserve or even sell
them, and reprioritise the people and resources into higher priority tasks like
properly crewing ASW and AAW platforms in NATO? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This may sound like heresy, but it feels that
the UK is on the verge of a genuine strategic pivot, faced with the difficult
reality that the global vision of the 1990s – 2010s has been replaced by the grim
future of a world where Russia will dominate our security thinking. It will
call for investment in areas we’ve neglected for too long (infrastructure, logistics,
supply chains) and allow far less time for the ‘fun stuff’ like global carrier
deployments. Is it this sense that we need to change and be truly bold, ditching
the old goals and instead focusing on being truly lethal in certain niche areas
that matters more now? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The key message we need to take from the CDS speech and the
evidence more widely to the HCDC is that really difficult choices lie ahead in
terms of spending and prioritisation and they can’t be easily solved. Much will
need to be cut and perhaps it is time to look at our policy aspirations and
dial back to a more pragmatic approach. The post Cold War era lasted roughly 30
years, enough time for a generation of officers to enjoy a career that helped
them look globally at being problem solvers while dismantling the legacy of a force
intended to deter, and if needs be fight, in a global nuclear conflict. Today we
need to focus on the ‘post-post cold war’ and create a new generation able to
focus once again on deterring Russia and having policy dreams that are less
grandiose in design but which keep the UK safe and secure for the long haul. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is likely that in this world we will need to accept that direct
military influence will play less of importance outside the NATO area and
instead the means by which we influence as a nation will come from
intelligence, trade, diplomats and low key presence over the ability to be able
to ‘fight tonight’ beyond certain areas. Instead planners need to take a
strategic view, planning for potentially many decades of facing off against a
state threat, investing in capabilities that bolster the NATO alliance and do
so while trying to make the Equipment Programme balance – a task akin to tightrope
walking blindfolded across a chasm, while people shake the rope and the other
side gets ever further away. Difficult times lie ahead, and even more difficult
decisions will need to be made in the next Defence Review. <o:p></o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-14950264412113894842023-12-11T19:28:00.001+00:002023-12-11T19:28:21.082+00:00Pass Notes - Thoughts On MOD Loss of Security Passes<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The most powerful document in Government is an individual’s
identity pass. It reveals who they are, confirms their identity and permits
access to specific sites for work purposes. Every member of the armed forces
possesses an official ID card, while everyone working on sites will (usually) be
in possession of a site-specific pass. It is the one common unifying theme across
all the Armed Services (regular and reserve), civilians and contractors will
have in common – they should have an ID card or pass. The news therefore that
the MOD has confirmed that 3800 passes have been reported as stolen or missing
in 2023 has raised concerns in parts of the media. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The story, initially a Hansard question which
was then picked up by the highly regarded <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/over-3800-ministry-of-defence-passes-lost-or-stolen/">UK
Defence Journal</a> and then republished with added comments in <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/25008385/security-passes-lost-ministry-of-defence/">the
Sun</a>, has raised concerns that terrorists are able to use this information
to conduct a terrorist attack. This included comments from Lord West, well
known for leaving a briefcase full of secret material by a canal in the 1980s
about security risks. The Labour Party (the UK Opposition party) has called for
an official inquiry, but how serious an issue is this in reality?<o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLpQc_uGl23g19x2S82ISZ617rvxA5_6fR0uQMp-TVDeNjfoaa7z1hZOmLeEH6IdyqcWeR-PTfepw4AQ9R3N1koVQKnCeHuEEgZxjlMUmb8La2YNnVqDFpNW28KX-_PKyfRVuaWzfoJY1AWyNNHF_pf-ZdErXr0KQ5ZnriGIzwexPbaSYhXSNJpr3NDukd/s1200/Exercise-Tractable.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1200" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLpQc_uGl23g19x2S82ISZ617rvxA5_6fR0uQMp-TVDeNjfoaa7z1hZOmLeEH6IdyqcWeR-PTfepw4AQ9R3N1koVQKnCeHuEEgZxjlMUmb8La2YNnVqDFpNW28KX-_PKyfRVuaWzfoJY1AWyNNHF_pf-ZdErXr0KQ5ZnriGIzwexPbaSYhXSNJpr3NDukd/s320/Exercise-Tractable.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Some 3551 passes were reported ‘lost’ and a further 285 ‘stolen’.
On paper this represents roughly 1.5% of the total MOD / Military headcount of
some 250,000 regular, reserve and civil service personnel. Trying to determine
how the figure was reached is more complex than this. For starters, even if the
passes were reported lost, it is not clear how many have then been found
shortly afterwards. Those familiar with Murphys law will be equally familiar
with the law that states that shortly after you’ve reported something missing,
you will find it. This is too late for MOD, whose security teams will rightly
take action when a lost pass is formally reported – it could be something as simple
as a pass falling into a folder, or slipping under a car seat, which goes
missing and then is found later on – there is no way to distinguish from this and
individuals who lose their pass while out and about and never see it again. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The next question that needs to be clarified is whether this
figure is drawn from permanent passes, or if it includes visitor passes too. If
you visit an MOD site, you can expect to be given a pass that clearly shows you’re
a visitor, and whether you need to be escorted or not – it is entirely normal
for Military and Civil Service colleagues from other sites to be issued with
these passes when visiting an MOD establishment that they don’t normally work
at. If you consider how many visits occur daily at the thousands of MOD establishments
around the world, it is easy to envisage circumstances where genuine mistakes
are made, for example wandering off site and forgetting to hand your visitor
pass in may result in the reception team reporting it as a lost pass – even if it
is returned later on. Alternatively, someone may put the pass down, forget they
have it and where they put. The visitor pass hasn’t gone missing, there is no
security risk, but it still remains, even temporarily, unaccounted for. This is
not to play down the threat from genuinely lost passes, but we do need to distinguish
between those passes permanently lost and those which have been always in
official hands and simply temporarily misplaced.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Finally, we need to ask who is losing these passes – is it only
the ‘normal’ workforce or does this figure cover everyone who has been issued a
pass, a figure that may include contractors, visitors, temporary pass holders or
other circumstances? We should not assume that these passes have been solely
lost by inept Civil Servants, and instead ask how have so many passes managed
to be misplaced – is it as simple as improving the quality of lanyards to stop
them falling off or our their holder. Is it a better accounting measure to
ensure visitor or temporary passes are handed back (e.g. to be issued one you
need to hand over a piece of formal ID) a good way to resolve this?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">While it is easy to find people prepared to claim that these
incidents represent a terrorist threat, there are multiple checks and balances
within the system. The chain of events in which someone ends up losing a pass
to the extent that someone finds it, copies it and can use it for nefarious
intent is relatively unlikely. Even being able to copy a pass does not ensure
that someone can gain access to a sensitive site – while this is not the location
to discuss other measures that may, or may not, be in place, it is worth noting
there are plenty of other mitigations and procedures which make it very
unlikely that a missing pass can enable a terrorist attack to happen in isolation.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What these stats do remind us of though is the importance of
trying to maintain a holistic approach to security. Passes are just one part of
the equation when it comes to protecting sites. If you look at the wider
perspective of security, what is of equal concern is the way staff willingly
share important information online that can be of significant value to hostile
intelligence services or terrorists. For example, look at LinkedIn and you’ll
see plenty of military staff advertising their skills, experiences, and security
clearances. Search for ‘Trident’ for example and its easy to find people able
to talk about almost every aspect of the Nuclear Firing Chain. Similarly,
groups like SC&DV Cleared jobs are a veritable intelligence officers collection
dream, giving lots of people the chance to make out that they know the colour
of the boathouse in Hereford. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">We live in a digital world where people think little of their
digital footprint or how the information they post may assist others. Look for
instance at how in the 2010s people were posting photos of their loadout on
HERRICK, usually hosted on an open internet site, that would have enabled hostiles
to understand the composition of a typical US or UK infantry patrol and who was
carrying what weapons and equipment. Very minor information, but potentially
useful in an ambush scenario. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly,
if you look online you’ll see a plethora of valuable collection information ranging
from the composition of nuclear weapon convoys through to the specific roles of
certain buildings in the Coulport facility, which is where the UK stores a
significant proportion of its nuclear warheads. It is also surprising that
unlike in France or other European countries, there is no blurring of sensitive
sites on online mapping. If you look at key French military bases you cannot
see them – there is just a blur. In the UK (and US) most nuclear sites are completely
observable from above – again, a minor intelligence issue given that the key
powers that do care already have better imagery of these sites, but when overlaid
with information about the buildings role, suddenly it helps allow low level intelligence
collection for both state and non-state actors. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Security needs to be more than just about whether a pass is
stolen or lost and far more about the all-encompassing approach that makes MOD
sites a ‘hard target’. This ranges from not wearing your pass outside to
ensuring that you don’t talk about work on social media or give information
away that could be used to help build pattern of life activity on potential
targets. There is little point making out that a site is incredibly secret if
you then upload your Strava heatmap that goes to prove its existence – for example
if you look at Djibouti, its very easy to find out where foreign military forces
are based and the location of perimeter fences. When overlaid with the fact
that you can spot US military facilities highlighted on imagery means that it
is ridiculously easy to spot where people are operating and exercising. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Similarly it is also worth remembering the importance of all
the key security disciplines and in protecting not just passes but also IT
assets too. Another Hansard question reveals that the in the last year the MOD
has lost 185 laptops, 98 phones, 70 external hard drives and 30 memory sticks –
not an ideal situation to be in, even if the devices were remotely disabled.
Getting people in the mentality of protecting all assets and data is critical. While
pass discipline matters, we should be realistic about the extent to which it
protects sites in isolation. What matters far more is training people not to
give information away, making it harder for individual targets to expose their
value as either a terrorist or intelligence opportunity and put in place the right
discipline and skills needed to ensure that people remember ‘security is everyone’s
responsibility’ <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-28849609361109559682023-12-01T22:48:00.001+00:002023-12-01T22:48:05.678+00:00Delivering For the Nation - Thoughts on the Royal Navy 'Surge' Deployments<p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Late November and early December is a time of year in the UK
when most peoples thoughts turn towards having a break. The prospect of
multiple public holidays and the pleasing period known as ‘tweenmass’ when time
loses all meaning and a glass of Sherry and a mince pie is scientifically
acknowledged to be an acceptable breakfast option is an exciting one. The majority
of people will be looking forward to a much deserved run down through parties
and time with families and friends. For the Royal Navy though, the next few
weeks promises to be anything but a quiet period following announcements this
week that two separate but equally important short notice deployments are occurring.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg4hDkVSmf4Np6SEERf-DR_POQb59OehUFhPOw82G5unyBSPw0d5ODnS26jUPrMDMop_yimcdCAYcuVU9J57CQgekW1CRxtboJsy9xkZ59bZheOlgj4wmy-6k3IrEtvVkn9OR-fORutiZvcCWxg6pixBuX5p7goZ-KjGRVH0N6NcaeDZDxO_x_plZKctHBI/s1200/RN05112018.jpg.iCem1ffbMWATAA.8LMJ3EcYWb.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="858" data-original-width="1200" height="229" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg4hDkVSmf4Np6SEERf-DR_POQb59OehUFhPOw82G5unyBSPw0d5ODnS26jUPrMDMop_yimcdCAYcuVU9J57CQgekW1CRxtboJsy9xkZ59bZheOlgj4wmy-6k3IrEtvVkn9OR-fORutiZvcCWxg6pixBuX5p7goZ-KjGRVH0N6NcaeDZDxO_x_plZKctHBI/s320/RN05112018.jpg.iCem1ffbMWATAA.8LMJ3EcYWb.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">HMS DIAMOND - UK MOD © Crown copyright 2022</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">The first is the announcement that six RN vessels will be deploying
to a sea area from the Channel to the Baltic to support deterrence patrols around
areas of interest, to deter potential action on cables and patrol areas of
interest to NATO allies. This deployment will see two Type 23 Frigates (HMS
RICHMOND and SOMERSET) as well as two OPVS (SEVERN and TYNE), as well as the MCMVs
CATTISTOCK and PENZANCE sail throughout the region, as well as the RFA MOUNTS
BAY. This is in response to wider NATO planning around ensuring that little green
frogmen don’t stray to places where they are not welcome.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is a significant deployment for several reasons. Firstly,
it reaffirms the importance of NATO at the heart of British defence policy and planning
in a way that has been absent for many decades. To see a substantial part of
the RN deployed and at sea in support of NATO missions is powerful testament to
how much the world has changed in recent years <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and how critical the protection of subsea
cables is to both UK and wider NATO interests. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also important as a reminder of how much the Baltic is
now central to British defence planning. There have been multiple RN visits to
the region in recent months, including exercises with HMS ALBION and QUEEN
ELIZABETH, as well as visits by smaller forces such as P2000s. There is a
significant and near constant presence of British warships to support both the
smaller NATO states like the Baltic Republics, and also work with new allies
like Finland and Sweden. When merged with the wider deployments of British Army
forces in the Baltic republics to deter attack, and the regular use of RAF
aircraft to provide QRA in the area, it is notable just how much British military
effort is now focused on this space. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">More practically it is a useful reminder of the flexibility of
maritime power, enabling a rapid deployment of capabilities at short notice to
support operations in a way that offers a range of opportunities to policy
makers and Ministers. These ships will likely be deployed in the region for
some time to come as a visible symbol of British commitment to NATO. This is a
message that will be noticed in Moscow too…<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Looking further afield, the destroyer HMS DIAMOND is to be
deployed through the Suez Canal and into the Southern Red Sea and potentially
the wider Gulf to provide support to merchant vessels that may be at risk from
attack from Iranian backed Houthi militants in Yemen. This deployment, coming on
the back of a busy year for DIAMOND when she has been deployed as part of the
Carrier Strike Group deployment (effectively acting as the ‘air defender for
HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH). Following a short pause in Portsmouth, she has now
deployed again, and judging from her Twitter feed, has already left Gibraltar
and is ‘somewhere in the Med’.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This is an extremely important deployment in what is an increasingly
volatile region. The US Navy has the USS EISENHOWER carrier battle group in the
area conducting operations to support shipping against the backdrop of Houthi militants
trying to seize ships (with some success) and the firing of ballistic missiles
in the general vicinity of the US Navy – already this group has shot down multiple
missiles either being fired in their direction, or towards Israel. This is, by
any reasonable definition, a ‘hot zone’. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also a waterway that is critical for the British
economy, with the vast bulk of merchant ships carrying gas, oil and goods bound
for British ports through this region. Each ship is vulnerable and the successful
hijacking or sinking of a major cargo ship would have repercussions that could
see insurance rates soaring (impacting on the price of goods at home to cover
these costs) or rerouting vessels via South Africa, slowing the supply chain
down and again increasing costs. The British (and wider Western) economy
depends on the timely arrival of these ships, so they need to be protected
against credible threats.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">HMS DIAMOND is well placed to carry this role out, carrying
advanced missiles capable of intercepting and destroying incoming fire, and using
her Lynx wildcat to conduct ISTAR work to identify problems well ahead of time.
This is not the first time a Type 45 has done work in this high threat area,
with the crew of HMS DARING rightfully awarded the GSM ‘<a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2018/august/19/180919-clasp-for-daring-sailors">Gulf
of Aden’</a> clasp some years ago. It was a challenging situation<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>then and this is unlikely to have changed
much in the intervening time. The reality is that the crews will need to be
ready to repeatedly sail within firing range of shore based missiles that have
been fired at Western ships, escorting other vessels and doing their best to keep
them safe. This is difficult and demanding work, requiring a high level of coordination
and professionalism to succeed in – it is not by any stretch of the imagination
a ‘jolly’. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What both of these separate deployments tell us is that the
Royal Navy is a very busy and operational force right now. Consider that as of
today (01 Dec) the RN has deployments underway in the Baltic, Eastern Med and
Southern Red Sea/Gulf. It has a carrier returning from a 3 month long
incredibly successful deployment to trial F35 in the US, while there is a Type
45 in the West Indies (HMS DAUNTLESS) acting as Guardship. There are five Batch
2 RIVER class deployed across the South Atlantic, Indo Pacific and Gibraltar,
while HMS MEDWAY is en route back to the West Indies. In the Gulf there is a frigate
(HMS LANCASTER) as well as MCMVs and an RFA. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Right now no less than 6 escorts are
operationally or forward deployed (roughly one third of the escort fleet),
including no less than 3 Type 45 destroyers (50% of the force). The MCMV force
is similarly hard worked, with nearly 50% of its ships deployed too. Finally no
less than 7 of 8 RIVER class patrol vessels are deployed globally or at sea on operations
– this is a Navy that is working bloody hard to get ships to sea and deliver
effect. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Over the last few months we’ve seen the RN really remind us
of what it means to be a globally focused operational, not decorational, navy. Out
of nowhere since October it has deployed RFAs to conduct support off the coast
of Israel, generated half a dozen vessels to deploy on deterrence missions and
surveillance patrols (ably supported by the RAF P8 force on both occasions). It
has sent a destroyer at very short notice from port to sailing into arguably
one of the most volatile and dangerous international waterways on the planet
ready to conduct whatever operations are asked of it. Its done this against the
backdrop of sustaining other escorts in support of operations ranging from NATO
maritime task groups, to preparing for hurricanes in the West Indies and doing
defence engagement and operations globally (and this is even without discussing
the Submarine Service). This has been a very busy period and yet it has kept on
delivering. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This level of operational intensity is hard work,
particularly given the age of so many of the ships in question. Most of the
T23s and MCMV force is between 25-40 years old and is, in the politest sense of
the word, venerable. Although modernised, keeping these hulls active and at sea
for the long haul is going to be a significant challenge both for the crew and
shore support organisations. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>More widely
this intensity will have an impact on people too – it is likely that many of
these ships will be away for some, or all, of the Christmas season, imposing a
big hit on family morale, a vital indicator in the retention game. With the personnel
situation being challenging, this sort of effort may potentially be felt by
sailors tired at being deployed as part of OP DENY CHRISTMAS and lead to
unplanned early departures. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It is also telling what isn’t being deployed – the RFA for
example are very busy with ARGUS and the BAY class, with 100% of the <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>class being deployed. Yet by the authors reckoning,
none of the RFA’s six tankers are operationally deployed, while FORT VICTORIA
remains in the UK. To put it kindly, the lack of these ships at sea reminds us
that until RFA crewing improves, the RN is utterly reliant on allies and shore
support to stay at sea – which is not a good place to be. It has the RFA ships,
but it does not have the people and things look like they will get much worse
before they get better if the headcount and retention data is anything to go
by. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A final thought is that this deployment reminds us of the
critical importance to politicians of being given the option to ‘send a gunboat’.
Being able to surge a warship to sea and deliver strategic goals is impressive and
long may this continue. But as the fleet changes shape and capability, this
will become harder to deliver. For example, the MCMV force is being replaced
not by warships, but by uncrewed platforms and technology and while
operationally this may be far better for the purpose of cable surveying,
detecting mines and eliminating them, it lacks the presentational punch of announcing
that ‘HMS NONSUCH is on her way’. There is perhaps a longer term challenge for
the RN of trying to work out how to message ‘deploying a capability’ lands with
Ministers aides who value image, appearance and the opportunities for photoshoots
over operational delivery… <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Ultimately though this week has been a good news story for
the Royal Navy. It has reminded the UK’s allies and foes that despite what some
may think, the RN remains an extremely capable navy, able to deploy forces globally
and operate at the highest levels of intensity and threat when required. There
are only two other navies out there with this level of presence, capability, and
reach (the US and France). Although some have found opportunities to attack these
deployments (the “scraping the bottom of the barrel” by an armchair admiral about
HMS DIAMOND on another site was a personal favourite example of stupidity), the
fact is that once again the Royal Navy has shown that when the need arises, it
can deliver for the nation. <o:p></o:p></p><br /><p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-31052157902772014012023-11-27T22:23:00.005+00:002023-11-27T22:23:49.954+00:00Rank Hypocrisy - The Military & 'Equivalent Rank'<p> </p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">There are a few easy ways to cause an outburst of “OUTRAGE”
from service personnel and veterans on social media. Any announcement celebrating
the appointment of someone who isn’t a white male into a senior role can upset
people worried about ‘standards’. Suggest that the Army should have beards is
another (apparently its about ‘standards’ and the risk of imminent NBC attack
for a good gas mask seal – thank god all our troops carry their gas masks on
them at all times to avoid this risk). The last one is to suggest that perhaps Civil
Servants in different grades are the equivalent level of a member of the armed
forces in their own rank structure. At this point its usually full-on pitchfork
wielding mobs out in force to hunt down the heretics who’d suggest such a
thing.<o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5kosruUSuw8E0rsUZDXkjiJRXwta0RbO_uUvKbdqUfjIw08wQ8gl1_LvqaFuWgvFhCA_5CKoLWd7eP12BO8z6P_ygYGA-gHu5ddKWdS28yv1tIV4kbVOLj539QEWvGb4cy_fy6rAmgQB5wZq0imxOty6R3WrP9Kdir8UDcm1YunVkrOgj6FSE06gv3NBJ/s1200/ACSSU-20230817-0144-Ex%20Agile%20Pirate-0854.jpg.iCfOhuHbMWATAA.Qpt_dtuF0O.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="801" data-original-width="1200" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5kosruUSuw8E0rsUZDXkjiJRXwta0RbO_uUvKbdqUfjIw08wQ8gl1_LvqaFuWgvFhCA_5CKoLWd7eP12BO8z6P_ygYGA-gHu5ddKWdS28yv1tIV4kbVOLj539QEWvGb4cy_fy6rAmgQB5wZq0imxOty6R3WrP9Kdir8UDcm1YunVkrOgj6FSE06gv3NBJ/s320/ACSSU-20230817-0144-Ex%20Agile%20Pirate-0854.jpg.iCfOhuHbMWATAA.Qpt_dtuF0O.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #212529; font-family: "Clear Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; text-align: left;">UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The most recent people to benefit from the power of the mob
was British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS), who committed the serious ‘crime’
of producing a chart that showed not only the comparative ranks of all the British
Armed Forces, but also showed the Civil Service comparative grades too. There
have been posters like this for many years, but the older version had become
dated and reflected outdated stereotypes that didn’t capture how modern Defence
works – so BFBS wisely took the call to make it look more professional (there
is a great blog on the reasons behind this <a href="https://creative.bfbs.com/diversity-and-inclusion-mission-critical-defence">HERE</a>).
The reason for this outrage seemed to be genuine upset that the Civil Service
has a hierarchy which can be equated to the military rank structure. You’d
think in an age when joint working was all the rage, understanding the grading
system of your civilian counterparts would be helpful. Alas, it was not, and it
triggered some fairly unpleasant responses on social media from individuals
very easily triggered about this sort of thing (dare we call them ‘snowflakes’?).
Given this, its worth doing a blog to try to remind people why the system exists
as it does and the best way to bring the military and civil service staff
together.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Since the Civil Service first formed itself into a
professional body back in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, it adopted a structure
of grades related to seniority. These grades were intentionally designed to
resemble a military style rank structure, with individuals progressing through
the system and promoting in a timescale not dissimilar to the military. For
example, it was normal for an Executive Officer to promote to Higher Executive
Officer after 7 years in role, in the same way that a Captain would promote to Major
in a similar timeframe. The result was an elegant system that has evolved over
the years to emerge into three main broad groups.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The first group is the Industrial / Admin Assistant / Admin
Officer grades. These are the roles carried out by the most junior (in hierarchical
terms) staff, and are critical parts of the Civil Service. A modern Industrial
worker is usually a highly skilled individual working on technical equipment,
carrying out work in dockyards or ammunition compounds and providing close
support to keep military equipment working. The Admin teams are the office
administrators and support teams who process admin, ensure orders are posted,
make sure minutes are distributed and conduct the myriad of works that without which
the system would surely fall apart. As of October 2023, roughly 14,000 of the
36,000 core MOD workforce (e.g. not in trading agencies or bodies like DE&S)
was in this group. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The next broad group is the main management grades Executive
Officer, Higher and Senior, then Grade 7 & Grade 6. These grades are the bulk
of the core MOD workforce (some 22,000 strong). These grades will manage teams,
own policy areas and be responsible for owning significant parts of the Defence
organisation in senior roles. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The final area is the Senior Civil Service (SCS) which is individuals
at the old ‘Grade 5’ level and above, but now known as SCS1-4, with the grades,
in Civil Service terms, aligning to the starred officers approach in the military.
These individuals are publicly nameable and accountable (unlike more junior
grades who have historically been anonymous, although this may change following
a recent court ruling). SCS are employed in owning responsibility for significant
parts of their department, for example acting as the ‘Command Sec’ or finance director
in a service, or heading the J9 function in major HQs. These are senior roles,
but the payscale does not reflect this – an SCS1 on appointment will usually
receive around £75k, some 10% less than a newly appointed Lieutenant Colonel in
the Army, and £45k less than a Commodore on promotion. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Brought together these groupings represent both the MOD
Civil Service and the wider Civil Service, with grades translating across the
entire public sector. This is a long established and effective hierarchy and it
works extremely well – it has been around for decades longer than the RAF, and
today enables over 450,000 Civil Servants to work together in an effective way,
knowing the relative scale and position different people hold in the ‘pecking
order’. It needs to be made clear though that these are grades and not ranks.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The challenge is that
the Armed Forces also have a rank structure and a strict hierarchy which
defines so much of military life. It is a truism that within 10 seconds of a
military meeting starting, everyone in the room knows their place in the pecking
order through use of ranks and titles as introduction. Everyone knows how everyone
fits into the scheme and who is in charge versus who realises they exist to
make the tea. This rank structure is similar in concept to the Civil Service, in
the sense of there are an almost identical level of officer ranks and CS grades,
whose seniority and levels of responsibility align. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To get past the fact that the military and CS work
together in an integrated way, not just with MOD CS, but also increasingly with
wider Whitehall partners, an ‘equivalent rank’ system was developed many
decades ago. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The author has never been able to quite work out when it was
first introduced, but in principle it’s a work of simple genius. The MOD has
taken the equivalent position in the hierarchy for each service (civilian and
military) and worked out what each person is in their respective system. So, a
Naval Lieutenant, Army (and RM) Captain, RAF Flight Lieutenant and a Higher
Executive Officer (HEO) all occupy the same relative position of authority and responsibility
within their respective systems. That’s all there is to it – its not saying
that the HEO is a Major, its saying that the HEO is, in the Civil Service system,
the same level as a Major is in the British Army. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The problem is that this gets lost in translation and two
things tend to happen. Firstly lots of military people hear the phrase ‘equivalent
rank’ and see red, angry at the idea that the Grade 7 is apparently a Colonel
equivalent, a move which focuses heavily on Colonel and ignores ‘equivalent’.
The result is bad feeling to CS who’ve done nothing wrong except give an answer
that winds the military up when asked ‘whats your equivalent rank’ and
answering ‘Wing Commander’. Secondly, you get some muppet CS assuming that
equivalent means rank and conflating the two.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The vast, vast majority of MOD CS do not care about this
stuff beyond knowing that it’s a very easy way to get a bite out of someone if
desired, and more pragmatically being a useful way to remind people that the
pecking order cuts across the MOD CS too. Where it goes wrong is when either CS
don’t understand the difference between rank and grade, or where they want to
be something they are not. The former is a time for education, to explain to junior
or inexperienced staff that its poor form to use the equivalent title, the
latter is for someone to have a quiet word and tell people in an appropriate
way to ‘stop being a dick’. The reason that CS find themselves caught up in this
position is arguably because the military really struggle to relate to engaging with
organisations without knowing what level someone is. The author has often
worked with military staff in isolated postings, where they are the token officer
– almost without exception every conversation involving new people involves the
officer wanting to work out this persons place in the pecking order. Its exhausting
for CS working in units that see high turnover of staff to have to fight a constant
battle to be taken seriously and credibly – equivalent grades are a useful way
of reminding people when you engage with them that you hold a position of
authority and responsibility too.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Equivalency matters because it helps people in the system
work out who line manages whom, and ensures that the right level of approvals, authorisations,
and financial sign off powers are clear. Understanding if the Civil Servant you’re
speaking to is responsible for printing the paperwork, signing the cheque or is
your new 1RO is helpful before you go into full ‘Brecon chop’ mode with them, lest
you discover that the terribly young-looking person in front of you is going to
be amending your OJAR to a ‘B Yes Dev’ in short order, ending your dreams of
upper third glory… Making sure everyone knows where everyone sits in the hierarchy
is essential for an organisation that exists to create wiring diagrams. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The MOD also uses ‘equivalent rank/grade’ for the purposes
of trying to work out who can stay in the mess on camp. This is a recipe for chaos
when Officers insist on CS staying against their wishes in an Army mess with
long and proud history. Its bringing together two alien cultures, neither of
whom is usually overly happy at the prospects of forced time together – think of
it as the snowbound Christmas family reunion from hell. Very few CS want to
spend their free time on a business trip staying in an officers mess instead of
a hotel, for good reasons. <o:p></o:p></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj40VIBIbyuDY9TZipeu2Dx_vP6-aaOGWwRaOzpYuP1fueUj_39pUAy6fFCkjyrAWQzPXHoHOM24erErwgt0zYldYnE-j3Ds2_8_1tLmyyxxfFts5RJr_Hc6bDrCyg9D-7N8ZxRJ6zmatwS4HXz0KCUhyphenhyphenHLbqK-iiBsBQeuDr6IwXQv71Kp0k1Q9mr-Bsd6/s874/Ranks.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="874" data-original-width="646" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj40VIBIbyuDY9TZipeu2Dx_vP6-aaOGWwRaOzpYuP1fueUj_39pUAy6fFCkjyrAWQzPXHoHOM24erErwgt0zYldYnE-j3Ds2_8_1tLmyyxxfFts5RJr_Hc6bDrCyg9D-7N8ZxRJ6zmatwS4HXz0KCUhyphenhyphenHLbqK-iiBsBQeuDr6IwXQv71Kp0k1Q9mr-Bsd6/s320/Ranks.JPG" width="237" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://creative.bfbs.com/sites/creative.bfbs.com/files/2023-11/UK%20Defence%20Ranks%20explained%20by%20BFBS%20Creative%2002_0.pdf">The BFBS Graphic</a></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p class="MsoNormal">Given all this, what can be done about it to improve the problem
of understanding ‘equivalent rank’ and making it easier to handle. Firstly, if
you are a military officer please understand that the vast majority of CS
really don’t care what rank or grade they are. But they’re very tired of
fighting a constant battle to be taken credibly in an organisation that lives
and breathes hierarchy. Please take the time to understand where they sit in
the hierarchy based on the role they fill and treat them accordingly – don’t
assume that just because they’re not a military rank, they don’t matter.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Secondly, spend time understanding the level of skills and
experience the people you work with hold. While it can be easy to dismiss them
as ‘just a bloody HEO’ understand that many CS have worked hard to get their
jobs, have a long and very credible career history and hold many different
professional certifications and qualifications to do their job. Treat them like
you’d treat a Professionally Qualified Officer and accept that they know their
stuff, even if they are a ‘hat’. A long serving admin officer may seem junior and
irrelevant to newly promoted Sqn Ldr Biggles, but they usually know where the bodies
are buried, why previous ‘good ideas’ failed and often have some insight into
personalities and ways of getting things done. Use them to your advantage and
get them on side – you’ll reap the benefits.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thirdly, understand that people often have far more
experience than you, even if they are younger than you. If on arrival in Main
Building on your first staff job as an SO2 you dismiss the views of a Grade 7
in the MOD as ‘what does she know, she’s barely 30’, then that’s not only very
stupid, but misses the fact that said official has likely got the best part of
a decade of relevant Whitehall experience, understanding and critically,
networks, which you could use to make yourself succeed. Understand that the CS
promotes people on ability, not time served, and that there are some exceptional
people in the MOD who are both young and senior. They didn’t get there by
accident, so listen to them rather than moaning about them. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Finally, you own the culture you build. If you are leading
or part of a mixed team, do your best to recognise that the MOD CS is an equal
part of the team and that their system has a hierarchy too. Don’t dismiss it, build
the team where people are respected on their ability to deliver and that their professional
role and level is respected for the right reasons. If someone is steering into
danger of making a fool of themselves, either through naivety or inexperience,
take them under your wing, take them for a quiet brew and explain to them why
they may be causing offence by going around calling themselves ‘Colonel’ – a well
judged intervention may have a powerful effect. Sure its funnier to take the piss,
but is that really how a proper lead should act? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For the MOD Civil Servants reading this, its worth
remembering a couple of things too. Firstly, NEVER act as if you are a rank,
always remember you hold the equivalent level of authority in your system. You
may be an SEO, but that does not make you a Commander, no matter how good it
sounds (particularly if you’re surnames Bond – “the Names Bond, SEO Bond’ just doesn’t
cut it). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Always remember that your
military peers worked bloody hard to earn their ranks and commission. It is both
a career and a lifestyle and involves living a life that fosters tight bonds,
tough decisions and builds a shared community that those who are not in do does
not have the right to mimic. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Never
underestimate how much offence is caused when lightly donning a rank title to
which you have no stake or claim to. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Learn the Service you are with and be respectful of its ways
and traditions. Understand that even though the CS has no direct equivalent to
the NCO cadre, only a fool, or a very brave person would incur the wrath of a Warrant
Officer by suggesting that She or He is ‘only equivalent to an Admin Officer’. Treat
the Service world with respect and in turn do your job in a way that earns
their respect too. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Remember that you
have a career, not a lifestyle. Do not wear the grade out on the town or expect
it to earn you bragging rights with your military peers. It’s a grade title, nothing
more. Be judged on what you deliver, not what your job title says.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The biggest regret is that all too often when this issue
comes up, people with links to the military get so angry at the idea that the
CS has a grade structure at all. They miss the bigger picture that it’s a hierarchy
and they seem to think the best thing to do is be rude and abuse the CS, often
for making mistakes. Remember that in an organisation like the CS new joiners,
who’ve not worked with the military before will have no idea of its ways or culture.
They are literally learning on the job and trying to find their way in a
complex world of TLA’s and testosterone. Sometimes they think they’re doing the
right thing, only to discover its completely wrong. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What would be nice would be if the military
personnel who get so angry about this or see it as a place for mockery would
grow up a bit and try to build an inclusive team. Try to respect their civilian
peers as professionals here to help them do the job on the front line, learn
from their knowledge and understand what can be done to help make things
easier. Build a shared civilian / military culture and not see the phrase ‘rank
equivalent’ as a red rag to a bull, but a simple way of understanding how the team
fits together. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If after all this you’re still
worked up at the idea of equivalent rank, perhaps you need to ask yourself if
the idea that a civilian workforce which works with Defence has a hierarchy gets
you so worked up, maybe you need to take a long look at your life priorities as
they seem really poorly ranked?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p><br /><p></p>Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.com0