tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post465439789903301212..comments2024-03-20T12:03:26.126+00:00Comments on Thin Pinstriped Line: Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth? The Army Reserve debate considered...Sir Humphreyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08704774192275240783noreply@blogger.comBlogger14125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-67807305111581320642013-12-19T02:33:01.589+00:002013-12-19T02:33:01.589+00:00There does seem to be an issue whereby a significa...There does seem to be an issue whereby a significant fraction of the Army does not believe what the public and politicians are telling them. That is understandable based on history. The retreat from empire post WWII lasted till 1967 and the leaving of Aden, before that there were periods of similtaneously supporting 2 and even 3 operations across the globe. There was then a single year of no active operations before Northern Ireland started, with of course the ongoing commitment of BAOR which had to train as if the real operation would come any day. <br /><br />As the Cold War ended! it took a while for the penny to finally drop this was real! the last Soviet troops left GSFG in 1993, the last British troops will leave Germany in 2019, only 25 years later! <br /><br />Then came operations in the Balkans through the 1990s, all as part of a coalition but often with us wanting to take the lead and punch above our weight. Then came Afghanistan and Iraq, again in both we are trying to act as if we are only slightly smaller contribution than the US as if it is still 1944. The reality is Hedrick reached a maximum of 10,000 troops after years of political argument over troop numbers and equipment, while the reality is 10,000 is a rounding error in pentagon planning. <br /><br />The public and the politicians are saying we do not want to punch above our weight any more, we do not mind making a small contribution to immediate support of a disaster or evacuation of UK citizens but there is no support for a further significant operation and you should plan on not having a major operation. <br /><br />From the army point of view the answer is we were told that in 1967 and n Ireland came along in 12 months, however if you see N Ireland as support to civil power rather than overseas operation, there was only the Falklands from 1967 to 1993. The Falklands straightforward unilateral and victory in weeks! is the sort of operation the nation will support. If the next continuing operation post herrick is the equivalent of the time from Aden in 1967 to Bosnia in 1993, it would be 2015 becomes 2041.<br /><br />While the public and the treasury would be happy if the next real continuing operation did not come round till the 2040's it would be a very different army by then with most with operational experience long since gone.Danhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05270416768188186705noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-25693949752857198502013-11-29T08:47:01.563+00:002013-11-29T08:47:01.563+00:00Paul Adam
You ask "What was straightforward ...Paul Adam<br /><br />You ask "What was straightforward about RMPA?" <br /><br /><br />Well, the clue is in the endorsed programme title - "Replacement". A simple job, and far less complex than many others at the time that were delivered to time, cost and performance. <br /><br />MoD decided to make it complex by modifying an existing aircraft, that had already been heavily modified and was known to be the subject of very serious safety concerns regarding fuel tank design. For example, two MoD reports from 1994 and 1996 read like a more detailed and knowledgeable investigation into the loss of XV230 in 2006. With those reports as the baseline, no one in his right mind would have agreed to modify the MR2. <br /><br />To go one step further, the programme team was staffed assuming a replacement. If you suddenly decide to modify, a much larger team with very different skills is required. This is precisely what happened on Chinook Mk3.. It started off as a follow-on buy of Mk2s, but was then split into Mk2s and a new standard, the Mk3. But the "team" remained as if it were a simple follow-on buy, with no expertise whatsoever in specifying, developing, producing and introducing to service a new Mark. Which repeated the mistake they'd made with the Mk1 to Mk2 conversion the previous year. Back to baselines. The Mk1 baseline was an unairworthy aircraft, which they simply retained when it became a Mk2. <br /><br />And I haven't even mentioned the fact that in each case the same 2 Star was advised in advance of every forthcoming problem, and ploughed ahead regardless. <br /><br /><br /> Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-26525722449840810032013-11-26T15:54:08.268+00:002013-11-26T15:54:08.268+00:00"The SAS does not seem to have a problem with..."The SAS does not seem to have a problem with Reservists, they have always embraced the concept."<br /><br />That's an interesting take on the relationship. Try running that past someone from 21. <br /><br />"Great quote from Mike above. "The Army (and Air Force) is the best thing fired by the Navy"<br /><br />It's originally Jacky Fisher - "The role of the Army is to be a projective fired by the Navy".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-30577781026615844322013-11-24T14:47:18.726+00:002013-11-24T14:47:18.726+00:00you really think the Daily Mail is accurate with d...you really think the Daily Mail is accurate with defence topics?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-75610966390397020892013-11-23T12:06:12.586+00:002013-11-23T12:06:12.586+00:00Oh dear, Sir Humph. So much schadenfreude und Sel...Oh dear, Sir Humph. So much schadenfreude und Selbstgefälligkeit.<br />Well, the Brown Jobs have had it coming and only Afgahnistan saved their bacon under the last government.<br />But describing operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan as, 'adventures', is uncharitable at the very least and in describing the Army of the future as a second fiddle is blatent arsenic and old lace.<br />Indeed the, 'good times', might be over, but wherever the fight may be, it's good old fashioned boots on the ground that have a certain ring of reality.<br />Ask your Lobsters. Derek McBridenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-40656510022255326572013-11-22T23:29:58.316+00:002013-11-22T23:29:58.316+00:00What was "straightforward" about RMPA? T...What was "straightforward" about RMPA? The worst candidate was chosen on political grounds (keep BAe's large airframes plant at Woodford in business, and "re-using Nimrod will obviously be cheaper". Warnings - from MoD - that this would lead to serious programme risks were brushed aside. (It ended up needing new wings, new fuselages, new engines... yes, great saving there, Minister, and Woodford's closed anyway).<br /><br />Other procurement calamities include BOWMAN, but also FRES (where uniformed experts defined the requirements, changed them, changed them again, threw them out and wrote a totally different set... as a result, billions spent for no results and we're still driving around in CVR(T) and FV432) <br /><br />It's convenient to blame "the MoD" for procurement fiascos, overlooking the fact that defence procurement - at a typical 25% overrun - is actually much nearer its planned costs than many civilian projects (from the Scottish parliament building, to the NHS patient database, to the Olympics...) It's also convenient to ignore the effect of the military desk officers tweaking the requirements or deciding that deleting the live-fire testing is a good way to cut costs (the uniforms are depressingly prone to "must make an impact during my two-year tour"). <br /><br />And over it all is the political impact of buying votes in marginal constituencies - I mean, preserving key industrial capabilities in deprived areas.<br /><br />There's problems and faults within the MoD too, but when you remember that most of the civilian staff (the majority at C2 or equivalent, or below) are paid about the same or less as a new graduate in industry, have had their pay frozen for some years, promotion stopped and numbers cut 25% with more to go... it's surprising we don't do *far* worse.<br /><br />"Fixing procurement" is fairly straightforward. Smack the knuckles of any politicians trying to fiddle with the details. Military desk officers need to be there for a lot longer, long enough that "successfully delivered on time, to cost and meeting spec" is a credible objective. MoD staff need to be able to pay more to recruit and retain specialists (technical and contractual) at something approaching market rates, as well as their being more sticks for poor performance. <br /><br />This has been known, described and declared time and again for at least twenty-five years; and for at least a quarter-century the politicians have been unable - or, more likely, unwilling - to do it. Paul J. Adamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16839286213289657833noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-22727323577330330182013-11-22T20:24:36.179+00:002013-11-22T20:24:36.179+00:00see post below. The main strike force--the RF is s...see post below. The main strike force--the RF is still about the same framework as most deployments were. and the RF is regular-manned--most of it. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-19153157058509129412013-11-22T20:22:38.003+00:002013-11-22T20:22:38.003+00:00People fail to recognise that the basic framework ...People fail to recognise that the basic framework for operations is still led by the regulars. There's the Reaction Force where many of the main firepower units are not AR but regular. Ignoring 4 PARA and the RWxY (MBT replacement), the AR in the reaction force is mainly support--CS, CSS. Even the Force Troops--Arty, Engineers, Intel, UAV etc are all Regular army. The reserves only come in in the period after the regulars have moved in--RF main battlegroup, RF, RF plus its AR and then adaptable force units. Even then the AF, the key units--light calvary, foxhound are all regular. The AR only man-s the light infantry plus CS/CSS.<br /><br />So there's still army firepower. It's just that if and only if there's a major conflict, regular plus reserves will fight together. Otherwise it's the two tier system. <br /><br />Not forgetting 16 AA has very few AR units--4 PARA plus the medical unit.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-59716391608037538232013-11-22T17:17:23.804+00:002013-11-22T17:17:23.804+00:00The SAS does not seem to have a problem with Reser...The SAS does not seem to have a problem with Reservists, they have always embraced the concept. A relatively small but highly deployable army is just what we need. A bit like the WWI/WWII Royal Marines. Of course we will need to expand the Navy to maximise the effect. (Sort of tongue in cheek, but actually the natural state for our island nation). Great quote from Mike above. "The Army (and Air Force) is the best thing fired by the Navy" (Oh PS you will always need the RM and FAA of course as the true specialists, who do it day in day out - tempted to put a smiley face here!)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-53775706333783686872013-11-22T11:06:23.698+00:002013-11-22T11:06:23.698+00:00I enjoy reading your mostly excellent posts, but t...I enjoy reading your mostly excellent posts, but the one huge elephant in the room you consistently avoid is the astronomical waste of money perpetrated by MoD, and the fact no senior staff or politician will do a thing about it. <br /><br />Therefore, before you can say a 100,000 strong Regular Army is unaffordable, you must consider what your funding and waste baselines are. For example, it remains acceptable to Ministers and seniors staffs that one relatively straight forward project (RMPA) and one exceedingly simple one (Chinook Mk3) squandered well in excess of £5Bn, and the perpetrators were rewarded (gongs and/or promotions.) The problems with both projects were foreseen and advised on Day 1, but these (same people in both cases) ploughed ahead in the full knowledge they would waste money. Why did MoD deny knowing who they were to the Public Accounts Committee, when all one had to do was look at the staff list for name and phone number? The answer is because these people are a protected species. <br /><br /><br />The BOWMAN system, primarily used by the Army (but for the most part not wanted or indeed needed by them) was around £3Bn, yet no-one mentions the fact that before the contract was awarded there were two other major programmes endorsed to replace BOWMAN, one with an achieved In Service Date 4 weeks before the BOWMAN contract was let, and another successfully trialled shortly after! Last year the aforementioned PAC noted many BOWMAN radios couldn't be accounted for, but conveniently ignored the reason why was because they were obsolescent when delivered and thrown in the bin. Because, in addition to the 2003 replacements, many units had better equipment procured under UOR in the late 90s. That is, in 2003 a BOWMAN contract was let to procure equipment that the suppliers regarded as obsolescent e.g. separate VHF and UHF radios using different batteries (which later exploded after less than 1% of specified life, injuring troops), when deployed units already had combined V/UHF multimodes. For example, AN/PRC117F, AN/PRC138. The latter was already quite old when bought in the 90s, yet BMN bought even older ones! At one point Harris couldn't reproduce such old radios economically and wanted to sell us surplus, and better, US kit before they scrapped it. (Which is exactly what happened on Apache!) <br /><br />And so on, seemingly without end. Avoid this waste. Establish a stable baseline. Then decide what you can afford. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-57434903626616365582013-11-21T20:21:03.691+00:002013-11-21T20:21:03.691+00:00You touch on very valid points here...
But the on...You touch on very valid points here...<br /><br />But the one I have seen and fear the most is the 'Afghan effect', the analogy you used on 'two British armies' is very much correct; we have a high tech and very highly experienced section of the Army... but its limited in scope, the core concepts have been left as operational demands came into effect, and they difficult to regain... one of the first things RAF squadrons retrain on, after Herrick tours, is the core and broad range of skills... not those well honed during tour. The RN still simulates high end threats in FOST... The Army, however, has been slow in retraining the core and broader skills and experience. That gap (2006-2012) is a rather frightening one that did not get the attention it deserved.<br /><br />And this is before touching on procured equipment that is highly specialised and difficult to integrate into the broader Army doctrine. <br /><br />Though its hard to fault the Army on this, they have been totally committed to a large and enduring mission that has dominated defence for over a decade, one that will (and has) leave it haggard, worn, with high tech equipment and vastly experienced personnel, but only in one niche area and type of operations.<br /><br />The re-organisation will require a change in Army mindset... not only towards the AR, but also on how the Army is potentially used... it may well be that the old quote "The Army is the best thing fired by the Navy" (or thereabouts) will return, albeit with "Air Force" tagged on the end ;)Mikenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-31034847884263258702013-11-21T19:05:34.361+00:002013-11-21T19:05:34.361+00:00Those reservists in your second photo look jolly s...Those reservists in your second photo look jolly smart, but not as disciplined as proper soldiers...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-88488618390942259052013-11-21T17:41:59.645+00:002013-11-21T17:41:59.645+00:00Interesting post Sir H, I think you're onto so...Interesting post Sir H, I think you're onto something when you talk about the Army really not appreciating the deal it's been given, which all said and done is actually not too bad...if they are prepared to evolve and accept a new set of realities.<br /><br />I have seen a couple of other commentators on this issue raise the point that the Army has lurched from imperial garrison duties to the BAOR to N.Ireland and then Iraq/Afghanistan and actually once Herrick has ended and the forces in Germany are brought home it will be in the advantageous position of not having a major commitment acting as a drain on resources and will have available a significantly larger deployable element than has been previously enjoyed.<br /><br />Of course not having a major war to justify it's resources will be a challenge, but as you say it also represents a good opportunity to change and adapt, to use this new set of circumstances to show why it's relevant in the modern world.<br /> Challengernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6254362504495980377.post-63263402167504884892013-11-21T17:23:37.418+00:002013-11-21T17:23:37.418+00:00Well said as always Sir H...but if you see anyone ...Well said as always Sir H...but if you see anyone in MTP lurking about I should duck and cover if I were you...<br /><br />aka Gloomy Northern BoyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com